Insolvency Oracle

Developments in UK insolvency by Michelle Butler


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The Changing Face of Pre-Packs

To explore pre-pack trends, I reviewed 120 SIP16 statements issued over the last 3 years.  Coupled with the Insolvency Service’s intriguing revised guidance on the phoenix rules and their summer report, I’ve been wondering how far we have come in 3 years and what else needs to change.

In this blog, I explore:

  • What is the Government’s timetable for changing pre-packs?
  • How many pre-pack purchasers themselves go out of business? And how many of these were connected purchasers?
  • Does the survival of pre-pack purchasers indicate that the Pool is working?
  • What is the trend in using the Pool?
  • Why do more connected Newcos fail?
  • Are there many serial pre-packers? Do they use the same IPs?
  • What effect will the new anti-phoenix provisions have?
  • What is going on with the Insolvency Service’s revisions of their S216/17 guidance?
  • Will HMRC’s move to preferential creditor change things?
  • How should pre-pack regulation change?

 

Has the heat on pre-packs cooled off?

A significant item on the Insolvency Service’s to-do list for the past few years has been the “pre-pack review”.  The Service’s 2017 Regulatory Report (published in May 2018) referred to the Government’s “review to evaluate the impact of the voluntary measures in order to inform any future decisions on whether legislative measures are required to regulate connected party sales in administration” and the anticipation back then was that the review would be completed by the autumn of 2018.

The Service’s 2018 Regulatory Report (published in May 2019) stated that the Service “have carried out” the review and “the Government hopes to be able to publish the findings and outcome from the review shortly”.

Of course, the Government’s more pressing pre-occupations inevitably have delayed this publication.  Also, since May 2019, the IS/RPB focus seems to have been squarely on the regulation of Volume IVA Providers.  Perhaps there has been little to say on pre-packs because the Service has been waiting for its review to reach the top of the Secretary of State’s pile, but that document is a year older now.  I wonder if its findings and outcome are quite so relevant.

 

The sunset clause is setting

Hanging over this topic, of course, is Section 129 of the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015, which allows the Government to make regulations prohibiting or imposing conditions on Administration sales of property to connected parties – pre-packs or otherwise.

This power will end on 26 May 2020.

There is no time left to consult on draft legislation.  The review was carried out behind closed doors and remains under wraps.  Presumably, the profession will have no opportunity, publicly, to engage in the proposals.

Have we seen any hints about what we are likely to see?  I suspect the RPBs have been involved in the Service’s review, so I was intrigued to read the IPA’s Oct-19 response to the Service’s call for evidence on regulation slip in: “the IPA supports the consideration of changes to the pre-pack pool to better scrutinise connected party sales”.  As we all feared, the focus still appears to be on the Pool.

In its May-18 submission to the Service’s pre-pack review, R3 emphasised the value of looking wider: “The Government should support and help develop the reforms made in 2015 and should look at the impact of the reforms as a whole, not just the Pre-pack Pool.”  Hear, hear.

Presumably, the Government’s review will consider the question: are pre-packs any different now than they were before the November 2015 changes?

 

What makes a pre-pack bad?

The answer to this question very much depends on who you ask.  I think that IPs in general will say that a bad pre-pack is one that does not maximise the realisation of the company’s property.  I think that the world before the Teresa Graham report would have said that a bad pre-pack was one that did not instill confidence that the company and the IPs were acting in creditors’ best interests.  That’s what the revised SIP16 and the Pool were intended to fix by providing more information on the pre-pack strategy in the SIP16 Statement and by the Pool providing an independent opinion on whether there are “reasonable grounds” for the proposed deal.  One of my frustrations with the Pool is that they have never explained how they measure such reasonableness.  How do they decide what is bad?

In my review of 120 SIP16 Statements, I came across one brave IP who, despite the prospective purchaser receiving a negative opinion from the Pool member, decided to do the deal anyway.  In his Administration Proposals, he had added a one-page summary, over and above the standard SIP16 disclosure, of why he had decided to complete the sale.  It made perfect sense to me and went to the core of the Administrator’s role: to achieve an Administration objective, which generally involves returning as much value as possible to creditors.  The Administrator also had explained why he believed the submission to the Pool was materially flawed.

 

What about the survival of Newco?

One of the accusations levelled against pre-packs is that they simply give new life to a business that ought to be terminated.  The more sceptical suspect that some directors hatch plans to phoenix by pre-pack and what is to stop them doing it all over again?

Therefore, I decided to test the survival of Newco: how many companies that purchased a business by a pre-pack later terminated?

* Sample size: 120 cases with no repeat of Administrator firm in any one period.  “Terminated” includes dissolutions and MVLs.

Now I know that, of course, the more recently the pre-pack occurred, the more likely Newco will still be alive.  But I still find this graph striking: my 2015 pre reforms group dated from June to October 2015, so how is it that their outcomes are so different from Nov/Dec 2015 cases?  This suggests to me that the measures introduced in November 2015, including the new SIP16, significantly changed the face of pre-packs.

 

Doesn’t this show that the Pre-Pack Pool is working?

No!  Only 6 cases in my sample involved the Pool.  It’s true that all those Newcos are still live companies, but setting those aside, the graph is still the same shape: the change in the survival rate of Newco from before the 2015 reforms cannot be attributed wholly (or even largely) to the Pool.

The Pre-Pack Pool’s 2018 report described its aim as “to provide assurance for creditors that independent experts have reviewed a proposed connected party pre-pack transaction before it is completed”, but it then acknowledged that “for this independent scrutiny to be seen to be effective, reference to the pre-pack pool needs to be seen as an essential part of the pre-pack administration process by both creditors and prospective applicants”.  So… at the moment, there is general apathy towards the Pool – from creditors and applicants – so it cannot do its job of providing assurance that someone other than the IP has considered the proposed sale..?  But perhaps the general apathy towards the Pool is because creditors and applicants do not see a need for the Pool opinion.  Perhaps they do not require the Pool’s opinion, not least I think because it is not at all clear what the Pool is measuring.

 

How many pre-packs have the Pre-Pack Pool reviewed?

Use of the Pool continues to fall.  The Pool’s 2018 report stated that, in 2018, there were 24 referrals to the Pool.  This is more referrals than in 2017, when there were 23 referrals, but as a percentage of the total number of connected party sales, 2018’s referrals were down on 2017.

With such a tiny referral rate, I do not think that the Pool can take any creditor for any material changes in pre-pack practices.

 

Would it help if the Pool were made compulsory for all connected party pre-packs? 

