Insolvency Oracle

Developments in UK insolvency by Michelle Butler

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Ethics: The Reboot

How does an Ethics Code more than triple in size overnight?  In my view, largely by adding lots of unnecessary words.  The devil, however, is in finding the detail hidden within the new Code that affects how we should be viewing and handling things differently from 1 May.

A primary reason why the new Code is substantially longer is that we now have “requirements” – highlighted in bold and given an “R” paragraph number – and “application material”, identified by normal text and “A” paragraph numbers.  This application material is “intended to help an insolvency practitioner to understand how to apply the conceptual framework to a particular set of circumstances and to understand and comply with a specific requirement” (1.4 A1).  So don’t be misled into viewing “A” paragraphs as optional guidance: although all the “shall”s appear in the “R” paragraphs, the language of most of the “A”s indicates that they also are necessary to achieve compliance.

Although I have tried to highlight the main areas of change, I do recommend that you read through the Code in its entirety yourself.  There is a great deal more detail to explain RPB expectations and you could find that the particular circumstances of you or your firm and your engagements gives rise to ethical threats that you may have overlooked in the past.

The ICAEW’s version of the new Code can be found at www.icaew.com/-/media/corporate/files/technical/ethics/insolvency-code-of-ethics.ashx?la=en and the IPA’s version of the new Code is at www.insolvency-practitioners.org.uk/regulation-and-guidance/ethics-code (although the IPA hasn’t amended the text of the page to highlight that the link is not to the Code that came into force in 2009, nor have they archived the accompanying docs that relate to the old Code).  The ICAEW’s Code has an additional “2” at the start of each paragraph (to fit the insolvency section into its overarching Code).  In this article, I have used the IPA’s numbering.

 

Why now?

Do I think that the implementation date of the new Code should have been postponed?  Yes, I do!

True, we have been waiting a loooong time for a revised Code – the JIC’s consultation on a draft revised Code concluded in July 2017.  However, the new Code is so much different from the old one (and from the 2017 draft), it is not at all an easy read at 70 pages, and there are many new requirements in there.  Therefore, expecting IPs to have absorbed and adapted systems to the new Code and to have trained staff by 1 May is grossly unfair in these extremely difficult times.  Shame on you, IS/RPBs!

 

Surely the Fundamental Principles are the same?

Generally, yes of course.  Some look a bit different now, though.

“Integrity” has been beefed up.  In addition to the “straightforward and honest” statement, we now have that an IP (R101.2):

“shall not knowingly be associated with reports, returns, communications and other information where the insolvency practitioner believes that the information:

  • Contains a materially false or misleading statement;
  • Contains statements or information provided recklessly; or
  • Omits or obscures required information where such omission or obscurity would be misleading.”

The Code allows IPs to be viewed as not in breach of this where they “provide a modified report” (101.2 A1), although I guess they could still have fallen foul of the principle of professional competence and due care by allowing the incorrect or misleading statement to be released in the first place.

As another solution, the Code requires an IP to “take steps to be disassociated” (R101.3) from such information when they become aware of having been associated with it.  Thus, it goes further than the advertising and marketing requirements of the old Code, capturing the spoken word and information that might wriggle out of “advertising”, and it makes clear that the IP need not have a marketing agreement with the party issuing the information, the IP just needs to be “associated” with it.

Having said that, the Code’s “Advertising, Marketing and Other Promotional Activities” section (360) has also been expanded on, making unacceptable standards more explicit.

“Confidentiality” has also grown by a page and a half.  Comfortingly, though, this Code has elevated the requirement for transparency, i.e. to report openly to creditors etc., by putting it up-front at R104.2, rather than buried as at para 36 in the old Code.  Most of the new text are statements of the obvious, e.g. being alert to the possibility of inadvertent disclosure in a social environment or to family and not using confidential information for the personal advantage of the IP or of third parties.

“Professional Competence and Due Care” is now accompanied by a new 1.5 page section, “Acting with Sufficient Expertise”, but I saw nothing in here that I thought really needed to be said.

“Professional behaviour” contains a subtle change: no longer must IPs only avoid action that discredits the profession, but they are required to avoid “any conduct that the insolvency practitioner knows or should know might discredit the profession” and they “shall not knowingly engage in any business, occupation or activity that impairs or might impair the integrity, objectivity or good reputation of the profession” (R105.1).

 

What about the Framework Approach?

Yes, we still have the basic framework of:

  1. identifying threats;
  2. evaluating them; and
  3. eliminating or reducing those threats to an acceptable level, often with the use of safeguards.

And in case there was any risk that we might forget this, it is provided in full twice (at 1.5 A1 and R110.2) and then appears in the introduction to almost every other section.  In fact, the word “framework” appears 45 times in the new Code (and only 6 times in the old Code).

 

Ok, so what has changed?  More paperwork, right?

Yes, of course!

Some have expressed the view that the requirements to evidence pre-appointment ethical considerations haven’t increased, if we’d been documenting things properly in the first place.  As the old Code had a simple “record considerations” message, there is some truth in that, but it is difficult to deny that the new Code reflects the record-keeping mission creep that the profession has seen over this century.

To avoid doubt over the extent of documentation required, we now have a list of six items to be documented at R130.2 – they are what you would expect, but you would do well to ensure you’re your Ethics Checklists specifically prompt for these items.

In addition, this list of six items should define the structure for documenting your ethical considerations when a threat arises after appointment (130.1 A1).

Under the old Code, we were required to keep threats under review, simple as that.  This has survived the revision (R210.7), but we now have added “application material” – 210.7 A1 – that helps define what such a review process should look like:

  • has new information emerged;
  • or have the facts or circumstances changed (facts cannot change, can they..?);
  • that impact the level of a threat;
  • or that affect the IP’s conclusions about whether safeguards applied continue to be appropriate?

