Insolvency Oracle

Developments in UK insolvency by Michelle Butler


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HMRC guidance note on S100 notices: what exactly does it mean?

I’m sure you have all seen the HMRC guidance note, “Deemed Consent Procedures”, but what does it actually mean?  I have asked HMRC and received some answers.

The guidance note can be found at: https://www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/regulations/regulatory-news/april-2022-deemed-consent-procedures-update.ashx (amongst other places).

“Deemed Consent Procedures” only?

R3 notified members of the guidance note under the heading, “HMRC Insolvency Guidance – Deemed consent procedures”.  Similarly, the IPA piece read: “HMRC update: we draw your attention to an update from HMRC on deemed consent procedures” and the ICAEW news heading was “April 2022: Deemed consent procedures update”.  The emphasis on the deemed consent process in the R3/RPB emails was not surprising given the title of the HMRC note, but does this reflect HMRC’s message?

Firstly of course I think it can be assumed that HMRC was not writing about all deemed consent process notices, e.g. notices proposing to extend an administration.  The note’s contents make clear that it applies only to “initial notification of a CVL”, by which I assume they mean the pre-CVL S100 notice, not the initial notification after the CVL has begun.

But did HMRC intend the change to affect only S100 deemed consent notices?  Nowhere in the HMRC note was any mention made of virtual or physical meeting notices.

A changed email address?

The original Dear IP article (chapter 8 article 26) and corresponding R3/RPB bulletins that notified us of the HMRC request to email S100 notices gave an email address of notifications.hmrccvl@hmrc.gsi.gov.uk, whereas the latest guidance note gives a different address: hmrccvlnotifications@hmrc.gov.uk (and incorrectly states that this was the email address that was given in January 2018).

Has HMRC got the email address in its new guidance note wrong?  Or have they changed the email address?  At present, the old one works.

HMRC’s response

After a couple of attempts, HMRC responded to my queries as follows:

Our recent comms note should have reflected the same instruction as the Dear IP article, with the only difference being that we now want IPs to stop using the mailbox where there is a compliance interest (as defined in our recent comms note). HMRC would like all S100 notices to be delivered in the same manner and to a compliance caseworker or the mailbox where there is no active interest.

Thank you.  So we can ignore the misleading title of the HMRC guidance note: all S100 notices – for virtual or physical meetings and for deemed consent processes – should be emailed to their mailbox or, where there is a compliance matter, delivered to the HMRC caseworker.  I also gather from this response that the email address is the one described in the Dear IP article.

What is the practical effect of the change?

Ok, setting aside my gripes about the wording of the note, what change is HMRC looking for? 

With effect from 1 June 2022, as quoted above, on prospective CVLs where there is an HMRC compliance interest, HMRC would like the S100 notice to be sent to the compliance caseworker, not emailed to their mailbox.

This will mean some more diligence when preparing for a S100 to establish whether there is a compliance interest and, if so, to get the details of the HMRC caseworker. 

The HMRC note states that a compliance matter “could be an ongoing compliance check or other correspondence regarding determination of the amount of any of the company’s tax liabilities”.  The words “could be” suggest to me that this is not an all-encompassing definition, but it seems to me that you could use this wording as a prompt in any questionnaire to directors to supply details of the caseworker where such a matter exists.

What if you don’t get full information from the directors?  Surely, all you can do is ask.

Will there be an update to Dear IP?

At present, the original Jan-18 HMRC request remains in the online Dear IP bank, at https://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/dearip/dearipmill/chapter8.htm#26.  I asked HMRC if they would please publish an update to this article (and/or withdraw this obsolete article) also via Dear IP, preferably making absolutely clear what HMRC now wishes.

What about a central bank for HMRC guidance notes?

While we’re on the subject, do you find it as frustrating as I do that there is no central bank for all these HMRC guidance notes?  I now have a folder dedicated to all these missives, which seem quite randomly produced on all sorts of subjects.  HMRC also appears to rely on the RPBs and R3 to notify members of new notes, who then often need to relay these to staff members to action. 

Wouldn’t it be better if there were a dedicated free-access web space for all these notes especially for future reference, much like Dear IP?


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The Insolvency Rules 2016: One Year On

“Please don’t make the 2016 Rules any harder than they have to be.”

Since receiving this feedback on an R3 event last year, I’ve been left feeling nervous about how to present on this topic. I don’t mean to make the Rules complicated and I wish they were simpler. One year on, some fairly common confusing blind spots seem to be emerging. I hope this post helps to clear away some troublesome clouds.

In this post, I’ll be covering issues seen around:

  • the CVL Statement of Affairs
  • if/how/when to deliver the SoA and S100 report
  • incomplete – and sometimes completely missing – notices
  • information to creditors on opting out
  • deemed approval -v- deemed consent of Administrators’ Proposals

 

The S100 Perfect Storm

Many IPs have had to weather the perfect storm affecting their bread-and-butter work, the CVL: the 2016 Rules have clashed noisily against the revised SIP6 as regards information-delivery and against the 2015 Rules as regards fee-approval; and everything needs to be done in a short timescale with directors who, no longer facing the fear of attending a physical meeting, quickly become as disengaged from the process as most creditors. Add to this some surprising pronouncements from RPB monitors on pre-CVL fees, bounce-backs from an overflowing HMRC inbox, and requests from creditors for physical meetings that no one attends (not even the requesting creditor) and it’s no surprise that some cry: there must be an easier way to make a living!

What to deliver when and how?

Old habits die hard, so, because we had been accustomed to sending a S98 pack to creditors post-appointment, I think it has taken some time for the S100 and SIP6 requirements to settle in.

The Statement of Affairs

In brief, regarding the Estimated Statement of Affairs (“SoA”):

  • R6.14(7) states that creditors must receive a copy of the SoA required under S99 – so this must be a full copy of the director’s SoA verified by a statement of truth; a draft will not do
  • as it needs to be verified by the director, it is difficult to see how this can be a prospective SoA – it might be tempting to produce an SoA as it should look on the decision date, but this seems impossible;
  • so don’t produce it too early: R6.3 requires the SoA to show the position not more than 14 days before the winding-up resolution;
  • but it must be sent in sufficient time for creditors to receive it at the latest on the business day before the decision date; and
  • it must be sent to creditors – unless you can send this by email, it must be sent by post.

Pre-appointment deliveries

Why can’t you deliver the SoA by website? Because only an office-holder can make use of the rules on website-delivery (R1.49 and R1.50). Unless you’ve already been appointed liquidator by the members by the time you send the SoA – which of course may be the case in a Centrebind – you won’t be an office-holder… and in fact I still don’t think R1.49 can be used in a Centrebind, because it refers to a document that is required to be delivered by the office-holder but of course the requirement to deliver the SoA is on the directors… but oddly R1.50 is worded differently, so it might be possible for a Centrebind liquidator to help a director to deliver an SoA under R1.50.

So why can docs be delivered by email pre-appointment? R1.45 simply sets out the criteria for delivery by email; there are no restrictions on who may follow the rule or when. There is a the small wrinkle that “deemed consent” to email delivery (R1.45(4)) refers to delivery by an office-holder, but Dear IP 76 states that “the assumed consent provision applies to all senders”.

The SIP6 report

However, as regards the SIP6 information (which is still generally produced as a “report”):

  • this is not a Rules’ requirement, so the statutory delivery provisions do not apply; and
  • as the SIP6 states, this report only needs to be “made available on request… and may be made available via a website”.

This seems very odd to some: why put so much effort into producing the SIP6 report when probably no one is going to ask to see it? Well, if you want to seek a decision from creditors on your pre-CVL fees and/or your post-appointment fees, the SIP6 report may prove valuable in justifying the work done and setting out the work you propose to do, so you may well want to provide it to creditors anyway. I think that a significant proportion of IPs are sending out the SIP6 report, but I am also seeing a growing number deciding not to.

After the S100 decision process

What about after appointment? Should the SoA and the SIP6 report be sent out then? Of course, after appointment you can start using the Rules on website-delivery, so it all gets a lot less burdensome. Again, the SIP6 report may be useful if proposing fee decisions, but there is no strict requirement to deliver it.

The SoA is different: R6.15(1)(a) requires a copy or summary of the SoA to be delivered to “any contributory or creditor to whom the notice under rule 6.14 [i.e. notice of the S100 decision] was not delivered”. In many cases, not all members will have received the S100 decision notice. Therefore, to save you the trouble of having to determine whether you’re circulating to any previously-missed members or creditors and especially if you’re using website-delivery, why not include a copy of the SoA as routine in all cases?

 

A Flood of Notices!

When it comes to the 2016 Rules’ treatment of notices, I think the Insolvency Service have absolutely failed to meet their apparent objectives of creditor-engagement and reducing costs. There are many more notices required under the 2016 Rules and each notice requires more information.

I can truly see no advantage in these new requirements: no one wants to see all this extra gumpf, do they? Apparently not all the RPB monitors agree: we have even heard from one client that an RPB monitor has been asking for more items on certain notices, going over and above the statutory requirements. When will this madness end?!

More standard contents

Far from escaping the shackles of prescription, the 2016 Rules list detailed and sometimes puzzling “standard contents” for notices, some of which we might not have been accustomed to including previously. I have found that the following are sometimes overlooked from notices to creditors etc.:

  • the company number
  • the bankrupt’s address
  • the court reference
  • either an email address or a telephone number “through which the office-holder may be contacted”
  • the relevant section or rule reference

I would also ask that, if you are relying on an external provider’s notices and you wonder what on earth a certain statement is doing in the notice, please resist the urge to delete it. Although of course none of us are perfect, some required contents don’t make any sense – for example, reference in a S100 notice to the fact that opted-out creditors can still vote (i.e. before they’ve even been told about opting out).

Notices where none were needed before

A common notice to omit is a R15.8 Notice of Decision Procedure when proposing a vote by correspondence. In the old days, all we used to issue was a circular explaining the proposed resolution and enclosing a voting form, what could have been simpler? But now the circular needs to include a Notice of Decision Procedure – this isn’t a notice solely for meetings.

Notices Inviting a Committee

Where you are proposing a decision (including where you’re proposing it by deemed consent), you will also need to send a Notice Inviting a Committee in all the following cases:

  • CVLs, including pre-liquidation, when giving notice of the S100 process (R6.19 and as explained on the Insolvency Service’s Rules blog)
  • ADMs – even if your proposed decision cannot be affected by a Committee, e.g. when asking creditors to approve the timing of your discharge (R3.39)
  • BKYs (R10.76)
  • and MVL conversions (R6.19)

However, compulsory liquidations are different. You only need to invite creditors to form a Committee when you’re posing a decision on the appointment of a liquidator (which of course is going to be very rare for IPs already in office). But, where you’re appointed by the SoS, you still need to tell creditors in your first letter to them on appointment that they can form a Committee and how they go about that (S137(5)).

The 2016 Rules mentioned above make clear that you are “inviting [the creditors] to decide whether a [creditors’/liquidation] committee should be established”. Therefore, as a “decision” is mentioned, you need to ensure that you list on the other items in your pack – the R15.8 Notice of Decision Procedure (or R15.7 Notice seeking Deemed Consent) and the voting form or proxy form – a proposed decision on the establishment of a Committee.

You should also make sure that the R15.40 Record of Decision – your statutory internal record of the outcome of the decision process (which will be either minutes of a meeting or some other record in all non-meeting decisions, including decisions sought by deemed consent) – lists the proposed decision on the establishment of a Committee and the outcome.

The Opting-Out Notice?