Help how?  What is the ill that the Pool is trying to remedy?  Is it still the case that there is a general lack of confidence?  If there is a general distaste for connected pre-packs, does this not simply stem from the general perception that it cannot be right for a director to fold Oldco, buy the business and assets, and then trade on with Newco?  I cannot see that increasing the frequency of the Pool’s opinion will counteract this perception.

I would be very interested to read how the Government’s review explains what is currently wrong with pre-packs.  I think that many in the profession think that, if the Government simply wants to “do something”, then making the Pool compulsory is the least damaging answer and far preferable than restricting Administrators’ powers to complete pre-packs.  That’s as may be, but I cannot see that expanding the Pool’s scope would achieve anything other than adding to the costs of the process.

 

Are connected party Newcos any more likely to fail?

This graph looks at how many of the failed Newcos had been connected to Oldco, compared to how many of the sample as a whole had been connected:

* Failures exclude terminations by MVL or dissolution

This graph does indicate that, with the exception of 2018 pre-packs, there has been a greater percentage of connected party Newco failures than there should have been if they were evenly spread across the whole population of Newcos… in my small sample, at least.  That’s not such good news for anyone hoping to avoid regulation.

My personal view is that this demonstrates how some directors of failing businesses struggle to face realities: they cannot come to terms with the thought of walking away from the business.  Of course, it is especially difficult for those who have tied up their personal assets in the fate of the business.  I wonder if connected potential purchasers need to be better advised on the challenges facing them, how Newco risks repeating Oldco’s mistakes and may even face new challenges in retaining disillusioned customers and suppliers.  The problem is that the potential Administrator is not in a position to give that advice, given the conflict of interests.  So does this mean that no one helps these directors face realities?

 

What about serial pre-packers?

Of course, there could be another reason for connected Newco failures: are some directors abusing pre-packs to dump debts and start again?  If this is the case, then wouldn’t we see serial pre-packers: if a director gets away with it once, then wouldn’t they be sorely tempted to do it again a few years down the line?

Firstly, here is a breakdown of the terminations in my sample:

So yes, I accept that seven Newco ADMs is a very small sample, but this in itself suggests that serial pre-packing is not widespread.  Arguably, though, even this small number is too many.

Here is a summary of the fates of the purchasers who themselves went into Administration:

It is interesting that two of the businesses were sold to connected parties for a second time.  It is alarming to see that one of those Newco-v2s went into CVL c.1 year after the second pre-pack sale.  It will be interesting to see how the other second connected purchaser fares with a bit more time.

The breaking point seems to be generally around the 2-year mark.  If this is the case, then it is encouraging to see that only one 2017 case and no 2018 cases failed.  Contrasting this with the four 2015 pre reform pre-pack purchasers that failed, doesn’t this again suggest that something happened with pre-pack practices after the 2015 reforms?  The purchasers after the 2015 reforms seem more robust than those before.  Also, my pre-2015 reforms cases only number 17% of the total, so it is even more disproportionate that so many purchaser failures appear in this group.

… and again, I cannot see that the Pool can take credit for this.  Did something else happen to refine the pre-pack process?

 

Should IPs be handling serial pre-packs?

It is alarming to see that, in one of the cases (Case 3), the same IPs then carried out the CVL of the second connected Newco.  I cannot tell you what happened to the assets of the Newco-v2 in this case, because the liquidators have not yet filed a progress report (despite the fact that the anniversary was in September!).  Even if the IPs felt that they were not conflicted from the appointment, surely there would be a significant perceived conflict, wouldn’t there?

 

Will the new anti-phoenix provisions change things?

In essence, the Finance Bill 2019-2020 provides that, where a director has been involved in at least two insolvent companies in a 5-year period and the same director is involved in a further Newco, HMRC can make that director joint and severally liable for the past tax liabilities of all those companies (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/tax-abuse-using-company-insolvencies).

On the face of it, Cases 3 and 5 above might have fallen foul of these provisions (subject to the finer detail of the criteria) had they been in force at the time.  Of course, it is possible that other cases in my sample had been bought out of a pre-pack prior to 2015, so perhaps it would have affected more.  I also haven’t analysed the 14 CVLs, which may include some other cases where directors have sought to stay in the same business.

Although the provisions will only capture tax liabilities arising after the legislation comes into force, I think the new Finance Bill 2019-2020 has great potential to discourage serial pre-packers and thus I think it could do more to improve creditors’ confidence in pre-packs than the Pool.

I also think that the Insolvency Service’s new approach to R22.4 may impact on connected party pre-packs.

 

What have the current phoenix provisions got to do with pre-packs?

Over the past year, the Insolvency Service have been tweaking their “Re-use of company names” guidance.

In March 2019, Dear IP 87 tweaked the guidance to make clear that, although R22.4(3) provides a 28-day timescale for issuing the notice to creditors/Gazette, it must nevertheless be given and published before the director begins acting in relation to a successor business.  Then, in November 2019, their online guidance expressed the opinion that directors “cannot give notice under this rule if the company is not already in liquidation, administration, administrative receivership or in a CVA”.

So how can a R22.4 notice be given in a pre-pack?

If the sale is completed on the day that the Administration begins, it seems to me that it will be impossible for anyone to comply with R22.4 unless the purchaser decides to close its doors for a couple of days to allow time for the notices to be “given and published”.

 

But the phoenix provisions only apply to liquidations, not Administrations, don’t they?

True, a director can only fall foul of the phoenix provisions if Oldco goes into liquidation.  Of course, some Administrations do exit into liquidation.  Assuming that moves to CVL occur c.1 year after the Administration begins, the stats for the year ending 30 September 2019 suggest that c.28% of all Administrations moved to CVL in that year.  So directors involved in connected pre-packs need to be aware of the phoenix provisions.

The problem is that there is no logic to the application of S216/17 to Para 83 CVLs.

It seems to me that directors of the healthier businesses are targeted.  If the company has sufficient property for a non-prescribed part dividend, the Administration moves to CVL… and thus S216/17 are triggered.  But if the company has no money for unsecured creditors (other than by way of a prescribed part), then it probably will move to dissolution… and S216/17 are not triggered.  In other words, if the directors have pulled the plug when the company’s assets are still relatively meaty, then they risk falling foul of the phoenix provisions.  But if they have bled the company dry and then bought the remaining business for a negligible sum, then they can avoid the phoenix issues!

 

Could ADM-to-dissolution be an abuse of the process?