Again, periodic review checklists may need to be enhanced.

 

Other paperwork: using specialists (Section 320)

To be honest, I never did like the old Code’s “obtaining specialist advice and services” section.  Its meanings were ambiguous; I never really understood in what circumstances periodic reviews had to be conducted and whether these were to be on a firm-wide or a case-by-case basis.

The new Code leaves us with no (ok, fewer) doubts.

The four “R”s in the section are key:

  • R320.3: “When an insolvency practitioner intends to rely on the advice or work of another, from within the firm or by a third party, the insolvency practitioner shall evaluate whether such advice or work is warranted.”
  • R320.4: “Any advice or work contracted shall reflect best value and service for the work undertaken.”
  • R320.5: “The insolvency practitioner shall review arrangements periodically to ensure that best value and service continue to be obtained in relation to each insolvency appointment.”
  • R320.6: “The insolvency practitioner shall document the reasons for choosing a particular service provider.”

So every time an IP plans to instruct a third party (or another department within the firm) to provide advice or work, they need to determine whether the instruction is warranted and then why they have decided on the particular provider, having in mind the need to achieve best value and service.  Then, they need to review periodically whether best value and service is being achieved for each appointment.

This sounds like another checklist or file note process per instruction together with more prompts on case reviews.

To reduce the detail required on each case’s instructions, it may be possible to create a firm-wide process evaluating the value and service provided by regular suppliers – in effect, an approved supplier list.  This would seem particularly relevant when using a specific service provider (e.g. storage agents, insurers/brokers and pension and ERA specialists) across your whole portfolio.

 

And more disclosure to creditors?

Oh yes!  In relation to using specialists, the Code says: “Disclosure of the relevant relationships and the process undertaken to evaluate best value and service to the general body of creditors or to the creditors’ committee” (320.6 A6) is an example of a safeguard to address a threat arising from instructing a regular service provider in the firm or those with whom there is a business or personal relationship.

The new section, “Agencies and Referrals”, also provides as an example safeguard similar disclosure to address threats created by any referral or agency arrangement (330.5 A2).

 

What about disclosure of ethical threats generally?

This is an area that appears to have been watered down.  The old Code stated that generally, it would be inappropriate for an IP to accept an appointment where an ethical threat existed (or could reasonably be expected to arise) unless disclosure were made prior to appointment to the court or creditors.

However, the new Code simply requires IPs to consider disclosure of the threats and the safeguards applied (210.5 A3)… although as disclosure is a safeguard, IPs would do well to disclose wherever this is practical (200.3 A3).

 

New Section (330): Agencies and Referrals

I would strongly urge you to read through Section 330 in full and consider how this impacts on your firm’s processes and communications.  There are a lot of disclosure and other safeguard requirements, which, when you think about it, could encompass a number of dealings.

For example, at the immaterial end of the spectrum, how do you decide where to send directors who have a Declaration of Solvency to swear?  Do you recommend the solicitor around the corner (or, now, one who is prepared to witness swearings remotely)?  Such referrals, even if the decision is a geographical no-brainer, must be subject to the rigorous evaluation and disclosure standards.

Of course, there will be other more material referrals, e.g. when assisting businesses outside (or prior to) formal insolvency or when conflicted from taking on an appointment or from advising directors personally, as well as recommendations made to individuals in IVAs.  These will require substantial documentary evidence that the appropriateness of the referral or introduction has been carefully and objectively considered and that a great deal of information (including the alternatives) has been provided.

 

Any change to referral fees?

There are some subtle changes in Section 340.

The new Code repeats the old Code’s principle that the benefit of any referral fees or commissions received post-appointment must be passed on to the insolvent estate.  The new Code extends the reach, though, in stating that no associate (as well as neither the IP nor their firm) may accept a referral fee or commission unless it is paid into the insolvent estate (R340.7).  Associates include connected companies and those with common shareholdings or beneficial owners (340.8 A1).

The new Code also puts a duty on IPs who do not control decisions on referrals to get information on referral fees received (340.8 A6).  This could be challenging for IPs in large firms or with a wide network of associates.

Its reach also extends to “preferential contractual terms… for example volume or settlement discounts” – these must also be passed on to the insolvent estate in full (R340.8).

Also, whereas previously the IP only needed to consider making disclosure to creditors, now, where an insolvency appointment is involved, any referral fee or commission payments must be disclosed to creditors (R340.6 and 7).

 

What about paying referral fees out?

The new Code is more direct in stating simply that an IP “shall not make or offer to make any payment or commission for the introduction of an insolvency appointment” (R340.4).  It also wraps the firm and associates in this prohibition and, again, if the IP does not control the referrals paid out by their firm or associates, they nevertheless need to ascertain what they are (340.8 A6).

I am not sure why we have now lost the old “furnishing of valuable consideration” prohibition.  After all, not every benefit is couched as a “payment”.

But then the old Gifts and Hospitality section has been substantially lengthened from half a page to four and a half pages, so non-monetary inducements connected with improper motives are caught elsewhere.

 

“Inducements, including Gifts and Hospitality” (Section 350)

This is another section that I’d recommend reading in full, as it has been beefed up.

The old Code had included assessing the appropriateness of a gift by having regard to what a reasonable and informed third party would consider appropriate.  However, the new Code makes the connection more directly with motive:

  • R350.6: “An insolvency practitioner shall not offer, or encourage others to offer, any inducement that is made, or which the insolvency practitioner considers a reasonable and informed third party would be likely to conclude is made, with the intent to improperly influence the behaviour of the recipient or of another.”
  • R350.7: “An insolvency practitioner shall not accept, or encourage others to accept, any inducement that the insolvency practitioner concludes is made, or considers a reasonable and informed third party would be likely to conclude is made, with the intent to improperly influence the behaviour of the recipient or of another.”

