Insolvency Oracle

Developments in UK insolvency by Michelle Butler


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The Rules’ complexities: get used to them!

In their report on the 2016 Rules’ review, the Insolvency Service all but acknowledges that some of the Rules leave IPs playing Twister, being forced into shapes that just won’t fit.  However, there are few admissions that things need to change.  Generally, all we can hope for is a review-on-the-review, which will consider further what, if anything, should change.

In this article, I cover:

  • The CVL process – top of the InsS’ list for change
  • The InsS maintains a general reluctance to fix fees
  • The new decision processes – successful or too complicated?
  • The InsS sees few problems with committees, dividends, the lack of prescribed forms, SoAs and personal data
  • But there are a handful of odds-and-sods that the InsS intends to change

The InsS report on their review can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/first-review-of-the-insolvency-england-and-wales-rules-2016/first-review-of-the-insolvency-england-and-wales-rules-2016

My personal consultation response is at https://insolvencyoracle.com/consultation-responses/

CVLs to change

One area that the InsS does appear committed to change is the CVL process.  In scope for consideration are:

  • The fact that the Rules only empower an office holder, not a director (or an IP acting on their instructions), to deliver documents by website
  • The fact that, although the Temporary Insolvency Practice Direction allows remote statutory declarations, a more permanent change to verifying Statements of Affairs would be beneficial
  • The fact that the Rules do not provide for the liquidation estate to pay any non-R6.7 pre-appointment expenses, e.g. the costs of seeking the shareholders’ resolution to wind up
  • Some respondents’ requests for more time to consider S100 decisions and SoAs

I find the last point a irritating: the new Rules’ S100 process for commencing CVLs is already more creditor-friendly than the IR86’s S98.  Now, the Statement of Affairs must be received by creditors at the latest the business day before the decision date, whereas under the IR86 the SoA only needed to be provided to the meeting.  Also, the new Rules’ 3-business-days-between-delivery-and-the-decision-date means that the notice period is usually one day longer than it was under the IR86. 

True, few CVLs need to happen quickly, but an extension in the period really must be accompanied by wider scope for the advising IP’s costs, as well as those of agents and solicitors, to be paid from the estate where the work is done with a view to the CVL.

 

A lacklustre response on fees

It was disappointing to read the InsS’ opening comment on the general subject of fees that:

“It is not certain that the rules on a necessarily moderately complex topic can be made clearer”. 

Pah!  You’re just not thinking hard enough, guys.

But at least we have some comfort that the InsS has “particularly noted concerns around rules 18.24 to 18.27 on changes to the bases of remuneration”, a topic on which I have blogged on several occasions, and they propose to review these fees rules “at a future date”.

While the InsS notes “concerns that the new Rules are not effective for small cases, including the absence of the ability of remuneration in a CVL to default to Schedule 11 scales”, they stated that “stakeholders”suggested “that reintroducing this measure… would make the process more complicated”.  Strange, I’m not sure why anyone would be against this measure.

They also stated that it might make “the process burdensome and more expensive rather than more efficient” if the rules were to provide different fee criteria for small cases, although the report does not make clear to what suggestion this was alluding. 

In my consultation response, I had suggested a de minimis statutory fee (after all, the OR has a set fee of £6,000) in recognition of the basic statutory and regulatory requirements of all CVLs, BKYs and WUCs.  This IP statutory fee either could be granted as automatic or, if the InsS weren’t comfortable in taking off all the reins, could be approved using the deemed consent process.  Personally, I was not suggesting different fee criteria for small cases, I was suggesting that this could be the standard for all cases, leaving the office holder to seek approval in the usual way for any fees above this de minimis level. 

I’m not entirely surprised that they’ve ignored such a suggestion from little me.  However, to suggest that there is no process by which the Rules could be changed to help IPs avoid the burden and expense of seeking the court’s approval where creditors refuse to engage in a decision procedure on fees is disappointingly defeatist and, I suspect, reflects a persistent lack of understanding of the difficulties encountered by many IPs.

Not even fees estimates to change

The report also noted that several respondents had made suggestions to simplify the fees estimate requirements.  The InsS gave several reasons why they felt there should be no changes, including:

  • the fees estimate provisions align with the statutory objective that regulators ensure that IPs provide high quality services at a fair and reasonable cost (hmm… does spending truck-loads of time creating a fees estimate pack really achieve this?);
  • “the level of fees charged by officeholders have often been a cause of complaint amongst creditors and sanctions by their regulators” (“often”?  Really??  The InsS Regulatory Report for 2021 reported that 5 out of 423 complaints were about fees and only one of the 53 regulatory sanctions listed was about the level of fees); and
  • “amending the Rules in the ways that have been suggested would have the effect that creditors would once again find it difficult to scrutinise and challenge remuneration due to a lack of timely information”. 