Of course, a company should only go into Administration if it can achieve an objective.  One of the big unanswered questions is: regardless of whether unsecured creditors receive a dividend from the Administration, does the survival of the business (involving TUPE-transferred employees, landlords with no gap in tenancy, customers with continuing services and products) achieve the second Administration objective of a better result for creditors as a whole than winding-up?  I understand views are divided on this.

Setting this aside though, I think that it will be much easier to achieve the third Administration objective from April 2020.  One of the problems with achieving the third objective in pre-pack scenarios is that there are usually no prefs, as all the employees are transferred to Newco.  However, from April 2020, HMRC will become a (secondary) preferential creditor in the vast majority of insolvencies.  Therefore, where a company has no employee prefs, the third Administration objective may be fairly easily achieved by paying a small distribution to HMRC… and then moving to dissolution.  HMRC has handed would-be phoenix-avoiders a lifeline.

 

But if HMRC is a pref, won’t they control the process?

Some of you may be groaning: does this mean that we risk going back to the bad old days when HMRC used to modify Administrators’ Proposals so that most Administrations exited to liquidation?  I don’t think so.

If the Administrator thinks that neither of the first two Administration objectives are achievable, then they make this statement – a Paragraph 52(1)(c) statement – in their Proposals.  The consequence is that they don’t ask any creditors to decide whether to approve their Proposals, but these are deemed approved if no creditors requisition a decision.  If HMRC (or any creditor, for that matter) wants to modify the Proposals to ensure that S216/17 are triggered by the Administration exiting to liquidation, they would need to put their hand in their pocket and pay Administrators to convene a decision process.  I can’t see HMRC doing this, can you?

Of course, HMRC may still vote on Administrators’ fees – that’s a whole different concern.

 

What effect will all this have on pre-packs?

In summary, my thoughts on the future are:

  • If the Pool is made compulsory for connected party pre-packs, undoubtedly this will reduce the number of pre-packs. Businesses will continue to be sold, but they will avoid falling into the statutory definition of “pre-pack”.  Even now, we’re seeing more business sales that are considered to fall outside the SIP16 definition, with some IPs going to the length of getting legal advice for comfort.
  • The new phoenix provisions, where HMRC will chase directors of serial insolvencies, will also reduce the number of pre-packs. Businesses will continue to be sold, but connections with former directors will be less likely (or simply less clear).
  • Theoretically, the Insolvency Service’s focus on the technical intricacies of the current phoenix provisions should reduce the number of pre-packs or at least reduce the number of pre-pack Administrations exiting to liquidation… but it is not clear to me whether the Service is clobbering directors for technical breaches of compliance with Rs22.
  • HMRC’s leg-up to preferential creditor could make pre-packs more attractive, as directors could more easily avoid the S216/17 provisions, but in reality I think this is too small a factor to influence directors’ decisions.
  • It seems to me from my small sample that pre-pack practices have changed materially from early 2015. Therefore, what I would prefer to see from the Government’s review is empirical evidence on what has been achieved by all the 2015 reforms and what still remains to be remedied, before they take steps to legislate pre-packs.

 

 


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Is the Pre-Pack’s Sun Setting?

As HMV has demonstrated, buying a business out of an administration does not guarantee its survival.  But the sale of the HMV business 5 years’ ago was not a pre-pack – the Company had traded for several months in administration before the deal was done.  Does the pre-pack deserve to be demonised?  In view of the SBEE Act’s sunset clause deadline of May 2020, what are the pre-pack’s chances of survival?

As promised way back in July, this is my third article looking at the Insolvency Service’s 2017 review of regulation.  My sincere apologies to regular readers.  I have soooo wanted to blog, I have had articles aplenty in my head, but I’ve simply not had the time to get them out.  I will try harder in 2019!

The Insolvency Service’s 2017 Review of IP Regulation can be found at:  https://tinyurl.com/ycndjuxz

The Pre Pack Pool’s 2017 Review is at: https://tinyurl.com/y92fvvqf

 

SIP16 Compliance Rate Flatlines

Of course, we all know that compliance with the SIP16 disclosure requirements has no real relevance to whether a pre-pack is “good” or “bad”.  Personally, I’d also argue that strict compliance with the disclosure requirements does little to improve perceptions… not when compliance is measured on whether or not the IP has ticked every last little disclosure box.  However, this is what the RPBs are measuring us on, so it can only be to our advantage to try to meet the mark.The analysis of this rate by each RPB shows an intriguing effect:Last year, the stats for the two largest RPBs appeared poles apart: the IPA’s compliance rate was 91% but the ICAEW’s was less than half this figure, at 39%.  But now look at those two RPBs’ rates: they have converged on 59%.  How odd.

I very much doubt that the IPA’s IPs have got decidedly worse at SIP16 compliance over the year.  I wonder if it has more to do with RPB staff changes – perhaps it is more than coincidental that an ICAEW monitoring staff member moved to take up a senior role within the IPA in late 2016.

What about the change in the ICAEW’s IPs’ fortunes last year?  It is more difficult to identify a trend in the ICAEW’s figures, as they reviewed only 23% of all SIP16 statements received in 2017 – they were the only RPB to have reviewed only a sample, which they chose on a risk-assessment basis.  The ICAEW had focused on SIP16 statements submitted by IPs for the first time, or for the first time in a long time, or by IPs whose previous statements had fallen short of compliance.  On this basis, it is encouraging to see such an improved compliance rate emerging from what might seem to be the high risk cases.  It makes me wonder what the compliance rate would have been, had the ICAEW reviewed all their SIP16 statements: rather than the flatline, would we have seen an overall strong improvement in the compliance rate?

From my personal reviewing experience, I am finding that many SIP16 statements are still missing the 100% compliant ideal, but the errors and omissions are far more trivial than they were years’ ago.  I suspect that few of the 38% non-compliant statements spotted by the RPBs contained serious errors.  Having said that, earlier this year the IPA published two disciplinary consent orders for SIP16 breaches, so we should not become complacent about compliance, especially as pre-packs continue to be a political hot potato and now that the RPBs have been persuaded by the Insolvency Service to publicise IPs’ firms’ names along with their own names when disciplinary sanctions are issued. 

 

A Resurgence of Connected Party Sales

Regrettably, the Insolvency Service’s 2017 review provided less information on pre-packs than previous reviews.  No longer are we able to examine how many pre-packs involved marketing or deferred consideration, but we can still look at the number of sales to connected parties:

Last year, I pondered whether the pressure on IPs to promote the Pre Pack Pool may have deterred some connected party sales.  I was therefore interested to see that, not only had the percentage of connected party sales increased for 2017, but the percentage of referrals to the Pool has decreased – coincidence?

