Insolvency Oracle

Developments in UK insolvency by Michelle Butler


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Emerging from the fog: some Amendment Rules

 

Long time, no see! Jo Harris has done a great job of keeping up with her monthly updates, whereas regrettably I have failed to blog throughout this crazy-busy time. But the release of new Amendment Rules is worthy of extra-special effort on my part.

The new statutory instruments, which (subject to Parliamentary scrutiny) will come into force on 8 December 2017, can be found at:

 

The Partnership Amendments

The bulk of the Partnership Amendments brings E&W LLPs and processes falling under the Insolvent Partnerships Order 1994 into line with the Insolvency (England & Wales) Rules 2016 (“2016 Rules”). Similarly, they also wrap the Administration of Insolvent Estates of Deceased Persons Order 1986 into the 2016 Rules regime.

They also add a positive duty on office holders of insolvent partnerships in Administration or Voluntary Liquidation to report on the conduct of officers of the partnership in the same manner as reports in corporate insolvencies, i.e. within 3 months of commencement. Officers of partnerships in liquidation can now also become subject to CDDA compensation orders.

The LLP changes are subject to transitional provisions similar to those that accompanied the 2016 Rules (e.g. where an old rules meeting has been convened before the relevant date, the meeting is concluded under the old rules) – of course with the relevant cut-off date being 8 December 2017.

  • Form 600 – Notice of the Liquidator’s Appointment

Unsurprisingly as it is governed by the Companies (Forms) (Amendment) Regulations 1987, changes to the Form 600 had not been wrapped in to the 2016 Rules changes. The Partnership Amendments replace the prescribed form with prescribed contents in the style of the 2016 Rules.

These changes to Form 600 have effect only in relation to liquidators appointed after 8 December 2017, so you should keep hold of the old Form 600 for a few more weeks. In any event, as far as I can see the new Form 600 has not been released yet on .gov.uk. Presumably, it will appear at https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/companies-house-forms-for-insolvency-rules-2016 soon.

 

The Amendment Rules

For me, this set of amendments is far more interesting. It has been badged by the InsS as making “minor corrections and clarifications which have been brought to our attention since the new insolvency rules came into force in April 2017”. But don’t get your hopes up. The Amendment Rules tackle a peculiar small cluster of rules.

  • Closing bankruptcies and compulsory liquidations

We all knew that the 1994 Regs that required Trustees and Liquidators to send to the InsS an R&P (aka Form 1) within 14 days of “the holding of a final general meeting of creditors” needed changing. However, I had assumed that all the InsS would do would be to drop the meeting reference so that the Form 1 would be sent on the IP vacating office – I think this is how most IPs have been fudging their way through the closure processes since April.

However, the Amendment Rules make a surprising change: from 8 December, submission of the Form 1 must occur within 14 days of sending the final account/report to the creditors. This means that the new closure process appears to be:

  1. The Liquidator/Trustee sends a notice that the administration has been fully wound up and the final account/report to creditors.
  2. Within 14 days of (1), the Liquidator/Trustee sends Form 1 to the InsS. The amended 1994 Regs continue to refer to the Form 1 as covering “the whole period of his office”, although as the IP will still be in office for another 6 weeks or more, it is difficult to see how this truly can be achieved.
  3. At least 21 days before the end of the 8-week period, the Liquidator/Trustee delivers notice of the intention to vacate office to the OR.
  4. 8 weeks (plus delivery time) after (1), provided that there are no outstanding challenges to fees/expenses etc.:
    • The Liquidator sends a copy of the notice under S146(4) to the SoS.  The notice is Form WU15 plus a copy of the final account that was sent to creditors under (1) above. These are also sent to the Registrar of Companies and the Court.
    • The Trustee sends a copy of the notice under S298(8) (which states whether any creditors objected to the Trustee’s release) to the SoS. We have learnt that the InsS also expects this notice to refer to R10.87 – without this reference, it seems that the InsS is rejecting the notice. R10.87(5) states that the notice must be accompanied by a copy of the final report, i.e. the report produced at (1) above. The notice and the final report are also sent to the Court.

The key point arising from the Amendment Rules is that in future the submission of Form 1 will occur at least 6 weeks before the IP vacates office. This reinforces the 2016 Rules’ approach that the account must be drawn down to nil with no remaining VAT issues etc. when the final account/report is issued at the start of the 8-week countdown.

In my autumn 2016 Rules’ presentations, I have been highlighting the issue of how to deal with any quarterly charge made on the IS account during the 8-week period. In the past, the InsS has expected IPs to leave £22 in the account in order to settle this, if the quarterly charge falls due in the 8-week period. It seems that, from 8 December 2017, the InsS may no longer charge to maintain the account after the Form 1 has been delivered to them. In effect, the Form 1 may be the trigger for the InsS to close the account.

In view of the significant changes to the required process made by this amendment that seemed at first glance quite insignificant, I am very pleased to have learnt that the InsS intends issuing guidance to IPs on what is required (and thank you, InsS, for dealing with my niggly queries).

  • Committees

This is something that was worth taking the trouble to fix: because of the 2016 Rules’ obsession with tagging everything to “delivery” (except of course when it involves the OR!), Liquidation/Creditors’ Committees never became established – and therefore could not act – until the notice had been “delivered” (R17.5(5)). Therefore, gone were the days when there could be a creditors’ meeting at which the newly-elected committee members were asked to stay behind after the meeting so that the office holder could hold the first committee meeting. Rather, the 2016 Rules required the newly-elected committee members to disperse for at least a few days until the office holder was certain that the notice of the committee’s establishment had been delivered and then the first committee meeting could be summoned.

The Amendment Rules return some sense to the process. Unfortunately, technically the notice still must be “sent” before the committee can act, but at least we no longer have to wait for “delivery”.

An odd wrinkle is that R17.29(3) remains untouched. Therefore, where an Administration is followed by a Compulsory Liquidation, the Liquidation Committee (i.e. the Creditors’ Committee that existed in the Administration) cannot act until the notice of continuance of the committee has been “delivered” to the Registrar. Never mind. I think we can live with this inconsistency.

  • Proxy forms

If you blinked, you will have missed it: the Amendment Rules swiftly return the 1986 Rules’ restriction on the content of proxy forms.

Personally, I thought that the 2016 Rules’ relaxation, which allowed proxy forms to display the name of the members’ nominated liquidator, was quite sensible – after all, don’t companies use such proxy forms all the time to appoint auditors? – provided of course that the form was also designed to enable a creditor easily to nominate a different IP.

However, the Amendment Rules again prohibit proxy forms from being sent out displaying the name of anyone as nominee for the office holder (as well as the name of anyone as proxy-holder, which has always been in the 2016 Rules).

  • S100 Reports

In my view, the 2016 Rules’ excessive use of “notices” with their copious prescriptive standard contents defeated the argument that an objective of the new rules was to reduce costs. Whereas under the 1986 Rules a simple one-page letter sufficed, in many cases the 2016 Rules require a long-winded notice. The circular produced after the S100 decision is one such example.

Whilst I accept that the grammar was questionable, I think that R6.15(1) could have been interpreted as requiring a “notice” providing a report on the S100 decision process to be issued. The Amendment Rules have changed this so that the “notice” is now “accompanied by a report”. Now that R6.15(1) presents us with only a list of accompaniments, I am left wondering what exactly our notice should state!

  • Other Corrections

To be fair, the Amendment Rules do fix some obvious errors, albeit that I think we have all managed to apply those particular 2016 Rules on the basis that we could see what they meant to say.

For example, paragraph 21 of Schedule 2 could have been interpreted as meaning exactly what it says: “the 1986 Rules apply” in certain pre-October 2015 cases – what, all of the 1986 Rules..? But I think we all realised that it meant that those pre-October cases did not need fee estimates etc. The Amendment Rules now specify which of the 2016 Rules do not apply.

I also couldn’t help but smile that the Amendment Rules finally correct the transitional provision on when the next progress report is required on an Administration that extended pre-April 2017… although of course all such Administrations are already 8 months older, so this argument has come and gone… but thanks, InsS, for listening 😉

Personally, I think there are other 2016 Rules that would benefit from further clarification (e.g. the inconsistent use of the word “between” and whether the Centrebind 14-day limit applies where a S100 decision date has been postponed because of requests for a physical meeting etc.), but every little helps.

It’s easy to forget the decades of debate and case law that went into refining our understanding of the 1986 Rules. Although in part the 2016 Rules are a product of our standing on the shoulders of giants, in many respects they venture into uncharted territory, which no doubt will generate decades more of furrowed brows.

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Two old(ish) debates: S100 fees decisions and old rules IVAs

 

Firstly, I should warn you: if you find my singular views often wind you up, you might want to skip this post. Here, I air what I suspect are unpopular opinions about two New Rules issues that have been doing the rounds over the past few months: (1) can fees decisions be taken by means of a correspondence vote set to run concurrently with a S100 deemed consent decision; and (2) to what extent do the 2016 Rules apply to IVAs that were approved before 6 April 2017 or that have been approved since then but with terms that refer to 1986 Rules?


 

1. Correspondence votes running concurrently with S100 deemed consent decisions

The Problem with S100 Deemed Consent Decisions

As we know, the deemed consent process cannot be used “to make a decision about the remuneration of any person” and the Insolvency Service has confirmed on its Rules blog that this applies to decisions approving the payment of any SoA/S100 fee. Therefore, unless you are paid the SoA/S100 fee before the liquidation begins, at some stage you will need to instigate a qualifying decision procedure to seek approval and of course you will also want to seek approval of your fees as liquidator at some point.

If these decisions cannot be posed via the S100 deemed consent process, what do you do? Do you wait until after your appointment has been confirmed via the S100 process and then seek a decision, e.g. via a correspondence vote? Or can you instigate a correspondence vote before your appointment? After all, doesn’t R18.16(10) provide for a “proposed liquidator” in a CVL to deliver information on their fees to creditors and doesn’t the table at R15.11(1) refer to “decisions of creditors for appointment of liquidator (including any decision made at the same time on the liquidator’s remuneration)”?

 

The Problems with Pre-Appointment Correspondence Votes

  1. Signing the Notice of Decision Procedure

Can the proposed liquidator sign the notice convening the proposed decision by correspondence? I don’t see any rule empowering a proposed liquidator to act as “convener” of such a process.  Could a director sign the notice?  R6.14 empowers a director to sign a notice for a decision by deemed consent or virtual meeting, but that’s all.  The rules do not appear to empower a director to sign a notice for correspondence vote.

Do the rules need to empower someone to sign such a notice? Isn’t it sufficient that they don’t say that it cannot be done?

It is true that “convener” is defined as an office holder or other person who seeks a decision in accordance with Part 15 of the Rules… but that is simply a definition. To view this definition as giving free rein for any old decision under Part 15 seems a nonsense to me.  If a proposed liquidator or director (other than as provided for under R6.14) were entitled to convene any decision procedure they liked, then this entitlement could surely extend to any “other person”, e.g. a creditor, shareholder, company agent/adviser, receiver… Surely it cannot be open to just anyone to instigate a decision procedure on anything, can it?

Ok, what about if the members had already appointed a liquidator? Could the liquidator sign a notice of decision procedure if he had already been appointed in a Centrebind process? I think the difficulty here is S166(2), which restricts the liquidator’s powers before the S100 decision. The only powers the liquidator can exercise at this time are those in S166(3) and I do not think that instigating a decision procedure on fees falls into the categories of taking control of or protecting company property and disposing of perishable/diminishing-value goods.

  1. Clashing timelines (1)

Setting aside the issue above about who signs the notices, I think there are other reasons why the concurrent correspondence vote for fees pre-S100 does not work: the impossible statutory timelines governing these processes.