It goes further than this too, even stating that the Code’s requirements (including the “A”s) “apply when an insolvency practitioner has concluded that there is no actual or perceived intent to improperly influence the behaviour of the recipient or of another” (350.9 A3).

Examples of such inducements that might still create threats are where (350.9 A3):

  • “An insolvency practitioner is offered hospitality from the prospective purchaser of an insolvent business…
  • “An insolvency practitioner regularly takes someone to an event…
  • “An insolvency practitioner accepts hospitality, the nature of which could be perceived to be inappropriate were it to be publicly disclosed.”

The Code also imposes an obligation on IPs to remain alert to inducements being offered to, or made by, close family members and requires IPs to advise the family member not to accept or offer the inducement, if it gives rise to a threat (R350.12 and 13).

 

New Section (390): “NOCLAR”

Presumably, accountants are already familiar with this acronym for “non-compliance with laws and regulations”.  The new section in the Insolvency Code certainly seems to be a lift-and-drop from the accountancy code, but in my view a clumsy one.

For example, instead of referring to the “firm”, which had been nicely defined and otherwise used throughout the Code (except where other lift-and-drops have been unsuccessful), this section refers to the IP’s “employing organisation”, which I think could mislead some into assuming that IP business owners do not need to apply many of the requirements.

But more fundamentally, this section fails to acknowledge IPs’ relationships with insolvents.

I can see how accountants working with live clients need to understand how they should react when they discover that their client has breached a law or regulation.  Although of course IPs often deal with live clients, the vast majority of their time is taken up as office holders over non-trading entities and individuals and it’s those engagements that – very often – reveal non-compliances committed by the insolvent.

The new Code makes no distinction between non-compliance committed by: (i) the IP’s/firm’s clients; (ii) the entity/individual over which the IP has been appointed office holder; or indeed (iii) the IP or their staff themselves.  I think that each of these situations gives rise to different concerns and so they each deserve a different approach.

In a nutshell, the core requirements of this section are: to explore all non-compliances (including suspected or prospective non-compliances); and then, unless they are clearly inconsequential non-compliances (except where they are money laundering related etc.), to report them upwards within the firm and, where appropriate, to those charged with governance of the entity/business and to appropriate authorities.  In addition, if the case is an MVL of an audit client or a CVA, the IP must consider communicating it to the audit partner/auditor (R390.12 and 13).

The Code also imposes similar exploration and internal reporting duties on insolvency team members.

Of course, there is an expectation that this will all be documented, although the Code only encourages IPs/team members to document the matter and actions taken (390.16 A2 and 390.20 A2).

Setting aside all the “consider” and “where appropriate” steps, what does this section actually require an IP/team member to do in all circumstances?

  • Take timely steps to comply with the NOCLAR section (R390.9)
  • “Seek to obtain an understanding of the matter” (R390.10 for IPs and R390.17 for team members)
  • For IPs: “discuss the matter with the appropriate level of management” (R390.11) and for team members: “inform an immediate superior” or, if they appear to be involved in the matter, “the next higher level of authority within the employing organisation” (R390.18)

In my view, these cumbersome NOCLAR requirements are OTT for the vast majority of non-compliances committed by insolvents (e.g. do IPs really need to discuss all director misconduct with “the appropriate level of management”?) and indeed a fair number of those committed by the IP/staff.  You might be able to rely on the “clearly inconsequential” paragraph (390.6 A2), but experience with RPB monitors has taught me that there are diverse opinions over what non-compliances are inconsequential.

 

New Section (380): “The insolvency practitioner as an employee”

Although clearly this section is most relevant in the volume IVA market, it is an important section for all IPs who act as employees.  Unsurprisingly, it reinforces the message that, even as an employee, the IP has a personal responsibility to ensure that they comply with the Code (R380.5).

Having said that, some statements seem to me unfair or perhaps the writers are simply treating IP employees as ethical novices.  For example, 380.5 A2 describes a circumstance that might create ethical threats: where the IP is “eligible for a bonus related to achieving targets or profits”… but nowhere does the Code highlight that the business/beneficial owner IP might be exposed to a similar self-interest threat.

However, the section cuts to the core in highlighting the tension that an IP seeking to administer engagements ethically may experience with their superiors and peers across the rest of the firm.  The Code doesn’t pull punches: in some circumstances, an IP’s efforts to disassociate themselves with the matter creating the conflict may demand their resignation from employment (380.7 A1).

 

My other gripes

Ok, this is just a final section to allow me to get some gripes off my chest.  My main ones are:

  • The whole of the Ethical Conflict Resolution section (140)

It took a debate with my partner, Jo, for me to understand that these requirements did not apply to a specific kind of conflict situation.  The problem I have is that this section, which refers to “resolving ethical conflicts”, sits awkwardly alongside the rest of the Code, which refers to “managing ethical threats and keeping them under review”.  In my mind, an ethical conflict is only resolved by removing it entirely, e.g. by walking away from an appointment, whereas in most circumstances an IP applies safeguards to manage threats to an acceptable level.

  • The lack of change to the insolvency examples section

Last year, there was some consternation over the ethics of retaining an appointment over an MVL converting to CVL.  The example in the old Code made no sense.  It had stated that: “Where there has been a Significant Professional Relationship, an insolvency practitioner may continue or accept an appointment…”  But the old Code had explained that a relationship is denoted as a Significant Professional Relationship (“SPR”) where, even with safeguards, the threats cannot be reduced to an acceptable level, so the IP should conclude that their appointment is inappropriate.  Therefore, how was it possible for an IP to continue with an appointment in the face of an SPR?  The new Code was the ideal opportunity to fix that.  But there has been no change: paragraph 520.4 still states that in some cases an SPR will not block an IP’s appointment or continuation in office and this conflicts with R312.7, which more strongly states that, in the face of an SPR, the IP “shall not accept the insolvency appointment”.