Personally, now I wonder whether the presence of the Pool has any material influence on pre-pack sales at all.  I suspect that the increased percentage of connected party sales may have more to do with the economic climate: who would want to take on an insolvent business with such economic uncertainties around us?  I suspect that now it is more and more often the case that connected parties are the only bidders in town.

 

Insights of the Pre Pack Pool

With such a tiny referral rate – the Pool reviewed only 23 proposed sales over the whole of 2017 (there were 53 referrals in the previous 14 months, since the Pool began) – does the Pool have any real visibility on pre-packs?

The Pre Pack Pool issued its own annual review in May this year.  Here is an analysis of the opinions delivered by the Pool:

This seems to suggest that the quality of applications being received by the Pool is deteriorating.  But, as the Pool gives nothing much away about how they measure applications, I am not surprised.

The Pool’s review states that: “Although the referral rate is much lower than expected, the Pool does perform a useful function where it has been approached.  Feedback from both connected party purchasers and creditors has been positive where we have received it.”

But what exactly are the benefits of using the Pool?

The Pool suggests that creditors/suppliers could put more pressure on Newcos to make use of the Pool, but it also notes that less than 1% of all complaints to the InsS in 2016 were about pre-packs (shame the Pool’s report did not refer to the number of pre-pack complaints in 2017: zero).  Maybe there is little pressure put on purchasers to approach the Pool, because the reasonableness or not of the pre-pack doesn’t really come into it when creditors are deciding to supply to Newcos.  The Pool review suggests that major stakeholders such as lenders and HMRC could insist on a Pool referral, but why should they when the Pool has yet to prove its value?

 

What makes a Bad Pre-Pack?

Stuart Hopewell, director of the Pool, has been quoted as stating that he “has seen cases where the objective [of the pre-pack] was avoidance of liabilities”, which led to the tagline that “businesses are sidestepping tax bills amounting to tens of millions of pounds using an insolvency procedure that the government is considering banning” (Financial Times, 26/11/2018).

How does Hopewell spot these abuses?  The Pool itself is not at all transparent about what, in its eyes, results in a “case not made” opinion, but the same article referred to the Pool giving “a red card, based on the tax situation”.  This suggests to me that their focus may be more on how the company became insolvent, rather than whether the pre-pack sale is the best outcome for the creditors at that point in time.  It seems to me that the Pool may be deciding that the pre-pack is the final step in a director’s long-term plan to rack up liabilities and walk away from them, whereas I suspect that most IPs first see a director who – as a result of wrong decisions or for reasons outside their control – is at the end of the road, having racked up liabilities they can no longer manage.  What should happen?  If the pre-pack were refused, the likely outcome would be liquidation with strong chances that the director would, via a S216 notice, start up again, possibly with a cluster of the original workforce and assets purchased at liquidation prices.  On the other hand, if the pre-pack were completed, it would most certainly generate more sales consideration and would be less disruptive for the employees, customers and suppliers.  But wouldn’t refusing a pre-pack result instead in a business sale to someone else, an unconnected party, even if at a reduced price?  I think that this is doubtful in the vast majority of cases.

 

It’s not all about the Pool

The Insolvency Service’s annual review lists some questions that its pre-Sunset Clause pre-pack review will seek to answer:

  • “Has the Pool increased transparency and public confidence in connected party pre-pack administrations?
  • “What numbers of connected party purchasers have chosen not to approach the Pool and why?
  • “What is the success rate of the new company where purchasers approached the Pool between 1 January 2016 and 31 December 2016?”

While these are all valid questions, I do hope the questions won’t stop there.

Ever since Teresa Graham’s recommendations in 2015, the Pre Pack Pool has occupied the limelight.  I think that’s a real shame, as I believe that other things are responsible for the improvements to the pre-pack process that we have seen over time.  Although I complain about the micro-monitoring that the Insolvency Service has inflicted on SIP16 compliance, it cannot be denied that the regulators’ emphasis on SIP16 compliance has improved the amount of detail provided.  More importantly perhaps, the RPBs’ emphasis on documenting decisions has helped some IPs question why certain strategies are pursued – most IPs do this anyway, but I think that some need to challenge their habitual reactions and sometimes exercise a bit more professional scepticism at what they’re being told.

The mood music around the pre-pack review seems to be about increasing the Pool’s reach, potentially making a referral to the Pool mandatory (for example, see R3’s May 2018 submission: https://tinyurl.com/y7kf22ul).  However, as with all proposed reforms, the first steps are to identify the problem and to define what one wants to achieve.  I would question whether the problem is still a lack of public confidence in pre-packs – it seems to be more about a lack of confidence in dealing justly with directors who ignore their fiduciary duties in a host of different ways – and, even if it were about confidence in pre-packs, we’re a long way from determining whether the Pool is the best tool to fix this.

 

Slow Progress

Finally, here is a summary of other items that were on the Insolvency Service’s to-do list at the time of publication of their 2017 annual review.  Of course, to be fair the government has kept the Insolvency Service otherwise occupied over the year.  You might be forgiven for having a sense of deja-vu – it looks frighteningly similar to 2017’s list and I assume that the tasks will now be carried over to 2019:

  • Replacement of the IS/RPB Memorandum of Understanding with “Guidance” – their initial draft required “a number of changes” and, as at May 2018, was being run past the “DfE” (Department for Education?). Nevertheless, the Service had anticipated that the guidance would “come into effect during the course of 2018”.
  •  A solution to the bonding “problem”? – the Insolvency Service’s call for evidence closed in December 2016 and they expected a follow-on consultation “soon”. A Claims Management Protocol, i.e. to set out how bond claims should proceed, is being developed: “possible publication, later this year”.  The Service is also looking at the bond wording.
  • Cash for complainants? – the early message that the Service was exploring with the RPBs if a redress mechanism for complainants could work seems to have evolved into work to determine how redress will be incorporated. “Once agreement has been reached”, the Service plans to include information on the Complaints Gateway website “to ensure complainants are aware of this recent development”.  Oh well, that’s one way to reverse the trend in falling complaint numbers!
  •  Revised IVA Protocol – although .gov.uk holds minutes of the IVA Standing Committee only up to July 2017, the Service reported that the Committee anticipated that we could look forward to a revised IVA Protocol likely later in 2018.
  • Revised Ethics Code – this was also expected later in 2018. I understand that accountancy bodies’ ethics code is currently being revised and therefore the JIC has decided to wait and see what emerges from this before finalising a revised insolvency code.