R15.11(1) sets the notice period of 3 business days for the S100 decision on the appointment of the liquidator and “any decision made at the same time on the liquidator’s remuneration”.  If the S100 decision is sought by deemed consent and a fees decision is sought by a correspondence vote, two processes are set in motion. That’s fine so far: you could set both processes going with the same decision date, say 14 September. With R15.11(1) in mind, let’s “deliver” the notices on 8 September, to give a clear 3 business days’ notice.

If a >10% creditor objects to the deemed consent decision, then that process terminates and the director must now convene a physical meeting for the purpose of seeking the S100 decision on the appointment of a liquidator. But what happens to the correspondence vote process? This is a different process altogether, so it seems to me that it keeps on going.

But does this create a problem? Yes, I think so. As I mentioned, R15.11(1) sets the notice period for a “decision made at the same time” as the S100 decision at 3 business days, but the correspondence vote decision has now deviated from the S100 decision; the decisions will no longer be made at the same time. However, the notice period for correspondence votes not made at the same time as a S100 decision is 14 days, so in hindsight the liquidator/director has failed to provide enough notice for the correspondence vote. Does this mean that the correspondence vote decision is invalid? Could you abandon the correspondence vote process? There doesn’t seem to be any power in the rules to postpone or cancel a correspondence vote process once started (unless it is terminated by reason of a physical meeting request).

Ok, so one solution might be to make sure that the correspondence vote is arranged with at least 14 days’ notice in any event, so that you don’t fall foul of the notice period if the two processes were to diverge. That may be so, but surely the fact that you could breach the statutory notice period in hindsight in this way is an indication that it was not envisaged that the rules would provide that two independent processes could run concurrently with a shorter notice period.

  1. Clashing timelines (2)

Returning to the example above: notices of a S100 deemed consent decision and a correspondence vote are delivered on 8 September with decision dates of 14 September. What happens if a >10% creditor submits a request for a physical meeting on 15 September? That’s a silly question, you may think, surely they are out of time as the decisions have been made.

I would agree that they out of time for the S100 decision, because R6.14(6)(a) states that “such a request may be made at any time between the delivery of the notice… and the decision date”. However, are they out of time for the correspondence vote? As the correspondence vote for fees is not provided for in R6.14, it would have a deadline for physical meeting requests of 5 business days from the date of delivery of the notice (R15.6(1)). Therefore, notwithstanding that the decision date had already passed, it seems that the creditor’s physical meeting request could impact the proposed fees decision. That’s nonsense, you say. I would agree, so I believe this is another reason why the rules could not have been intended to provide for a correspondence vote to run concurrently with a S100 deemed consent process.

Ok, what if you followed the same solution suggested above: convene the correspondence vote with at least 14 days’ notice? Wouldn’t this easily accommodate the 5 business days timescale for requesting a physical meeting? Yes, I suppose it could, but imagine then that you received a request for a physical meeting on business day 6. What would be the consequence: would you consider that the request only stopped the S100 liquidator decision, whereas the correspondence vote on fees could continue to its original decision date? Interesting… so the S100 physical meeting could decide on a different liquidator, who would take office with an already-approved fees decision in which he had taken no part. That would be odd!

 

So where does this leave correspondence votes running concurrently with a S100 deemed consent decision?

I think that, for these reasons, concurrent correspondence votes just do not work: the statutory timescales throw up all sorts of impossible or at least risky scenarios, but more fundamentally there is no one empowered by the rules to sign the notice of decision procedure.

 

But then why do the rules allow proposed liquidators to issue fees-related information?

I believe this is because a fees decision could be proposed pre-appointment: via a S100 virtual – or indeed, where required, a physical – meeting.

Such meetings do not suffer any of the problems described above:

  • the notice of the meeting decision procedure is signed by the director under R6.14;
  • the fees decision(s) can be proposed and made at the meeting “at the same time” as the S100 liquidator decision and therefore the fees decisions can be sought on 3 business days’ notice;
  • there is no possibility of the S100 liquidator decision and the fees decisions diverging, because a S100 virtual meeting can only be stalled by a physical meeting request (not also by a deemed consent objection) and this would terminate the virtual meeting process set up to consider all the decisions; and
  • as the fees decisions have been proposed via a notice of decision procedure issued under R6.14(2)(b), the deadline for requests for a physical meeting is set by R6.14(6), which would apply to all decisions proposed for consideration at the virtual meeting.
  • The possibility of proposing fees decisions via a S100 virtual/physical meeting also makes sense of R18.16(10), because in order for the creditors to consider a fees decision at the meeting, the proposed liquidator needs to send the fees-relevant information beforehand.

 

Haven’t we been here before?

I accept that my concerns above are purely technical. I am reminded that so too was the debate that arose in October 2015 about whether IPs could issue fee-related information before they were appointed liquidators so that fees resolutions could be considered at the S98 meetings. It seemed to me that the profession quickly became divided into two camps: those who took comfort in Dear IP 68 that stated that the intention was not to preclude pre-appointment fee estimates and those who, notwithstanding the clarification of such intention, chose to avoid falling foul of an apparent technicality in the rules by seeking fee approval only after appointment. The 2016 Rules – R18.16(10) referred to above – have resolved that old issue, but we now have a different set of technicalities affecting attempts to seek fee approval by S100-concurrent correspondence votes.

Can we expect the regulators to clarify their intentions and regulatory expectations on this question? We can only hope! However, if the answer were on the lines of Dear IP 68 (i.e. the rules might not exactly say this, but this is what we intended), then would this help or would we, without a legislative fix, still be left to choose between two camps? I hasten to add that I have no idea on which side of the fence the regulators might fall on this new question in any event.

 

Are the issues only about the technical?

In exploring the above issues with people at the Insolvency Service and the IPA, both have raised concerns – aside from the purely technical – about the appropriateness of proposing decisions on liquidators’ fees before appointment.

I understand that there are concerns about the huge amount of documentation – the Statement of Affairs, SIP6 information, fees and expenses related information – that creditors would be expected to absorb and vote on potentially in less than 3 business days. There seems to be slightly less concern attaching to fee-approval sought via a S100 virtual meeting, I think because this is seen to provide creditors with a forum in which to explore matters in an attempt to assess the reasonableness of fee requests. However, I believe there are also concerns about how IPs can put forward a reasoned and justifiable case for post-appointment fees before they have got stuck into the appointment.

There are clearly lots of factors to weigh up here, factors that may impact more than simply the rights and wrongs of correspondence votes running concurrently with S100 deemed consent decisions. In view of the serious ramifications of getting fees decisions wrong, I do hope that the regulators put their heads above the parapet and tell us all their views on these matters soon.


 

2. VAs incorporating 1986 Rules

The Problems with VAs based on 1986 Rules: the story so far

The issue I’ve blogged about before (https://insolvencyoracle.com/2017/05/02/new-rules-emerging-interpretations-part-1/) is: how far should you apply the 2016 Rules as regards VAs that incorporate 1986 Rules?

Dear IP 76 contains the following statements by the Insolvency Service:

  • the IVA Protocol’s Standard Terms’ reference to calling meetings “in accordance with the Act and the Rules” means the amended Act and the 2016 Rules;
  • the Act and 2016 Rules “remain silent on how decisions are taken” in VAs;
  • supervisors should not “feel restricted to only using a physical meeting”; and
  • the Insolvency Service “expect[s] supervisors to take advantage of the new and varied decision making procedures”.

I blogged my concerns about these statements:

  • If calling meetings “in accordance with the Act and the Rules” means the new provisions, which are indeed silent as regards meetings in approved VAs, then we must look to the statutory provisions for Trustees, because paragraph 4(3) of the Protocol Standard Terms states that supervisors should “apply the provisions of the Act and Rules in so far as they relate to bankruptcy with necessary modifications”. Therefore, does this mean that in fact a supervisor is prohibited from calling a physical meeting by reason of S379ZA(2) in the same way as a Trustee is?
  • How can a term stating that “a supervisor may… summon and conduct meetings” equate to “a supervisor may seek a decision by, say, an electronic vote”?
  • Dear IP focused on the wording of the IVA Protocol, whereas I believe that consideration of the R3 Standard Terms leads to very different conclusions, because the R3 Standard Terms are almost entirely independent from any Act and Rules provisions.

However, after I’d blogged, R3 issued its own statement, which included:

“The current R3 Standard Conditions refer to ‘meetings of creditors’ rather than making specific reference to the Rules. R3 is also of the opinion that IPs are not restricted to using physical meetings of creditors only when seeking the views of creditors and that the full range of decision making procedures introduced by the new Rules are available to the supervisor. It could also be argued that section 379ZA of the Act which prevents physical meetings being held except in limited, defined circumstances, applies to existing arrangements…

“We are of the opinion that the current version of the Standard Conditions continues to be relevant and supervisors using the current version of the Standard Conditions for arrangements approved post 6 April 2017 should apply the new Rules when seeking decisions of creditors. For the avoidance of doubt however nominees may wish to seek their own legal advice on the wording to be used when seeking variations of the arrangement and supervisors may wish to seek their own legal advice on the procedures to be followed for decisions of creditors to be taken on arrangements approved before the introduction of the new Rules.”

My problems with R3’s Statement

R3’s statement floored me. Not only did it repeat what I consider are the Insolvency Service’s flawed arguments, but in view of the wording of R3’s Standard Conditions for IVAs, it gave me even more reasons to disagree:

  • Again, how can the R3 Standard Conditions’ “meetings of creditors” be translated to mean “the full range of decision making procedures”, especially as the R3 Standard Conditions do not make specific reference to the Rules? That is, the R3 Standard Conditions contain the entire process of calling and holding a meeting, which is not dependent on any Rules, and so what entitles a supervisor of an IVA incorporating the R3 Conditions to walk away from those Conditions and decide to do something completely different contained in Rules, which are “silent” on VA processes?
  • I am doubtful that S379ZA “applies to existing arrangements” that incorporate the R3 Standard Conditions. The reason why I blogged that S379ZA(2) might apply to Protocol IVAs is because the Protocol Standard Terms refer to calling meetings “in accordance with the Act and the Rules”, but these words are missing from R3’s Standard Conditions. S379ZA(1) states that the section “applies where, for the purpose of this Group of Parts, a person seeks a decision from an individual’s creditors about any matter”. The “Group of Parts” comprises Ss251A to 385, but as we all know this Group of Parts does not refer to a decision to vary an IVA (it only speaks of approving the IVA). Therefore, how can S379ZA, which prevents physical meetings from being held unless requested by creditors, apply to already-approved IVAs incorporating R3’s Standard Conditions? I appreciate that R3 has only stated that “it could… be argued”, but is it responsible to give some weight to such a feather-light argument?
  • I am also not persuaded that “supervisors using the current version of the Standard Conditions for arrangements approved post 6 April 2017 should apply the new Rules when seeking decisions of creditors” because of the principles in the case set out below.
  • (And, if I wanted to be really picky, I’d question what “nominees” have to do with varying arrangements!)

 

William Hare Ltd v Shepherd Construction Ltd

In the case of in William Hare Ltd v Shepherd Construction Ltd [2009] EWHC 1603 (TCC) (25 June 2009), a subcontractor (“H”) was engaged in December 2008 to carry out some work for the main contractor (“S”). The sub-contract defined the employer’s insolvency with reference to: the appointment of an administrative receiver, insolvent liquidation, winding-up by court order and “an administration order made by the court”.

When the employer was placed into administration, S issued notices withholding payment. H argued that, because the employer had gone into administration via a directors’ appointment and not via a court administration order, the withholding notices were invalid, as the employer had not gone insolvent according to the sub-contract’s definition. S argued that it would be absurd for the sub-contract to be construed as ignoring the later amendments to the 1986 Act and that all routes to administration under the 1986 Act as amended were covered by the wording of the sub-contract.