I have similar issues with the example at 510.2, which deals with an IP accepting an appointment after having worked as an investigating accountant for the creditor.  For starters, not all IPs are accountants, but they may still do investigation work for a creditor – the text indicates that those IPs are in the scope of the example… so why not change the heading?!  More importantly, the instructions include impossibilities: they state that, where the secured creditor is seeking to appoint the IP as an administrator or admin receiver, the IP needs to “satisfy them self (sic.) that the company… does not object to them taking such an insolvency appointment”.  But it then explains that an IP may still take the appointment, even if the company does object or where the directors haven’t had an opportunity to object… so the IP doesn’t need to “satisfy them self” then?!

On the bright side, at least IPs taking on Scottish or Northern Irish appointments are now better represented in the examples section.

 

And now the marketing footer

My partner, Jo Harris, has recorded two webinars covering the new Ethics Code (there was just too much for one sitting).  We have also: created new checklists to address the new sections such as instructing specialists and dealing with referrals; substantially revised our main ethics checklists to address specifically the new Code’s requirements; and enhanced other docs like progress reports and case review forms.

If you would like more information on signing up for access to our webinars, document templates – we’re offering the ethics templates as a standalone package or you can subscribe to all our document packs and future updates – or technical support service, please do get in touch with us at info@thecompliancealliance.co.uk.


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BHS: lessons for IPs?

0317-kenya

Now that all the pantomiming is over, are there any lessons to glean from the Select Committees’ efforts? I think so. Allegations of “group think” and suggestions of advisers being too heavily incentivised to drive through a particular outcome could lead some to ponder “there but for the grace of God…” Whether or not mud is warranted, some stains may prove stubborn to remove.

The House of Commons Work and Pensions and BIS Committees’ report can be found at: goo.gl/Yi9eMI

 

“A remarkable level of ‘group think’”

Referring to the several advisers to Sir Philip Green and to Dominic Chappell, the Committee report states that “many of those closely involved claim to have drawn comfort from the presence of others”. Names such as Goldman Sachs and respected law firms and accountants appear to have lent credibility to the proceedings.

During the evidence sessions, some witnesses valiantly attempted to explain to the Committee members the scope of customer due diligence checks and the relatively narrow terms of their engagements. The Committees’ response may be discerned from the report (paragraph 64):

“The only constraint beyond the legally required checks is the risk that a company is willing to take that its reputation may be tarnished by association with a particular client or deal. In the case of BHS, it appears that advisory firms either did not consider the reputational risk or demonstrated a remarkable level of ‘group-think’ in relying solely on each other’s presence.”

IPs and related professionals work in a fairly small pond. Although we like to think we’re a robustly independent bunch, could we be at risk of some complacency when we encounter the same old faces?

 

“Advisers were rewarded handsomely”

It is perhaps less fair for the Committees to target the advisers on the levels of their fees. The firm that provided a financial due diligence report on BHS to the prospective purchaser, RAL, were set to be paid four times the fee if the transaction were successful than if it were aborted. The Committee also noted that “advisers were doubly dependent on a successful transaction because RAL did not have the resources to pay them otherwise” (the report does not refer to the existence of any guarantees, which was disclosed in the evidence sessions).

The firm tried to put their engagement into context by explaining the additional risks inherent in a successful purchase and by pointing out the ethical and professional standards that safeguard against such arrangements generating perverse strategies (http://goo.gl/ugfiIP).

The Committees were forced to admit that neither of the advisers “can be blamed for the decision by RAL to go ahead with the purchase”. That said, they did feel that the transaction advisers’ report “could have more clearly explained the level of risk associated with the acquisition” and, in the Committees’ typical emotive style, they stated that the advisers were (paragraph 73):

“…increasingly aware of RAL’s manifold weaknesses as purchasers of BHS. They were nonetheless content to take generous fees and lend both their names and their reputations to the deal.”

 

Countering the Self-Interest Argument

The Committees’ suggestion is that the advisers were too tied into a particular outcome, leading to doubts as to the veracity of their advice. Of course, almost everyone who gives advice – from pensions advisers to dentists – suffer this scepticism. When IPs act both as solutions advisers and implementers, accusations of acting in one’s self-interest are levelled as if they are statements of the blindingly obvious. Such perceptions of being unprofessionally influenced by self-interest are not only articulated by unregulated advisers looking to pigeon-hole IPs into creditors’ pockets, but also are reflected time and again in the Government’s/Insolvency Service’s proposals, for example on how to deal with the pre-pack “problem”, the perennial debates around IPs’ fees and the more recent moratorium proposals.

How do we counter this perception? Personally, I don’t believe the solution lies in setting thresholds on where advisers’ work should end – I was pleased that the early pre-pack suggestions of using a different administrator or a different subsequent liquidator were not taken up – as this risks the evolution of unwritten partnerships with the assumption that the self-interest and self-review arguments automatically fall away.

The perception can only really be tackled by doing a good job, by serving our clients’ interests best and being attentive to our (near-)insolvent clients’ obligations. We also need to remain alert to relationships and when we have stepped over the threshold. We must not see the Insolvency Code of Ethics only in terms of the “Specific Situations”, which I feel is very much an appendix to the real substance of the Code. The Code is by design largely non-prescriptive, but this means that we need to:

  • reflect on prior relationships, e.g. when we have acted as adviser (to the insolvent or to its creditors)
  • evaluate the relationship: is it “significant”, i.e. does it give rise to a threat to our objectivity (or any other fundamental principle)?
  • Can we reduce that threat to an acceptable level?
  • If not, we must have the strength of character to accept the conclusion that we should not take the appointment.
  • And of course, if we do think we can still take the appointment, we need to set out our reasonings and regularly review the position and effectiveness of any safeguards; ticking boxes on an ethics checklist is highly unlikely to be sufficient.