It’s a shame that the InsS appears to view the time that IPs spend in complying with the copious information requirements as time – and cost to the estate – well spent.

The case for physical meetings

Before the new Rules came into force, I think that many of us thought that removing the power to convene a physical meeting and replacing this with a variety of decision processes was unhelpful and an unnecessary complication.  Although the InsS report indicates that these views have persisted, personally I think that 5 years of experience with the new decision processes, as well as the pandemic lockdowns, has led many of us to think that maybe this new normal of decision-making isn’t so disastrous after all. 

But I do struggle to accept the report’s contention that “there is some suggestion that the new processes have not been detrimental to creditor engagement”, unless by “engagement” they simply mean “voting”.  It seems the InsS is arguing that correspondence and deemed consent decision processes “may encourage creditor engagement precisely because they reduce the need to spend time and money actively interacting with officeholders in cases of lesser interest”.  Hmm… this might explain why it seems that some creditors lodge objections to deemed consents and then fail to engage when the IP is forced thereafter to convene another decision procedure. 

I also had to smile at the InsS’ suggestion that the increased number of creditor complaints over the complexity of the decision processes may actually reflect creditors’ increased interest in engaging!

Decisions, decisions…

Fundamentally, the InsS report concludes that the new processes require no material changes.  In particular:

  • The InsS is happy with the 11.59pm cut-off time;
  • The InsS is happy that non-meeting votes cannot be changed (R15.31(8)); they state that, to provide otherwise “would require a framework to govern exactly how and when that could happen” (Would it really?  It’s not as if we have a framework for changing a vote submitted by proxy, do we?)
  • The InsS is happy that there is no ability to adjourn a non-meeting process; they consider that “naturally officeholders would not use a non-meeting process where there was any indication that an adjournment might be needed”
  • The InsS is happy that their Dear IP 76 encouragement for IPs to take a pragmatic approach as regards the statutory timescales for delivering documents to overseas creditors is sufficient
  • In response to some comments that office holders would value the discretion to convene a physical meeting, the InsS believes that at present “the restriction on physical meetings is operating correctly, this does not rule out future changes in this area”

But the InsS has indicated that a couple of suggestions are worthy of further consideration:

  • That creditors with small debts should not be required to prove their debt in order to vote
  • Fixing the apparent inconsistency in requiring meetings, but not non-meeting decision procedures, to be gazetted

Information overload

The InsS report does acknowledge that “information overload” as regards creditors’ circulars for decisions is “a core concern”.  However, they suggest that this is in part because some IPs “are still in the process of determining how best to use and present the new decision-making options”.  Charming!  But, InsS, you cannot escape the truth that the new Rules require an extraordinary amount of information – R15.8 alone covers a page and a half of my Sealy & Milman!

Surely we can cut out some of the gumpf, can’t we?  For example, some people raised the point that R15.8(3)(g) requires pre-appointment notices to include statements regarding opted-out creditors even though no such creditors would exist at that stage.  The InsS suggests the solution lies in adding yet further information in such notices if IPs “think that reproducing the literal wording of the rules could cause confusion”. 

This implied confirmation that IPs do need to provide such irrelevant statements in notices is frustrating, given that the court had previously expressed the view (in re Caversham Finance Limited [2022] EWHC 789 (Ch)) concerning the similarly irrelevant requirement of R15.8(3)(f) for notices to refer to creditors will small debts:

“I think that Parliament cannot have intended that redundant information should be included on the notice”. 

Well, the InsS has spoken: they do require such redundant information.

Are decisions like dominoes?

I love it when the InsS writes something that makes me go “ooh!” 

The report describes the scenario where a decision procedure was convened to address several decisions, but then “a physical meeting is requested in one of those decisions but not the others”.  Someone had suggested that the physical meeting be convened to cover all the original proposed decisions or that the Rules make clear that the request applies only to one. 

The InsS has responded that they consider that:

“the Rules are clear that each decision is treated separately for the purposes of requests for physical meetings”. 

While I can see this from Ss 246ZE(3) and 379ZA(3) – these refer to creditors requesting that “the decision be made by a creditors’ meeting” – I have not seen this being applied in practice. 

So this means that every time a creditor asks for a physical meeting, it seems the director/office-holder should ask them what decision(s) they want proposed at the meeting and, if there are any decisions that they don’t list, then these decisions should be allowed to proceed to the original decision date.  Interesting.