It seems to have taken some time for the issuing of opting-out information, as required by R1.39, to have become embedded successfully in our practices.

R1.39(1) states that “the office holder must, in the first communication with a creditor, inform the creditor in writing that the creditor may elect to opt out of receiving further documents relating to the proceedings”. A few things are worthy to note:

  • The Rules do not call this a “notice” that we must “deliver”. Therefore, although it means that we don’t need to worry about ensuring the standard contents for notices are covered, it does mean that it is not something we can simply upload to a website and tell creditors where to find it.
  • The Rule states it must be “in the first communication”, so again uploading it to a website will not work.
  • “Communication” does not mean just by letter – if we are emailing a creditor on appointment (e.g. an MVL director owed a DLA balance), we need to ensure the information is “in” the email. Incidentally, personally I think that this Rule must only apply to written communication, not oral, as you cannot provide information “in writing” in your first telephone conversation.
  • The Rule refers to our first communication “with a creditor”, so we need to think wider than just the first on-appointment circular to creditors as a body – if any creditors emerge later, we need to provide the opt-out information in our first communication with each of them (arguably once we have established that they are – or perhaps may be – a creditor).

 

It’s Raining “Deemed”s

Even under the 1986 Rules, the Administration processes caused problems. Now – in a world where we deal both with “deemed consent” and “deemed approval” – confusion truly is raining down.

  1. Deemed Approval

The 1986 Rules’ deemed approval process has continued largely unaltered. Thus, if the Administrator’s Proposals contain a Para 52(1) Statement, you’re still looking at a “deemed approval” process:

  • The Administrator does not ask creditors to approve the Proposals.
  • Creditors are simply provided the Proposals and given 8 business days (from delivery, which is a change from the 1986 Rules) in which to request that a decision process be instigated.
  • If no (or insufficient) creditors respond within the time period, the Proposals are deemed approved.
  • This is not deemed consent.
  1. Deemed Consent

Deemed consent may be relevant where the Proposals do not include a Para 52(1) Statement.

In this case, the Administrator does ask creditors to approve the Proposals. This decision may be posed via a virtual meeting, correspondence (or electronic) vote, or by a Notice seeking Deemed Consent.

If we choose the deemed consent process, then we are asking creditors to make a decision “that the Administrator’s Proposals be approved”. Then, if no (or insufficient) creditors respond, the decision is made, i.e. the Proposals are actually approved – they’re not deemed approved, they are approved.

Does it matter?

Actually, probably not a great deal. A practical consequence is that different forms must be delivered to the Registrar of Companies:

  • If the Proposals have been “deemed approved”, you should use Form AM06, Notice of Approval (yep, that’s right: we were all accustomed to the Notice of Deemed Approval, but this no longer exists)
  • If the Proposals have actually been approved (by deemed consent or another decision process), you should use Form AM07, Notice of Creditor’s Decision (yep, the incorrect placing of the apostrophe gets under my skin too)

Interestingly, the case of Promontoria (Chestnut) Limited v Craig & Harold ([2017] EWHC 2405 (Ch)) (http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2017/2405.html) illustrates that the confusion is far wider than just with some IPs. Para 46 of this judgement states that the Administrators’ Proposals in this case were approved by deemed consent. However, the very next para, which refers to proposals containing a Para 52(1) Statement, states that the Proposals were “deemed approved”, but then the rest of para 47 is an argument about the status of proposals approved by deemed consent. What a mess!

 

Eclipsing the 2015 Fees Rules

RPB monitors seem unanimous in their recent messages, with which I concur: all this focus on the 2016 Rules seems to have had a detrimental effect on the general standards of compliance with the fees rules that were introduced in October 2015.

Unfortunately of course, if we don’t meet the fees rules and the decision-making rules, there could be serious consequences. So, while you may discover that an ICR, self cert or monitoring visit reveals 101 things to fix, I think that realistically many of us would do well to prioritise our efforts to fix the fundamentals of fee-approval for some time to come. After all, the 21st century is all about risk management 😉


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Two old(ish) debates: S100 fees decisions and old rules IVAs

 

Firstly, I should warn you: if you find my singular views often wind you up, you might want to skip this post. Here, I air what I suspect are unpopular opinions about two New Rules issues that have been doing the rounds over the past few months: (1) can fees decisions be taken by means of a correspondence vote set to run concurrently with a S100 deemed consent decision; and (2) to what extent do the 2016 Rules apply to IVAs that were approved before 6 April 2017 or that have been approved since then but with terms that refer to 1986 Rules?


 

1. Correspondence votes running concurrently with S100 deemed consent decisions

The Problem with S100 Deemed Consent Decisions

As we know, the deemed consent process cannot be used “to make a decision about the remuneration of any person” and the Insolvency Service has confirmed on its Rules blog that this applies to decisions approving the payment of any SoA/S100 fee. Therefore, unless you are paid the SoA/S100 fee before the liquidation begins, at some stage you will need to instigate a qualifying decision procedure to seek approval and of course you will also want to seek approval of your fees as liquidator at some point.

If these decisions cannot be posed via the S100 deemed consent process, what do you do? Do you wait until after your appointment has been confirmed via the S100 process and then seek a decision, e.g. via a correspondence vote? Or can you instigate a correspondence vote before your appointment? After all, doesn’t R18.16(10) provide for a “proposed liquidator” in a CVL to deliver information on their fees to creditors and doesn’t the table at R15.11(1) refer to “decisions of creditors for appointment of liquidator (including any decision made at the same time on the liquidator’s remuneration)”?

 

The Problems with Pre-Appointment Correspondence Votes

  1. Signing the Notice of Decision Procedure

Can the proposed liquidator sign the notice convening the proposed decision by correspondence? I don’t see any rule empowering a proposed liquidator to act as “convener” of such a process.  Could a director sign the notice?  R6.14 empowers a director to sign a notice for a decision by deemed consent or virtual meeting, but that’s all.  The rules do not appear to empower a director to sign a notice for correspondence vote.

Do the rules need to empower someone to sign such a notice? Isn’t it sufficient that they don’t say that it cannot be done?

It is true that “convener” is defined as an office holder or other person who seeks a decision in accordance with Part 15 of the Rules… but that is simply a definition. To view this definition as giving free rein for any old decision under Part 15 seems a nonsense to me.  If a proposed liquidator or director (other than as provided for under R6.14) were entitled to convene any decision procedure they liked, then this entitlement could surely extend to any “other person”, e.g. a creditor, shareholder, company agent/adviser, receiver… Surely it cannot be open to just anyone to instigate a decision procedure on anything, can it?

Ok, what about if the members had already appointed a liquidator? Could the liquidator sign a notice of decision procedure if he had already been appointed in a Centrebind process? I think the difficulty here is S166(2), which restricts the liquidator’s powers before the S100 decision. The only powers the liquidator can exercise at this time are those in S166(3) and I do not think that instigating a decision procedure on fees falls into the categories of taking control of or protecting company property and disposing of perishable/diminishing-value goods.

  1. Clashing timelines (1)

Setting aside the issue above about who signs the notices, I think there are other reasons why the concurrent correspondence vote for fees pre-S100 does not work: the impossible statutory timelines governing these processes.

R15.11(1) sets the notice period of 3 business days for the S100 decision on the appointment of the liquidator and “any decision made at the same time on the liquidator’s remuneration”.  If the S100 decision is sought by deemed consent and a fees decision is sought by a correspondence vote, two processes are set in motion. That’s fine so far: you could set both processes going with the same decision date, say 14 September. With R15.11(1) in mind, let’s “deliver” the notices on 8 September, to give a clear 3 business days’ notice.

If a >10% creditor objects to the deemed consent decision, then that process terminates and the director must now convene a physical meeting for the purpose of seeking the S100 decision on the appointment of a liquidator. But what happens to the correspondence vote process? This is a different process altogether, so it seems to me that it keeps on going.

But does this create a problem? Yes, I think so. As I mentioned, R15.11(1) sets the notice period for a “decision made at the same time” as the S100 decision at 3 business days, but the correspondence vote decision has now deviated from the S100 decision; the decisions will no longer be made at the same time. However, the notice period for correspondence votes not made at the same time as a S100 decision is 14 days, so in hindsight the liquidator/director has failed to provide enough notice for the correspondence vote. Does this mean that the correspondence vote decision is invalid? Could you abandon the correspondence vote process? There doesn’t seem to be any power in the rules to postpone or cancel a correspondence vote process once started (unless it is terminated by reason of a physical meeting request).

Ok, so one solution might be to make sure that the correspondence vote is arranged with at least 14 days’ notice in any event, so that you don’t fall foul of the notice period if the two processes were to diverge. That may be so, but surely the fact that you could breach the statutory notice period in hindsight in this way is an indication that it was not envisaged that the rules would provide that two independent processes could run concurrently with a shorter notice period.

  1. Clashing timelines (2)

Returning to the example above: notices of a S100 deemed consent decision and a correspondence vote are delivered on 8 September with decision dates of 14 September. What happens if a >10% creditor submits a request for a physical meeting on 15 September? That’s a silly question, you may think, surely they are out of time as the decisions have been made.

I would agree that they out of time for the S100 decision, because R6.14(6)(a) states that “such a request may be made at any time between the delivery of the notice… and the decision date”. However, are they out of time for the correspondence vote? As the correspondence vote for fees is not provided for in R6.14, it would have a deadline for physical meeting requests of 5 business days from the date of delivery of the notice (R15.6(1)). Therefore, notwithstanding that the decision date had already passed, it seems that the creditor’s physical meeting request could impact the proposed fees decision. That’s nonsense, you say. I would agree, so I believe this is another reason why the rules could not have been intended to provide for a correspondence vote to run concurrently with a S100 deemed consent process.

Ok, what if you followed the same solution suggested above: convene the correspondence vote with at least 14 days’ notice? Wouldn’t this easily accommodate the 5 business days timescale for requesting a physical meeting? Yes, I suppose it could, but imagine then that you received a request for a physical meeting on business day 6. What would be the consequence: would you consider that the request only stopped the S100 liquidator decision, whereas the correspondence vote on fees could continue to its original decision date? Interesting… so the S100 physical meeting could decide on a different liquidator, who would take office with an already-approved fees decision in which he had taken no part. That would be odd!

 

So where does this leave correspondence votes running concurrently with a S100 deemed consent decision?

I think that, for these reasons, concurrent correspondence votes just do not work: the statutory timescales throw up all sorts of impossible or at least risky scenarios, but more fundamentally there is no one empowered by the rules to sign the notice of decision procedure.

 

But then why do the rules allow proposed liquidators to issue fees-related information?

I believe this is because a fees decision could be proposed pre-appointment: via a S100 virtual – or indeed, where required, a physical – meeting.

Such meetings do not suffer any of the problems described above:

  • the notice of the meeting decision procedure is signed by the director under R6.14;
  • the fees decision(s) can be proposed and made at the meeting “at the same time” as the S100 liquidator decision and therefore the fees decisions can be sought on 3 business days’ notice;
  • there is no possibility of the S100 liquidator decision and the fees decisions diverging, because a S100 virtual meeting can only be stalled by a physical meeting request (not also by a deemed consent objection) and this would terminate the virtual meeting process set up to consider all the decisions; and
  • as the fees decisions have been proposed via a notice of decision procedure issued under R6.14(2)(b), the deadline for requests for a physical meeting is set by R6.14(6), which would apply to all decisions proposed for consideration at the virtual meeting.
  • The possibility of proposing fees decisions via a S100 virtual/physical meeting also makes sense of R18.16(10), because in order for the creditors to consider a fees decision at the meeting, the proposed liquidator needs to send the fees-relevant information beforehand.