Calls continue to be made for directors to seek help early, when more doors to rescue remain open. IPs are being seen less often solely as insolvency office holders and they have augmented their insolvency skills accordingly.

R3 has just published two helpsheets for individuals and company directors with financial difficulties (at http://goo.gl/WOfCKI and http://goo.gl/eyHlia). These aim to dispel many of the misconceptions about IPs. As the falling insolvency statistics illustrate, IPs can and do help people and businesses get back on track without resorting always to formal insolvency tools.


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Ethics hits the headlines again: should we be worried?

Peru163

The big story of last week was the disciplinary sanction ordered to an EY IP for breaches of the Ethics Code.  But I think this is just one more straw on the camel’s back.  Every new criticism of apparent poor ethical standards that is added to the pile increases the risk of a regulatory reaction that would be counter-productive to the effective and ethical work of the majority.

 

Journalistic fog

Plenty has been said about the “noise” around pre-packs.  Therefore, I was not entirely surprised – but I was disappointed and frustrated – to read that the latest sanction had been twisted to fit one journalist’s evident attempt to keep shouting: “It was the classic cosy insolvency I wrote about last month: a company calls in insolvency advisers who conduct an ‘independent business review’, take the job of administrator and act on the sale as well.  On Wind Hellas, the creditors could not see how Ernst & Young could take both appointments without compromising their integrity. Six-and-a-half years later, the professional body has at last agreed with them.” (http://goo.gl/aIY9rU)

Actually, a look at the ICAEW notice (https://goo.gl/H7jUov) suggests that they did nothing of the sort.  The relationship that got the IP into hot water related to the fact that an associated company, Ernst & Young Societe Anonyme, had carried on audit related work during the three years before the IP took the appointment as Joint Administrator of the company.

It is unfortunate that a failure to join the ethical dots between a potential insolvency appointment and the firm’s audit-related connection with the company has been used to pick at the pre-pack wound that we might have hoped was on the way to being healed.

 

Speed of complaints-handling

Is the journalist’s reference to 6½ years another distortion of the facts?  I was surprised to read an article in the Telegraph from February 2011 (http://goo.gl/8902YO).  Apparently, the ICAEW’s investigation manager wrote to the IP way back then, saying that “the threat to Ms Mills’ objectivity ‘should have caused you to decline, or resign, from that appointment’”.  Given that that conclusion had been drawn back in 2011, it does seem odd that it took a further four years for the ICAEW to issue the reprimand (plus a fine of £250,000 to the firm and £15,000 to the IP).  Perhaps the recouping of £95,000 of costs is some indication of why it took four years to conclude.

I found it a little surprising to read in the Insolvency Service’s monitoring report in June 2015 (https://goo.gl/Lm5vdU) that the Service considers the that ICAEW operates a “strong control environment” for handling complaints, although it did refer to some “relatively isolated and historical incidents” as regards delays in complaint-processing (well, they would be historic, wouldn’t they?). In addition, in its 2014 annual review (https://goo.gl/MZHeHK), the Service reported that two of the other RPBs evidenced “significant delays” in the progression of three complaints referred to the Service.

Although I do understand the complexities and the need for due process, I do worry that the regulators risk looking impotent if they are not seen to deal swiftly with complaints.  I also know that not a few IPs are frustrated and saddened by the length of time it takes for complaints to be closed, whilst in the meantime they live under a Damocles Sword.

 

Ethics Code under review

In each of the Insolvency Service’s annual reviews for the last three years (maybe longer, I didn’t care to check), the Service has highlighted ethical issues – and conflicts of interest in particular – as one of its focal points for the future.  In its latest review, it mentions participating in “a JIC working group that has been formed to consider amendments to the Code”.

Ethical issues still feature heavily in the complaints statistics… although they have fallen from 35% of all complaints in 2013 to 21% in 2014 (SIP3 and communication breakdown/failure accounted for the largest proportions at 27% apiece).  Almost one third of the 2014 ethics-based complaints related to conflicts of interest.

The Service still continues to receive high profile complaints of this nature: its review refers to the Comet complaint, which appears to be as much about the “potential conflict of interest” in relation to the pre-administration advice to the company and connected parties and the subsequent appointment as it has to do with apparent insufficient redundancy consultation.

I suspect that the question of how much pre-appointment work is too much will be one of the debates for the JIC working group.  Personally, I think that the current Ethics Code raises sufficient questions probing the significance of prior relationships to help IPs work this out for themselves… but this does require IPs to step away and reflect dispassionately on the facts as well as try to put themselves in the shoes of “a reasonable and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant information” to discern whether they would conclude the threat to objectivity to be acceptable.

It is evident that there exists a swell of opinion outside the profession that any pre-appointment work is too much.  Thus, at the very least, perhaps more can be done to help people understand the necessary work that an IP does prior to a formal appointment and how this work takes full account of the future office-holder’s responsibilities and concerns.  Are Administrators’ Proposals doing this part of the job justice?

 

Criticisms of Disciplinary Sanctions

Taking centre stage in the Insolvency Service’s 2014 review are the Service’s plans “to ensure that the sanctions applied where misconduct is identified are consistent and sufficient, not only to deal with that misconduct, but also to provide reassurance to the wider public”.

Regrettably, the body of the review does not elaborate on this subject except to explain the plan to “attempt to create a common panel [of reviewers for complaints] across all of the authorising bodies”.  I am sure the Service is pleased to be able to line up for next year’s review that, with the departure of the Law Society/SRA from IP-licensing, the Complaints Gateway will cover all but one appointment-taking IP across the whole of the UK.