 


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SIP16 and the Pool: Great Expectations as yet Unrealised?

I think we’ve all shared in the pain of SIP16 compliance. We’ve tried really hard, haven’t we? So why is it that the wholly-compliant rate dropped from 87% in 2015 to 62% last year? Where are we going wrong?

In this blog, I air my suspicions about the stats, not only on SIP16 compliance, but also on the changing profile of pre-packs and the role of the Pool, as presented in the Insolvency Service’s and the Pre Pack Pool’s 2016 Reviews. Yes, I know I’m a little late on this story (I blame the 2016 Rules!).

The Insolvency Service’s 2016 Review of IP Regulation can be found at: https://goo.gl/Jkwz19

The Pre Pack Pool’s 2016 Review is at: https://goo.gl/fPEXTe

 

SIP16 Compliance Rates Fall Back to Square One

There has been a significant drop in the reported rate of SIP16 compliance – at 62% of 2016’s SIP16 statements considered wholly compliant, it is the lowest annual rate on record (note: several years are estimates because not all SIP16 statements received were compliance-reviewed):

Why is this? It’s true that it takes time to adapt to a new SIP and this is bound to hit compliance, but is this the whole story? Or has the shift of the job of reviewing SIP16s from the Insolvency Service to the RPBs introduced an element of inconsistency into the process?

Let’s drill down into the overall compliance rate of 62% to see how the rate varies from RPB to RPB:

As you can see, the rates range from ICAS’ 100% of SIP16 statements wholly compliant to the ICAEW’s 39%.

I consider it highly unlikely that ICAEW-licensed IPs are in reality far worse at complying with SIP16 than other IPs, so this indicates strongly to me that there is a great diversity in the standards being applied. Given that the ICAEW reviewed 54% of all SIP16s received last year, it’s not surprising that the overall compliance dropped from 2015’s 87% to 62%.

The Insolvency Service’s Review does not help us to understand what might be behind the non-compliances, although it gives us some comfort. It states: “for the vast majority of non-compliant statements, the breach was not deemed to be serious and was merely of a technical nature”.

The ICAEW has published some feedback on their reviewing (Feb 2017, available to their Insolvency & Restructuring Group members at https://goo.gl/YkExP7), which suggests that the following have been lacking in some cases:

  • An explanation of the pre- and post-appointment roles of the IP (the ICAEW acknowledges that SIP16 does not strictly require this explanation in the SIP16 Statement, but it needs to be delivered to creditors and directors somewhere);
  • An explanation of why no requests were made to potential funders to fund working capital (even if in some cases, it is obvious);
  • If the business has not been marketed on the internet, an explanation why not (even if the nature of the business makes this obvious);
  • An explanation of the reasons underpinning the marketing strategy (whereas some appear to have simply provided a list of what marketing has been done);
  • An explanation of the reasons behind the length of time of the marketing (even if there were obviously financial pressures that limited this);
  • The date of the initial introduction – not simply “in December 2016”;
  • An explanation of the rationale behind the basis/bases of valuations (helpfully, the ICAEW give a clear steer on what they expect: “where you have obtained going concern and forced sale valuations, tell [creditors] that you’ve obtained valuations on both bases as you’re seeking to understand whether realisations will be maximised by breaking up the business and selling the assets on a piecemeal basis or whether it’s better to try to find a buyer for the business as a going concern”);
  • If goodwill is valued, an explanation and basis for the valuation provided; and
  • An explanation of the method by which consideration was allocated to different asset classes.

Given the prevalence of some apparent failures to state the bleedin’ obvious, perhaps other RPB reviewers are measuring compliance against a different list of tick-boxes.

 

The Shifting Profile of Pre-Packs

Probably the main difference between the old and the new SIP16 was the introduction of the “marketing essentials”, with the clear message that an absence of marketing should most definitely be the exception. Has the new SIP16 pushed up the frequency of marketing?

I certainly think that the SIP16 pressure has influenced attitudes towards marketing, as this graph indicates. Even in cases where the offer on the table looks too good to beat, I suspect that many view some marketing effort as essential to shield one from criticism. I doubt that safety-blanket marketing in these cases increases realisations and it will increase costs, but if it answers the sceptics’ questions about possible undervalue sales, then it seems to have everyone’s blessing.

Then again, perhaps I am being unfair: is it merely coincidental that the graph above shows that, as the frequency of marketing has increased, the prevalence of connected party purchasers has taken a dive? Could it be that increased marketing has widened the pool of potential purchasers, resulting in more occasions when connected interested parties lose out to the competition?

I am surprised that no one (as far as I have seen) has connected these two trends with this simple cause-and-effect explanation. Rather, perhaps I am not the only person who suspects that the fall in the number of connected purchasers is more a consequence of the new SIP16 pressures on connected party pre-packs, including the pressure to apply to the pre-pack pool. As revealed in its 2016 Review, the Pre Pack Pool is evidently of this view:

“It may be that the introduction of the Pool and the wider post-Graham reforms have deterred some connected party pre-packs from being proposed in the first place.”

But what has replaced these pre-packs? Are connected party sales avoiding the SIP16 obstacles altogether?

Perhaps hurdles are being overcome by having connected party sales accompany liquidations instead of Administrations. Well, I was surprised to discover that the numbers of Gazette notices for S216 re-use of a prohibited name do not follow a trend suggesting more sales in liquidation:

So could it be that Administration sales are being shifted out of the pre-pack definition either by being completed before Administration or perhaps negotiations are not starting until after appointment? This doesn’t ring true either: SIP16 statements as a percentage of the total number of Administrations has been fairly steady since the introduction of the Pool (2015: 29%; 2016: 24%):

* The SIP16 review actually covered 14 months, but for the purpose of this graph the number has been pro rated for 12 months.

Although the number of Administrations continues to fall, I find this picture encouraging: at least the SIP16 and Pool pressure does not seem to be persuading people to find ways around the measures. Pre-packs have a role and it seems that IPs are sticking with them.

 

Is the Pre Pack Pool making its mark?

In light of the second-hand warnings I’ve heard over the past years about how strongly the Insolvency Service feels about the need for IPs to embrace the Pool, I found the Service’s annual review surprisingly dead-pan. In contrast, the ICAEW’s release on the subject stated that the number of referrals to the pool was “disappointingly low”.