What about concurrent decision processes?

The report noted comments that the Rules are unclear as to whether a decision procedure can run concurrently with a S100 deemed consent process in order to seek approval of pre-CVL expenses or the basis of the liquidator’s fees. 

The InsS’ reaction to this issue is curious.  The report merely flags the “risk” that the decision procedure on fees would be ineffective where the creditors nominate a different liquidator to that resolved by the company (would it?  Why??). 

So… does this mean that the InsS doesn’t see any technical block to these concurrent processes?  Are we any clearer on this debate that has been running since 2017?

What about the reduced scope for resolutions at S100 meetings?

The report notes that the new Rules have excluded the IR86’s provision that S98 meetings may consider “any other resolution which the chairman thinks it right to allow for special reasons”, which was previously used as the justification for S98 meetings also considering the approval of pre-CVL fees.  Does this omission affect the ability for fees/expenses decisions to be made at S100 meetings?

The InsS’ response to this one is equally cryptic.  They appear to be saying that, as “rule 6.7 now includes expenses that were omitted from the Insolvency Rules 1986”, the “any other resolution” provision is no longer necessary. 

I don’t get it: R6.7 is no wider in scope than the old Rs 4.38 and 4.62, so there’s no remedied omission as far as I can see.  The problem is that the new Rules still lack an explicit provision that the initial S100 meeting may consider other resolutions, such as approval of the R6.7 expenses and indeed the basis of the liquidator’s fees.  At least it’s nice to have the InsS’ view that there is no problem, I suppose!

Committee complexities

The InsS report does not pass comment on whether respondents’ questioning “the value of continually requesting that creditors decide whether to create a committee” was a good point worth taking forward.

The report does suggest that the InsS won’t be taking forward issues around the establishment of a committee where there are more than 5 nominations.  The InsS considers that the decision in Re Polly Peck International Plc (In Administration) (No. 1), [1991] BCC 503, “remains relevant”.  This decision concluded that, “where more nominations are received than available seats on the committee, that a simple election should be held with those nominees who receive the greatest number of votes (by value) filling the vacancies”.  Ah yes, the simple election – simples! 

The more recent decision, Re Patisserie Holdings Plc (In Liquidation) ([2021] EWHC 3205 (Ch)), suggests that even where fewer than 5 nominations are received, those nominations will only be decisive where they have been made by the majority creditors.  Therefore, it seems to me that we are still left with a cumbersome committee-formation process stretching over two decision processes.

No going back on prescribed forms

The InsS is of the view that the decision to abolish prescribed forms was the correct one.  The report states that there does not appear “to be truly widespread difficulty” and they maintain that their impact assessment had accommodated the familiarisation cost appropriately. 

Although I think this unfairly plays down the impact on small businesses, I do think the boat has sailed on this debate.  I would have loved the InsS to have provided optional templates to support the prescribed content rules, but given that even the InsS’ own proof of debt form does not help creditors to meet all the Rules’ requirements, it is probably safer that they did not.

No easy fixes for dividends

An age-old bugbear is the hassle for all parties where a dividend payment is paltry.  It does the profession no favours when office holders are required to post out cheques for sums smaller than the postage stamp. 

I understand that the InsS did consider the pre-IR16 request to provide a statutory threshold for dividend payments below which they need not be paid.  But I’d heard that this had been considered unconstitutional, as every creditor has the right to the dividend no matter how small.  Instead, the InsS gave us the “small debts” provisions, which I think do the opposite and only increase the likelihood that office holders will be sending small payments to creditors who consider it is just not worth their trouble. 

This time around, it was suggested to the InsS that creditors be entitled to waive their dividend rights in favour of a charity or that this process could be automatic for payments below a certain amount.  The InsS rejected this suggestion, citing that it would simply add a different administrative burden onto office holders and creation of an automatic process would impair creditors’ rights to repayment.

The report does a good job of explaining why a NoID for an ADM must be sent to all creditors, not just those who have not proved as in other cases.  This is because the ADM NoID triggers the set-off provisions of R14.24, so all creditors need to know about it.  So no change there either.

Some respondents commented on the generally unnecessary duplication of requiring employees to submit proofs even though the IP receives information about their claims sent to the RPO.  This is an area that the InsS has noted for future consideration.

SoAs and personal data

I’m sure we remember the kerfuffle created by Dear IP chapter 13 article 97, which seems (or attempts) to grant IPs the discretion to breach the Rules requiring the circulation to creditors of personal data in Statements of Affairs.  Well, it seems that the InsS has already forgotten it.