But these are just cosmetic changes, aren’t they?  Has there been any real progress in improving consistency across the RPBs?  It is perhaps too early to judge: the Common Sanctions Guidance and all that went with it were rolled out only in June 2013.  Over 2014, there were only 19 sanctions (excluding warnings and cautions) and seven have been published on the .gov.uk website (https://goo.gl/F3PaHj) this year.

A closer look at 2014’s sanctions hints at what might be behind the Service’s comment: 15 of the 19 sanctions were delivered by the IPA; and 20 of the 24 warnings/cautions were from the IPA too.  To license 34% of all appointment-taking IPs but to be responsible for over 80% of all sanctions: something has got to be wrong somewhere, hasn’t it?

The ICAEW has aired its own opinion on the Common Sanctions Guidance: its response to the Insolvency Service’s recommendation from its monitoring visit that the ICAEW “should ensure that sanctions relating to insolvency matters are applied in line with the Common Sanctions Guidelines” was to state amongst other things that the Guidance should be subject to a further review (cheeky?!).

 

Other Rumbles of Discontent

All this “noise” reminded me of the House of Commons’ (then) BIS Select Committee inquiry into insolvency that received oral evidence in March 2015 (http://goo.gl/CCmfQp).  There were some telling questions regarding the risks of conflicts of interest arising from pre-appointment work, although most of them were directed at Julian Healy, NARA’s chief executive officer.  Interestingly, the Select Committee also appeared alarmed to learn that not all fixed charge receivers are Registered Property Receivers under the RICS/IPA scheme.  Although it seems contrary to the de-regulation agenda, I would not be surprised to see some future pressure for mandatory regulation of all fixed charge receivers.

The source of potential conflicts that concerned the Select Committee was the seconding of IPs and staff to banks.  I thought that the witnesses side-stepped the issue quite adeptly by saying in effect, of course the IP/receiver who takes the appointment would never be the same IP/receiver who was sitting in the bank’s offices; that would be clearly unacceptable!  It was a shame that the Committee seemed to accept this simple explanation.  But then perhaps, when it comes to secondments, the primary issue is more about the ethical risk of exchanging consideration for insolvency appointments, rather than the risk that a seconded IP/staff member would influence events on a particular case to their firm’s advantage.

Bob Pinder, ICAEW, told the Committee: “It used to be quite prevalent that there were secondments, but he [a Big Four partner] was saying that that is becoming less so these days because of the perception of conflict… There is a stepping away from secondments generally”, so I wonder whether there might not be so much resistance now if the JIC were to look more closely at the subject of secondments when reconsidering the Ethics Code.

The FCA’s review of RBS’ Global Restructuring Group, which was prompted by the Tomlinson report (and which clearly was behind much of the Committee’s excitement), is expected to be released this summer (http://goo.gl/l96vtl).  When it does, I can see us reeling from a new/revived set of criticisms – one more straw for the camel’s back.


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Tomlinson: IPs caught in the cross-fire

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Banks have become the 21st century pariahs. It seems that they can do nothing right and they cannot afford to do anything wrong. Lawrence Tomlinson may have banks, and RBS in particular, sighted in his cross-hairs, but is there much in his report that should concern the IP regulators or may herald changes for IPs?

Tomlinson’s published report can be found at: http://www.tomlinsonreport.com/docs/tomlinsonReport.pdf.

The IP’s role: pre-appointment

A large part of the report raises issues regarding companies’ routes into the RBS’ Global Restructuring Group and how, once there, companies find it almost impossible to escape it alive. IPs become wrapped into this argument via Tomlinson’s observations over the opaque nature of the Independent Business Review process: the bank selects the IP and usually only the bank sees the report. When you add to this the fact that the cost of the IBR is passed to the company, I can see how this may rankle, although I am not sure that this makes the whole process flawed.

Tomlinson raises the issue of conflict of interest: he states that “it is easy to see how these reports may be used to protect the bank’s interests at the expense of the business. Much of the high value work received by these firms comes from the banks so it is naturally in their interest to protect the bank’s financial position”. Inevitably, the work of the IBR IP is fraught – can they really act independently? But who really is expecting them to do so? The IP’s client is the bank, not the company, so, at a time when the bank’s and the company’s interests cease to be aligned, it would seem to me to be foolish to assume that the IP introduced by the bank is not advising first and foremost the bank on how to protect its interests. If the company wants its own advice, then it should instruct its own IP. Of course some do, although Tomlinson fails to mention the barriers to some companies and their instructed IPs working to find a solution acceptable to the bank.

The appointment of administrators

Tomlinson writes that there are many occasions when the IBR IP later is appointed administrator. This seems to be a general comment rather than RBS-targeted, which might have been difficult to make stack up, as I understand that it is RBS’ policy not to appoint the IBR IP as administrator, is it not?

It is also not clear whether the cases involving directors who feel mistreated by the banks are the same cases in which the IBR IP later became the administrator. I think this is important because, on its own, an IBR IP becoming administrator is not an heinous act. On the other hand, if we take one of Tomlinson’s worst case scenarios, where a business was only considered insolvent because of a property revaluation, the directors were frozen out of any opportunity to offer solutions, and they protested that the IBR leading to the bank’s decision to appoint an administrator was flawed, then one might expect the IP to decline the appointment.

