Insolvency Oracle

Developments in UK insolvency by Michelle Butler


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Red Tape? Hang out the bunting!

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Any measures to reduce insolvency regulation are most welcome and, apart from the odd item that threatens to increase the burden on IPs, the proposals of the Insolvency Service’s Red Tape Challenge consultation promise to bring in a brave new world where website communication is the norm and meetings are a thing of the past. Whether these proposals will be seen as working against the tide of opinion seeking greater creditor engagement remains to be seen, but, for me, some of these changes cannot come soon enough.

Ever conscious that my articles are getting longer and longer, I have described my Top Seven proposals from the consultation document.

The consultation document (“CD”) can be found at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/Consultations/RedTapeChallenge?cat=open. The deadline for responses is 10 October 2013.

1. Abolition of Reg 13 Case Records, but there’s a sting in the tail

The first proposal in the document is a belter: let’s abolish the Reg 13 Case Record – yes, please! I remember spending what seemed so much wasted time ensuring that the Reg 13 (or Reg 17 in my day) schedules were complete and accurate – far more overall, I suspect, than the 1 hour per case estimated in the Impact Assessment (which strangely is assumed to apply to only 80% of all cases).

However, it seems the Service is twitchy about leaving IPs to their own devices and is recommending that “legislation should require IPs to maintain whatever records necessary to justify the actions and decisions they have taken on a case. It is not expected that such a provision would impose a new requirement, but rather codify what is already expected of regulated professionals” (paragraph 32). Scary! So instead of a simple, albeit useless, two-pager listing key filing dates etc. of the case, legislation will require IPs to retain certain records. This could go one of two ways: either the provision will be so bland (e.g. as the CD describes it: records to justify actions and decisions) as to be pointless, or it will be in the style of the 2010 Rules on Progress Reports, which will introduce a whole new industry of compliance workers whose job will be to cross-check case files against a statutory list.

Why does the Service see a need to “codify” this matter? If an IP is not already retaining a sensible breadth of records (and such an IP will be rare indeed), if only to protect themselves from the risk of challenge, do they think that a statutory provision is going to force them to do it? Do they think that there needs to be a statutory requirement to assist regulators in addressing any serious failures? Such a measure has the potential to increase the regulatory burden on IPs without, as far as I can see, bringing any advantage whatsoever.

2. Abolishing almost all meetings

Although I welcome these proposals, I do think that the Service has over-egged the savings. For example, the Impact Assessment suggests that £7m would be saved by abolishing final meetings. Although the Service recognises that there will be negligible saving in relation to drafting the final documentation – even if there is no final meeting, a final report etc. will still need to be produced – they have estimated that each case will save on room hire of £64, 1 hour of an administrator’s time, and half an hour of a manager’s time. Personally, I would be very surprised if any IP makes provision for anyone attending a final meeting – does the Service picture IP staff sitting in an empty hired room twiddling their thumbs just in case someone turns up? Ok, so IP staff will save time on drafting minutes of the meeting, but that’s little more than churning off a standard template; it’s hardly 1.5 hours worth.

So if most meetings are abolished, is everything going to be handled in a process similar to the Administration meeting-by-correspondence process? Not quite, although it seems that almost all matters that will require a positive response from creditors – approval of VAs and of the basis of remuneration in any insolvency process – may be handled either as a physical meeting or by correspondence votes. The CD indicates that in other circumstances, “deemed consent” may occur: “the office-holder will issue documents to the creditors informing them of an event (as happens now) and that the contents of these documents are approved (if approval is required for that document/event) unless 10% or more by value or by number of creditors object in writing” (paragraph 64). In what kind of circumstances might this apply? I’m struggling to come up with many instances. I am aware that several IPs seek approval of R&Ps, although personally I do not believe that they need to. The CD also proposes to revise the Act’s Schedules so that Liquidators can exercise more powers without consent, but I guess that, if that does not go ahead, they might be other instances. I guess there might also be case-specific events, e.g. to pursue an uncertain asset, which might be referred to creditors. But there’s nothing wholesale that in future might be handled by “deemed consent”, is there? Unless…

Although the CD excludes office-holder’s fees from “deemed consent”, it makes no mention of SoA/S98 fees. If under the present statute, these need creditors’ approval, might they be deemed approved in future. Personally, I think this is another area, if the fees are due to the IP/firm/connected party, that also needs positive creditor approval.