As regards suggestions that the Rules might restrict the circulation of the personal details of employee and consumer creditors, the report states that the InsS is:

“satisfied that the current balance struck by the Rules remains an appropriate one” 

Oh!  So does that mean they will be recalling the Dear IP article?

Respondents also raised other concerns regarding the disclosure of personal details:

  • the requirement for non-employee/consumer creditors’ details to be filed at Companies House, so this would include personal addresses of self-employed creditors etc.
  • the need to disclose an insolvent individual’s residential address on all notices
  • the fact that, if the InsS is truly concerned with creditors being able to contact each other, then wouldn’t email addresses be more relevant?

The report states that “these issues will remain under consideration for amendment in future updates to the Rules”.

The opt-out process: who cares?

In my view, far too much space in the report was devoted to explaining the feedback of the creditor opt-out process, with the conclusion that the InsS “will give further thought to whether there should be any changes to, or removal of, these provisions”. 

I was not surprised to read that few creditors – “less than 1%” (personally, I would put it at less than 0.1%) – have opted out.  One respondent had a good point: don’t the opt-out provisions give the impression “that information provided by officeholders has no value or interest”?  Even the report referred to creditors opting out of “unwanted correspondence”.  Doesn’t this suggest something more fundamental, that in many respects the Rules are overkill and that communications could be made far more cost-effective?

Odds-and-sods to fix

The report acknowledged the following deficiencies in the Rules… or in some cases the InsS admitted merely the potential for confusion:

  • ALL: the court’s ruling in Manolete Partners plc v Hayward and Barrett Holdings Limited & Ors ([2021] EWHC 1481 (Ch)), which highlighted the limited scope of “insolvency applications” in R1.35 leading to additional costs – this issue has been singled out by the InsS as being one of the “most pressing” to resolve
  • ADM: the requirement for the notice of appointment of Administrators to state the date and time of their appointment – in view of the expansive comments by the courts on this topic, it is surprising the InsS only intends to “give further consideration to removing this requirement”
  • ADM/CVL/MVL/WUC: oddly, the report states that, as R18.3(1)(b) does not explicitly require a progress report to include details of the company (but just the bankrupt), this “gives the appearance of an error so may be confusing”.  However, R18.3(1)(a) states that reports need to identify “the proceedings”, which under R1.6 includes information identifying the company, so I don’t understand the problem.  In contrast with some of the items mentioned above, the InsS apparently thinks that this issue is of such significance that they “will look to rectify this in a future update to the Rules”.  Guys, where are your priorities?!
  • CVL: “The differing use of the word ‘between’ in rules 6.14(6)(a) and 15.4(b)” (i.e. in one case, the InsS believes it does not include the days either side of the “between”, but in the other case, I think they believe it does) – the InsS has set aside for further review whether the contexts make this inconsistency sufficiently clear
  • BKY: the fact that R10.87(3)(f) lists the contents of a notice being that the Trustee will vacate office once they have filed a final notice with the court, but the Act/Rules do not require the Trustee to file such a notice
  • BKY/WUC: the 5-day period in which to nominate a liquidator or trustee after the date of the OR’s notice – the InsS acknowledged that the short timescale has caused issues (indeed! Especially considering this seems to be the only Rules’ timescale that does not start on delivery of the notice, but rather on the date of the notice)
  • CVA/IVA: Rs 2.44(4) and 8.31(5) appear to have caused some confusion as they now state that a supervisor “must not” (previously: “shall not”) vacate office until the final filing requirements have been met
  • CVA: the fact that there is no provision to file at Companies House any notice of a change of supervisor – again, the InsS’ response is surprisingly non-committal; they will merely “consider whether this justifies creating an additional filing requirement for officeholders”
  • IVA: R8.24 was overlooked in the EU Exit changes and still reflects the wording required when the UK was part of the EU

So much to do, so little opportunity

This article demonstrates the Insolvency Service’s long to-do list.  And this is only the Rules’ review.  Last month, the InsS issued a call for evidence on the personal insolvency framework and they will have a fundamental role in the statutory debt repayment plan process expected to be rolled by the end of this year… and of course no doubt behind the scenes they are working on the response to the proposed single regulator consultation. 

With such high profile projects, when on earth are they going to find the time to get back to the Rules?!


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New IP Fees Rules: Simples?

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With little more than benign overviews of the new fees rules out there, I thought I would examine them a bit closer.  What are the practical implications of the rules and do they contain any risky trap-doors?