However, the ICAEW was relatively subtle about IPs’ role in the referral process: “the aim of the pool is to increase transparency and confidence around prepacks and low level use of the pool is unlikely to achieve that. We know you can’t compel a connected party to approach the pool but encouraging them to do so supports the overall aim of the pool”. I found the Pre Pack Pool less subtle: “the insolvency profession and creditors have important roles to play in ensuring connected party purchasers are informed of the option to use the Pool and putting pressure on them to do so”. How does the Pool expect IPs to “put pressure” on potential purchasers, I wonder.

The Pool also acknowledges that “creditor awareness of the Pool has been low and few have taken the time to read through administrators’ reports”. On the other hand, they report that “those connected party purchasers who have used the Pool have said it has been an important step in building credibility and trust in the ‘NewCo’ among creditors”. The Pool’s Review does not elaborate, but there are some interesting quotes in an article written by Stuart Hopewell, director of Pre Pack Pool Limited, and David Kerr, IPA’s Chief Executive, for Credit Magazine in November 2016 (www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/download/documents/1467).

As shown on one of the graphs above, 13% of all pre-packs were referred to the Pool. This represents 28% of all connected party pre-packs. Personally, I’m surprised it was that many! My personal view is that those who find this uptake disappointingly low had unrealistic expectations.

 

The Performance of the Pool

Given that referral to the Pool is voluntary, personally I wasn’t expecting any negative decisions to emerge. After all, if you didn’t have to sit an exam, you wouldn’t do so unless you were certain of passing it, would you? I was wrong…

The breakdown of the Pool’s opinions over the 14 months to the end of 2016 is as follows:

  • 34 referrals: the case for the pre-pack is “not unreasonable”
  • 13 referrals: the case is “not unreasonable but there are minor limitations in the evidence provided”
  • 6 referrals (although 4 were a group of connected companies): the case for the pre-pack is “not made”

I appreciate that the Pool doesn’t want to give away its secrets, but unfortunately the Review gives nothing away about what factors tipped the balance or indeed how they measure a good pre-pack from the bad. The author ends the Review by stating that “hopefully referrals to the Pool will increase in 2017 as stakeholders become more familiar with the way it works and the reassurance it provides”, but without more feedback than simple statistics I cannot see this happening.

 

The Future of Pre-Packs

As we know, the Small Business Act included a reserve power to legislate the operation of pre-packs, with a sunset clause ending in May 2020. The Service’s Review continued its dead-pan mood, simply stating that they would carry out an evaluation “in due course”.

The Pool seemed barely more enthusiastic, simply stating in its Review that “it would be a shame to lose” pre-packs.

 

The Future of the Pool?

Back in May, the Times reported (https://goo.gl/QRcVZc) that Frank Field, Labour MP and Chair of the House of Commons’ Work & Pensions Select Committee, found the number of referrals to the Pool “deeply worrying” and he raised the prospect of the Committee scrutinising the Pool after the election. Sir Vince Cable also said that the number of referrals raised “worrying questions” and said that moves should be made towards making Pool referrals mandatory.

The Pre Pack Pool may be contemplating how to enlarge its role, but not necessarily with mandatory pre-pack referrals in mind. In the Credit Magazine article mentioned earlier (www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/download/documents/1467), Stuart Hopewell and David Kerr considered the extension of the Pool’s remit in the context of the revision of SIP13, suggesting “perhaps there is a role for the Pool to represent [creditors’] interests in all connected sale situations?” Although I continue to be concerned that much of the media outrage at connected party sales is levelled at the liquidation equivalents of pre-packs, surely the Pool must first provide convincing evidence that it is achieving the objective for which it was created before we seek to cast its net farther afield.

Are we to conclude that Hopewell/Kerr’s perception is that SIP13 sales to connected parties is an issue and having an independent review will regulate these sales?  I am not aware of any research into whether Liquidation connected party sales need regulating, so it would seem again that the tide is pulling us to tackle perceptions. Considering that the regulatory objectives include “promoting that maximisation of the value of returns to creditors” and encouraging IPs to provide “high quality services at a cost to the recipient which is fair and reasonable”, I struggle to see how these objectives are met by contributing further to this expensive over-regulated PR exercise.


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The ICAEW Roadshows: A Helping Hand Through Hazards

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Last autumn, Jo Harris and I enjoyed travelling with the ICAEW on their Roadshows (although it has taken us several months to recover!). If you want to know what you missed (or you feel you need a reminder in view of all that has changed in the past six months), here is my personal summary of highlights from last year’s programme.

RPB Changes

Bob Pinder, ICAEW’s Director of Professional Standards, explained to us the impacts of the two 2015 Acts primarily on the RPB environment.

As we know, the Small Business Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 introduced new powers for the Insolvency Service to sanction RPBs. However, it is worth remembering that the Secretary of State now also has the power to apply to court for a “direct sanctions order” against an IP “if it appears to the Secretary of State that it would be in the public interest for the order to be made” (S141 of the SBEE Act 2015).  Such an order could involve: loss, suspension or restriction of a licence; specific requirements to comply; and/or a contribution to creditors.

Although I am sure that this action will only be contemplated in extreme cases (not least as I’m sure the Service would prefer that the RPBs spend the time and money disciplining IPs), I found this development more than a little disconcerting given the cudgel a certain past Secretary of State swung about when some IPs appeared not to have complied with the employee consultation requirements. As commented on by R3 last November (https://goo.gl/QX6kHM), the 2015 government consultation on this particular issue offered no helpful solution and who knows what (in)action might light the next touch paper in Ministers’ minds.

Compliance Hazards

This was Jo’s and my presentation: an attempt to highlight the principal areas in which we’ve seen IPs trip up. Some of the areas we covered were:

  • Getting remuneration right: how to approach the new fees rules
  • File management: how to deal with the new Oct-15 IP Regulation on maintaining records to demonstrate administration and material decisions
  • Statutory deadlines: how misunderstanding certain rules can make all the difference
  • Anti-money laundering and bribery: how to make checklists more effective
  • SIP highlights: a quick trip through the SIP series identifying some key and some lesser-known slip-up risks
  • Ethics: how to avoid threatening compliance with the principle of professional competence and due care

If you would like to hear the full presentation, Jo has recorded it as a webinar available to all Compliance Alliance webinar subscribers (£250+VAT for firm-wide access to all our webinars for one year)*.

Legal Update

Steven Fennell, Exchange Chambers, explored with ease some key decisions, such as Jetivia SA v Bilta (UK) Limited and Re Corporate Jet Realisations Limited.