The judge was “in no doubt” that H’s construction of the sub-contract was to be preferred and he held that the court should not rewrite the sub-contract to allow for the amendments to the 1986 Act. His reasons included the following:

  • The meaning of the words was plain and there was no reason to believe that the parties did not intend to use the words as they were written or that they had made a mistake in using the words. In contrast, S’s construction involved “a significant rewording of the clause”.
  • The sub-contract had been made long after the Act had been amended. In this case, the parties agreed that they must be deemed to have known about the amendments to the Act when they made the sub-contract. “In these circumstances it is appropriate to view the failure to amend clause 32 as a choice, as a deliberate decision to include one particular method of administration.”
  • If it were needed, the principle of contra proferentem – that, when there is doubt about the meaning of a contract term, the words may be construed against the person who put them forward – supported H’s construction.
  • Because the sub-contract was executed after the change in the legislation, sections 17 and 23 of the Interpretation Act 1978 (which incidentally are the provisions that Dear IP cited in support of the opinion that the 2016 Rules replaced the 1986 Rules in the Protocol Terms, because they refer to the 1986 Rules “as amended”) were not relevant.

 

The relevance of this case to New IVAs using Old Rules Terms

Say, you are a supervisor of an IVA that was approved last week and the IVA Proposal incorporates R3’s current Standard Terms (or indeed any Terms) that continue to refer throughout to the 1986 Rules.

Surely the principles in the case above cast serious doubt on whether you are free to translate those 1986 Rules into 2016 Rules, don’t they? You, as the debtor’s adviser, had deliberately put forward a Proposal that refers to 1986 Rules in the knowledge that the Rules have changed and it seems that the Interpretation Act 1978, which was the backbone of the Insolvency Service’s argument set out in Dear IP 76, is of no effect. Therefore, is there not a strong argument that you intended to incorporate 1986 Rules into the IVA?

I think also about the debtor and unsophisticated creditors: based on the Terms, they might expect a meeting of creditors in order to vary the Proposal, so what could their reaction be if they were to receive notice of a correspondence vote or perhaps even a notice seeking deemed consent? It seems to me that, if you were to say: “ah yes but the 2016 Rules changed things”, I might respond: “yes, but those changes happened in April, so why did you produce Terms after this that still referred to creditors’ meetings?”

 

Maybe I should accept that the Emperor is wearing clothes!

I have no doubt that the Insolvency Service and R3 have opinions backed up with legal advice. Of course, I am not suggesting for one moment that their statements should be ignored, but I feel I must say things as I see them. I am also not the only one who believes that the InsS and R3 have got this one wrong. I am not surprised therefore that R3 refers to seeking legal advice. No one can be certain how a challenge in court would pan out.

But in practice does the answer to this question really matter? If debtors, creditors and supervisors are happy to consider agreeing variations proposed in a manner that is not strictly according to the Terms, who is going to challenge it? Presumably also the RPBs aren’t going to take a different tack to that set out in Dear IP. And even if a debtor were to dispute the soundness, say, of a creditors’ decision to terminate an IVA, maybe the court would conclude that it was simply a technicality that has no real practical effect on the majority creditors’ wishes… but nevertheless it could make for an expensive debate.


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More little gems from the Insolvency Service’s blog

As promised in my last blog (but later than planned – sorry), here is my second selection of news from the Insolvency Service’s blog and Dear IP 76 that I think is worthy of spreading… with some further commentary from me, of course.

The questions fall into the following topics:

  • S100 Decisions
  • Other Decision Processes
  • Timing Issues

As I mentioned previously, I am very pleased that the Insolvency Service has shared their views on many issues and I do hope they will continue to be this open. I would also like to thank the technical and compliance managers and consultants with whom I have spent many hours debating the rules; without these valuable exchanges, many of the issues would not have occurred to me.

 

S100 Decisions

  • Can the Statement of Affairs and SIP6 Report be delivered by website?

As the director is responsible for delivering the Statement of Affairs, it is the Insolvency Service’s view that the Statement cannot be delivered by means of a website, as the rules governing website delivery – Rs 1.49 and 1.50 – only apply to office holders. Therefore, the Statement must be either posted or emailed to creditors.

Of course, delivery of the SIP6 report is not a statutory requirement and strictly-speaking SIP6 simply requires the report to “ordinarily be available”. I understand that at least one RPB is content for the SIP6 report to be made available via a website.

  • Does an invitation to decide on whether to form a committee need to be sent along with the S100 proposed decision notice?

The question arises because R6.19 requires such an invitation where any decision is sought from creditors in a CVL, whereas usually the company is not in CVL when the S100 proposed decision notice is signed.

The Insolvency Service has answered “yes”, the director needs to seek a decision from creditors on whether to form a committee when they propose the S100 appointment.

  • Can the SoA/S100 fee be approved via deemed consent?

In view of the Insolvency Service’s approach to IPs’ fees in general, the answer to this might seem an obvious “no”. However, the background to the query was that the rules require creditors to approve the payment of the fee, not its quantum, and therefore it is not quite so obviously “a decision about the remuneration of any person”, which the Act limits to decision procedures, i.e. not including the deemed consent process.

But unsurprisingly the Service answered: “no”.

This has led some people to rethink their process of getting paid the SoA/S100 fee. We have been receiving quite a few questions on whether such fees need approval if they are paid pre-appointment and/or by a third party.

The Insolvency Service has confirmed that R6.7(5) – which requires approval of payments made to the liquidator or an associate – applies to payments referred to in R6.7(4), i.e. those made by the liquidator. R6.7(3) provides that, where payment is made from the company’s assets before the winding-up resolution, the director must provide information on the payment along with the SoA, but they do not require creditor approval.

  • Does R15.11’s timescale for decisions on the liquidator’s remuneration (when made at the same time as the S100 decision on the liquidator) apply also to decisions on the SoA/S100 fee?

R15.11 provides that at least 3 business days’ notice must be given for S100 proposed decisions on the liquidator. This rule also provides that the same timescale applies to “any decision made at the same time on the liquidator’s remuneration”. It stands to reason that, if a virtual meeting were convened to consider a decision on the SoA/S100 fee at the same time as the decision on the liquidator, the same notice requirements would apply, but does the SoA/S100 fee strictly fall under “the liquidator’s remuneration”?

The Insolvency Service has stated that R15.11 should be taken to include the proposed pre-liquidation payments referred to in R6.7(5).

 

Other Decision Processes

  • What access information needs to be provided on a notice summoning a virtual meeting?

This question arises from the requirement of R15.5 that the notice to creditors must contain “any necessary information as to how to access the virtual meeting including any telephone number, access code or password required”.

The Insolvency Service has answered: “we think that sending a contact number or email address for creditors to contact in order to obtain such details is also acceptable under this rule”.

Personally, I am pleased with this answer, as I think it makes the logistics of virtual meetings far more manageable. It almost eliminates the risk of unknown “excluded persons”, as you would know who is planning to attend. You could also set up ways of verifying who participants are; you could contact them beforehand, maybe send them agendas and meeting packs. Also during the meeting if they get cut off, you would have a ready alternative contact for them, and it would be easier to count votes or set participants up with electronic voting. I don’t think that some kind of pre-meeting contact is too much to ask from creditors; to illustrate, if I want to sign up to an open-access webinar, I think nothing of contacting the convener beforehand in order for a link to be sent to me.

  • Can creditors ask upfront for an Administrator’s Para 52(1) Proposals to be considered at a physical meeting?

As we know, when Administrators include a Para 52(1) Statement in their Proposals, they do not ask creditors to vote on whether to approve the Proposals, but they must start a decision process going if the requisite number of creditors ask for a decision within 8 business days of delivery of the Proposals. Para 52(2) makes it clear that the request from creditors is for a decision, not a meeting as was the case before the Small Business Act. However, R15.6(1) states that “a request for a physical meeting may be made before or after the notice of the decision procedure or deemed consent procedure has been delivered”. Therefore, if the consequence of creditors asking for a Para 52(2) decision is that the Administrator issues a notice of decision procedure (say, a correspondence vote on the Proposals), then this rule seems to allow creditors to ask for a physical meeting before this notice is delivered.

The Insolvency Service has confirmed that this is the case: “there is no reason that the requisitioning creditor should not at the same time request a physical meeting. We note your comment that the request for a physical meeting is being made here before a decision process has even commenced, but we think that is it reasonable to interpret the rules this way on this occasion because the request does clearly relate to a decision”.

  • Ok, so does a creditor asking for a physical meeting to consider the Para 52(1) Proposals need to pay a deposit to cover the costs of this meeting?

R15.6 sets out how creditors’ requests for a physical meeting should be handled. It includes no reference to paying a deposit to cover the costs of the meeting. Mention of paying a deposit appears at R15.18, which relates to requisitioning decisions.

Therefore, quite rightly (albeit unfairly) in my view, the Insolvency Service has stated that “it would follow that where costs of the decision are met by the requisitioning creditor then these would be for a decision which is not made by a physical meeting. Any costs of the physical meeting over and above the security paid by the creditor for a decision process would be an expense to the estate”.

Thus, it would seem that, on receiving sufficient requests for a physical meeting to be summoned to consider Para 52(1) Proposals, the Administrator would need to calculate hypothetically how much it would cost to organise this via a non-physical-meeting procedure and ask the requisitioning creditor for this sum. As the rules require “itemised details” of this sum to be delivered to the creditor, this would take some explaining in order to put the creditor’s mind at ease that we weren’t ignoring their request for a physical meeting even though we were asking them to pay the costs for conducting, say, a correspondence vote!

  • Does a creditor need to lodge a proof of debt in support of a request for a physical meeting?

The Insolvency Service’s simple answer is “no”. This is what I thought when I read the rules, but it does seem odd… and could lead to all sorts of controversy.

  • Can approval for an Administration extension be sought by deemed consent?

Understandably I think, the Insolvency Service has answered “yes”. It almost goes without saying, however, that seeking secured creditors’ consents is not a decision process; the positive approval of each and every secured creditor is required (just thought I’d mention it).

  • How do you deal with the need to invite creditors to make a decision on whether to form a committee when seeking a decision by deemed consent?

The Insolvency Service has confirmed that this committee decision can be posed by deemed consent.

Via Dear IP 76, the Service also endorses the format of a proposed decision in the negative, i.e. that a committee shall not be formed… although it adds a sticky proviso: “in this way, if creditors have already indicated a lack of desire to appoint a committee, the office holder could simply propose that no committee be formed”. How do creditors indicate a lack of desire? In S100 CVLs, this seems straightforward enough in view of the fact that, as mentioned above, the director will have needed to invite such a decision in the first place. However, whether an absence of anything but the usual creditor concerns in, say, the first few weeks of an Administration is sufficient to indicate a lack of desire to satisfy the Service, I don’t know.

What is the alternative: that a positive deemed consent decision be posed, i.e. that a committee will be formed? The problem here is that, unless creditors object, then this decision will be made by default. In the light of probable creditor apathy, this could be unhelpful. Therefore, if a positive deemed consent decision is posed, it would seem necessary to describe it something like “a committee will be formed if there are sufficient creditors nominated by [date] and willing to act as members”, which to be fair is almost the wording set out in the Rules (e.g. R10.76). In this way, if the invitation for nominations is similarly ignored, then the positive decision, even if technically made, is of no effect.

However, it’s all a bit of a faff, isn’t it? It hardly makes for a Plain English process. I also dislike the idea that an office holder must propose a decision that he/she may not support. It doesn’t sit right with me for an IP to invite creditors to approve a decision to form a committee when the IP does not see the need or advantage in having one on the case in hand.   However an IP words the proposed decision, creditors can take action to appoint a committee and, as the Rules do not prescribe a form of words, then surely office holders are free to propose a decision as they see fit.

  • If a Notice of General Use of Website has already been issued, what is the effect of Rs3.54(3/4), 2.25(6/7) and 8.22(4/5), which require additional wording about website-delivery in certain circumstances?