My overriding thoughts are similar to those I have on the pre-pack changes: in an apparent effort to improve transparency, is the whole process becoming so unwieldy that it will turn IPs off altogether?  Maybe that’s the plan: make it so difficult to seek time costs that IPs switch to fixed/% fees.

As you know, the new rules take effect from 1 October 2015.  They can be found at: http://goo.gl/mekR5j.

Stephen Leslie, for Lexis Nexis, has produced a good basic summary of what they contain at: http://goo.gl/eqs9Aq.  R3’s Technical Bulletin 109 and Dear IP 65 also cover the subject.

S98s: same problem, different solutions

For CVLs, when should the liquidator set out his fees estimate?

R4.127(2A) will state that “the liquidator must prior to the determination of” the fee basis give the fees estimate (and details of expenses) to each creditor.  It seems to me that reference to “liquidator” requires the IP to be in office – so the fees estimate cannot be provided, say, along with notice of the S98 meeting.

But am I reading too much into this?  After all, R2.33 currently refers to pre-administration costs incurred by the “administrator”, when clearly the IP isn’t in office as administrator when the costs are incurred.  Therefore, maybe reference in the new rules to “liquidator” similarly is sloppy-hand to include “the person who would become liquidator”.  If that is the case, then maybe the expectation is that IPs will provide fees estimates along with S98 notices with a view to running S98 meetings along the same lines as they are at present.

Of course, then there’s the argument about how an IP is supposed to come up with a sensible estimate before he knows anything about the case.  Ok, he will have a better idea – but still not a great one – when the Statement of Affairs is drafted, but that’s little more than a few scribbles on a page, if that, at the stage when the S98 notices are issued.  So how long “prior” to the resolution should the liquidator “give” the information?  Given that S98s are pretty swift events anyway, would it be acceptable to send estimates the day before the S98 meeting..?

A confabulation of compliance consultants, especially with nothing more to guide us than a handful of new rules, is bound to generate a variety of proposed solutions.  Here are just three of them:

(i)         The return of the Centrebind

A Centrebind would overcome the problem of the IP being in office at the time of issuing the estimate and 14 days or thereabouts would seem sufficient to provide creditors with a reasonable estimate before the S98 meeting.

Of course, Centrebinds went out of fashion because of the limited powers the members’ liquidator has before the S98 meeting is held.  It’s not a great place to be as an office holder.  Do we really want to return to that practice wholesale?  And given the Cork Committee’s dissatisfaction over Centrebinds, would the regulators take a dim view if the practice were taken up again just to ensure that the IP could get his fees approved at the S98 meeting?  Some might argue that it’s the most practical way of working with the rules, but are there alternative solutions..?

(ii)        A second creditors’ meeting

This was my first thought when I read the rules: why seek a fees resolution at the S98 meeting?  Would it really be such a chore to convene another creditors’ meeting soon after appointment?

True, it would add another chunk of costs to the estate, but would IPs be criticised for taking this approach?  After all, how much of a solid estimate can an IP give before he truly knows what is involved in the case?  In my view, the costs of convening a second meeting would be entirely justifiable, as it seems to be the way the rules are pushing IPs.  Indeed, the rules as a whole are hardly cost-saving, given the additional work IPs will need to undertake to provide estimates and seek increases, if necessary later on.

Of course, in having a second meeting, IPs run the risk that the creditors already will have lost interest and they’re left with inquorate meetings and no resolution.  Also, as the liquidator (or an associate) will be chairman of the second meeting, they won’t be able to rely on the director-chairman’s vote or his use of general proxies.  However, the practice of looking to the director to approve the liquidator’s fees is viewed with scepticism anyway – many observers don’t recognise that, with so little creditor engagement, it’s sometimes the only practical way – so maybe it is a practice that we should be distancing ourselves from in any event.

(iii)       Fixed fees

This wasn’t my idea, but I see the attraction of it, particularly for “burial jobs”.

Given all the hassle of providing a detailed estimate of time costs, why bother, especially on jobs where in all likelihood the time costs incurred will outstrip the asset realisations net of other costs?  If liquidators were to seek a fixed fee, they would still need to provide, prior to the fees resolution, “details of the work the liquidator proposes to undertake and the expenses the liquidator considers will, or are likely to be, incurred”, but they could avoid providing the full estimated time costs breakdown.

Thus (provided that the IP doesn’t need to be in office as liquidator at the time), along with the S98 notices or just before the meeting, the IP can provide a pretty standard summary of tasks to undertake in any liquidation and set out the proposal to seek fees of £X.  If the SoA shows assets of, say, £15,000, the SoA/S98 fee is £7,500 of this and there are a few £hundreds of standard expenses, a fixed fee of £10,000 would seem reasonable to cover everything that a liquidator needs to do and, 9 times out of 10, there would be no need to seek an increase.