Professor Kempson reported that IPs estimated that 4% of creditors attended meetings. It is not clear in the report what kind of meetings these are, but I bet they are S98s in the main. Personally, I have always viewed S98s as good opportunities for IPs to communicate something to trade creditors about the insolvency process and to convey face-to-face something of the professionalism, competence, and integrity of IPs. If it is true that no one goes to these any more, then fair enough, but even if it is only the rare S98 that attracts an audience, I feel it could just widen the gap further between IPs and creditors if no S98 meeting were ever held again. Having said that, the Service estimates that there will be only 30% fewer meetings, but if statute no longer requires physical S98s, would they be held; could the cost be justified?

3. Communication by website

The Impact Assessment does not quantify the estimated savings from these proposals, suggesting that they will be smaller than those related to the proposals to allow creditors to opt out of receiving correspondence, but, unless I have misunderstood their proposal, personally I could see this provision being used extensively.

Firstly, a bit more about creditors opting out: the Service estimates that, if they could under statute, 20% of creditors would notify office-holders that they did not wish to receive any further information on a case. I’m sorry, but I really cannot see it: this would require creditors to take action to disengage from the insolvency process – if they’re not already engaged, why would they send back such a notification? And would some then worry that they might miss out on important news, e.g. that miraculously there’s a prospect of a dividend, even though statute might be designed to ensure that Notices of Intended Dividend (“NoID”) etc. be issued notwithstanding any creditor opt-out?

As I say, much more promising I think is the Service’s suggestion that office-holders could write once to creditors to tell them that all future documents are going to be accessible on a website, which is something that office-holders can do presently but only with a court order. Wouldn’t that be great? No more need to send one-pagers to creditors informing them that a progress report has been placed on the website – you’d just put in on the website, job done. I wonder how many hits the web page would get… On second thoughts, I don’t think I want to know; I think it would only make me cry at the realisation of the huge amount of money, time and trees that had been wasted over the decades in sending reports that almost no one read.

There are a couple of catches: the Service proposes that the office-holder could do this only when he/she “considers that uploading statutory documents to a website, instead of sending hard copies, will not unfairly disadvantage creditors” (paragraph 95). I would have thought that creditors might only be unfairly disadvantaged if they are unable to access the website, no? So are we talking here about a particular profile of creditor? Or is the Service thinking, not about the creditors, but about the importance of the documentation? I could see that it might be unfair to place a NoID on a website with no announcement, leaving it to creditors’ pot luck as to whether they spotted the notice in time to lodge a claim – and I’m guessing that NoIDs would be excluded from this provision. But in what other circumstances could creditors be unfairly disadvantaged?

In another section of the CD, which covers a proposal to reduce the number of statutory circulars (which has not made it to my Top Seven), the Service states that: “Important information is being passed – to attend a meeting, to know of its outcome – which we would not want dissipated” (paragraph 102). So does the Service believe that a notice of meeting needs to be circulated, rather than pop onto a website, for fear that creditors might not see it until the meeting had been held? Ok, but then what about progress reports, the issuing of which sets the clock ticking for challenges to fees: are these similarly too important to pop onto a website unannounced? Could creditors be considered to be unfairly disadvantaged by this action? But where would that leave us: what documents would be appropriate to post to a website unannounced?

4. Extend extensions by consent

The Service proposes to extend the period by which Administrations may be extended by consent of creditors to 12 months. They also invite views on whether this should be extended further.

My personal view is that it would seem practical, whilst not making it too easy for Administrations to stagnate, to allow creditors to extend Administrations indefinitely but only by, say, 6 months at a time.

I can think of few circumstances where an Administration should move to a Liquidation, particularly if another of the Service’s proposals – that the power to take fraudulent or wrongful trading actions be extended to Administrators – is implemented. The CD also suggests empowering an Administrator to pay a dividend from the prescribed part, although I would like to see the power extend to a dividend of any description (what’s so special about the prescribed part?). These changes would seem to remove the need to move a company from Administration to CVL (although I wonder if these changes will persuade HMRC to drop its practice of modifying proposals to require that the company be placed into liquidation of some description – why do they do that?!), but then some Administrations might need to be extended for significant periods – adjudicating on claims can be a lengthy business.