 

Haven’t we been here before?

I accept that my concerns above are purely technical. I am reminded that so too was the debate that arose in October 2015 about whether IPs could issue fee-related information before they were appointed liquidators so that fees resolutions could be considered at the S98 meetings. It seemed to me that the profession quickly became divided into two camps: those who took comfort in Dear IP 68 that stated that the intention was not to preclude pre-appointment fee estimates and those who, notwithstanding the clarification of such intention, chose to avoid falling foul of an apparent technicality in the rules by seeking fee approval only after appointment. The 2016 Rules – R18.16(10) referred to above – have resolved that old issue, but we now have a different set of technicalities affecting attempts to seek fee approval by S100-concurrent correspondence votes.

Can we expect the regulators to clarify their intentions and regulatory expectations on this question? We can only hope! However, if the answer were on the lines of Dear IP 68 (i.e. the rules might not exactly say this, but this is what we intended), then would this help or would we, without a legislative fix, still be left to choose between two camps? I hasten to add that I have no idea on which side of the fence the regulators might fall on this new question in any event.

 

Are the issues only about the technical?

In exploring the above issues with people at the Insolvency Service and the IPA, both have raised concerns – aside from the purely technical – about the appropriateness of proposing decisions on liquidators’ fees before appointment.

I understand that there are concerns about the huge amount of documentation – the Statement of Affairs, SIP6 information, fees and expenses related information – that creditors would be expected to absorb and vote on potentially in less than 3 business days. There seems to be slightly less concern attaching to fee-approval sought via a S100 virtual meeting, I think because this is seen to provide creditors with a forum in which to explore matters in an attempt to assess the reasonableness of fee requests. However, I believe there are also concerns about how IPs can put forward a reasoned and justifiable case for post-appointment fees before they have got stuck into the appointment.

There are clearly lots of factors to weigh up here, factors that may impact more than simply the rights and wrongs of correspondence votes running concurrently with S100 deemed consent decisions. In view of the serious ramifications of getting fees decisions wrong, I do hope that the regulators put their heads above the parapet and tell us all their views on these matters soon.


 

2. VAs incorporating 1986 Rules

The Problems with VAs based on 1986 Rules: the story so far

The issue I’ve blogged about before (https://insolvencyoracle.com/2017/05/02/new-rules-emerging-interpretations-part-1/) is: how far should you apply the 2016 Rules as regards VAs that incorporate 1986 Rules?

Dear IP 76 contains the following statements by the Insolvency Service:

  • the IVA Protocol’s Standard Terms’ reference to calling meetings “in accordance with the Act and the Rules” means the amended Act and the 2016 Rules;
  • the Act and 2016 Rules “remain silent on how decisions are taken” in VAs;
  • supervisors should not “feel restricted to only using a physical meeting”; and
  • the Insolvency Service “expect[s] supervisors to take advantage of the new and varied decision making procedures”.

I blogged my concerns about these statements:

  • If calling meetings “in accordance with the Act and the Rules” means the new provisions, which are indeed silent as regards meetings in approved VAs, then we must look to the statutory provisions for Trustees, because paragraph 4(3) of the Protocol Standard Terms states that supervisors should “apply the provisions of the Act and Rules in so far as they relate to bankruptcy with necessary modifications”. Therefore, does this mean that in fact a supervisor is prohibited from calling a physical meeting by reason of S379ZA(2) in the same way as a Trustee is?
  • How can a term stating that “a supervisor may… summon and conduct meetings” equate to “a supervisor may seek a decision by, say, an electronic vote”?
  • Dear IP focused on the wording of the IVA Protocol, whereas I believe that consideration of the R3 Standard Terms leads to very different conclusions, because the R3 Standard Terms are almost entirely independent from any Act and Rules provisions.

However, after I’d blogged, R3 issued its own statement, which included:

“The current R3 Standard Conditions refer to ‘meetings of creditors’ rather than making specific reference to the Rules. R3 is also of the opinion that IPs are not restricted to using physical meetings of creditors only when seeking the views of creditors and that the full range of decision making procedures introduced by the new Rules are available to the supervisor. It could also be argued that section 379ZA of the Act which prevents physical meetings being held except in limited, defined circumstances, applies to existing arrangements…

“We are of the opinion that the current version of the Standard Conditions continues to be relevant and supervisors using the current version of the Standard Conditions for arrangements approved post 6 April 2017 should apply the new Rules when seeking decisions of creditors. For the avoidance of doubt however nominees may wish to seek their own legal advice on the wording to be used when seeking variations of the arrangement and supervisors may wish to seek their own legal advice on the procedures to be followed for decisions of creditors to be taken on arrangements approved before the introduction of the new Rules.”

My problems with R3’s Statement

R3’s statement floored me. Not only did it repeat what I consider are the Insolvency Service’s flawed arguments, but in view of the wording of R3’s Standard Conditions for IVAs, it gave me even more reasons to disagree:

  • Again, how can the R3 Standard Conditions’ “meetings of creditors” be translated to mean “the full range of decision making procedures”, especially as the R3 Standard Conditions do not make specific reference to the Rules? That is, the R3 Standard Conditions contain the entire process of calling and holding a meeting, which is not dependent on any Rules, and so what entitles a supervisor of an IVA incorporating the R3 Conditions to walk away from those Conditions and decide to do something completely different contained in Rules, which are “silent” on VA processes?
  • I am doubtful that S379ZA “applies to existing arrangements” that incorporate the R3 Standard Conditions. The reason why I blogged that S379ZA(2) might apply to Protocol IVAs is because the Protocol Standard Terms refer to calling meetings “in accordance with the Act and the Rules”, but these words are missing from R3’s Standard Conditions. S379ZA(1) states that the section “applies where, for the purpose of this Group of Parts, a person seeks a decision from an individual’s creditors about any matter”. The “Group of Parts” comprises Ss251A to 385, but as we all know this Group of Parts does not refer to a decision to vary an IVA (it only speaks of approving the IVA). Therefore, how can S379ZA, which prevents physical meetings from being held unless requested by creditors, apply to already-approved IVAs incorporating R3’s Standard Conditions? I appreciate that R3 has only stated that “it could… be argued”, but is it responsible to give some weight to such a feather-light argument?
  • I am also not persuaded that “supervisors using the current version of the Standard Conditions for arrangements approved post 6 April 2017 should apply the new Rules when seeking decisions of creditors” because of the principles in the case set out below.
  • (And, if I wanted to be really picky, I’d question what “nominees” have to do with varying arrangements!)

 

William Hare Ltd v Shepherd Construction Ltd

In the case of in William Hare Ltd v Shepherd Construction Ltd [2009] EWHC 1603 (TCC) (25 June 2009), a subcontractor (“H”) was engaged in December 2008 to carry out some work for the main contractor (“S”). The sub-contract defined the employer’s insolvency with reference to: the appointment of an administrative receiver, insolvent liquidation, winding-up by court order and “an administration order made by the court”.

When the employer was placed into administration, S issued notices withholding payment. H argued that, because the employer had gone into administration via a directors’ appointment and not via a court administration order, the withholding notices were invalid, as the employer had not gone insolvent according to the sub-contract’s definition. S argued that it would be absurd for the sub-contract to be construed as ignoring the later amendments to the 1986 Act and that all routes to administration under the 1986 Act as amended were covered by the wording of the sub-contract.

The judge was “in no doubt” that H’s construction of the sub-contract was to be preferred and he held that the court should not rewrite the sub-contract to allow for the amendments to the 1986 Act. His reasons included the following:

  • The meaning of the words was plain and there was no reason to believe that the parties did not intend to use the words as they were written or that they had made a mistake in using the words. In contrast, S’s construction involved “a significant rewording of the clause”.
  • The sub-contract had been made long after the Act had been amended. In this case, the parties agreed that they must be deemed to have known about the amendments to the Act when they made the sub-contract. “In these circumstances it is appropriate to view the failure to amend clause 32 as a choice, as a deliberate decision to include one particular method of administration.”
  • If it were needed, the principle of contra proferentem – that, when there is doubt about the meaning of a contract term, the words may be construed against the person who put them forward – supported H’s construction.
  • Because the sub-contract was executed after the change in the legislation, sections 17 and 23 of the Interpretation Act 1978 (which incidentally are the provisions that Dear IP cited in support of the opinion that the 2016 Rules replaced the 1986 Rules in the Protocol Terms, because they refer to the 1986 Rules “as amended”) were not relevant.

 

The relevance of this case to New IVAs using Old Rules Terms

Say, you are a supervisor of an IVA that was approved last week and the IVA Proposal incorporates R3’s current Standard Terms (or indeed any Terms) that continue to refer throughout to the 1986 Rules.

Surely the principles in the case above cast serious doubt on whether you are free to translate those 1986 Rules into 2016 Rules, don’t they? You, as the debtor’s adviser, had deliberately put forward a Proposal that refers to 1986 Rules in the knowledge that the Rules have changed and it seems that the Interpretation Act 1978, which was the backbone of the Insolvency Service’s argument set out in Dear IP 76, is of no effect. Therefore, is there not a strong argument that you intended to incorporate 1986 Rules into the IVA?

I think also about the debtor and unsophisticated creditors: based on the Terms, they might expect a meeting of creditors in order to vary the Proposal, so what could their reaction be if they were to receive notice of a correspondence vote or perhaps even a notice seeking deemed consent? It seems to me that, if you were to say: “ah yes but the 2016 Rules changed things”, I might respond: “yes, but those changes happened in April, so why did you produce Terms after this that still referred to creditors’ meetings?”

 

Maybe I should accept that the Emperor is wearing clothes!

I have no doubt that the Insolvency Service and R3 have opinions backed up with legal advice. Of course, I am not suggesting for one moment that their statements should be ignored, but I feel I must say things as I see them. I am also not the only one who believes that the InsS and R3 have got this one wrong. I am not surprised therefore that R3 refers to seeking legal advice. No one can be certain how a challenge in court would pan out.

But in practice does the answer to this question really matter? If debtors, creditors and supervisors are happy to consider agreeing variations proposed in a manner that is not strictly according to the Terms, who is going to challenge it? Presumably also the RPBs aren’t going to take a different tack to that set out in Dear IP. And even if a debtor were to dispute the soundness, say, of a creditors’ decision to terminate an IVA, maybe the court would conclude that it was simply a technicality that has no real practical effect on the majority creditors’ wishes… but nevertheless it could make for an expensive debate.


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Emerging Interpretations of the New Rules – Part 1: the biggies

Along with Dear IP 76, the Insolvency Service’s Rules blog has been a fascinating read. If you don’t fancy trawling through all 148 comments, here are my personal favourites. There are too many to cover in one go, so I’ll start here with a handful of the more contentious:

  • How do the New Rules affect existing VAs?
  • What is the deadline for forcing a S100 physical meeting?
  • What happens if a Centrebind is longer than 14 days?
  • How should you handle decisions sought from preferential creditors alone?
  • How should creditors comply with the Rules when submitting notices and forms?

 

I’ll also take this opportunity to reflect on how these emerging interpretations and the Amendment Rules have impacted on my previous blog posts. I have tried to update old blog posts as time has moved on, but I cannot promise that old blog posts – or indeed this one – will remain current. Things are moving fast.

Dear IPs can be found at: https://goo.gl/wn8Vog (although no. 76 has yet to appear)

The Insolvency Service’s Rules blog is at: https://theinsolvencyrules2016.wordpress.com/

 

Can we rely on the Insolvency Service’s answers?