This question requires some explaining. As we know, R1.50 provides that the office holder can send one notice to creditors informing them that all future circulars (with a few statutory exceptions) will be posted onto a website with no further notice to them – this is what I mean by a Notice of General Use of Website. However, we also have R1.49, which repeats the 2010 provision that each new circular can be delivered by posting out a one-pager notifying creditors that the specific document has been uploaded to a website.

Things get complicated when looking at Rs3.54, 2.25 and 8.22. These rules govern how we invite creditors to decide on an Administration extension and a CVA/IVA Proposal. They state that the notice regarding such a decision may also state that the outcome of the decision will be made available for viewing and downloading on a website and that no other notice will be delivered to creditors and these rules go on to specify additional contents of such a notice, which draw from R1.49.

So the question arises: if you have already given notice under R1.50 to confirm that a website is going to be used for (almost) everything, do you need this extra gumpf?

The Insolvency Service has clarified that you don’t. If you have already followed (or are following simultaneously) the R1.50 process, then you need not worry about adding such references to your R3.54/2.25/8.22 notices; you can simply issue the notice via the website and then issue the outcome via the website also. Of course, given that you’re inviting creditors to consider an important decision, you might also want to post something out to them, but this does not appear necessary under the rules.

 

Timing Issues

  • If an Administration has already been extended pre-April 2017, when should I next produce a progress report?

As covered in a previous blog, the issue here is that, before April 2017, an extension would have resulted in the reporting schedule moving away from 6-monthly from the date of appointment and instead it will be 6-monthly from the date of the progress report that accompanied the request to approve the extension. As drafted, the 2016 Rules had not provided a carve-out for these cases, so it seemed that the reporting schedule for these extended Admins would be reset on 6 April back to 6-monthly from the date of appointment.

An attempt was made to fix this in the Amendment Rules, but in my view it was not wholly successful. They state: “Where rules 18.6, 18.7 or 18.8 prescribe the periods for which progress reports must be made but before the commencement date an office-holder has ceased to act resulting in a change in reporting period under 1986 rule 2.47(3A), 2.47(3B) 4.49B(5), 4.49C(3), or 6.78A(4), the period for which reports must be made is the period for which reports were required to be made under the 1986 Rules immediately before the commencement date.” The intention is clear: where the 1986 Rules have moved a reporting schedule away from the date of appointment, this adjusted schedule should continue. However, the reference to an IP ceasing to act is unfortunate, because in the scenario described above, this has not happened.

The Insolvency Service acknowledged that this rule “could perhaps have been more explicit” (ahem, I think the problem is that it was too explicit), but emphasised that the intention is clear. Presumably therefore the Registrar of Companies will not reject filings made on the extended 6-monthly schedule.  (UPDATE 04/12/2017: the Amendment Rules that come into force on 8 December 2017 settle this matter once and for all.)

Also, just in case you haven’t already picked it up, I should mention that the Amendment Rules have most definitely fixed the issue I raised some months ago about the length of a month, so progress reporting now continues pretty-much in the pre-April way… although of course we now have to factor in the time taken to deliver reports.

  • Do Administrators’ Proposals really have to include a delivery date?

Sorry, this is more just me having a whinge: R3.35(1)(e) requires Administrators’ Proposals to state the date that the Proposals “are delivered” to creditors. When the Proposals are signed off, this will be a date in the future.

The Insolvency Service has confirmed that this is the case: they require the future “deemed” delivery date to be listed.

Of course, there are practical issues with this. If you deliver Proposals using more than one method, e.g. by R1.50 general website-delivery but also by post where some creditors have asked for hard copies (which admittedly will be rare), then you may well have more than one delivery date.

More practically, how will you/your staff complete this little nugget? It is commonplace for Proposals to go through lengthy drafting processes (despite some non-appointment taking IPs’ views that Proposals should be simple to produce in the first few days especially where there has been a pre-pack); drafts are turned over to several different people, being edited as they go. It is going to be a real faff to keep an eye on this insignificant date. My personal recommendation, if the issue date cannot be guaranteed at the outset, is to keep this delivery date coloured/highlighted on draft Proposals so that it is the very last item completed just before the Proposals are signed off.

  • Do you have to wait until the MVL final account has been delivered to members before submitting a copy to the Registrar of Companies?

When closing an MVL, the liquidator is required to confirm to the Registrar that s/he “has delivered” the final account to members (R5.10(3)).

The Insolvency Service does not believe that the liquidator has to wait until the final account has been “delivered” to members at this stage; it is sufficient that the liquidator has sent it. From what I can decipher, it seems they are viewing delivery here as “deemed” delivery, i.e. once it has left your office, it will end up being delivered a couple of days’ later (if sent by post).   Personally, I still think it is odd to confirm at this point that the final account has been delivered, but at least we have an answer for any pedant who wants to debate this.

  • Do you have to wait until the Notice of Establishment of the Committee is delivered to the Registrar/Court before holding the first Committee meeting?

Despite the paradoxical “no” for the previous question, the answer to this one is “yes”.

The issue arises because R17.5(5) states that “the committee is not established (and accordingly cannot act) until the office-holder has delivered a notice of its membership” to the Registrar/Court.   The Insolvency Service has confirmed that, yes, the notice must be delivered before the first meeting is held.

The frustration here, of course, is that we will no longer be able to hold the first committee meeting immediately after any meeting that establishes it, but because the rules require us to hold a first meeting (although this can be by remote attendance), we will have to call the committee members back again.

Personally, I wonder if practically it would still be valuable to hold an informal meeting with the (elected) committee members immediately – so that matters for investigation can be discussed and so that you can help them understand how committees work, maybe even discuss the office-holder’s fee proposal with a view to agreeing this later on – and then, hopefully, the actual first meeting will be little more than a formality.  (UPDATE 04/12/2017: the Amendment Rules that come into force on 8 December 2017 fix this issue… sort of.  See my explanation at https://insolvencyoracle.com/2017/12/04/emerging-from-the-fog-some-amendment-rules/)

 

The next instalment..?

As we apply the new rules in practice, I am sure that more issues and ambiguities will emerge. As I mentioned previously, I am grateful to the Insolvency Service for their openness.

Emerging interpretations and views force me to revisit my previous conclusions, which is a good thing, although I am very conscious that earlier blog posts and presentations quickly become out-of-date. Even my presentation for the R3 SPG Technical Review at the end of March needed an update and this is now available to Compliance Alliance webinar subscribers (drop me a line – info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk– if you want to know more 😉 ).

I am also looking forward (err… sort-of!) to presenting on the rules at other R3 events – 6 June SPG Technical Review in Leeds; 7 June Southern Region meeting in Reading; 28 June North East Region meeting; and 4 July SPG Technical Review in Bristol. I welcome your queries and quirky observations on the rules, which will help me to make my presentations useful to the audience. I’m sure there are many more gems to unearth.


1 Comment

Emerging Interpretations of the New Rules – Part 1: the biggies

Along with Dear IP 76, the Insolvency Service’s Rules blog has been a fascinating read. If you don’t fancy trawling through all 148 comments, here are my personal favourites. There are too many to cover in one go, so I’ll start here with a handful of the more contentious:

  • How do the New Rules affect existing VAs?
  • What is the deadline for forcing a S100 physical meeting?
  • What happens if a Centrebind is longer than 14 days?
  • How should you handle decisions sought from preferential creditors alone?
  • How should creditors comply with the Rules when submitting notices and forms?

 

I’ll also take this opportunity to reflect on how these emerging interpretations and the Amendment Rules have impacted on my previous blog posts. I have tried to update old blog posts as time has moved on, but I cannot promise that old blog posts – or indeed this one – will remain current. Things are moving fast.

Dear IPs can be found at: https://goo.gl/wn8Vog (although no. 76 has yet to appear)

The Insolvency Service’s Rules blog is at: https://theinsolvencyrules2016.wordpress.com/

 

Can we rely on the Insolvency Service’s answers?

Nick Howard’s introduction to Dear IP 76 states candidly “While it is only a Court that can give a binding interpretation of the law, the enclosed article sets out the policy intentions and how we believe the Rules support those”. That’s understandable. Much as we thirst for a cut-and-dried answer, we cannot have it. Just like the 1986 Rules, it will take decades to establish robust interpretations and even then there will always be the Minmar-like decision that takes us by surprise.

  • What about the Rules blog?

To be fair, the Service provided it with the purpose “to offer users the chance to share their thoughts and experiences as they prepare for commencement” of the Rules. It was never meant to be an inquisition of the Insolvency Service, but it was inevitable that it would turn out that way and I am very grateful that the Service has grasped the nettle and been prepared to post their views publicly for the benefit of us all.

  • So what comfort can we draw from the answers?

At the very least, the Service’s explanations are extremely valuable in understanding how they meant the Rules to work and in giving us all a starting point. I wonder if it could be seen a bit like the new mantra, “comply or explain”: if we don’t trust an answer, we need to be certain that our reasons for departing from it are well-founded. And at the very best, the Service has provided explanations that make us say: “right, yes I can see that. Thanks, I’ll work on that basis”.

 

What are the New Rules’ Impacts on Existing VAs?

The difficulty for the Insolvency Service – and indeed for all of us – is that of course each VA is dependent on its own Proposals and Standard Terms & Conditions (“STC”), so expressing any opinion on the effect of the New Rules on VAs in general is going to be dangerous.

  • The difference between IVA Protocol and R3 STCs

The majority of IVAs use either the IVA Protocol or R3’s STC, so you might think it would be relatively straightforward at least to establish some ground rules for these two documents and then leave each IP to determine whether the Proposal itself has any overriding effect. Dear IP seems to have made a stab at this in relation to the IVA Protocol at least. However, I think it is important to bear in mind that Dear IP makes no mention of R3’s STCs and from what I can see there is a chasm of difference in how the two STCs have incorporated the 1986 Rules.

True, both STCs define the “Rules” as the Insolvency Rules 1986 as amended and the Service makes the case for equating this to the 2016 Rules. I have heard argument that the Service’s reliance on S17 of the Interpretation Act 1978 does not stack up: if a contract – which is what we’re talking about here – refers to Rx.xx of the Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended), does it not remain as such notwithstanding that the 1986 Rules have been revoked?

This takes me to the chasm between the two sets of STC: for example, the IVA Protocol STC state that “The Supervisor may… summon and conduct meetings of creditors… in accordance with the Act and the Rules” (19(1)), whereas the R3 STC describe in detail how to convene meetings and conduct postal resolutions with no reference to the Act or Rules. Therefore, personally I am struggling to see how the 2016 Rules affect existing VAs’ methods of seeking creditors’ agreements where those VAs are based on the R3 STC. However, I also question whether the R3 STC restrict meetings to physical ones – when I read the STC cold, I’m not persuaded that they don’t also work for virtual meetings (but then again, don’t most meetings happen only on paper anyway?) – so it seems to me that the R3 STC may allow a variety of routes but, thankfully, without all the baggage that the 2016 Rules carry with them, which may load down Protocol IVAs in view of their vague reference to “in accordance with the Act and the Rules”.

  • Does Dear IP make the IVA Protocol position clear?

It’s Dear IP’s treatment of the Protocol STC’s wording, “The Supervisor may… summon and conduct meetings of creditors… in accordance with the Act and the Rules”, that puzzles me. On the one hand, Dear IP acknowledges that the Act and Rules “remain silent on how decisions are taken once in (sic.) a voluntary arrangement is in place”… so they seem to be saying that the Act and Rules are irrelevant to a supervisor looking to call a meeting. But then Dear IP says: “we do not believe [supervisors] should feel restricted to only using a physical meeting. We expect supervisors to take advantage of the new and varied decision making procedures that are available under the Act as amended and the 2016 Rules”.