I think the Enterprise Act envisaged Administrations as a holding cell, allowing the office-holder to do what he/she could to get the best out of the situation, but once the end-result was established, the idea was that the company would move to liquidation, CVA, or even escape back to solvency. But that all seems a bit over-complicated and costly when, in many respects (e.g. specific bond, R&P and currently D-report/return), the successive CVL is a completely separate insolvency case. Why does the company need to move to CVL to pay a dividend?

5. Scrap small dividends

The Service proposes that, where the dividend payment to a creditor will be less than, say £5 or £10, the dividend is not paid to the creditor. The Service suggests that these unpaid dividends might be passed to its disqualification department or to HM Treasury.

The Service has spotted the key difficulty: should the threshold apply to each interim/final dividend payment or to the total dividend? Although it would not be impossible, it could be tricky applying the threshold to the total dividend – the office holder would need to keep a tally of small unpaid dividends at each interim payment and monitor when the sum total crossed the threshold. To be fair, I guess there are few insolvencies that involve interim dividends – I am assuming that this provision would not apply to VAs (unless the debtor specifically provided for it in the Proposal), but I believe that any increased burden on declaring interim dividends should be avoided.

6. “Minor” changes

The CD provides some annexes of so-called “minor” proposals for change:

• Extend the deadline for proxies up to, and including at, the meeting. Granted very few meetings are physical meetings, but I remember the days of holding CVA meetings and having someone stand by the office fax machine just in case any last-minute proxies came in – it’s not exactly cost-free.

• Apply the VA requisite majorities rule on connected party voting to liquidations and bankruptcies. Personally, I think this is quite a naughty proposal to slip in to this consultation, particularly at the tail-end of a “minor” proposals annex – it hardly seems in keeping with the Red Tape Challenge objective of abolishing unnecessary regulation! Why isn’t it already in liquidations and bankruptcies? I don’t know for sure, but I wonder if it is something to do with the fact that the resolutions taken at VA meetings decide the fate of the insolvent entity, whether to approve the VA or not. The provision is also in Administrations, which is a bit more difficult to rationalise (as are a lot of Administration rules!): perhaps it is because Administrators’ Proposals might also decide the fate of the company, whether the Administrator pursues its rescue by means of a CVA or otherwise (see, for example, Re Station Properties Limited, http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-3I). These decisions are fundamentally different from those taken at liquidation and bankruptcy meetings, where any connected party bias is far less relevant.

• “Clarify that, where ‘creditors’ is mentioned in insolvency regulation, only those creditors whose debts remain outstanding are being referred to. Currently, if a creditor has received payment in full, they would still be classed as a creditor in the insolvency (as they would have been a creditor at the commencement of the procedure, which fixes the use of that term legally). As the legislation refers to actions that can be carried out by or with the consent of creditors, engaging with those ‘creditors’ who have already received full payment (and may not consider themselves creditors any longer) can be difficult” (annex 6(a)). Well, I’m glad we got that cleared up! It makes a joke of the current position, though. For example, the ICAEW blogged that creditors need to receive copies of MVL progress reports (http://www.ion.icaew.com/insolvencyblog/26779). Although I dispute that this is the only interpretation of the Act/Rules, the consequence of the Service’s stance described above is that, despite what the Service apparently has told the ICAEW, even if creditors have been paid, they still receive copies of MVL progress reports – what nonsense! To my mind, however, the key issue arising from this conclusion is the application of R2.106(5A) – not only would paid secured creditors’ approval to the basis of fees need to be sought, but also paid preferential creditors. I wonder what the court would say if a paid creditor applied on the ground that the Administrator had failed to include them in an invitation to approve fees? I suspect: ”Go away and stop wasting the court’s time!” And don’t forget that the Administrator needs to seek all secured creditors’ approvals of the time of his/her discharge – personally, this seems unnecessarily burdensome to me anyway, but do we really need to seek the approval of creditors who are no longer owed anything? Also, the Act/Rules do not seem to allow the Administrator to get his/her discharge by means of anything other than a positive consent from all secured creditors. It’s a shame that this CD does not propose that silent secured creditors could be ignored, when seeking approval for discharge or for fees.