Reviewing Steven’s notes now emphasises to me how necessary it is for us to keep up to date with court decisions – so much can happen in six months! Cue plug for R3’s Technical Reviews (starting next month): https://goo.gl/jnnxUA.

Regulatory Hot Topics

Allison Broad, Senior Manager of ICAEW QAD, ran through some regulatory developments and issues seen by the monitoring team. The main points that stood out to me were:

  • ICR reminders: as we know, all appointment-taking ICAEW-licensed IPs need to have an ICR each year. Don’t forget that this includes retiring IPs even if they are merely running off their remaining few cases. IPs who move practices also need to make sure that this requirement is not overlooked, which is easily done if their new colleagues have already carried out an ICR earlier in the year.
  • Ethics reminders: make sure that ethics checks are carried out and signed off before appointment; initial ethics checks signed off months (or even years!) after appointment are not acceptable. Ethics checks should be signed off by the appointment-taking IP personally, not delegated. Make sure that the ethics check is noted appropriately, e.g. if your Form 2.2B (Statement of Proposed Administrator) discloses a prior relationship, is this noted on the ethics review?
  • Anti-Money Laundering reminders: ensure that the files demonstrate the risk-based approach; it is not sufficient simply to state that you consider a subject as “normal” risk, you should be setting out how you reached this conclusion. Also don’t forget to carry out a risk assessment even on court appointments and take appropriate steps consequent to that risk assessment.
  • Bonding reminders: make sure that forms calculate the bond correctly, taking into consideration charged assets and prescribed parts. Also, be consistent in calculating the bond level in VAs: you may have difficulty in justifying why you have bonded assets for less than their realisable values as set out in the VA Proposal’s EOS.
  • SIP8 reminders: Allison described a surprising flurry of SIP8 breaches as regards S98 reports, e.g. lack of detail in trading history and company accounts and inaccurate deficiency accounts. Therefore, perhaps it would be valuable to refresh your staff’s/template’s treatment of SIP8 disclosures in S98 reports.

The Pre Pack Pool

At a time when we were all awaiting the revised SIP16, Stuart Hopewell, a Director of Pre Pack Pool Limited, gave us a welcome insight into the Pool’s vision… and valiantly tackled a number of enthusiastically-delivered questions from the floor.

Back in December, Allison’s webinar http://goo.gl/ZCzzxR reported that the Pool had received two applications over its first month of operation.  I wonder if that number has reached double figures yet…

Valuable CPD

In conclusion, I would just like to say to those of you who have never attended an ICAEW Roadshow before: please do consider it this year. I found it a valuable overview of core developments – both past and prospective – affecting insolvency, together with several heads-up warnings on how some IPs are getting things wrong and carefully-worded insights into the RPB’s perspective on some serious challenges for IPs, balancing well the ICAEW’s roles as both a regulator and a membership body.

* For more information on the Compliance Alliance’s Compliance Hazards webinar, please email info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk


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SIP16: it’s more than just a Pool

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The Pre Pack Pool launched to sounds of applause from the likes of Anna Soubry MP and Teresa Graham, whilst most IPs have been keeping their own counsel at best.  For IPs and their agents, the new SIP16 contains changes of more practical consequence than the Pool.

On the Compliance Alliance blog, I have set out some pointers on how to implement the changes into internal processes and documentation (http://thecompliancealliance.co.uk/blog/sips/sip16/).  I’d also like to make a plug for my Fees Rules article for the ICAEW’s Insolvency & Restructuring Group’s newsletter, which I have reproduced on the CompAll blog (http://thecompliancealliance.co.uk/blog/practical/octfees/).  I plan to present a webinar on the combined subjects of SIP9 and SIP16 in a few weeks’ time.

Here, I thought I’d explore the outlook from over the SIP16 parapet.

How many applications will the Pre Pack Pool see?

Shall we open a book on that question?

Here are the Administration and pre-pack stats:

ADMs

 

 

 

 

 

 

I’ve drawn from the Insolvency Service’s insolvency appointments tables, extrapolating for a full year’s figures, and their annual regulatory and SIP16 monitoring reports.

If the pre-pack proportions are consistent, there would be 340 pre-packs over 2015 of which 228 would be to connected parties.  In one respect, it’s a shame that the Insolvency Service has handed over SIP16-monitoring to the RPBs, as I guess we may lose this insight into the numbers in future.

The Pool has 19 members (I’m not sure why 20 is often-quoted, unless there is an anonymous member!) – the names are at https://www.prepackpool.co.uk/about-the-pool – so each one could be expecting up to one review each month.  Of course, as many have noted, the reality could be far fewer given that applications are not mandatory.  Although the government’s threat of statutory measures to control pre-packs has been breathed hotly, why should this prospect persuade the pre-pack purchasers of today to apply to the Pool?

Also, as the graph illustrates, Administrations have been on the decline for a number of years and I suspect that the additional hurdles raised via the revised SIP16 and the fear in some IPs’ minds of their regulator picking up on an unintentional SIP16 clanger will force the numbers lower still, as instead more deals may be done either before or after Liquidation (which I think is already a far more frequent occurrence).

How will the regulators view absent Pool opinions?

There seems to be some anxiety that the regulatory bodies will be critical of IPs who complete connected party (“CP”) sales that lack a Pool review.  However, the new SIP16 puts little responsibility on the IP to press for a Pool application.  It merely states:

“the insolvency practitioner should ensure that any connected party considering a pre-packaged purchase is aware of their ability to approach the pre-pack pool and the potential for enhanced stakeholder confidence from the connected party approaching the pre-pack pool and preparing a viability statement for the purchasing entity” (paragraph 9).

‘The IP should ensure that [the party] is aware of their ability…’ – that is pretty light touch.

The IP also needs to ask the CP for a copy of any Pool opinion, but of course there is no obligation on the CP to concede to that request.  I understand that the CP can tick a box during the application to tell the Pool to provide a copy of the opinion to the IP, which at least might cut out the potential for some delay.

How should an IP react to a Pool application?

What would you do if you knew that the CP had applied to the Pool, would you wait for the opinion before concluding the sale?  I asked this question of an IP the other day and I confess that I was surprised when he said that he would wait.

Admittedly, 48 hours might not be long to wait in the great scheme of things, although this presupposes that the CP gets their application in pretty sharpish.  In view of the Pool’s wish-list (albeit not prerequisites), some of which carry not insignificant cost, the fact that the CP is probably being bombarded with issues from all directions and feeling ragged given their involvement in a limping company, and of course the inevitable reaction of “so you’re telling me I don’t have to make an application?”, the odds do seem stacked against a swift and comprehensive application to the Pool.