But how possibly can the phrase, “the supervisor may summon and conduct meetings of creditors”, morph into for example: “the supervisor may seek a decision by means of a correspondence vote”? This is too much of a stretch, isn’t it? Rather than be meant as a comment on the application of the 2016 Rules to existing VAs, perhaps the Service is simply stating that it would like IPs to incorporate the various processes in future VA Proposals and STC, don’t you think?

Because the Act and Rules in themselves do not empower supervisors to seek decisions, does this mean that the Protocol STC’s words “in accordance with the Act and the Rules” are redundant? Or are these words supposed to mean that the supervisor should “apply the provisions of the Act and Rules in so far as they relate to bankruptcy with necessary modifications”, as paragraph 4(3) of the Protocol STC states? Ok, if the latter is the case, then what is the effect of S379ZA(2), i.e. that a trustee cannot summon a physical meeting unless sufficient creditors request one? This would seem to take us far from the Dear IP position where supervisors should not “feel restricted to only using a physical meeting”.

For these reasons, I think the Dear IP is horribly muddled. Perhaps the IVA Standing Committee might like to clarify the position in relation to their STC..?

 

What is the deadline for forcing a physical meeting in a S100 scenario?

This is another area that seems to have got horribly muddled. It seems to me that much of the confusion over this arises because of the conflating of two potential creditor responses: (i) a creditor can object to a decision sought by deemed consent; or (ii) a creditor can request a physical meeting. It is true that, when a S100 decision on the liquidator is sought by deemed consent, the consequence of either response is the same: a physical meeting is summoned. However, the Rules around each response are different.

  • The deadline for objections

R15.7(2)(a) states that the notice seeking deemed consent must contain “a statement that in order to object to the proposed decision a creditor must have delivered a notice, stating that the creditor so objects, to the convener not later than the decision date”. “Not later than the decision date” must surely mean that objections delivered on the decision date are valid (note: although this rule only specifies what must appear in a notice, S246ZF(4) makes clear that “the procedure set out in the notice” is binding).

  • The deadline for physical meeting requests

For a S100 decision, R6.14(6)(a) states that “a request [for a physical meeting] may be made at any time between the delivery of the notice… and the decision date”. I have heard argument that “between” excludes the days at each end, which would mean that the deadline for requests would be the end of the day before the decision date. At first, I was persuaded by this interpretation, given that, if I were to count how many people in a queue were between me and the ticket office, I would not include myself in the number… but then someone asked me to pick a number between 1 and 10..!

This interpretation of “between” also makes little sense when considering R15.4(b), which states that an electronic voting system must be “capable of enabling a creditor to vote at any time between the notice being delivered and the decision date”… so the IP isn’t interested in votes cast on the decision date then..?

  • The Insolvency Service’s policy intentions

How does Dear IP pull these threads together? It states: “The policy intention (in all cases) is that a request for a physical meeting must arrive before the decision date. The policy intention with regard to electronic voting is that creditors may cast their votes up until the decision closes (i.e. 23:59 on the decision date). We believe that the 2016 Rules are capable of supporting both these policy intentions.”

The Insolvency Service appears blinkered in their statement that the 2016 Rules support the policy intention, because they simply focus on requests for a physical meeting. Irrespective of how “between” is interpreted, the fact is that a deemed consent can be objected to up to 23.59 on the decision date and such an objection would force a physical meeting. Therefore, a members’-appointed liquidator will still be left in the position of not knowing whether there will be a last-minute objection that will force an unexpected c.week-long Centrebind.

 

What happens if a Centrebind is longer than 14 days?

I feel I should apologise for wasting people’s time in explaining (via this blog (https://goo.gl/hikYKr), R3 presentations and our webinars) the risks that a Centrebind could last longer than 14 days if material transactions need to be reported or a physical meeting needs to be convened.

  • The Insolvency Service’s simple answer

The Insolvency Service gave the simple answer on their blog that “it is sufficient that the original decision date was within the required timescale”. In other words, provided that the convener fixed the decision date for the S100 deemed consent process or the virtual meeting not later than 14 days after the winding-up resolution, it is of no consequence that this decision date falls away because the date of a consequent physical meeting falls outside this timescale.

I find the Insolvency Service’s answer startling. Personally, I would expect the Rules to make explicit that it is the original S100 decision date that matters, in the same way as Para 51(2) uses the expression “initial decision date” when setting down the 10-week deadline for Administrators to seek approval of their proposals (i.e. Para 51(3) explicitly provides that Administrators do not get into a pickle if creditors reject a decision by deemed consent and then the Administrator convenes another decision process with this second decision date falling outside the 10 weeks).

  • Can this principle apply also to VA Proposal decision dates?

What about the other instance when an important decision date deadline must be met: the approval of an IVA Proposal? R8.22(7) states that this decision date must be not more than 28 days from the date on which the nominee received the Proposal (or when the nominee’s report was considered by the court). Given that 14 days’ notice is required, it would be very possible for a physical meeting decision date to be outside this timescale. Would it matter as long as the original decision date was inside it? The Rules do not address this point, but neither do they address the unintended Centrebind position.

Much as my heart’s cockles are warmed by the Insolvency Service’s answer, personally I would be nervous in relying on it.

 

How do you deal with preferential creditors’ decisions?

The Insolvency Service’s answers on this topic are eminently sensible and I am more than happy to live with them… but it’s just that I cannot help but continue to ask myself: “yes, but where does it say that?”

The questions surround the New Rules’ defined process for seeking prefs’ approval of matters such as the Administrators’ fees. Exactly how do you conduct a decision procedure of prefs alone?

Firstly, what do you do with pref creditors who have been paid in full? R18.18(4) states that pref creditors must make a decision on fees, if the Administrator “has made or intends to make a distribution” to prefs (in a Para 52(1)(b) case). This would seem to include prefs who have been paid in full, but R15.11 excludes them from receiving notice of the decision procedure.

But, actually, what do we mean when we refer to pref creditors being paid in full? Usually we mean that the pref element of their claim has been paid in full, but often they will still have a non-pref unsecured claim. How do you calculate a pref creditor’s value for voting purposes?

R15.31(1)(a) states that, in an administration, votes are calculated “according to the amount of each creditor’s claim as at the date on which the company entered administration, less any payments that have been made to the creditor after that date in respect of the claim”.

  • Another simple answer from the Insolvency Service

The Insolvency Service’s answer to these questions was: “Our interpretation is that [R15.31(1)(a)] would lead an administrator to consider the value of outstanding preferential claims at the date that the vote takes place. This would only include the preferential element of claims, and if these had been paid in full then the administrator would not be expected to seek a decision from those creditors.”

Personally, I don’t see that R15.31(1)(a) gets us anywhere: it doesn’t state that a creditor’s claim is only its preferential element when a decision procedure is only open to pref creditors and it doesn’t state that you do not need to seek a decision from pref creditors who have been paid their pref elements in full… but in all other respects I like the Service’s answers!

 

Do creditors need to get forms absolutely correct?

There is no denying that the 2016 Rules have placed a heavier burden on us all to get the details correct. Many things that we were used to doing in simple text form are now described as “notices” and every statutory notice must include “standard contents”, which often require the addition of new detail such as insolvents’ company registered numbers or residential addresses.

  • The validity of old proofs of debt

In many cases, creditors are not spared these requirements. For example, the prescriptive detail of proofs of debt – R14.4 – is quite different from the old requirements. If you are adjudicating on pre-April proofs, can you accept them for dividend purposes? Indeed, can you rely on a Notice of Intended Dividend process commenced before 6 April?

As regards the need for creditors to submit new proofs to meet the New Rules’ requirements, the Insolvency Service answered: “Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978 may be relied upon here, and proofs which have already been submitted do not become invalidated.”

Incidentally, S16 of the Interpretation Act 1978 states that a “repeal does not, unless the contrary intention appears… affect the previous operation of the enactment repealed or anything duly done or suffered under that enactment [or] affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under that enactment”, so does this help as regards NoIDs? Are IPs safe to rely on old NoIDs as protecting them from late creditors? This wasn’t the question put to the Service, but it would seem to me the only way the New Rules could possibly work.

However, I’m not quite sure how S16 helps IPs decide now whether to admit an old proof for dividend purposes, when surely they must measure proofs against the New Rules, mustn’t they? But, realistically, what could an old proof possibly be lacking that might struggle to get it admitted under the New Rules?

  • Providing the detail required for new proofs

I asked the Service about the requirement for a proof to be authenticated. R1.5(3) states that “if a document is authenticated by the signature of an individual on behalf of… a body corporate of which the individual is the sole member, the document must also state that fact”. If a creditor failed to state this on a proof, would it render the proof invalid? And, if so, does this obligate office holders to check this point?

Alternatively, does R1.9(1)(b) help us all out? This rule states that “where a rule sets out the required contents of a document, the document may depart from the required contents if… the departure (whether or not intentional) is immaterial”.

The Insolvency Service’s answer was: “The extent to which an office-holder could rely on rule 1.9(1)(b) here would be a matter for them to decide, possibly in liaison with their regulatory body.” I can understand why the Service was not tempted to put their neck on the block on this question, but it does demonstrate to me the nonsensical nature of the New Rules: they set out prescriptive detail of what must be provided… then add a rule that states it’s okay if a departure is “immaterial”. Why put prescriptive immaterial requirements in the Rules in the first place?!

  • Do creditors need to meet the notice requirements?

I felt a similar irritation when I read Dear IP’s article, “Do creditors’ notices have to comply with standard content”, for example when creditors object to a decision sought by deemed consent. The Service seems to be implying that the answer is no: “if it is clear what the creditor is seeking in their notice, it should be accepted”. Again, this leaves me wondering: if a creditor is free to run a red light, why put the lights up in the first place?

Having said that, R1.9(1)(b) might be a useful one to remember the next time the RPB monitors call… although we might expect some debating over what is “immaterial”.

  • The detail (not) required for proxy forms

I think it is also worth mentioning here the observation made on the Service’s blog at the lack of prescription when it comes to proxy forms. The Service explained that “the requirement to authenticate [a proxy form] was removed as a deregulatory measure, because authentication does not confer legitimacy. As long as the office-holder is satisfied that the proxy comes from the creditor then the requirements for submission are met.” So a creditor must sign a hard copy proof but need not sign a proxy form. Well, fancy that!

 

In my next post, I’ll set out some other nuggets gleaned from the Insolvency Service’s blog.


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Navigating Obstacles: S100s for Work-Winners

I suspect that many of you (like me) have heard plenty of theory on the New Rules’ decision-making changes. Maybe reading it from the practical perspective of the work-winner will give it a freshness.

Some non London-centric IPs who missed out on my recent presentation for R3 expressed disappointment, so I thought a blog post was warranted. Here I have concentrated only on the S100 process.

 

S100 CVLs: Deemed Consent or Virtual Meeting?

Before we start thinking about what we might discuss with directors, I think it’s worth weighing up the pros and cons of the two possible routes in to a CVL appointment… well, apart from a physical meeting, of course, but a physical meeting might be required whichever initial decision process we start with.

  • Material Transactions

The rules don’t define a material transaction, but they do say that (R6.17):

“where the statement of affairs sent to creditors… does not, or will not, state the company’s affairs at the creditors’ decision date, the directors must cause a report… to be made to the creditors… on any material transactions relating to the company occurring between the date of the making of the statement and the decision date”.

That sounds to me like it’s any transaction that changes the SoA, but the InsS people I’ve spoken to don’t see this as wrapping in, say, changes in asset class where book debts are converted into cash at bank or where a forgotten van pops up. They say they intended the rule to ensure that creditors learn of events that might impact on the independence of the proposed liquidator, i.e. things that happened with his involvement or since his appointment in Centrebind cases.