Nick Howard’s introduction to Dear IP 76 states candidly “While it is only a Court that can give a binding interpretation of the law, the enclosed article sets out the policy intentions and how we believe the Rules support those”. That’s understandable. Much as we thirst for a cut-and-dried answer, we cannot have it. Just like the 1986 Rules, it will take decades to establish robust interpretations and even then there will always be the Minmar-like decision that takes us by surprise.

  • What about the Rules blog?

To be fair, the Service provided it with the purpose “to offer users the chance to share their thoughts and experiences as they prepare for commencement” of the Rules. It was never meant to be an inquisition of the Insolvency Service, but it was inevitable that it would turn out that way and I am very grateful that the Service has grasped the nettle and been prepared to post their views publicly for the benefit of us all.

  • So what comfort can we draw from the answers?

At the very least, the Service’s explanations are extremely valuable in understanding how they meant the Rules to work and in giving us all a starting point. I wonder if it could be seen a bit like the new mantra, “comply or explain”: if we don’t trust an answer, we need to be certain that our reasons for departing from it are well-founded. And at the very best, the Service has provided explanations that make us say: “right, yes I can see that. Thanks, I’ll work on that basis”.

 

What are the New Rules’ Impacts on Existing VAs?

The difficulty for the Insolvency Service – and indeed for all of us – is that of course each VA is dependent on its own Proposals and Standard Terms & Conditions (“STC”), so expressing any opinion on the effect of the New Rules on VAs in general is going to be dangerous.

  • The difference between IVA Protocol and R3 STCs

The majority of IVAs use either the IVA Protocol or R3’s STC, so you might think it would be relatively straightforward at least to establish some ground rules for these two documents and then leave each IP to determine whether the Proposal itself has any overriding effect. Dear IP seems to have made a stab at this in relation to the IVA Protocol at least. However, I think it is important to bear in mind that Dear IP makes no mention of R3’s STCs and from what I can see there is a chasm of difference in how the two STCs have incorporated the 1986 Rules.

True, both STCs define the “Rules” as the Insolvency Rules 1986 as amended and the Service makes the case for equating this to the 2016 Rules. I have heard argument that the Service’s reliance on S17 of the Interpretation Act 1978 does not stack up: if a contract – which is what we’re talking about here – refers to Rx.xx of the Insolvency Act 1986 (as amended), does it not remain as such notwithstanding that the 1986 Rules have been revoked?

This takes me to the chasm between the two sets of STC: for example, the IVA Protocol STC state that “The Supervisor may… summon and conduct meetings of creditors… in accordance with the Act and the Rules” (19(1)), whereas the R3 STC describe in detail how to convene meetings and conduct postal resolutions with no reference to the Act or Rules. Therefore, personally I am struggling to see how the 2016 Rules affect existing VAs’ methods of seeking creditors’ agreements where those VAs are based on the R3 STC. However, I also question whether the R3 STC restrict meetings to physical ones – when I read the STC cold, I’m not persuaded that they don’t also work for virtual meetings (but then again, don’t most meetings happen only on paper anyway?) – so it seems to me that the R3 STC may allow a variety of routes but, thankfully, without all the baggage that the 2016 Rules carry with them, which may load down Protocol IVAs in view of their vague reference to “in accordance with the Act and the Rules”.

  • Does Dear IP make the IVA Protocol position clear?

It’s Dear IP’s treatment of the Protocol STC’s wording, “The Supervisor may… summon and conduct meetings of creditors… in accordance with the Act and the Rules”, that puzzles me. On the one hand, Dear IP acknowledges that the Act and Rules “remain silent on how decisions are taken once in (sic.) a voluntary arrangement is in place”… so they seem to be saying that the Act and Rules are irrelevant to a supervisor looking to call a meeting. But then Dear IP says: “we do not believe [supervisors] should feel restricted to only using a physical meeting. We expect supervisors to take advantage of the new and varied decision making procedures that are available under the Act as amended and the 2016 Rules”.

But how possibly can the phrase, “the supervisor may summon and conduct meetings of creditors”, morph into for example: “the supervisor may seek a decision by means of a correspondence vote”? This is too much of a stretch, isn’t it? Rather than be meant as a comment on the application of the 2016 Rules to existing VAs, perhaps the Service is simply stating that it would like IPs to incorporate the various processes in future VA Proposals and STC, don’t you think?

Because the Act and Rules in themselves do not empower supervisors to seek decisions, does this mean that the Protocol STC’s words “in accordance with the Act and the Rules” are redundant? Or are these words supposed to mean that the supervisor should “apply the provisions of the Act and Rules in so far as they relate to bankruptcy with necessary modifications”, as paragraph 4(3) of the Protocol STC states? Ok, if the latter is the case, then what is the effect of S379ZA(2), i.e. that a trustee cannot summon a physical meeting unless sufficient creditors request one? This would seem to take us far from the Dear IP position where supervisors should not “feel restricted to only using a physical meeting”.

For these reasons, I think the Dear IP is horribly muddled. Perhaps the IVA Standing Committee might like to clarify the position in relation to their STC..?

 

What is the deadline for forcing a physical meeting in a S100 scenario?

This is another area that seems to have got horribly muddled. It seems to me that much of the confusion over this arises because of the conflating of two potential creditor responses: (i) a creditor can object to a decision sought by deemed consent; or (ii) a creditor can request a physical meeting. It is true that, when a S100 decision on the liquidator is sought by deemed consent, the consequence of either response is the same: a physical meeting is summoned. However, the Rules around each response are different.

  • The deadline for objections

R15.7(2)(a) states that the notice seeking deemed consent must contain “a statement that in order to object to the proposed decision a creditor must have delivered a notice, stating that the creditor so objects, to the convener not later than the decision date”. “Not later than the decision date” must surely mean that objections delivered on the decision date are valid (note: although this rule only specifies what must appear in a notice, S246ZF(4) makes clear that “the procedure set out in the notice” is binding).

  • The deadline for physical meeting requests

For a S100 decision, R6.14(6)(a) states that “a request [for a physical meeting] may be made at any time between the delivery of the notice… and the decision date”. I have heard argument that “between” excludes the days at each end, which would mean that the deadline for requests would be the end of the day before the decision date. At first, I was persuaded by this interpretation, given that, if I were to count how many people in a queue were between me and the ticket office, I would not include myself in the number… but then someone asked me to pick a number between 1 and 10..!

This interpretation of “between” also makes little sense when considering R15.4(b), which states that an electronic voting system must be “capable of enabling a creditor to vote at any time between the notice being delivered and the decision date”… so the IP isn’t interested in votes cast on the decision date then..?

  • The Insolvency Service’s policy intentions

How does Dear IP pull these threads together? It states: “The policy intention (in all cases) is that a request for a physical meeting must arrive before the decision date. The policy intention with regard to electronic voting is that creditors may cast their votes up until the decision closes (i.e. 23:59 on the decision date). We believe that the 2016 Rules are capable of supporting both these policy intentions.”

The Insolvency Service appears blinkered in their statement that the 2016 Rules support the policy intention, because they simply focus on requests for a physical meeting. Irrespective of how “between” is interpreted, the fact is that a deemed consent can be objected to up to 23.59 on the decision date and such an objection would force a physical meeting. Therefore, a members’-appointed liquidator will still be left in the position of not knowing whether there will be a last-minute objection that will force an unexpected c.week-long Centrebind.

 

What happens if a Centrebind is longer than 14 days?

I feel I should apologise for wasting people’s time in explaining (via this blog (https://goo.gl/hikYKr), R3 presentations and our webinars) the risks that a Centrebind could last longer than 14 days if material transactions need to be reported or a physical meeting needs to be convened.

  • The Insolvency Service’s simple answer

The Insolvency Service gave the simple answer on their blog that “it is sufficient that the original decision date was within the required timescale”. In other words, provided that the convener fixed the decision date for the S100 deemed consent process or the virtual meeting not later than 14 days after the winding-up resolution, it is of no consequence that this decision date falls away because the date of a consequent physical meeting falls outside this timescale.

I find the Insolvency Service’s answer startling. Personally, I would expect the Rules to make explicit that it is the original S100 decision date that matters, in the same way as Para 51(2) uses the expression “initial decision date” when setting down the 10-week deadline for Administrators to seek approval of their proposals (i.e. Para 51(3) explicitly provides that Administrators do not get into a pickle if creditors reject a decision by deemed consent and then the Administrator convenes another decision process with this second decision date falling outside the 10 weeks).

  • Can this principle apply also to VA Proposal decision dates?

What about the other instance when an important decision date deadline must be met: the approval of an IVA Proposal? R8.22(7) states that this decision date must be not more than 28 days from the date on which the nominee received the Proposal (or when the nominee’s report was considered by the court). Given that 14 days’ notice is required, it would be very possible for a physical meeting decision date to be outside this timescale. Would it matter as long as the original decision date was inside it? The Rules do not address this point, but neither do they address the unintended Centrebind position.

Much as my heart’s cockles are warmed by the Insolvency Service’s answer, personally I would be nervous in relying on it.

 

How do you deal with preferential creditors’ decisions?

The Insolvency Service’s answers on this topic are eminently sensible and I am more than happy to live with them… but it’s just that I cannot help but continue to ask myself: “yes, but where does it say that?”

The questions surround the New Rules’ defined process for seeking prefs’ approval of matters such as the Administrators’ fees. Exactly how do you conduct a decision procedure of prefs alone?

Firstly, what do you do with pref creditors who have been paid in full? R18.18(4) states that pref creditors must make a decision on fees, if the Administrator “has made or intends to make a distribution” to prefs (in a Para 52(1)(b) case). This would seem to include prefs who have been paid in full, but R15.11 excludes them from receiving notice of the decision procedure.

But, actually, what do we mean when we refer to pref creditors being paid in full? Usually we mean that the pref element of their claim has been paid in full, but often they will still have a non-pref unsecured claim. How do you calculate a pref creditor’s value for voting purposes?

R15.31(1)(a) states that, in an administration, votes are calculated “according to the amount of each creditor’s claim as at the date on which the company entered administration, less any payments that have been made to the creditor after that date in respect of the claim”.

  • Another simple answer from the Insolvency Service

The Insolvency Service’s answer to these questions was: “Our interpretation is that [R15.31(1)(a)] would lead an administrator to consider the value of outstanding preferential claims at the date that the vote takes place. This would only include the preferential element of claims, and if these had been paid in full then the administrator would not be expected to seek a decision from those creditors.”

Personally, I don’t see that R15.31(1)(a) gets us anywhere: it doesn’t state that a creditor’s claim is only its preferential element when a decision procedure is only open to pref creditors and it doesn’t state that you do not need to seek a decision from pref creditors who have been paid their pref elements in full… but in all other respects I like the Service’s answers!

 

Do creditors need to get forms absolutely correct?

There is no denying that the 2016 Rules have placed a heavier burden on us all to get the details correct. Many things that we were used to doing in simple text form are now described as “notices” and every statutory notice must include “standard contents”, which often require the addition of new detail such as insolvents’ company registered numbers or residential addresses.

  • The validity of old proofs of debt

In many cases, creditors are not spared these requirements. For example, the prescriptive detail of proofs of debt – R14.4 – is quite different from the old requirements. If you are adjudicating on pre-April proofs, can you accept them for dividend purposes? Indeed, can you rely on a Notice of Intended Dividend process commenced before 6 April?