I guess that the proxy forms should list the proposed fee resolution in full, which would suggest that the IP knows what he wants to charge at the point of issuing the S98 notices.  As mentioned above, this would involve a degree of uncertainty, but for IPs working in the burial market, I can see that the risk is outweighed by the simplicity of this approach.  With Reg 13 ditched, IPs might not need to maintain time records* – what could be simpler?! – and they wouldn’t suffer the closure Catch 22 of billing time costs at a point when they haven’t yet spent the time closing the case.

But does this solution have legs for anything other than the simplest of jobs, where the IP would always be looking at a time costs write-off from the word go?  On its own, I don’t think so.  However, I don’t think it would be beyond the realms of possibility to devise a fairly standard formula for seeking fees on a combination of a fixed sum and a percentage basis.  This might help address any unexpected asset realisations, for example antecedent transactions or hidden directors’ loans.  Seeking percentage fees of such asset realisations would also deal with the concerns that it may be both impractical and indiscrete to propose fees estimates detailing what investigatory work is anticipated and how much that is likely to cost.

With several possibilities available, evidently S98s will require some thought and planning in readiness for 1 October.

* Although the Insolvency Practitioners (Amendment) Regulations 2015 are removing the Regulation 13 IP Case Record and thus, with it, the specific requirement to maintain “records of the amount of time spent on the case”, I do wonder whether an IP will be expected to continue to be prepared to meet the requirements of R1.55, R5.66 and Reg 36A of the 1994 Regs as regards providing time cost information to pretty-much any interested party who asks.  I know that no one asks, but with the continued existence of these Rules and Reg, does the abolition of Reg 13 really mean the abolition of time cost records in fixed/percentage fee cases?

Administrations: confusing

Of course, when tinkering with fee approval, it was always going to prove confusing for Administrations!  Here are a few reasons why:

Para 52(1)(b) cases

The current Act & Rules do not prescribe the process for seeking fee approval from secured (and preferential) creditors in Para 52(1)(b) cases.  Therefore, particularly where the Administrator has been appointed by a secured creditor and so will be reporting to his appointor outside of the statutory process, often a request is made very early on for approval for fees.

In future, if the Administrator is looking for time costs, he will need to “give to each creditor” the fees and expenses estimates before “determination” of the fee basis.  This indicates to me that an Administrator will not be able to seek approval for fees from a secured creditor before he has issued his Proposals to all creditors… unless he sends the estimates to all creditors in something other than his Proposals (unlikely)… or unless approval rests with other creditors in addition to his appointor – i.e. another secured creditor or also the preferential creditors – because it would seem to me that the basis of his fees is not “determined” until all necessary creditors have approved it.

This also means that an Administrator’s Proposals will have to include the fees and expenses estimates even for Para 52(1)(b) cases.  I can see some sense in this, as unsecured creditors can always requisition a meeting to form a committee that will override the secureds’/prefs’ approval of fees.  However, it seems quite a leap in policy, given that the full SIP9 information is not currently required in Proposals in these cases.

Changed outcomes

I am not surprised that the Service has introduced a new rule to deal with some Administrations where the prospective outcome has changed so that a different class of creditors is now in the frame for a recovery.  The Enterprise Act’s dual mechanism for obtaining fee approval depending on the anticipated outcome was always meant to have ensured that fees were approved by the party whose recovery was reduced because of the fees.  It’s true that the Act & Rules often do not deliver that consequence (not least because Para 52(1)(c) cases aren’t dealt with at all properly), but that has always been touted as the policy objective.

Sure enough, Dear IP 65 repeats this objective: “the new provision revises to whom the office holder must make a request or application in such circumstances [as described below] to make sure that such matters are determined by parties with the appropriate economic interest”.  Yes, but does it..?

In future, if fees have been approved on a Para 52(1)(b) case by secureds/prefs and the Administrator wants to draw fees in excess of the previous estimate, but he now thinks that a (non-p part) unsecured dividend will be made, he will need to seek approval from the unsecured creditors.  Fine.

However, there is no new provision to deal with outcomes changing in the other direction.  For example, if an Administrator originally thought that there would be a (non-p part) unsecured dividend – so he sought approval for fees by a resolution of the unsecured creditors – but now he thinks that there won’t be a dividend and maybe even that the secureds/prefs will suffer a shortfall, to whom does he look for approval of fees in excess of the previous estimate?  From what I can see, he will still go to the unsecured creditors.