Personally, I found this interpretation most surprising, as it’s really not what the rules say – and I’d love to get this down in writing from the InsS, as I think it’ll make a huge difference to the frequency of material transactions.  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: Dear IP 76 simply states that a New Rules’ material transaction “is the same as 1986 rules 4.53B-CVL(1) and should be interpreted as such”… so we’re on our own on this one.)

So why should it matter?

Well, it won’t matter if you’re having a meeting, because you’d just report the material transaction to the meeting – it’s in our rules now, but it is never done (well I’ve never seen it done) because the SoA is usually signed off minutes before the meetings.

But it will matter if you’re working with the Deemed Consent process.

In this case, you must send out the report to creditors and if the report is delivered within 3 business days of the Decision Date, then the decision date moves to the end of 3 business days from delivery of the report.

This could leave you either in an unexpected Centrebind or needing to adjourn the members’ meeting.

  • Fees Decisions – who knows?!

I have put question marks on the table above, as the rules are very unclear when it comes to proposing fees decisions around the S100 time. That’s so helpful, isn’t it? It’s not as if fees is something we need to get absolutely spot-on, is it..?!

The only thing we do know for certain is that Deemed Consent cannot be used for “a decision about the remuneration of any person” (S246ZF(2)). The rest is unclear.

Can you propose a fees decision via a correspondence vote to run concurrently with the S100 Deemed Consent process? I struggle with this, as I cannot see who has authority under the rules to “convene” such a Decision Procedure. The IP isn’t in office (and if he is the members’ liquidator, his limited powers do not extend to seeking fee approval) and the director only has the power to convene a decision by Deemed Consent or by virtual meeting.

Can fees decisions be considered at a virtual meeting? There is nothing in the rules that expressly addresses this, but at least the director does have the power to convene the virtual meeting. Is it not arguable that tagging on (pre and post) fees decisions corresponds to what we do with S98s now (especially as the New Rules expressly provide for the “proposed liquidator” to circulate fees information – R18.16(10))?

I have received conflicting opinions on the routes available from reliable sources. As the consequences of getting this wrong are so serious, I’m very reluctant to pass further comment and I do hope that the powers-that-be will put us all out of misery and tell us categorically – and before 6 April! – how/whether fees decisions can be made at the same time as the S100 decision, as R15.11(1) seems to suggest is possible… somehow.

  • Timing

The deadline for the Deemed Consent process is 1 minute to midnight. The disadvantage here is that you won’t be certain on the decision until the next morning. I get the sense that most IPs are planning to hold their members’ meeting on the day of the Deemed Consent process, but this will still leave us with an inescapable Centrebind – it may be for only a few hours, but it’s worth thinking about it for insurance purposes at least.

On the other hand, virtual meetings can be held at anytime – the old between-10-and-4 rule has not been repeated in the New Rules. However, the convener still needs to “have regard to the convenience of those invited to participate when fixing the venue for a decision procedure” (R15.10), so the virtual meeting’s timing and “platform” (which has been added to the definition of “venue”) is still a factor to consider.

  • Excluded Persons

The rules describe an excluded person as (R15.36):

“someone who has taken all steps necessary [to attend the meeting virtually or remotely, but the arrangements] do not enable that person to attend the whole or part of that meeting.”

In other words, the technology or signal for the virtual meeting has failed.

If the chair becomes aware of an excluded person, he can continue the meeting, suspend it for up to an hour, or adjourn it. If the chair decides to continue the meeting, resolutions can be taken and these will be valid but they’re subject to complaints from the excluded person or from any other attendee who claims they were prejudiced by the exclusion.

The timescale for complaints is short – before 4pm on the next business day from the meeting or from receipt of an “indication” of what occurred at the meeting – but the consequences can be far-reaching. The chair could review the voting and conclude that the excluded person’s vote overturns resolutions that had been thought passed.

Practically, where would this leave a liquidator who thought they were free to publicise their appointment and perhaps also to complete asset sales? I am not certain that these actions would be covered by the S232 defects-deemed-valid provision.

Clearly it is vital that office holders know where they stand immediately after a meeting, but how would they know whether there were any excluded persons? They may know if someone drops out of contact mid-stream, but what if someone could not get online in the first place? Obviously, this is a risk if the notice of the virtual meeting includes all the information necessary to attend… but is this what the Rules require?

R15.5 states that the notice to creditors must provide:

“any necessary information as to how to access the virtual meeting including any telephone number, access code or password required”

A couple of InsS people have told me that they believe that simply giving out a contact number so that creditors can ask for the login details before the meeting would satisfy this Rule – it is “necessary information”, after all. Clearly, this would be a great help in identifying excluded persons as well as going some way to “safeguard[ing] against participation by persons who are not properly entitled to participate” (SIP6) and helping to plan for sufficient access to a virtual meeting. Hopefully the InsS will confirm this in writing when they respond to a question about this on their blog.  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: Dear IP 76 describes the Insolvency Service’s view as explained here.)

 

S100 CVLs: What Directors Need to Know

Please bear in mind that it has been a loooong time since I worked on the frontline. I do not feel worthy of explaining to IPs what they should discuss with directors pre-appointment. However, with the New Rules – and new SIP6 – in mind, here are my suggestions:

  • S100/SoA fees

With the lack of clarity in the Rules, you’ll probably want to get your fees paid upfront. But what happens if you have to convene a physical meeting? Who is going to pay for that? It might be an idea to factor this in to your engagement letter: make sure that it’s clear what the fixed fee covers and what effect the cost of an additional physical meeting might make.

  • Quick information

You’ll want to line the director up to providing information very quickly, given the short timeframes for compiling the SoA and the SIP6 report (see below).

  • Post-SoA material transactions

It might be helpful to make the directors aware of the consequences of any material transactions occurring after the SoA is produced. The risk of a postponement in the Decision Date might help them to focus on giving you the whole story and avoid doing anything silly in the hiatus period.

  • Postponed decisions

Material transactions or the need for a physical meeting will delay the S100 decision. If these events happen early enough, there might be a chance to adjourn the members’ meeting. But of course, if this happens, then the directors will be in control of the company for longer. What effect will this have on the CVL strategy?

You might also want to warn the director that they may need to attend a physical meeting. And will you be around for the physical meeting? Fortunately, the new rules have been relaxed a bit so that the members’ liquidator need not attend the physical meeting, he can appoint someone else in his stead (another IP or an experienced staff member), but if a physical meeting has been requested, then you might want to make sure you’re there.

  • SIP6 additions to engagement letters

The new SIP6 states that the assisting IP should “take reasonable steps to ensure that the convener is made fully aware of their duties and responsibilities”, so you may need to beef up your engagement letter to set out the director’s duties to take appropriate action as regards objections, requests for a physical meeting, material transactions and excluded persons, all of which are the convener’s/chair’s responsibilities; and to provide the SoA/SIP6 required information swiftly.

SIP6 also requires “reasonable steps to ensure that… the instructions to the IP to assist are adequately recorded”. I’m not sure what the RPBs are getting at here, other than expecting a signed engagement letter. Do they want you to have set out whether your instructions are to proceed with the Deemed Consent or the virtual meeting route? And/or should you specify that you’ll be assisting with assessing objections and requests for physical meetings?

Connected with this is SIP6’s requirement to “take reasonable steps to ensure that the convener and/or chair is informed that it may be appropriate for them to obtain independent assistance in determining the authenticity of a prospective participant’s authority or entitlement to participate and the amount for which they are permitted to do so in the event these are called into question”. This isn’t surprising given that something similar is in SIP8 regarding the conflict risk when counting proxies, but it may be a good idea to put it in your engagement letter if it isn’t already.

  • Excluded persons

Given the risk of excluded persons changing the outcome of meetings, you might want to be careful about what you indicate to directors that you plan to do on the day of, and the day after, the meeting.

 

S100 CVLs: The Unintended Centrebind

So what does the new S100 process look like? What needs to happen when?

Here is a timeline for a no-complication Deemed Consent, demonstrating the shortest notice possible:

A virtual meeting timeline would work the same, but it would just mean that you’d be able to schedule the meeting on Business Day 7 for a sensible time instead of a minute to midnight.

In particular, note the time needed to send the SoA and SIP6 report in order to accommodate delivery in time.  (UPDATE 23/03/17: it has been pointed out to me that SIP6 only requires the report to be “made available”, so some are interpreting this to mean that it does not have to be delivered to creditors (although the SoA still does need to be).)

But what if creditors object to the Deemed Consent at the last minute (i.e. after the members’ meeting had been held on business day 7)?

(UPDATE 23/03/17: it has been pointed out to me that requests for a physical meeting must be received “between the delivery of the notice and the decision date” (R6.14(6)) and thus it has been suggested that a physical meeting request received on the decision date will be too late. (UPDATE2 02/05/2017: the Insolvency Service’s view, as set out in Dear IP 76, is explored further in my post, https://goo.gl/ygnWjg.)  The deadline for deemed consent objections, however, is “not later than the decision date” (R15.7(2)), so I believe the timelines above and below are still relevant.)

You could fit the physical meeting within the statutory 14 calendar day timescale, provided that you can get the director to move quickly to convene it, but it would leave you managing an unintended Centrebind.

The picture looks grimmer if a material transaction occurs:

 

As you can see, there isn’t enough time to deal with a material transaction and a physical meeting.  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: the Insolvency Service has expressed the view on its blog that “it is sufficient that the original decision date was within the required timescale”.)

Virtual meetings avoid this issue, as the report on the material transaction would occur at the virtual meeting. It’s not the whole answer to avoiding a Centrebind, as creditors could still request a physical meeting, but at least it could be held within the 14 days.

 

There’s More

As I mentioned at the start, I’ve limited this blog post to S100 decisions only – it’s long enough already.

If you want to listen to my whole presentation, you can purchase it via The Compliance Alliance (£250+VAT for firm-wide access to all our webinars for a year) – just drop a line to info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk.

Other topics covered include:

  • The timeline of an intended Centrebind
  • S100s for the IP acting for creditors
  • VAs: correspondence vote or virtual meeting?
  • Creditors’ powers and the process to seek an IP appointment in bankruptcies and compulsories
  • Administrations: the pros and cons of seeking approval of Proposals by Deemed Consent or a decision procedure
  • How creditors can stay in the loop on communications


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New Rules, Part 15: Decisions, Decisions!

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More than one IP has asked me: ok, I know the New Rules pretty-much remove creditors’ meetings, but what’s all the fuss about? It gets me every time! Not only are the changes far more widespread than this, but also this change is hardly simple. It sounds simple though, doesn’t it: just replace all creditors’ resolutions with some kind of postal vote?

From what I believe was a desire to provide options – to creditors mainly, but also to directors and IPs – has evolved a web of overlapping timescales and feedback mechanisms, not to mention reams more information to creditors, which cannot fail to bamboozle and further dissuade them from engaging.

 

Decision 1: what type of decision do you have?

The SBEEA15 introduced the idea of two tiers of decisions (by the way, in our new world, there are few resolutions anymore, just decisions… although some decisions are made by resolution, if considered at a meeting, whether physical or virtual). There are decisions that can be made by Deemed Consent and others that must be made by a Qualifying Decision Procedure (although the New Rules drop the “Qualifying” bit). In the latter category are:

  • any “decision about the remuneration of any person” (S246ZE(2)); and
  • the acceptance of IVA and CVA Proposals.

So what decisions might be dealt with by Deemed Consent? The biggie is the appointment of a CVL Liquidator (you might also have thought about the appointment of an IP in court cases, but this involves first the removal of the incumbent OR – aha, now the reason for the change so that the OR becomes Trustee immediately on the order becomes clear, doesn’t it..?). Other Deemed Consent decisions could include several ADM items, e.g. extensions, discharge and even the Proposals themselves. But other than these, Deemed Consent is unlikely to get out much.