As regards the need for creditors to submit new proofs to meet the New Rules’ requirements, the Insolvency Service answered: “Section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978 may be relied upon here, and proofs which have already been submitted do not become invalidated.”

Incidentally, S16 of the Interpretation Act 1978 states that a “repeal does not, unless the contrary intention appears… affect the previous operation of the enactment repealed or anything duly done or suffered under that enactment [or] affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under that enactment”, so does this help as regards NoIDs? Are IPs safe to rely on old NoIDs as protecting them from late creditors? This wasn’t the question put to the Service, but it would seem to me the only way the New Rules could possibly work.

However, I’m not quite sure how S16 helps IPs decide now whether to admit an old proof for dividend purposes, when surely they must measure proofs against the New Rules, mustn’t they? But, realistically, what could an old proof possibly be lacking that might struggle to get it admitted under the New Rules?

  • Providing the detail required for new proofs

I asked the Service about the requirement for a proof to be authenticated. R1.5(3) states that “if a document is authenticated by the signature of an individual on behalf of… a body corporate of which the individual is the sole member, the document must also state that fact”. If a creditor failed to state this on a proof, would it render the proof invalid? And, if so, does this obligate office holders to check this point?

Alternatively, does R1.9(1)(b) help us all out? This rule states that “where a rule sets out the required contents of a document, the document may depart from the required contents if… the departure (whether or not intentional) is immaterial”.

The Insolvency Service’s answer was: “The extent to which an office-holder could rely on rule 1.9(1)(b) here would be a matter for them to decide, possibly in liaison with their regulatory body.” I can understand why the Service was not tempted to put their neck on the block on this question, but it does demonstrate to me the nonsensical nature of the New Rules: they set out prescriptive detail of what must be provided… then add a rule that states it’s okay if a departure is “immaterial”. Why put prescriptive immaterial requirements in the Rules in the first place?!

  • Do creditors need to meet the notice requirements?

I felt a similar irritation when I read Dear IP’s article, “Do creditors’ notices have to comply with standard content”, for example when creditors object to a decision sought by deemed consent. The Service seems to be implying that the answer is no: “if it is clear what the creditor is seeking in their notice, it should be accepted”. Again, this leaves me wondering: if a creditor is free to run a red light, why put the lights up in the first place?

Having said that, R1.9(1)(b) might be a useful one to remember the next time the RPB monitors call… although we might expect some debating over what is “immaterial”.

  • The detail (not) required for proxy forms

I think it is also worth mentioning here the observation made on the Service’s blog at the lack of prescription when it comes to proxy forms. The Service explained that “the requirement to authenticate [a proxy form] was removed as a deregulatory measure, because authentication does not confer legitimacy. As long as the office-holder is satisfied that the proxy comes from the creditor then the requirements for submission are met.” So a creditor must sign a hard copy proof but need not sign a proxy form. Well, fancy that!

 

In my next post, I’ll set out some other nuggets gleaned from the Insolvency Service’s blog.


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Navigating Obstacles: S100s for Work-Winners

I suspect that many of you (like me) have heard plenty of theory on the New Rules’ decision-making changes. Maybe reading it from the practical perspective of the work-winner will give it a freshness.

Some non London-centric IPs who missed out on my recent presentation for R3 expressed disappointment, so I thought a blog post was warranted. Here I have concentrated only on the S100 process.

 

S100 CVLs: Deemed Consent or Virtual Meeting?

Before we start thinking about what we might discuss with directors, I think it’s worth weighing up the pros and cons of the two possible routes in to a CVL appointment… well, apart from a physical meeting, of course, but a physical meeting might be required whichever initial decision process we start with.

  • Material Transactions

The rules don’t define a material transaction, but they do say that (R6.17):

“where the statement of affairs sent to creditors… does not, or will not, state the company’s affairs at the creditors’ decision date, the directors must cause a report… to be made to the creditors… on any material transactions relating to the company occurring between the date of the making of the statement and the decision date”.

That sounds to me like it’s any transaction that changes the SoA, but the InsS people I’ve spoken to don’t see this as wrapping in, say, changes in asset class where book debts are converted into cash at bank or where a forgotten van pops up. They say they intended the rule to ensure that creditors learn of events that might impact on the independence of the proposed liquidator, i.e. things that happened with his involvement or since his appointment in Centrebind cases.

Personally, I found this interpretation most surprising, as it’s really not what the rules say – and I’d love to get this down in writing from the InsS, as I think it’ll make a huge difference to the frequency of material transactions.  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: Dear IP 76 simply states that a New Rules’ material transaction “is the same as 1986 rules 4.53B-CVL(1) and should be interpreted as such”… so we’re on our own on this one.)

So why should it matter?

Well, it won’t matter if you’re having a meeting, because you’d just report the material transaction to the meeting – it’s in our rules now, but it is never done (well I’ve never seen it done) because the SoA is usually signed off minutes before the meetings.

But it will matter if you’re working with the Deemed Consent process.

In this case, you must send out the report to creditors and if the report is delivered within 3 business days of the Decision Date, then the decision date moves to the end of 3 business days from delivery of the report.

This could leave you either in an unexpected Centrebind or needing to adjourn the members’ meeting.

  • Fees Decisions – who knows?!

I have put question marks on the table above, as the rules are very unclear when it comes to proposing fees decisions around the S100 time. That’s so helpful, isn’t it? It’s not as if fees is something we need to get absolutely spot-on, is it..?!

The only thing we do know for certain is that Deemed Consent cannot be used for “a decision about the remuneration of any person” (S246ZF(2)). The rest is unclear.

Can you propose a fees decision via a correspondence vote to run concurrently with the S100 Deemed Consent process? I struggle with this, as I cannot see who has authority under the rules to “convene” such a Decision Procedure. The IP isn’t in office (and if he is the members’ liquidator, his limited powers do not extend to seeking fee approval) and the director only has the power to convene a decision by Deemed Consent or by virtual meeting.

Can fees decisions be considered at a virtual meeting? There is nothing in the rules that expressly addresses this, but at least the director does have the power to convene the virtual meeting. Is it not arguable that tagging on (pre and post) fees decisions corresponds to what we do with S98s now (especially as the New Rules expressly provide for the “proposed liquidator” to circulate fees information – R18.16(10))?

I have received conflicting opinions on the routes available from reliable sources. As the consequences of getting this wrong are so serious, I’m very reluctant to pass further comment and I do hope that the powers-that-be will put us all out of misery and tell us categorically – and before 6 April! – how/whether fees decisions can be made at the same time as the S100 decision, as R15.11(1) seems to suggest is possible… somehow.

  • Timing

The deadline for the Deemed Consent process is 1 minute to midnight. The disadvantage here is that you won’t be certain on the decision until the next morning. I get the sense that most IPs are planning to hold their members’ meeting on the day of the Deemed Consent process, but this will still leave us with an inescapable Centrebind – it may be for only a few hours, but it’s worth thinking about it for insurance purposes at least.

On the other hand, virtual meetings can be held at anytime – the old between-10-and-4 rule has not been repeated in the New Rules. However, the convener still needs to “have regard to the convenience of those invited to participate when fixing the venue for a decision procedure” (R15.10), so the virtual meeting’s timing and “platform” (which has been added to the definition of “venue”) is still a factor to consider.

  • Excluded Persons

The rules describe an excluded person as (R15.36):

“someone who has taken all steps necessary [to attend the meeting virtually or remotely, but the arrangements] do not enable that person to attend the whole or part of that meeting.”

In other words, the technology or signal for the virtual meeting has failed.

If the chair becomes aware of an excluded person, he can continue the meeting, suspend it for up to an hour, or adjourn it. If the chair decides to continue the meeting, resolutions can be taken and these will be valid but they’re subject to complaints from the excluded person or from any other attendee who claims they were prejudiced by the exclusion.

The timescale for complaints is short – before 4pm on the next business day from the meeting or from receipt of an “indication” of what occurred at the meeting – but the consequences can be far-reaching. The chair could review the voting and conclude that the excluded person’s vote overturns resolutions that had been thought passed.

Practically, where would this leave a liquidator who thought they were free to publicise their appointment and perhaps also to complete asset sales? I am not certain that these actions would be covered by the S232 defects-deemed-valid provision.

Clearly it is vital that office holders know where they stand immediately after a meeting, but how would they know whether there were any excluded persons? They may know if someone drops out of contact mid-stream, but what if someone could not get online in the first place? Obviously, this is a risk if the notice of the virtual meeting includes all the information necessary to attend… but is this what the Rules require?

R15.5 states that the notice to creditors must provide:

“any necessary information as to how to access the virtual meeting including any telephone number, access code or password required”

A couple of InsS people have told me that they believe that simply giving out a contact number so that creditors can ask for the login details before the meeting would satisfy this Rule – it is “necessary information”, after all. Clearly, this would be a great help in identifying excluded persons as well as going some way to “safeguard[ing] against participation by persons who are not properly entitled to participate” (SIP6) and helping to plan for sufficient access to a virtual meeting. Hopefully the InsS will confirm this in writing when they respond to a question about this on their blog.  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: Dear IP 76 describes the Insolvency Service’s view as explained here.)

 

S100 CVLs: What Directors Need to Know

Please bear in mind that it has been a loooong time since I worked on the frontline. I do not feel worthy of explaining to IPs what they should discuss with directors pre-appointment. However, with the New Rules – and new SIP6 – in mind, here are my suggestions:

  • S100/SoA fees

With the lack of clarity in the Rules, you’ll probably want to get your fees paid upfront. But what happens if you have to convene a physical meeting? Who is going to pay for that? It might be an idea to factor this in to your engagement letter: make sure that it’s clear what the fixed fee covers and what effect the cost of an additional physical meeting might make.

  • Quick information

You’ll want to line the director up to providing information very quickly, given the short timeframes for compiling the SoA and the SIP6 report (see below).

  • Post-SoA material transactions

It might be helpful to make the directors aware of the consequences of any material transactions occurring after the SoA is produced. The risk of a postponement in the Decision Date might help them to focus on giving you the whole story and avoid doing anything silly in the hiatus period.

  • Postponed decisions

Material transactions or the need for a physical meeting will delay the S100 decision. If these events happen early enough, there might be a chance to adjourn the members’ meeting. But of course, if this happens, then the directors will be in control of the company for longer. What effect will this have on the CVL strategy?

You might also want to warn the director that they may need to attend a physical meeting. And will you be around for the physical meeting? Fortunately, the new rules have been relaxed a bit so that the members’ liquidator need not attend the physical meeting, he can appoint someone else in his stead (another IP or an experienced staff member), but if a physical meeting has been requested, then you might want to make sure you’re there.

  • SIP6 additions to engagement letters

The new SIP6 states that the assisting IP should “take reasonable steps to ensure that the convener is made fully aware of their duties and responsibilities”, so you may need to beef up your engagement letter to set out the director’s duties to take appropriate action as regards objections, requests for a physical meeting, material transactions and excluded persons, all of which are the convener’s/chair’s responsibilities; and to provide the SoA/SIP6 required information swiftly.

SIP6 also requires “reasonable steps to ensure that… the instructions to the IP to assist are adequately recorded”. I’m not sure what the RPBs are getting at here, other than expecting a signed engagement letter. Do they want you to have set out whether your instructions are to proceed with the Deemed Consent or the virtual meeting route? And/or should you specify that you’ll be assisting with assessing objections and requests for physical meetings?