What would you do if the Pool’s answer was negative?  The Pool’s Q&As are factually correct but tight-lipped on the consequence for a potential sale of a negative Pool opinion (remembering of course that a negative opinion means “there is insufficient evidence that the grounds for the pre-packaged sale is reasonable”):

“It is for the IP to decide whether to proceed with such a sale or not.

“IPs are subject to regulation and authorised to act as IPs by recognised professional bodies. The insolvency regulators look at practitioners’ conduct through complaints received and proactive monitoring. Where systemic problems are identified, the regulators have the ability to take appropriate action.

“A complaint would not be well founded solely on the basis that a pre-packaged sale transaction was entered into when an opinion had been issued that the evidence was insufficient to support the grounds for a pre-packaged sale.”

I think that everyone reasonable now appreciates that the IP has got to do what the IP has got to do.  What would an IP do with a negative Pool opinion?  Would it make him think again about the sale, even though he would not know what had been behind the Pool member’s decision?  If it would not – on the basis that the IP knows what needs doing and can fully justify his actions – then why wait for the opinion?

Fortunately, I think negative Pool opinions will be very rare in any event.  After all, why would a CP go to the time and expense of voluntarily applying to the Pool, if he thought that he would struggle to persuade the Pool that the pre-pack was reasonable?  If the Pool does not a record a near-100% “pass” rate, I will be very surprised.

But would a 100% pass rate mean that the Pool has failed?  I do hope it won’t be seen that way!  After all, I suspect that applications will only be made to the Pool if the IP is moving towards concluding a sale; if the IP thinks the sale should happen, then let’s hope that the Pool rarely, if ever, disagrees.  Also, I think there’s an argument that, if applications to the Pool become the norm (although I am not convinced they will be), then the absence of an approach to the Pool might lead onlookers to presume that the CP was uncertain it would pass muster.  Therefore, even if the Pool notches up a 100% pass rate, creditors should feel confident that the wheat is distinguished from the chaff… so job done as regards improving confidence!

Quality agents step forward

For all its publicity, practically the Pool does not present the biggest SIP16 sea change for IPs.  Of far more practical effect to IPs are the additions as regards marketing.  This doesn’t mean that IPs’ past work has necessarily been at odds with the new standards, but inevitably practices and disclosures need to be adjusted to fit the now-codified standards.

Some agents have questioned the emphasis placed on having adequate PII as now required by the SIP, as they feel that qualifications – and especially RICS registration – are far better indicators of high quality and ethical services.  I can see their point, however I think that the quality agent could ease the IP’s SIP16 compliance burden in a new way.

I’d summarise the SIP16 marketing essentials this way:

  • The marketing strategy should be designed to achieve the best available outcome for creditors as a whole in all the circumstances.
  • The business should be marketed as widely as possible proportionate to the nature and size of the business.
  • Consideration should be given to the type of media used to reach the widest group of potential purchasers in the time available. Online communication should be included alongside other media by default.
  • Marketing should be undertaken for an appropriate length of time to ensure that the best available outcome for creditors as a whole in all the circumstances has been achieved.
  • Any previous marketing of the business by the Company is not justification in itself for avoiding further marketing. The adequacy and independence of the marketing should be considered in order to achieve the best available outcome.

Although much of the strategising is likely to be conducted in conversations in view of the urgency of the situation, SIP16 compliance requires good record-keeping.  Could agents help IPs on this?  Could they perhaps set out the “reasons underpinning the marketing and media strategy used” in a form that the IP could transfer readily to the SIP16 Statement?  After all, an agent worth his salt will be familiar with the new SIP16 and will understand well the pre-pack tensions that need to be managed in order to get the best sale away.  IPs look to their agents to propose and execute effective marketing strategies, so wouldn’t it follow that the agents fully justify their recommendations and actions in writing?  Such a helpful service might also attract a premium rate or repeat instructions, mightn’t it?

Before I move away from the marketing topic, I’ve been asking myself: how can we decide if a valuation agent’s PII is “adequate”?

For starters, I suggest that IPs who do more than the occasional pre-pack set up central registers of the PII details of the agents that they use, rather than deal with this on a case-by-case basis.  In this way, you need only ask your agents for PII information once and you can update your central register when the PII renewal dates come along.

Secondly, you might find RICS’ PII guidance useful: http://goo.gl/IAd7TX.  This describes minimum terms for PII required by RICS in a style that will be familiar to all IPs.

Curly additions to SIP16

In the process of updating the CompAll SIP16 Statement template, I discovered that there were several sneaky additions to the new SIP16.  I’ve attached at SIP16 comparison a tracked-changes comparison of the 2013 version and the current SIP16.

Some – but by no means all – of the lesser-publicised changes, which will affect standard documents and processes, are (in italics):

  • IPs should make it clear that their role is not to advise either the directors or any parties connected with the purchaser.
  • IPs should keep a detailed record of both the decision to do a pre-pack and all alternatives considered.
  • If the Administrator has been unable to send his Proposals with the SIP16 Statement, the Proposals should include an explanation for the delay.
  • Confirmation in the SIP16 Statement “that the sale price achieved was the best reasonably obtainable in all the circumstances” has been replaced by confirmation that the outcome achieved was the best available outcome for creditors as a whole in all the circumstances.
  • Disclosure of the extent of the Administrator’s involvement pre-appointment has been extended to involvement of the Administrator’s firm and/or any associates.
  • Disclosure of the alternative courses of action considered has been widened to the alternative options considered, both prior to and within formal insolvency by the IP and the company, and on appointment [of] the Administrator.
  • Disclosure should include explanations of why no consultation took place with major – or representative – creditors; why no requests were made to potential funders; and why no security was taken for deferred security (including the basis for the decision that none was required), if any of these were the case.
  • Disclosure of the names of directors/former directors involved in the management or ownership of the purchaser has been extended to include their associates and to any involvement in financing the purchasing entity.
  • Disclosure of fixed/floating charge allocations of consideration needs to include the method by which the allocation was applied.

 

Although these SIP16 changes will make compliance staff’s (and consultants’) lives a little more unpleasant as we try hard to avoid SIP16 Statement slip-ups, I would welcome that extra bit of misery if the pay-off were the Holy Grail of “improved confidence”. I am yet to be convinced that this will be the outcome.