[Theoretically, he might be able to issue revised Proposals in which he makes a Para 52(1)(b) statement, so that the secureds/prefs have authority to approve his fees.  In any event, the changed outcome might make revised Proposals appropriate.  But then what?  Would that result in the basis of his fees not being “determined” with the consequence that he has to issue fees and expenses estimates again to every creditor before he can seek the secureds’/prefs’ approval to the basis of his fees?]

Given that the OFT study concluded that secured creditors are so much better at controlling fees than unsecureds are, why not hand the power to secured creditors automatically by means of the new rules when the outcome deteriorates, in the same way that they shift the power automatically from the secureds to the unsecureds when the outcome improves?

Transitional provisions

This is more just a headache than confusing: one more permutation to accommodate in systems.

In general, the transitional provisions are designed so that, if an IP takes office after 1 October 2015, he will need to go through the new process to get his fees approved.  In effect, they treat Para 83 CVLs as new appointments, so the new rules disapply R4.127(5A) for Para 83 CVLs beginning after October in relation to Administrations that began before October.  Thus, Para 83 CVL Liquidators will not be able to rely on any fee approvals in the Administration.  Instead, they will have to go through the new process.

However, R4.127(5A) kicks back in for Para 83 CVLs following Administrations that begin after 1 October.  This is because, in these cases, the Administrator will have already gone through the new process in order to get fee approval, so it seems reasonable that the Liquidator can continue to rely on this approval.  Of course, the Liquidator will be subject to the Administrator’s fee estimate, so if he wants to draw fees in excess of the estimate, he will need to go through the new process for approval.

It might seem a bit much to expect an Administrator to be able to estimate a subsequent Liquidator’s fees.  For once, I think that the Insolvency Service has been sensible: the rules state that the Administrator’s estimates may include any subsequent Liquidator’s fees and expenses, not must – it’s good to see office holders left with a choice for a change!  Thus, where the Administrator’s estimates have not provided anything for the Liquidator, an increase in the estimate is probably going to be one of his first tasks.

I wonder if an Administrator’s estimate might be devised so that, if he has not used up his estimate in full, then it can be treated as the Liquidator’s estimate..?  I suspect the regulators might take a dim view of that…

Compulsory Liquidations: inconsistent treatment?

I didn’t spot this one, but it was passed to me by a Technical & Compliance Manager (thank you, D).

As explained above, the transitional provisions seem to be designed so that the critical date is the date of the IP’s appointment, rather than the more commonly-used insolvency event date.

It gets complicated, however, when one tries to define every way that an IP can be appointed.  For compulsory liquidations, the transitional provisions cover appointments (post-1 Oct) by: creditors’ meeting (S139(4)); contributories’ meeting (139(3)); and the court following an administration or CVA (S140).

What about appointments by the Secretary of State (S137)?

I cannot see why these appointments should be treated differently.  Does this mean that no Secretary of State appointments will be subject to the new rules?  Or does it mean that all SoS appointments will be subject to them..?

I have asked the Insolvency Service for comments.

Practical difficulties

Of course, there are practical difficulties in devising fee and expenses estimates for each case.  The Impact Assessment for the new rules (http://goo.gl/vCOsnS) state: “Based on informal discussions with IPs and internal analysis by the Insolvency Service it has been estimated that the costs of learning about the new requirements will be relatively moderate as in many cases IPs produce estimates of the work they will be undertaking for their own budgeting purposes. Therefore the industry has the pre existing infrastructure in place to produce estimates and so there will no additional set up costs for business. All the information that will be needed for the estimates is already available to IPs so there will be no additional costs of gathering information” (paragraph 34).  What nonsense!  Even if IPs do estimate fees at the start of a job, they are little more than finger-in-the-air estimates and are way less sophisticated than the new rules envisage.

The Insolvency Service followed up this nonsense with the suggestion that it would take IPs 1 hour to get their systems up to scratch for the changes!  Personally, I feel that such a fantasy-based statement is an insult to my intelligence.

In relation to generating fee and expenses estimates, the Impact Assessment states: “The work is likely to be an administrative task extended from the existing practice to produce estimates for business planning so we believe the work is likely to be completed by support staff within practices. It is estimated that the task will take around 15 minutes per case” (paragraph 36).  This is just so much nonsense!

Anyway, back to the practicalities…

The Insolvency Service has explained that it is working with the JIC to tackle “the key challenge… to present this information [the fees and expenses estimates] in a clear, concise format that the creditor, i.e. the end user, finds both useful and informative” (Dear IP 65, article 55).  I guess we are talking here about a revised SIP9.