Connected with this is SIP6’s requirement to “take reasonable steps to ensure that the convener and/or chair is informed that it may be appropriate for them to obtain independent assistance in determining the authenticity of a prospective participant’s authority or entitlement to participate and the amount for which they are permitted to do so in the event these are called into question”. This isn’t surprising given that something similar is in SIP8 regarding the conflict risk when counting proxies, but it may be a good idea to put it in your engagement letter if it isn’t already.

  • Excluded persons

Given the risk of excluded persons changing the outcome of meetings, you might want to be careful about what you indicate to directors that you plan to do on the day of, and the day after, the meeting.

 

S100 CVLs: The Unintended Centrebind

So what does the new S100 process look like? What needs to happen when?

Here is a timeline for a no-complication Deemed Consent, demonstrating the shortest notice possible:

A virtual meeting timeline would work the same, but it would just mean that you’d be able to schedule the meeting on Business Day 7 for a sensible time instead of a minute to midnight.

In particular, note the time needed to send the SoA and SIP6 report in order to accommodate delivery in time.  (UPDATE 23/03/17: it has been pointed out to me that SIP6 only requires the report to be “made available”, so some are interpreting this to mean that it does not have to be delivered to creditors (although the SoA still does need to be).)

But what if creditors object to the Deemed Consent at the last minute (i.e. after the members’ meeting had been held on business day 7)?

(UPDATE 23/03/17: it has been pointed out to me that requests for a physical meeting must be received “between the delivery of the notice and the decision date” (R6.14(6)) and thus it has been suggested that a physical meeting request received on the decision date will be too late. (UPDATE2 02/05/2017: the Insolvency Service’s view, as set out in Dear IP 76, is explored further in my post, https://goo.gl/ygnWjg.)  The deadline for deemed consent objections, however, is “not later than the decision date” (R15.7(2)), so I believe the timelines above and below are still relevant.)

You could fit the physical meeting within the statutory 14 calendar day timescale, provided that you can get the director to move quickly to convene it, but it would leave you managing an unintended Centrebind.

The picture looks grimmer if a material transaction occurs:

 

As you can see, there isn’t enough time to deal with a material transaction and a physical meeting.  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: the Insolvency Service has expressed the view on its blog that “it is sufficient that the original decision date was within the required timescale”.)

Virtual meetings avoid this issue, as the report on the material transaction would occur at the virtual meeting. It’s not the whole answer to avoiding a Centrebind, as creditors could still request a physical meeting, but at least it could be held within the 14 days.

 

There’s More

As I mentioned at the start, I’ve limited this blog post to S100 decisions only – it’s long enough already.

If you want to listen to my whole presentation, you can purchase it via The Compliance Alliance (£250+VAT for firm-wide access to all our webinars for a year) – just drop a line to info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk.

Other topics covered include:

  • The timeline of an intended Centrebind
  • S100s for the IP acting for creditors
  • VAs: correspondence vote or virtual meeting?
  • Creditors’ powers and the process to seek an IP appointment in bankruptcies and compulsories
  • Administrations: the pros and cons of seeking approval of Proposals by Deemed Consent or a decision procedure
  • How creditors can stay in the loop on communications


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New Rules, Part 15: Decisions, Decisions!

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More than one IP has asked me: ok, I know the New Rules pretty-much remove creditors’ meetings, but what’s all the fuss about? It gets me every time! Not only are the changes far more widespread than this, but also this change is hardly simple. It sounds simple though, doesn’t it: just replace all creditors’ resolutions with some kind of postal vote?

From what I believe was a desire to provide options – to creditors mainly, but also to directors and IPs – has evolved a web of overlapping timescales and feedback mechanisms, not to mention reams more information to creditors, which cannot fail to bamboozle and further dissuade them from engaging.

 

Decision 1: what type of decision do you have?

The SBEEA15 introduced the idea of two tiers of decisions (by the way, in our new world, there are few resolutions anymore, just decisions… although some decisions are made by resolution, if considered at a meeting, whether physical or virtual). There are decisions that can be made by Deemed Consent and others that must be made by a Qualifying Decision Procedure (although the New Rules drop the “Qualifying” bit). In the latter category are:

  • any “decision about the remuneration of any person” (S246ZE(2)); and
  • the acceptance of IVA and CVA Proposals.

So what decisions might be dealt with by Deemed Consent? The biggie is the appointment of a CVL Liquidator (you might also have thought about the appointment of an IP in court cases, but this involves first the removal of the incumbent OR – aha, now the reason for the change so that the OR becomes Trustee immediately on the order becomes clear, doesn’t it..?). Other Deemed Consent decisions could include several ADM items, e.g. extensions, discharge and even the Proposals themselves. But other than these, Deemed Consent is unlikely to get out much.

I think the Insolvency Service saw Deemed Consent being useful to office holders in seeking creditors’ approval to certain strategies, e.g. to commence litigation. I agree that this is a possibility, however the abolition of the statutory requirement to seek sanction to exercise many old Schedule powers has meant that more often than not IPs feel empowered to take such decisions in the interests of creditors in any event.

 

Decision 2: should you use Deemed Consent?

The key point to note about Deemed Consent is that, unless more than 10% in value of creditors (entitled to vote) positively object to the decision, then it is approved as proposed. If this proportion of creditors objects, then the IP has another bite of the cherry by proposing the decision by one of the other decision processes (excluding a physical meeting unless the proposed decision is for your CVL appointment).

There is a wrinkle: creditors who meet different criteria can respond by asking for a physical meeting, rather than (or in addition to) objecting to the decision proposed by Deemed Consent. If this happens, then the Insolvency Service has stated that the Deemed Consent process is superseded and the decision must be considered at a physical meeting. Personally, I have failed to spot where this consequence is set out in the rules, so I have asked the Service for clarification.

The thresholds for seeking a physical meeting are either 10% in value of creditors, 10% in number, or 10 creditors (the “10/10/10” criteria). (UPDATE 23/03/17: recently-issued Amendment Rules affect this, although their application is unclear.  I have blogged a question on the Insolvency Service’s blog.) This time, the criteria relate to all creditors, not just those entitled to vote. Thus it seems to me more than just a theoretic possibility that a creditor/s might reach the threshold to seek a physical meeting but fall short of the threshold to object to a Deemed Consent decision… hence the need, I believe, for the rules to be clear on the consequences of a request for a physical meeting.  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: the Insolvency Service has blogged: “The intention here is that the creditors that have an interest in the decision being taken are the ones who determine whether the costs of holding a physical meeting should be incurred. Therefore the convener would consider the value of the potential vote of the creditor(s) making the request, and compare them to the total value of the potential vote.”  Got that? 😉 )

Whilst there are potential complications, I think the Deemed Consent advantages are clear, especially where you need to seek approval from uninterested creditors, e.g. the ADM extension and discharge questions (although if you need secured creditors’ approval, silence from the unsecureds is only half the battle won).

What if you are seeking a CVL appointment, should you go for Deemed Consent? Well, one downside is that you will need to add on another decision procedure if you want to get your fees, including your pre-appointment fee, approved. However, if another IP starts showing an interest, they will first have to object to the Deemed Consent process before the scene is re-set to count votes on nominations. Granted however, it may mean that you’re looking at an unexpected Centrebind.

Another strange characteristic of seeking a CVL appointment by Deemed Consent is that, if unopposed, there is no statutory requirement for any pre-appointment Gazette notice – how odd is that?!

 

Decision 3: which other Decision Procedure might you use?

How else might you seek a decision? In the order that I think they will be used, the methods are:

  • vote by correspondence (no longer a “meeting” by correspondence and not defined in the rules);
  • virtual meeting (yes, cumbersome and in some respects risky, but the only way effectively to negotiate decisions);
  • electronic voting (hmm… maybe not for some time yet);
  • only if sufficient creditors request it, a physical meeting;
  • and A N Other process that none of us has yet thought up.

Virtual meetings are prepared for pretty-much as physical meetings are now: they require Gazetting and they involve proxy forms, which can be delivered anytime up to the start of the meeting in any case, no longer just for VA meetings. Proofs of debt also need to be delivered and, although there is a deadline of 4pm the business day before the meeting, there is also provision for the chair to accept late proofs, if he is “content”.

Of course, the obvious difference is finding an appropriate virtual meeting resource. From those who I know have been exploring this, I understand that there is no clear winner. Issues include: being able to identify attendees, especially when they join and leave, and being able to block access to people not entitled to attend. The main risk in holding a virtual meeting is that an “excluded person” (i.e. someone who tried to participate but could not through no fault of their own; say, they just happen to live in an area of the UK with unreliable broadband connections) can influence the decision after the meeting (assuming you did not decide to adjourn it). They are given a very short window of opportunity to complain that, had they participated, they would have swung the vote, but this is clearly not an uncertainty you want to be left with after a decision on your appointment or on a VA Proposal. There is also the practical uncertainty in knowing how many people are likely to want to join in to a virtual meeting: multi-party conference calls are exasperating at the best of times and the prospects of being surprised by a virtual room full of fired-up creditors doesn’t bear thinking about.

So should you go for a correspondence vote? Well, if you’re looking for a CVL appointment, it’s worth clocking now that this is not an option: Deemed Consent and virtual meeting are your only options. It is also worth remembering that the deadline for correspondence votes (and other non-meeting processes, including Deemed Consent) is one minute to midnight on your chosen day (the “Decision Date”), so we will have to get used to not knowing the outcome of a proposed decision until the day after… which could prove challenging if you’re trying to coordinate it alongside a members’ meeting. Correspondence votes need to be supported by proofs of debt submitted by the Decision Date and importantly, once a vote has been lodged, it cannot be changed. This makes correspondence vote a risky choice for VA Proposals, I think. I also wonder where correspondence votes will get us on fee approvals: if there is no negotiating possible, then will it result in an increase in court applications?

As with Deemed Consent, on receiving an invitation to a virtual meeting or to vote by another means, a creditor may react by asking for a physical meeting. They have 5 business days after delivery of the notice of the decision procedure in which to have delivered a request (but see Timetables below) and the 10/10/10 thresholds apply.

There is also no ability to ask creditors for a deposit as security for the costs of convening a physical meeting on request… unless it is a requisitioned decision (yes, there is a difference!). The latter may arise for example as a consequence of issuing Para 52 Proposals, although the rules allow you only to ask for the costs of seeking a “decision”, not a physical meeting… however it is not clear whether creditors could ask explicitly for a physical meeting at this stage (that’s another question to the Insolvency Service).  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: the Insolvency Service has blogged that they think it is reasonable to interpret the rules as allowing the creditor to request a physical meeting at the same time as requisitioning a decision, although they have also confirmed that the deposit sought should only be for requesting a decision, not holding a physical meeting.)

 

Invitations to Form a Committee

In all cases (except, strangely, in Compulsory Liquidations unless the meeting is to appoint a liquidator), whenever a Deemed Consent or decision procedure notice is issued, creditors must be asked at the same time whether they wish to establish a Committee and to propose nominations. This requirement sits unhappily besides the other rules, especially the Deemed Consent process. For starters, how do you ask creditors “whether” they want something? You must propose it as a decision, e.g. I propose the decision that a Committee be established. But if you were to propose this as a Deemed Consent decision and received no objections, this would mean that the decision had been made and you would need to canvass for (more) nominations, thus postponing your original objective until the sorry “no we didn’t mean we wanted a Committee, we simply don’t care” response was made certain. Therefore, several have designed the proposed decision in the negative: I propose the decision that a Committee should not be established (which personally I think also sits better ethically where the IP does not believe a Committee is warranted: is it honest and straightforward for an IP to propose a decision he does not himself desire?). In this case, creditors’ silence works well.