I think the Insolvency Service saw Deemed Consent being useful to office holders in seeking creditors’ approval to certain strategies, e.g. to commence litigation. I agree that this is a possibility, however the abolition of the statutory requirement to seek sanction to exercise many old Schedule powers has meant that more often than not IPs feel empowered to take such decisions in the interests of creditors in any event.

 

Decision 2: should you use Deemed Consent?

The key point to note about Deemed Consent is that, unless more than 10% in value of creditors (entitled to vote) positively object to the decision, then it is approved as proposed. If this proportion of creditors objects, then the IP has another bite of the cherry by proposing the decision by one of the other decision processes (excluding a physical meeting unless the proposed decision is for your CVL appointment).

There is a wrinkle: creditors who meet different criteria can respond by asking for a physical meeting, rather than (or in addition to) objecting to the decision proposed by Deemed Consent. If this happens, then the Insolvency Service has stated that the Deemed Consent process is superseded and the decision must be considered at a physical meeting. Personally, I have failed to spot where this consequence is set out in the rules, so I have asked the Service for clarification.

The thresholds for seeking a physical meeting are either 10% in value of creditors, 10% in number, or 10 creditors (the “10/10/10” criteria). (UPDATE 23/03/17: recently-issued Amendment Rules affect this, although their application is unclear.  I have blogged a question on the Insolvency Service’s blog.) This time, the criteria relate to all creditors, not just those entitled to vote. Thus it seems to me more than just a theoretic possibility that a creditor/s might reach the threshold to seek a physical meeting but fall short of the threshold to object to a Deemed Consent decision… hence the need, I believe, for the rules to be clear on the consequences of a request for a physical meeting.  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: the Insolvency Service has blogged: “The intention here is that the creditors that have an interest in the decision being taken are the ones who determine whether the costs of holding a physical meeting should be incurred. Therefore the convener would consider the value of the potential vote of the creditor(s) making the request, and compare them to the total value of the potential vote.”  Got that? 😉 )

Whilst there are potential complications, I think the Deemed Consent advantages are clear, especially where you need to seek approval from uninterested creditors, e.g. the ADM extension and discharge questions (although if you need secured creditors’ approval, silence from the unsecureds is only half the battle won).

What if you are seeking a CVL appointment, should you go for Deemed Consent? Well, one downside is that you will need to add on another decision procedure if you want to get your fees, including your pre-appointment fee, approved. However, if another IP starts showing an interest, they will first have to object to the Deemed Consent process before the scene is re-set to count votes on nominations. Granted however, it may mean that you’re looking at an unexpected Centrebind.

Another strange characteristic of seeking a CVL appointment by Deemed Consent is that, if unopposed, there is no statutory requirement for any pre-appointment Gazette notice – how odd is that?!

 

Decision 3: which other Decision Procedure might you use?

How else might you seek a decision? In the order that I think they will be used, the methods are:

  • vote by correspondence (no longer a “meeting” by correspondence and not defined in the rules);
  • virtual meeting (yes, cumbersome and in some respects risky, but the only way effectively to negotiate decisions);
  • electronic voting (hmm… maybe not for some time yet);
  • only if sufficient creditors request it, a physical meeting;
  • and A N Other process that none of us has yet thought up.

Virtual meetings are prepared for pretty-much as physical meetings are now: they require Gazetting and they involve proxy forms, which can be delivered anytime up to the start of the meeting in any case, no longer just for VA meetings. Proofs of debt also need to be delivered and, although there is a deadline of 4pm the business day before the meeting, there is also provision for the chair to accept late proofs, if he is “content”.

Of course, the obvious difference is finding an appropriate virtual meeting resource. From those who I know have been exploring this, I understand that there is no clear winner. Issues include: being able to identify attendees, especially when they join and leave, and being able to block access to people not entitled to attend. The main risk in holding a virtual meeting is that an “excluded person” (i.e. someone who tried to participate but could not through no fault of their own; say, they just happen to live in an area of the UK with unreliable broadband connections) can influence the decision after the meeting (assuming you did not decide to adjourn it). They are given a very short window of opportunity to complain that, had they participated, they would have swung the vote, but this is clearly not an uncertainty you want to be left with after a decision on your appointment or on a VA Proposal. There is also the practical uncertainty in knowing how many people are likely to want to join in to a virtual meeting: multi-party conference calls are exasperating at the best of times and the prospects of being surprised by a virtual room full of fired-up creditors doesn’t bear thinking about.

So should you go for a correspondence vote? Well, if you’re looking for a CVL appointment, it’s worth clocking now that this is not an option: Deemed Consent and virtual meeting are your only options. It is also worth remembering that the deadline for correspondence votes (and other non-meeting processes, including Deemed Consent) is one minute to midnight on your chosen day (the “Decision Date”), so we will have to get used to not knowing the outcome of a proposed decision until the day after… which could prove challenging if you’re trying to coordinate it alongside a members’ meeting. Correspondence votes need to be supported by proofs of debt submitted by the Decision Date and importantly, once a vote has been lodged, it cannot be changed. This makes correspondence vote a risky choice for VA Proposals, I think. I also wonder where correspondence votes will get us on fee approvals: if there is no negotiating possible, then will it result in an increase in court applications?

As with Deemed Consent, on receiving an invitation to a virtual meeting or to vote by another means, a creditor may react by asking for a physical meeting. They have 5 business days after delivery of the notice of the decision procedure in which to have delivered a request (but see Timetables below) and the 10/10/10 thresholds apply.

There is also no ability to ask creditors for a deposit as security for the costs of convening a physical meeting on request… unless it is a requisitioned decision (yes, there is a difference!). The latter may arise for example as a consequence of issuing Para 52 Proposals, although the rules allow you only to ask for the costs of seeking a “decision”, not a physical meeting… however it is not clear whether creditors could ask explicitly for a physical meeting at this stage (that’s another question to the Insolvency Service).  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: the Insolvency Service has blogged that they think it is reasonable to interpret the rules as allowing the creditor to request a physical meeting at the same time as requisitioning a decision, although they have also confirmed that the deposit sought should only be for requesting a decision, not holding a physical meeting.)

 

Invitations to Form a Committee

In all cases (except, strangely, in Compulsory Liquidations unless the meeting is to appoint a liquidator), whenever a Deemed Consent or decision procedure notice is issued, creditors must be asked at the same time whether they wish to establish a Committee and to propose nominations. This requirement sits unhappily besides the other rules, especially the Deemed Consent process. For starters, how do you ask creditors “whether” they want something? You must propose it as a decision, e.g. I propose the decision that a Committee be established. But if you were to propose this as a Deemed Consent decision and received no objections, this would mean that the decision had been made and you would need to canvass for (more) nominations, thus postponing your original objective until the sorry “no we didn’t mean we wanted a Committee, we simply don’t care” response was made certain. Therefore, several have designed the proposed decision in the negative: I propose the decision that a Committee should not be established (which personally I think also sits better ethically where the IP does not believe a Committee is warranted: is it honest and straightforward for an IP to propose a decision he does not himself desire?). In this case, creditors’ silence works well.

But is it truly necessary to go through this rigmarole every time you propose a decision? Yes, it seems so. And of course we will need to highlight the SIP15 Committee Guidance… however I am puzzled by the SIP15 reference to highlighting it prior to inviting creditors for nominations: does this mean that we need to write to creditors separately before our first proposed decision? For once, this is not a question for the Insolvency Service!

 

Timetables

In most cases, notice of a decision – by Deemed Consent or other process – must be at least 14 days (plus delivery time). CVL appointment is the obvious exception: in this case, notice must be 3 business days after delivery, which including a weekend makes it very slightly shorter than the current requirement. Because of the short timescale in CVL appointments, requests for a physical meeting can be made at any time up to the Decision Date.  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: oops!  Sorry, the rules set the deadline as between the notice and the Decision Date and Dear IP 76 suggests that the Decision Date is not included in this period.  See https://goo.gl/ygnWjg for more analysis.)

 

There’s more

The rules contain prescriptive details about the content of notices and how to deal with “excluded persons”. In addition, the interaction of Deemed Consent/decision procedures with other requirements such as the need to send a Statement of Affairs before the CVL appointment Decision Date adds another layer of complexity to the work.

If you want to know more:

  • on the detail of decision processes especially in the context of CVL appointments, then access Jo Harris’ webinar, “New Rules: Decision Procedures and Changes on CVL Appointments” (mailto:info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk for details);
  • on the pros, cons and strategies of decision processes, then join me at the R3 breakfast seminar, The New Rules for Insolvency Work-Winners (16 March in London), or any of the three R3 SPG Technical Reviews (28 March in London, 6 June in Huddersfield, 4 July in Bristol)… and there are more Compliance Alliance webinars to come on these topics;

… or feel free to get in touch with me… but don’t expect many simple answers!


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Part 18: Reporting and Remuneration

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Finally, I’ve reached the end of the crazy-busy season and I can get back to the New Rules. This post deals with Part 18 of the Rules: Reporting and Remuneration.

I’m very pleased to see that the Insolvency Service has taken the opportunity to iron out some of the overly prescriptive, clunky and vague rules.   For example:

  • Fixing the prescriptive: stripping back on the loooong list of final report contents
  • Fixing the clunky: new approaches to the ADM-to-CVL conversion process and to reporting for changes in office holder or ADM extensions
  • Fixing the vague: settling the debates on issuing a fees estimate before being appointed as liquidator and on the process of seeking preferential creditors’ approval to fees in Para 52(1)(b) Administrations

Other changes have slipped in too, mainly as a consequence of the more material changes affecting other areas of practice, such as the abolition of final meetings.

For a step-by-step guide to Part 18, including many rules that I have not touched on in this post, I would recommend Jo Harris’ webinar, available now through The Compliance Alliance – contact info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk.

 

Part 18: Scope

Part 18 is one of the now “common” parts. I think it does help to bring together the procedures that are common to all cases… but it’s not quite this simple. Part 18 covers reporting and remuneration for Administrations, all Liquidations and Bankruptcies. It does not deal with VA reporting. Neither does it deal will all the closing reporting requirements – bits of these appear in the case-specific parts. Ho hum.

One key point to remember is that for the most part the changes apply across the board, so we need to be ready to report and seek rem under the New Rules from the off.

The exceptions are, as previously mentioned, progress reporting on the old pre-2010 appointments and any progress reports that fall due before 6 April 2017. But for everything else – including closure processes on all cases – the New Rules apply.

 

Contents of Progress Reports

There are some pesky little changes in here. One intriguing change is that, no longer must we detail “assets that remain to be realised”, but instead we need to detail “what remains to be done” (R18.3(1)(h)). I know that we usually do provide a one-liner on this, but isn’t it charming for the Insolvency Service to make it a statutory requirement..?

R18.3(6) accommodates the significant change in the process of an ADM moving to CVL. It’s good to see the Insolvency Service have yet another go at getting this process working smoothly. In my mind, the New Rules improve the process… although I still don’t see why we need to rely on the Registrar of Companies (“RoC”) to tell us when the ADM ends and the CVL starts. Regrettably, though, the trigger for the move has been set down in the Act, so the New Rules simply try to make the best of this awkward situation.

R3.60 sets out the new ADM-to-CVL process. The Administrator submits the Notice of the Move together with their final report to the RoC and copies the pack to creditors etc. Once the Notice is registered, the former Administrator informs the Liquidator of “anything which happens after the date of the final progress report and before the registration of the notice which the administrator would have included in the final report had it happened before the date of the report” (R3.60(5)).

Consequently, within the Liquidator’s first progress report, they must include “a note of any information received by the liquidator from the former administrator” (R18.3(6)).

This process sounds a bit odd when you remember that usually the Administrator is the Liquidator – will the RPBs expect the file to contain a “note to self”..? I think we get the idea though and at least the new process avoids the uncomfortable position of completing and issuing a final Administration report after having vacated office.

 

Timing of Progress Reports

In principle, nothing has changed on timing. However, again a couple of welcome simplifications in other areas will affect reporting complications with which we have all become familiar under the current Rules.