Given that it has taken the IS/JIC ten months (and counting) to complete a revised SIP16 following Teresa Graham’s report, how close to the 1 October deadline do you think we’ll get before we see a revised SIP9?  I know that the SIP16 revision has been dependent on the pre-pack pool being set up, but I reckon it’s all going to get a bit tense towards early autumn.

The issue is: do we gamble now on what we think the regulators will want or do we sit and wait to see?  The new rules require that time costs fee estimates specify:

“details of the work the insolvency practitioner and his staff propose to undertake… [and] the time the insolvency practitioner anticipates each part of that work will take”. 

Is it a safe bet to assume that the regulators will expect a SIP9-style matrix, classifying work as Admin & Planning, Investigations, Realisation of Assets etc.?  Will they also want the estimate to list, not only the total time costs per work category, but also the time costs per staff grade, i.e. the hours plus time costs?  Will they also want a greater level of detail, say breaking down the Admin & Planning etc. categories into sub-categories, for cases where time costs are anticipated to exceed £50,000?  Conversely, what level of detail will they expect for cases with time costs estimated at less than £10,000, given that at present SIP9 requires only the number of hours and average hourly rate to be disclosed for fee-reporting purposes? Finally, will these expectations be, as they are now, set out as a Suggested Format, or will there be required disclosure points?

Given that the rules refer to “each part of that work”, personally I would get cracking now to devise systems and models to produce fees estimates styled on the table in the SIP9 appendix.  I might run some analyses of past cases to see if I could come up with some sensible tables for “typical” cases, maybe examine some outliers to see, for example, how much it costs to realise some difficult assets or pay dividends, depending on the class and number of creditors.  Setting up such templates and systems to capture the key elements of each case is going to take time.  We have less than six months.

Not quite so urgent, but just as systems-based, is the need to design mechanisms for monitoring fees estimates.  It would be useful to know if the major software-providers are designing tools to compare fees estimates to fees taken – much like the bond adequacy review – and whether these tools can be used to identify cases where fees are approaching estimates.

And of course, the rules provide loads more work on creating and revising standard documents and checklists *sigh*!

Finally, an obvious practical difficulty will be ensuring that creditors are still sufficiently engaged some way down the insolvency process to put pen to paper and approve additional fees.

Techies’ corner

I know that the following points are nit-picky, but, as we’re talking about fees approval, I felt that they were important to get right.

When does remuneration arise..?

We’ve had drummed into us that “remuneration is charged when the work to which it relates is done” (R13.13(19)).  This definition was introduced with the new progress reports so that IPs disclose time costs incurred, not just remuneration drawn.

But how does this definition fit with the new rules that state that “the remuneration must not exceed the total amount set out in the fees estimate without approval”?  Does this mean that we need to ask creditors to approve an excess before the time costs are incurred, i.e. before the work is done?  And what if the IP is prepared to write off the excess, does he still need to seek approval?

Yeah, I know, it’s pretty obvious what the intention of the rules is, but I asked the Insolvency Service anyway.  Their lawyer’s view was that the “court would resolve any tension” between the rules by coming to the conclusion that the new rules make it “sufficiently clear that the office holder is permitted to incur additional fees above the level of the estimate, before securing further approval”, because the same rules state that a request for approval must specify the reasons why the office holder “had exceeded” (or is likely to exceed) the fees estimate.  It’s the drawing down of additional fees that would be prohibited without approval, not the incurring of them.  Fair enough.

What “creditors” should be asked in Para 52(1)(b) Administrations..?

I have drafted the article above on the basis of the Insolvency Service’s answer to my second question, although I have to say that I think they could have done a better job at drafting the rules on this one.

New R2.109AB(2) explains which party/parties the Administrator should approach for approval of fees in excess of the estimate.  There are three choices, dependent on who fixed the fee basis in the first place:

“(a)  where the creditors’ committee fixed the basis, to the committee;

“(b)  where the creditors fixed the basis, to the creditors;

“(c)  where the court fixed the basis, by application to the court”.

My question was: if a secured creditor alone fixed the basis, who should approve the excess?  It can hardly be said that “the creditors” approved the basis.  Also, given that the OFT study had concluded that secured creditors seem to control fees quite adequately, perhaps it was felt that there was no need to add another layer of control in these cases…

The Insolvency Service’s response was: “it would be for the secured/preferential creditors to approve if the para 52(1)(b) statement held good. We think the wording of the Rules is sufficiently clear in this regard”.  Well, I’m glad I asked!