But is it truly necessary to go through this rigmarole every time you propose a decision? Yes, it seems so. And of course we will need to highlight the SIP15 Committee Guidance… however I am puzzled by the SIP15 reference to highlighting it prior to inviting creditors for nominations: does this mean that we need to write to creditors separately before our first proposed decision? For once, this is not a question for the Insolvency Service!

 

Timetables

In most cases, notice of a decision – by Deemed Consent or other process – must be at least 14 days (plus delivery time). CVL appointment is the obvious exception: in this case, notice must be 3 business days after delivery, which including a weekend makes it very slightly shorter than the current requirement. Because of the short timescale in CVL appointments, requests for a physical meeting can be made at any time up to the Decision Date.  (UPDATE 02/05/2017: oops!  Sorry, the rules set the deadline as between the notice and the Decision Date and Dear IP 76 suggests that the Decision Date is not included in this period.  See https://goo.gl/ygnWjg for more analysis.)

 

There’s more

The rules contain prescriptive details about the content of notices and how to deal with “excluded persons”. In addition, the interaction of Deemed Consent/decision procedures with other requirements such as the need to send a Statement of Affairs before the CVL appointment Decision Date adds another layer of complexity to the work.

If you want to know more:

  • on the detail of decision processes especially in the context of CVL appointments, then access Jo Harris’ webinar, “New Rules: Decision Procedures and Changes on CVL Appointments” (mailto:info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk for details);
  • on the pros, cons and strategies of decision processes, then join me at the R3 breakfast seminar, The New Rules for Insolvency Work-Winners (16 March in London), or any of the three R3 SPG Technical Reviews (28 March in London, 6 June in Huddersfield, 4 July in Bristol)… and there are more Compliance Alliance webinars to come on these topics;

… or feel free to get in touch with me… but don’t expect many simple answers!


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The new Insolvency Rules: is the wait almost over?

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The last published .gov.uk update on the new Insolvency Rules was July 2015, when the expectation was that the Rules would be made in “Spring 2016 with a commencement date of 1 October 2016”. As that day fast approaches, where are we..?

Is there a light at the end of the tunnel?

At the ICAEW’s London roadshow last week, Simon Whiting, Senior Policy Advisor of the Insolvency Service, gave us the news:

“we are aiming to lay the Rules before Parliament in the week commencing 10 October 2016”

“commencement will be 6 April 2017”

“… all subject to Ministerial approval”

Technical and compliance directors, managers and consultants have been fearing and dreading this day for several years now. Although my stomach still turns when I think of all the candle-burning days and nights ahead, personally I feel like I’ve done enough waiting: I’m ready!

 

Spare a thought for colleagues

This is a short plea to all appointment-taking and practice-heading IPs in England & Wales: please try to avoid giving your technical and compliance staff any other projects over the next six to twelve months.

The new Rules will be well over 400 pages long and they will introduce changes from the blinding to the subtle. Okay, many changes will be neither here nor there; if some changes are overlooked, the worst effect will be a red flush at the next monitoring visit. However, some crucial processes – such as how to get appointed and how to obtain fee approval – will change fundamentally and you will want to get these correct from the start.

Also, don’t be misled into thinking that the changes won’t matter until you get your first new appointment after 6 April 2017. The plan is that, with the exception of a few common-sense items, the new Rules will apply across the board, to both existing and future appointments. This does have an advantage – we won’t have to devise and endure dual processes, as we have done since 2010 – however, it will be impossible to introduce the changes gradually: when we wake up on 6 April 2017, we will have to be ready to implement the new Rules for cases at any stage from cradle to grave.

 

The headline changes

Deborah Manzoori summarised some of the planned changes in an earlier post on the Compliance Alliance’s blog (https://goo.gl/qGLZWv). We’ve known about these ever since the Small Business Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 and the Deregulation Act 2015 came into being. These changes are set in stone and we’ve simply been waiting for the new Rules to tell us “how to”.

They include:

  • Abolition of physical meetings (unless requested by creditors who meet prescribed criteria)
  • Introduction of decisions approved by “deemed consent”
  • “Qualifying decision procedures” – i.e. the methods by which positive responses to proposed decisions can be sought
  • Allowing small debts without proofs
  • Official Receiver immediately being appointed as Trustee in Bankruptcy

If you want to learn more about these changes as set out in the two Acts, which are good foundations to the detailed changes to come, my partner Jo Harris will be recording a webinar in a week’s time. Email info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk for more information.

 

The “how to”s… and more

If you have a chance to attend one of the ICAEW’s roadshows – or indeed one of the IPA’s – I would recommend it. Hearing first-hand how the Insolvency Service plans to implement the Acts’ changes is quite an experience: I challenge you not to leave the room feeling baffled and just a little depressed!

I’m sure things will become crystal clear when we finally get to see the new Rules… won’t they?

I don’t want to steal the roadshows’ thunder, but here are some items that furrowed my brow:

  • Complicated S98s

I am very keen to see how S98s will work: Centrebinds will still be 14 days max, but creditors will have some time after receiving notices (for a virtual meeting or a proposed deemed consent) to request a physical meeting… for which directors (/IPs) then will need to issue notice. I am sure it can be done, but timescales will be very tight (perhaps it will mean that more company meetings will be adjourned) and companies/IPs will need to manage unexpected hiatus periods.

  • Complicated Statements of Affairs

It will take some careful managing to comply with the requirement for statements of affairs submitted to Companies House to exclude details of “consumers and employees”, whilst ensuring that creditors receive the full schedules. Will this mean a new creditor code in IPS etc.? What about cases where the director submits a hard copy SoA (e.g. Administrations); will insolvency staff need to type up separate schedules for RoC? Will “consumers” always be obvious, e.g. will they be easily distinguishable from other individual creditors? What is the risk if an IP gets it wrong..?

  • Complicated ADM-CVL Conversions

The Insolvency Service has made several attempts in the past to manage the move from Administration to CVL. Their latest method sounds better, but still not ideal. It seems that the conversion will happen when the final Admin report is filed at RoC… and, if in the meantime “anything” has happened, the Administrator will inform the Liquidator. So the final Admin report won’t actually present the final position and IPs will still be on tenterhooks waiting for the RoC to bring down the shutter.

These are only some of the meaty changes. There are many, many more, affecting every part of what we do, even to the extent of changing some of our language: you may think that it is not before time that “defray” is being removed from Notices of No (Further) Dividend, but think of the template-editing to be done as a consequence.

 

Standing on the starting blocks

As we take our places on the starting blocks – working (/support!) groups are created, timetables are formulated, and we wave goodbye to holidays – we steel ourselves for the next six months: bring it on!

We at the Compliance Alliance are planning a suite of progressive webinars and document pack updates to help clients prepare for the big day. Call us sceptical, but we’re reluctant to set out exactly what we’re planning until we see the new Rules land – we’ve been here before! However, if you want me to explain to you what we think we’ll be doing, please do get in touch with me.

 


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The Small Business Enterprise and Employment Bill: Part 2 – insolvency odds and sods

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My second post on the Small Business Enterprise and Employment Bill focuses on the proposed changes to the Insolvency Act as a consequence of the Red Tape Challenge… with a couple of sneaky additions thrown in.

Changes to the Insolvency Act 1986

The Red Tape Challenge proposals require changes both to the Act and the Rules. Therefore, this Bill is not the whole story and many of the practicalities of the new processes will only become evident when the Insolvency Rules are changed.

The Insolvency Service’s current targets on the Rules consolidation exercise appear to be finalisation of the statutory instrument in October 2015 so that it has an effective date of April 2016.

The Bill’s Impact Assessment (“IA”) summarises the changes as follows:

1. “Removing meetings of creditors as the default position in insolvencies
2. Abolition of final meetings
3. Removal of requirement for liquidator to be present at a S98 meeting
4. Opting out of further correspondence
5. Administration extensions
6. Allowing an office-holder to pay a dividend in respect of a debt of less than £1,000 without the need for the creditor to submit a formal claim
7. Removal of requirement to seek sanction for certain actions in liquidation and bankruptcy
8. Crystallisation of Scottish floating charges
9. Abolition of Fast Track Voluntary Arrangements
10. Official Receiver to be appointed trustee on the making of a bankruptcy order
11. Clarification that a court application under paragraph 65 of Schedule B1 is not required where an administrator intends to make a prescribed part payment to unsecured creditors
12. Clarification that a progress report must be issued to creditors where the liquidator changes within the first year of a CVL
13. Alignment of the time limit for an appeal against the outcome of an IVA where there is no interim order with that where there is an interim order in place”

“Deemed consent” and non-physical meetings

The savings that will result from complete removal of “physical” meetings seem to be built on the premise that all IPs are charging room hire of £64 and 1.5 hours of administrator/manager time each time a meeting is “held”. Although the vast number of circulars still refer to a place and time for meetings, I suspect that rarely does this involve any more cost than if the business were conducted by correspondence.

Firstly, the Bill introduces a “deemed consent procedure” (S110 and 111) that seems to work like this:

• The office holder provides creditors with written notice of his “proposed decision” on a matter.
• If less than 10% (or perhaps “10% or less” – the IA does not make it clear and the Rules will prescribe this) of total creditors by value object to the proposed decision, the creditors are treated as having made the decision.
• If more than 10% (or “10% or more”) object to the proposed decision, then the office holder must follow a “qualifying decision procedure”.

The Bill lists several decisions that cannot be handled by the deemed consent procedure:

• “Any matter relating to a proposal” for a VA;
• Removal of an office holder;
• “Any matter relating to the remuneration of an office holder”, which I guess will wrap in S98s and consideration of Administrators’ Proposals (unless Para 52(1)(b) applies);
• Where the court so orders; and
• “Any matter prescribed as an excluded matter by the Rules”.

The IA suggests that the process will not disadvantage small-value creditors, as “they will still have the facility to object to [the proposals] and raise any concerns with the office holder, who will in turn have a duty to consider whether deemed consent is the most appropriate mechanism to use”, which seems most odd: does the Service expect office holders to start the deemed consent process and, even if the 10% threshold has not been passed, they might decide that minority objecting creditors deserve a voice and thus they can spend estate monies in following a more inclusive decision-making process? This also seems contrary to the Bill, which states that, if less than the prescribed proportion of creditors object, the creditors are to be treated as having made the proposed decision (S246ZF(4) under S110).

The IA does point out that use of the deemed consent procedure is discretionary; it states that “office holders will be able to use their experience to identify situations where the creditors are unlikely to agree with its use” and thus go straight to an alternative decision procedure. However, the Service also waves the stick of regulatory action, if it seems that an IP has lost sight of achieving “value for money”.

The Bill’s memorandum states: “in most cases the intention is that the office holder will be able to use a process of deemed consent”. However, given the exclusions listed above, how many opportunities will there be for the deemed consent procedure in any event? How many meetings (other than final meetings, which are dealt with elsewhere) do not include a resolution on fees?

The Bill doesn’t prescribe the qualifying decision procedures – the Rules will “prescribe examples of procedures” – but the IA indicates that these will not include a physical meeting, unless 10% or more request a physical meeting. The procedures will include business by correspondence, remote meetings, and electronic voting.

Given that most meetings are convened at present to deal with the excluded matters listed above and that physical meetings will not be an option unless creditors ask for one, I really cannot see why the IA has estimated a reduction of only 50% in the number of physical meetings. It states that “50% was seen as prudent, given because this will be ‘new ground’ for office holders and creditors, who may feel decide (sic.) that they would prefer to have meetings in some cases”. Don’t you get it, Insolvency Service? How many times do we have to say it? On the whole, creditors don’t vote! Why on earth would they – in 50% of cases! – ask for a physical meeting?!