The Insolvency Code of Ethics states: “Where such an investigation was conducted at the request of, or at the instigation of, a secured creditor who then requests an Insolvency Practitioner to accept an insolvency appointment as an administrator or administrative receiver, the Insolvency Practitioner should satisfy himself that the company, acting by its board of directors, does not object to him taking such an insolvency appointment. If the secured creditor does not give prior warning of the insolvency appointment to the company or if such warning is given and the company objects but the secured creditor still wishes to appoint the Insolvency Practitioner, he should consider whether the circumstances give rise to an unacceptable threat to compliance with the fundamental principles.” If an IP still decides to accept the appointment amidst protestations, clearly he should be prepared to encounter a complaint and perhaps worse.

Tomlinson makes the point that “once an administrator has been appointed, the directors lose their right to legal redress”. Whilst directors lose their management powers and the administrator acquires the power to bring any legal proceedings on behalf of the company – and I should point out that I’m not a solicitor – there is precedent for directors to take some actions, e.g. challenging the validity of the administrator’s appointment, as demonstrated in Closegate (http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-4I). Challenges may also be made to court by shareholders (or creditors) (Paragraph 74 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986) and courts can order the removal of administrators (Paragraph 88). Of course, these measures cost money and probably will not reverse any damage done.

The IP’s role: post-appointment

More to the point, I think, is the risk of conflict of interest for bank panel IPs generally. Tomlinson puts it this way: “The relationship between the bank, IPs, valuers and receivers should undergo careful analysis. The interdependency of these businesses on banks for generating custom establishes a natural loyalty and bend towards the interests of the banks. Often the bank recommends or instructs the IP directly, so their preferential treatment is critical to their clientele. Maintaining independence and a fair hand for all parties involved appears extremely difficult.”

We’ve seen this argument play out in the pre-pack arena: if directors are in control of appointing an IP as administrator, how can creditors be confident that the IP, on appointment, will be acting with due regard for their interests? Similarly, how can other stakeholders be confident that an IP will not be persuaded by this “natural loyalty” towards the bank controlling their appointment to act contrary to his duties as administrator? In a number of cases, I would suggest that it is academic: if the bank is the only party with any real interest – or it shares that with the unsecured creditors looking to a prescribed part – then any bias towards the bank will achieve the same result as if there were none… although this may overlook the first objective of an administration, which is to rescue the company as a going concern.

Tomlinson is right: maintaining the IP’s balance here is extremely difficult, although I would be inclined to take receivers out of the equation, as there is no real change of “hat” for IPs in those cases. Until now, we have depended on the professionalism of the parties and the legal and regulatory processes to wield a stick towards any who stray, but I guess that we live in an age when that is no longer seen as adequate.

Tomlinson highlights another risk of conflict of interest in relation to selling assets: “RBS is in a particularly precarious position given its West Registrar commercial portfolio under which it can make huge profits from the cheap purchase of assets from ‘distressed’ businesses… Others have stated that they believe their property was purposefully undervalued in order for the business to be distressed, enabling West Registrar to buy assets at a discount price.” This is a new one on me and I’m not aware of any other bank being in a similarly “precarious position”. Although I would have thought that there would be little criticism levelled against IPs selling to West Registrar where it represents the best deal – and Tomlinson does not appear to be suggesting transactions at an undervalue by administrators – as we all know, there is a risk of getting caught up in allegations of stitch-ups wherever there is a connected party sale, whether that involves a director’s purchase in a pre-pack or a party connected to an appointing creditor.

The Repercussions

The most IP-relevant solution suggested by Tomlinson is:

“It is also important that the wider potential conflicts of interest between the banks, IBRs, valuers, administrators, insolvency practitioners and receivers are given careful consideration. Where these conflicts occur, it does so at the expense of the business. If collusion did not happen between these parties and their relationships were more transparent, then better fairness between the parties could be ensured. This requires further investigation and consideration by the Government to ensure that the law is being upheld and these conflicts do not impact on the businesses ability to operate.”

As mentioned previously, the Insolvency Code of Ethics covers specifically the scenario of an IP carrying out an IBR then contemplating an insolvency appointment. Personally, I think it does this rather well – it addresses not only how to view an objection by the directors, but also how the IP has acted prior to the insolvency appointment, how he has interacted with the company, whether he made clear who his client was etc. However, there is no ultimate ban on the IP accepting the appointment; as with most ethical issues, it is left to the IP to consider whether the threats can be managed or they render his appointment inappropriate. I would not be surprised if, down the line, there were a call for there to be a ban that an IBR IP could not be appointed as administrator. If it were a legislative measure, we could have fun and games defining such items as what constitutes IBR work and for how long a subsequent appointment would be prohibited, but it could be done.

But would it have the desired effect? It would certainly increase the costs of some administrations, as the built-up knowledge and in many respects positive relationships of the IBR IP would be lost to the administrator. It might also have limited effect, as the “natural loyalty” could persist in any IP who has the prospect of more than one bank appointment, be it a case on which he carried out an IBR or a case on which he’d had no prior connection. I believe it is a natural tendency in all professions and trades to protect one’s clients and work sources and I do not believe it is something that can be avoided entirely.

As with pre-packs, I would prefer the solution to involve those who feel mistreated doing something about it, calling to account anyone who acted contrary to their duties, ethical or otherwise. As with pre-packs, however, the devil is in establishing a clear understanding of what is and what is not acceptable behaviour, rather than simply trusting a gut feeling. Tomlinson has aired a few relevant issues, but also some irrelevant ones, I think, which unfortunately cloud the picture.

But is anyone listening? The FT reported yesterday (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/550c5360-5c31-11e3-931e-00144feabdc0.html#ixzz2mVVnGjFz) that George Osborne has washed his hands of the report, although Mr Cable seems more convinced that there are genuine problems. However, whatever the conclusions of the FCA’s skilled person’s review, I am sure that insolvency regulators already are contemplating their next step. Some will see the Tomlinson report as an opportunity to renew calls for the end to bank panels of IPs. With a revision of the Insolvency Code of Ethics moving up the agenda of the Joint Insolvency Committee, I can see the ethics of the move from pre-appointment work to a subsequent appointment again being the subject of debate.