In future, the 6/12-monthly reporting routine will not be affected by the following events:

  • A change in office holder: under the New Rules, incoming office holders are required to deliver a notice to members/creditors (depending on the case type) “of any matters about which the succeeding (office holder) thinks the members/creditors should be informed” (Rs18.6(3), 18.7(4), 18.8(3)). This removes the need for a formal progress report to draw a line under the change, so the original progress reporting routine remains unaffected. The New Rules are vague on what triggers this requirement, but in my view it is likely to mean that nothing is required if the office holder changes but the practice does not.
  • Extension of an Administration: under the New Rules, a progress report is no longer required in order to seek approval of an extension. The New Rules simply require the Administrator to send, along with the court application or the notice requesting creditors’ consent, “the reasons why the administrator is seeking an extension” (R3.54(2)).

This is all good stuff, thanks Insolvency Service.

These changes do leave me with a question, though: what if you are already dealing with a case with an altered reporting schedule, i.e. an extended ADM or a case involving a change in office holder where the court was not asked to over-ride the current rules’ effect of changing the reporting timeline? After 6 April 2017, will you need to revert to the pre-extension/office holder-change schedule or will you continue to produce 6/12-monthly reports from the date of the last pre-April report? I have heard rumours that the Insolvency Service’s intention is the latter, but personally I think that the wording of the New Rules would require such cases to revert to the old schedule.   That’s another question for the Insolvency Service’s blog, I reckon.

(UPDATE 17/01/2017: the Insolvency Service responded to my query on their blog: “It was not the intention that where a reporting cycle in any relevant process had already been reset, it would need to be changed again as a result of the commencement of the new rules. As you have suggested, we had identified that a transitional provision would make it clear that this should not happen, and we are looking to see whether and how we can insert such a provision into Schedule 2 of the new rules.”)

(UPDATE 23/03/2017: the Insolvency Service has indeed introduced a fix via the recently-issued Amendment Rules.  This fixes the position for changes in office holder such that, if you have an existing case with an amended reporting schedule due to a pre-6/4/17 change in office holder, then after 6/4/17 you continue to report according to your amended schedule.  The position is a little less satisfactory for already-extended ADMs: whilst it seems that the Insolvency Service has attempted to apply the same principle to these cases, I am not convinced that the Amendment Rules wording delivers this effect… although casparjblog has suggested a possible wriggle-through – see the Insolvency Service’s blog at https://goo.gl/IE0pmK.)

(UPDATE 02/05/2017: in Dear IP 76, the Insolvency Service expresses the view that the Amendment Rule is “sufficiently clear” that the reporting schedule for an already-extended ADM should continue, rather than be re-set to the original schedule.)

 

Contents of “Final Accounts” and “Final Reports”

The abolition of final meetings in Liquidations and Bankruptcies necessitates a change in the final reporting processes. The new processes can be found at:

  • Rs5.9 and 5.10 for MVLs;
  • R6.28 for CVLs;
  • R7.71 for Compulsory Liquidations; and
  • R10.87 for Bankruptcies.

I won’t cover them here, but suffice to say that creditors (and/or members/bankrupt) are provided with a final account (or, in Bankruptcies, a final report) 8 weeks before the office holder obtains their release.

The contents of these final accounts/reports are found in R18.14. Delightfully, the Insolvency Service has decided to lighten up on the miserable prescription that had been introduced by the 2010 Rules (e.g. no more statements of the aggregate numbers of preferential and unsecured creditors or that accounts have been reconciled with those held by the SoS) – thank you again!

In case you’re wondering about Administrations, R3.53 contains details of some of the contents of an ADM final progress report… but because, in Administrations, the final document is called a final progress report, the Part 18 rules on the contents of progress reports also apply to Administration final progress reports (plus an additional requirement slipped in to R18.3(2)).

 

Remuneration: Circulating Fees Estimates

The biggest change in the remuneration chapters is something very welcome: finally, we can stop debating whether it is possible for an IP to issue a fees estimate (and/or other fees-related information) before they are appointed as Liquidator. R18.16(10) states that “a proposed liquidator” may deliver the information. Excellent!

Of course, the New Rules will transform the whole S98 process beyond recognition – this is a huge topic for another blog post entirely.

 

Remuneration Niggles

Yes, I know I can be pedantic. If you have visited the Insolvency Service’s blog, you will have seen my query on R18.18(3), which could be read as requiring every Administrator’s fees to be agreed by creditors by a “decision procedure”, which would have had unexpected consequences for Para 52(1)(b) ADMs with only secured creditors in the frame. Thankfully, the Service is on the case and hopefully this will be fixed before April.  (UPDATE 23/03/2017: the recently-issued Amendment Rules have fixed this issue so that Para 52(1)(b) case fees are subject to approval only by secureds/prefs.)

Another niggle of mine is that the wording of the time costs basis has been changed – again. I think it passed by many of us that the 2015 Rules changed the time costs basis from “the time properly given… in attending to matters arising in the administration/winding up/bankruptcy” to “the time properly given… in attending to matters arising in the administration/winding up/bankruptcy as set out in the fees estimate”. Those words in italics have been removed for the New Rules – so if you were diligent enough to change the wording of your standard resolutions last year, unfortunately you’ll have to put them back to the way they were pre-2015.

 

Preferential Creditors’ Approval

The New Rules resolve another long-running debate: how were we to read the current R2.106(5A)(b)(ii), which sets out that Administrators who have made a Para 52(1)(b) statement and who have made or intend to make a distribution to preferential creditors need to seek the approval to fees of “preferential creditors whose debts amount to more than 50% of the preferential debts of the company, disregarding debts of any creditor who does not respond to an invitation to give or withhold approval”. The question has always been: what happens if no preferential creditor votes, does this mean that you have approval?

R18.18(4) eliminates all doubt. It states that in future Administrators will need to seek preferential creditors’ approval (on relevant cases) “in a decision procedure”. This is a New Rules-defined term, which I will not go into here (again, this is another blog post entirely), but it does mean without a doubt that there will need to be at least one positive vote to reach a decision.

A second long-running question on the current R2.106(5A)(b)(ii) has also been: what if you have paid preferential creditors’ claims in full, do you still need to ask these creditors to approve your fees?

This conundrum is solved by Rs15.11 and 15.31(1)(a), which indicate that in these circumstances only preferential creditors who have not been paid in full are circulated and that, if there’s no claim left, the creditor has no vote. These two rules are specific to creditors voting in decision procedures in Administrations though, so they won’t help you in any other cases (including, I assume, where secured creditors are being asked to approve fees in Administrations).

 

As mentioned earlier, there are many more rules in Part 18 that are essential-reading, but if you prefer to hear about them, drop an email to info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk and ask about Jo’s webinar.


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The new Insolvency Rules: is the wait almost over?

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The last published .gov.uk update on the new Insolvency Rules was July 2015, when the expectation was that the Rules would be made in “Spring 2016 with a commencement date of 1 October 2016”. As that day fast approaches, where are we..?

Is there a light at the end of the tunnel?

At the ICAEW’s London roadshow last week, Simon Whiting, Senior Policy Advisor of the Insolvency Service, gave us the news:

“we are aiming to lay the Rules before Parliament in the week commencing 10 October 2016”

“commencement will be 6 April 2017”

“… all subject to Ministerial approval”

Technical and compliance directors, managers and consultants have been fearing and dreading this day for several years now. Although my stomach still turns when I think of all the candle-burning days and nights ahead, personally I feel like I’ve done enough waiting: I’m ready!

 

Spare a thought for colleagues

This is a short plea to all appointment-taking and practice-heading IPs in England & Wales: please try to avoid giving your technical and compliance staff any other projects over the next six to twelve months.

The new Rules will be well over 400 pages long and they will introduce changes from the blinding to the subtle. Okay, many changes will be neither here nor there; if some changes are overlooked, the worst effect will be a red flush at the next monitoring visit. However, some crucial processes – such as how to get appointed and how to obtain fee approval – will change fundamentally and you will want to get these correct from the start.

Also, don’t be misled into thinking that the changes won’t matter until you get your first new appointment after 6 April 2017. The plan is that, with the exception of a few common-sense items, the new Rules will apply across the board, to both existing and future appointments. This does have an advantage – we won’t have to devise and endure dual processes, as we have done since 2010 – however, it will be impossible to introduce the changes gradually: when we wake up on 6 April 2017, we will have to be ready to implement the new Rules for cases at any stage from cradle to grave.

 

The headline changes

Deborah Manzoori summarised some of the planned changes in an earlier post on the Compliance Alliance’s blog (https://goo.gl/qGLZWv). We’ve known about these ever since the Small Business Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 and the Deregulation Act 2015 came into being. These changes are set in stone and we’ve simply been waiting for the new Rules to tell us “how to”.

They include:

  • Abolition of physical meetings (unless requested by creditors who meet prescribed criteria)
  • Introduction of decisions approved by “deemed consent”
  • “Qualifying decision procedures” – i.e. the methods by which positive responses to proposed decisions can be sought
  • Allowing small debts without proofs
  • Official Receiver immediately being appointed as Trustee in Bankruptcy

If you want to learn more about these changes as set out in the two Acts, which are good foundations to the detailed changes to come, my partner Jo Harris will be recording a webinar in a week’s time. Email info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk for more information.

 

The “how to”s… and more

If you have a chance to attend one of the ICAEW’s roadshows – or indeed one of the IPA’s – I would recommend it. Hearing first-hand how the Insolvency Service plans to implement the Acts’ changes is quite an experience: I challenge you not to leave the room feeling baffled and just a little depressed!

I’m sure things will become crystal clear when we finally get to see the new Rules… won’t they?

I don’t want to steal the roadshows’ thunder, but here are some items that furrowed my brow:

  • Complicated S98s

I am very keen to see how S98s will work: Centrebinds will still be 14 days max, but creditors will have some time after receiving notices (for a virtual meeting or a proposed deemed consent) to request a physical meeting… for which directors (/IPs) then will need to issue notice. I am sure it can be done, but timescales will be very tight (perhaps it will mean that more company meetings will be adjourned) and companies/IPs will need to manage unexpected hiatus periods.

  • Complicated Statements of Affairs

It will take some careful managing to comply with the requirement for statements of affairs submitted to Companies House to exclude details of “consumers and employees”, whilst ensuring that creditors receive the full schedules. Will this mean a new creditor code in IPS etc.? What about cases where the director submits a hard copy SoA (e.g. Administrations); will insolvency staff need to type up separate schedules for RoC? Will “consumers” always be obvious, e.g. will they be easily distinguishable from other individual creditors? What is the risk if an IP gets it wrong..?

  • Complicated ADM-CVL Conversions

The Insolvency Service has made several attempts in the past to manage the move from Administration to CVL. Their latest method sounds better, but still not ideal. It seems that the conversion will happen when the final Admin report is filed at RoC… and, if in the meantime “anything” has happened, the Administrator will inform the Liquidator. So the final Admin report won’t actually present the final position and IPs will still be on tenterhooks waiting for the RoC to bring down the shutter.

These are only some of the meaty changes. There are many, many more, affecting every part of what we do, even to the extent of changing some of our language: you may think that it is not before time that “defray” is being removed from Notices of No (Further) Dividend, but think of the template-editing to be done as a consequence.

 

Standing on the starting blocks

As we take our places on the starting blocks – working (/support!) groups are created, timetables are formulated, and we wave goodbye to holidays – we steel ourselves for the next six months: bring it on!

We at the Compliance Alliance are planning a suite of progressive webinars and document pack updates to help clients prepare for the big day. Call us sceptical, but we’re reluctant to set out exactly what we’re planning until we see the new Rules land – we’ve been here before! However, if you want me to explain to you what we think we’ll be doing, please do get in touch with me.