The IA states that “it is not anticipated that the time taken to undertake a virtual meeting will be any more or less than the time taken to undertake a physical meeting” – I agree – but it then states “where a physical meeting is not being held the proportion of instances where a virtual or remote meeting is held is likely to be small, given that deemed consent will be available as well as other cheaper methods”. The IA then applies a best estimate of 50% reduction in meetings, whether virtual or physical, and eliminates entirely the time costs of an estimated 1.5 hours for holding a meeting. Crazy! As is clear above, there will barely be an opportunity to use deemed consent and, as the time incurred in completing unattended meetings is mostly about collating and considering proofs and proxies and drafting minutes, these pretty-much will still need to be spent in any other decision procedure. Okay, business by correspondence will be cheaper than a physical or virtual meeting where people actually turn up, but it is not cost-free!

Is it any wonder that the Service has managed to come up with savings for this measure alone of £50 million over ten years?!

Final meetings

The IA states that the proposal “scraps all final meetings of creditors where they occur”, although the Bill (S114) provides only that the SoS be empowered to remove Insolvency Act meetings, so I think there is another step required to amend S106 etc. It is not clear whether the Service envisages that the deemed consent procedure will apply to a proposed resolution for release, or whether the draft final report simply will be issued and creditors will need to request a meeting, if they want to object to the office holder’s release.

The IA suggests that this measure will save £6 million per year (in addition to the £50 million above), based on room hire of £64 per meeting and 45 minutes of time, although, if the deemed consent procedure were necessary, it will carry with it some costs to wrap up. The Bill does not refer to any requirement to tell creditors the outcome of any attempt at obtaining deemed consent; hopefully the Rules changes will add nothing, as this would return any costs saved in abolishing final meetings.

S98 meetings

The Bill and IA seem confused over the fate of S98 meetings: are they being abolished? If not, who gets to decide how they should be held? And practically, how can such decisions be managed?

One thing is clear: the need for the company’s liquidator to be present at the S98 meeting will be removed (although it is not in the Bill, as it is a Rules provision). The IA states that “in most cases it will be an insolvency manager who has best knowledge of the intricacies of a CVL rather than the office holder themselves and it represents much better value for the creditors for that person to attend the meeting” – charming! Don’t they think that creditors will want and deserve to see the liquidator in person? The IA does acknowledge that, if there is significant creditor interest in the proceedings, suggestion of director misconduct or “negotiations that the office holder in person may wish to lead”, the IP may “feel that their presence would be necessary or beneficial”. The IA estimates this may occur in 30% of cases.

I know that some have aired grave concerns over the prospect of creditor disengagement by abolishing physical S98 meetings. Chuka Umunna MP commented on this when the Bill had its second reading – see column 922 at http://goo.gl/VGOE07.

But are physical S98 meetings being abolished? The IA estimates there will be a 50% reduction in physical S98 meetings, which suggests that they aren’t. However, from my reading of the Bill, it seems that S98s will be subject to the “qualifying decision procedure” rules, which means that a physical meeting could only be held where over 10% of creditors request one, so, without this, an IP may only decide to “attend” a meeting remotely. Also don’t directors technically convene S98 meetings..? So a director who doesn’t want to face creditors – even remotely – can decide to conduct business by correspondence..?

Given that creditors only receive seven days’ notice of S98 meetings, I am not sure how a creditor’s request for a physical meeting will work practically. Presumably, directors/IPs may do well to predict cases where there is likely to be sufficient creditor interest and set up a meeting room in advance (although this will be wasted if the requisite creditors do not request a meeting). Otherwise, they could be looking at expensive last-minute conference room bookings – and you would need to give timely notice to all creditors of the venue – or a postponed S98 meeting, albeit not for long given the need to get on with the liquidation and the Centrebind restrictions.

So much for saving costs!

Creditors’ circulars

The Bill provides (Ss 112, 113) that creditors may opt out of receiving correspondence from office holders (excluding notices of (proposed) distributions, which presumably include notices of intended dividends).

Again, I think the Service has over-estimated the savings to be made: personally, I cannot see their assumption of 20% of creditors deciding to opt out becoming reality, although apparently “a representative of a leading firm of insolvency practitioners, a partner in a large regional firm, and a major creditor representative all said that they agreed that the assumption was reasonable and two of them thought the 20% figure to be conservative”, so what do I know..? I also note the IA assumption that no creditors will opt out where the OR is in office: if this provision is such a cost-saver, why is it only being imposed on IPs? They have also provided no provision for the costs to the office holder of managing two creditor databases.

What I want to know is: where has the other Red Tape Challenge proposal gone? If the Service is serious about IPs’ saving costs, then they should progress the proposal to allow office holders to post everything on a website without the need to write to each creditor every time notifying them that the document had been released. Maybe this will turn up in the Rules revision…

Extending administration extensions

Para 76(2)(b) of Schedule B1 is to be changed so that an administration may be extended by up to one year by consent (S115).

It is a shame the Service has not taken this opportunity to change the consent requirements, so that it does not require the administrator to seek the approval of every secured creditor, irrespective of their recovery prospects. Oh well. This may mean that the Service’s prediction that all administrations set to last up to two years will be extended by consent in future may prove to be an over-estimate also.

Dividend processes

Ss119 and 120 of the Bill provide for creditors who have not proved small debts (to be prescribed, although the IA proposes a threshold of £1,000) “to be treated as having done so”. The IA points out that, as with any proving creditor, this does not stop the office holder asking for further evidence from the creditor if thought necessary, although it states that this measure will “permit the insolvency office holder to rely upon the debtor’s own records”. Also, a creditor can always submit a proof, if it is owed more than the debtor’s records indicate.

I must admit that I have often struggled with the office holder’s duty as regards adjudicating on claims and I have even more difficulty with it in this “value for money” world: on the one hand, an office holder is expected to be diligent to ensure that he distributes the estate’s monies to those who are entitled to it; however, on the other hand, every minute he spends on scrutinising claims, asking for, and examining further evidence, eats away at the funds available to distribute. I guess this provision sets out more clearly the government’s expectation: just take small claims as read… unless you have reason to doubt them, e.g. if you think that the director who swore the SoA has added all his friends and neighbours to the list of creditors.

A Red Tape Challenge proposal that would really help put this measure into context is that small dividend payments – £5 or £10 were mentioned – would not be sent to individual creditors, but would be pooled for use by the disqualification unit or the Treasury. If this also were introduced, then, yes indeed, don’t waste any time considering whether to admit small claims, as the chances are that those creditors will not see their dividends anyway. However, this proposal hasn’t made it to the Bill. Is it another one for the Rules or will we never see it again..? (UPDATE 02/11/2014: I understand this proposal has now been dropped, as the Service had received advice that it would prove too contentious to deprive certain creditors of the right to receive a dividend, however small that might be.)

The Bill includes two measures affecting administration distributions. The IA describes them as clarifications and as removing ambiguities, although personally I think that the provisions change the Act, which seems pretty clear-cut to me.

S116 contains two parts:

• To Paragraph 65(3) will be added the power to distribute the prescribed part in an administration.
• Paragraph 83 will include a further restriction on moving from administration to CVL: this will only be possible where the administrator thinks that a non-prescribed part distribution will be made to unsecured creditors.

It is a shame that Schedule B1 of the Act is not being amended so that dividends generally can be paid through administration. The IA hints at why this is not considered appropriate: it states that liquidation “provides for more engagement” of unsecured creditors. Personally, I see no difference in creditor engagement in administrations and liquidations: there are the same powers to form a committee and to approve fees (as we are not talking about Para 52(1)(b) cases here), and the changes to liquidators’ powers mentioned below bring the office holders’ needs to seek sanction on a par. The IA has estimated a cost of £8,250 on converting an administration to liquidation, so why not save by eliminating the need to move to liquidation?

Pre-packs

S117 of the Bill is the Dear IP 62 threat to “ban ‘pre-pack’ administration sales to connected parties if certain criteria are not met”. The Bill’s memorandum elaborates, referring to Teresa Graham’s recommendations: “Clause 117 is in response to the recommendation to take a legislative power to legislate in the event that the recommendation to establish third party scrutiny is not adopted on a voluntary basis… It is considered that by taking a legislative power, this will act as an incentive to encourage connected parties to adopt the voluntary proposals set out in the Graham Review”. Hmm… I can’t see that the threat of future legislation is going to matter one jot to connected parties presently contemplating a sale! However, “the Government is fairly confident that voluntary reforms backed by this ‘backstop’ power will act as sufficient incentive to change behaviours and so it will not be necessary to exercise the power.” I know that R3 and others are working frantically to see what can be done with the Graham recommendations and I will not list my own views and concerns, as there have been plenty of other loud critics.

The Bill empowers the SoS to make regulations “prohibiting or imposing requirements or conditions in relation to the disposal hiring out or sale of property of a company by the administrator to a connected person in circumstances specified in the regulations”. Note that regulations may not be limited to pre-packs, but may affect any transaction involving a connected person (which is also defined by the section), whenever they occur and however large or small the property transferred. This fits in with Teresa Graham’s recommendations, although I haven’t seen any commentary refer to this wider scope.

S117 provides that, in particular, future regulations may require approval (or provide for the imposition of requirements/conditions) by creditors, the court, or “a person of a description specified by the regulations”.

Other fixes

The Bill also contains:

• S107: the proceeds of claims or assignments arising from Ss213, 214, 238, 239, 242, 243, and 244 are not to be available for floating charge holders, i.e. they will not be part of the company’s net property. I believe that some have expressed concern over this, but doesn’t this simply put case precedent into the Act?

• S108: liquidators may exercise any of the powers in Parts 1 to 3 of Schedule 4 of the Act without sanction (S109 provides similarly in relation to trustees and Schedule 5)… although I’m wondering why the Parts need to exist at all.

• S118: provides that, when an administrator of a Scottish company obtains permission from the court to pay a dividend to unsecured creditors, floating charges crystallise.

• S121: the OR will become trustee on the making of a bankruptcy order (if an IP isn’t made trustee at that time). The IA explains that the motivation for this is to improve the efficiency of asset realisations by not restricting the OR’s immediate activities only to protecting the estate. I can see some value in having the bankrupt’s estate vest in the OR immediately on bankruptcy, avoiding some of the confusion illustrated in the Pathania v Adedeji case (http://goo.gl/AcktAk), although there is obvious concern that this process disenfranchises creditors, as this erodes creditors’ opportunities to make a decision on who they want to administer the estate.

• S122: changes S262(3)(a) of the Act so that the 28 day time period for challenging an IVA meeting decision counts from the decision where there is no interim order and from the filing of the report to court in interim order cases… although I’m wondering why the time of the meeting’s decision could not work for all cases; it’s hardly “alignment”, as the IA suggests.

• S124: removes reference to producing progress reports only for (E&W) VLs that last longer than one year. This deals with the nonsensical position that, if the liquidator changes during the first year, it seems that he must predict if the case will last longer than one year in order to decide whether to issue a progress report on the change-over – an issue highlighted by Bill Burch (http://goo.gl/6K4a4E) – although it does not deal with the unnecessary costs of issuing progress reports mid-year and the re-setting of deadlines caused by changing liquidators. Courts usually deal with these matters in block transfer orders, but let’s hope that the revised Rules will effect a change.

That’s almost the whole of the Bill’s insolvency measures covered. It just leaves the provisions impacting on IP regulation… for another day.