(01/02/14 UPDATE: BBC4’s File on Four programme, “Design by Default?”, can be accessed at http://www.bbc.co.uk/iplayer/episode/b03q8z4f/File_on_4_Default_by_Design/)


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Two Scottish Cases: (1) Heavy Criticism for a Liquidator who Bypassed the Court to Obtain Remuneration and (2) Proper Court Procedure Catches Out Administrator

Although these two cases are much more for readers north of the Border, it seems to me that principles arising from the first case – that officers of the court have greater concerns than simply getting paid and that IPs and solicitors should be always alert to conflicts of interest – are relevant to many more of us.

Heavy Criticism for a Liquidator who Bypassed the Court to Obtain Remuneration
Re Quantum Distribution (UK) Limited (In Liquidation) [2012] CSOH 191 (18 December 2012)
http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2012/2012CSOH191.html
Summary: The judge in the Court of Session hoped that the publication of his opinion “will discourage a repetition of the unacceptable events” (paragraph 1). Lord Hodge’s criticisms were leveled primarily at a liquidator who had bypassed the court to obtain his remuneration from a newly-formed liquidation committee despite a very critical report from the court reporter. He also criticised the petitioning creditor’s solicitors, who also acted for the IP on some matters, for failing to make clear to the liquidator his need to take separate legal advice when they were in a position of conflict of interest.

The Detail: The court only learned of the events when the Auditor of Court raised his concerns with Lord Hodge. The Auditor had produced “a most unusual report” that concluded that, in light of the concerns identified by the court reporter, he was unable to report what would be suitable remuneration of the liquidator.

The court reporter’s concerns included questions regarding a settlement for the insolvent company’s ultimate parent (“QC”) to pay £50,000 each to the liquidation and to the petitioning creditor (“IEL”), although it was unclear what direct claim IEL had against QC. The reporter criticised the liquidator for charging time for brokering the deal, which he suggested was not an appropriate agreement, to the general body of creditors; for failing to disclose the settlement to creditors; and for adjudicating IEL’s claim without taking into account mitigating factors. He also suggested that the petitioning creditor’s solicitors appeared to have a clear conflict of interest in also acting as the liquidator’s adviser and that the petitioning creditor “had been allowed to exert undue influence over the liquidation” (paragraph 23).

However, it appears that, despite receiving the Auditor’s report declining to report what would be suitable remuneration, the liquidator did not make enquiries into what the court reporter’s concerns were, but instead he convened a meeting of creditors to form a liquidation committee and obtained approval for his fees from the committee, which the judge considered was “not acceptable behaviour” (paragraph 36). Lord Hodge expressed concern that the liquidator and the solicitors showed “a striking disregard of their obligations to the court. It appears that nobody applied his mind to why the Auditor said what he did or showed any curiosity as to what the court reporter had said in his report. The concern, as the emails show, was simply how to get the liquidator his remuneration” (paragraph 37). The judge’s opinion was that, as officers of the court, the liquidator and the solicitors’ staff should have brought the concerns of the court reporter to the attention of the court.

The liquidator was also criticised for failing to disclose the full terms of the settlement to the liquidation committee. In addition, it seems that the liquidator had failed to recognise that the compromise needed the court’s approval.

In reviewing the solicitors’ position, Lord Hodge commented that “solicitors who act in an insolvency for both the petitioning creditor and the insolvency practitioner need to be much more alert to the dangers of conflict of interest… It may be acceptable for a firm of solicitors so to act when the petitioning creditor’s claim is straightforward and not open to dispute. But where the claim is complex and is open to question, the potential for conflict of interest should bar the solicitor from so acting. In my opinion claims for damages for breach of contract often are of that nature, particularly where, as here, they entail a claim for loss in future years” (paragraph 40).

Proper Court Procedure Catches Out Administrator
Re Prestonpans (Trading) Limited (In Administration) [2012] CSOH 184 (4 December 2012)
http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2012/2012CSOH184.html
Summary: Is it correct to seek remedy under S242 (gratuitous alienations) by means of a petition? The judge decided that it was not, but he left open the question of whether the consequence should be that the joint administrator should begin the process again, given that no prejudice, inconvenience or unfairness would flow from continuing with the petition process.

The Detail: The joint administrators petitioned that an assignation granted by the company amounted to a gratuitous alienation under S242. Counsel for the respondents sought dismissal of the petition with the argument that the remedy is available only by way of summons, not by petition.

The case turned on the interpretation of rule of court 74.15, which states that applications under any provision of the Insolvency Act 1986 during an administration shall be by petition or by note in the process of the petition lodged for the administration order. The judge compared the wording of the rule of court prior to the 2002 Act, which listed the applications that should be made by motion in the process of the petition (because, of course, pre-2002, all administrations were instigated by petitions). Lord Malcolm then concluded that rule 74.15 “covers an application which relates to the supervision of, and is incidental to the administration, such as those specifically mentioned in the pre-existing rule; and does not apply to proceedings brought by administrators under sections 242 and 243 of the 1986 Act” (paragraph 10).

However, Lord Malcolm questioned whether, in this case, it followed that the proceedings should be dismissed as incompetent. He acknowledged that, “in the present circumstance, when no prejudice, inconvenience or unfairness would flow from persisting with the current petition, it would be unfortunate if the petitioners were required to begin again before the same court, albeit in a different form of process, with all the consequential extra expense and delay” (paragraph 16), however the rule of court remains. He invited the parties to address him further on this issue and concluded that this case supported the call for the abolition of the distinction between ordinary and petition procedure in the Court of Session.