• “Consider the efficiency of the process by which administration can exit into dissolution or CVL and clarify them, if necessary” (annex 6(f)) – yes, please! Despite being tweaked and being the subject of much debate and consultation, it seems that the move to CVL process defies simplification. Now we have the unsatisfactory position that the Administrator needs to sign off and submit to Registrar of Companies (“RoC”) a final report covering the period up to the date that the company moves to CVL, but, because Administrators only learn of this event when they see it appear on the register at Companies House, they have already vacated office by the time they can sign and submit the report. Whilst Administrators can get the report pretty-much ready for signing before they vacate office – so at least they can be paid for the work! – there must be a way of avoiding this fudge, mustn’t there? I ask myself, why should the RoC be in control of the move date? Why couldn’t the Administrator sign a form with the effect that the company moves to CVL and statute simply provide that the form must be filed within a short time thereafter? After all, the dates of commencement of all other insolvency processes are fixed outside of RoC’s hands and the appropriate notices/resolutions are filed after the event.

7. Changes to D-report/return forms

I know that R3 has expended a lot of effort into seeking changes to the D-report/return forms and in putting them online, so I hope that I’m not dissing the Service’s proposals unduly out of ignorance. However, the CD left me puzzled.

Instead of asking IPs to express an opinion on whether the director “is a person whose conduct makes it appear to you that he is unfit” – because the Service believes that this can delay submission of the form, as the IP takes time to gather evidence – it proposes to ask IPs to provide “details of director behaviour which may indicate misconduct” (paragraph 209). From what I can gather, it seems there will be a tick-box list of behaviours that may indicate misconduct. But IPs will still be working on the basis of evidence in ticking the boxes, won’t they? So all that will be removed is the need for the IP to decide whether a D-return or report is appropriate (the Service’s plan is to have only one form). In fact, it could be more burdensome to IPs, as currently they use their own judgment in deciding that an action or behaviour does not, or is unlikely to, cross the threshold of misconduct, which would lead them to submit a clean return, end of story. However, under the proposed system, it seems to me that the IP would tick the box regarding the particular behaviour and the Service would then have to decide whether it warranted further investigation. Would that help anyone?

I appreciate IPs’ reluctance in expressing an opinion on misconduct, but I suggest that the main rationale for dropping this requirement is that, as currently, the Service will make its own mind up anyway, so what does it matter what the IP thinks? However, what will be lost under the new system will be the IP acting as a first-level filter, which I guess achieves the Red Tape Challenge objective, but it seems unhelpful in the greater scheme of things.

And is this tick-box approach going to be an improvement? Although the Service has promised a free text box (woo hoo!), it all sounds a bit restrictive to me.

One promising proposed change is that the Service will pre-populate returns with information that is already available (presumably from RoC). Not only will this make IPs’ lives a little easier, but also the receipt of a pre-populated return may act as a useful prompt to complete the task.

BIS is pursuing its “Digital by Default vision” and so views are sought on whether electronic submission of D-returns could be mandatory. Although personally I think it would not be a huge leap for all IPs to do this – provided the return was a moveable document that could be worked on and passed around a number of people in the IP’s office before finalisation and submission – I dislike the suggestion that there would be no other way of complying with the legislation and I did have to laugh at the image of an IP typing up his D-return in a public library (paragraph 205)!

The Service is also proposing to change the deadline to 3 months, on the assumption that this would be doable if IPs were not required to express an opinion and on the basis that “all of the information required for completion of the return will be available to the office-holder within that reduced period in the vast majority of cases” (paragraph 212). I’m not so sure, particularly if the IP encounters resistance in retrieving books and records and if directors are slow in submitting completed questionnaires – and these likely will include the cases where some misconduct has gone on. The CD does not mention what an IP’s duty would be in relation to any discoveries after the 3 months, but presumably a professional IP will go to the expense of informing the Service of material findings. I realise that resources are stretched extraordinarily within the Investigations department, but I’m not convinced that this is the best way to tackle the issue.

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Well, I had intended to avoid prattling on for too long, but I think I failed! Hopefully, this is a reflection of the interest I have in the Service’s proposals: despite my criticisms, Insolvency Service, I am grateful for your efforts in seeking to improve things – thank you.


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The Kempson Review of IP Fees – a case of Aussie Rules?

5436 Sydney

Whilst this atypical British weather may have brought out the Aussie in many of us, as we settle down to sipping a stubby over the barbie, Professor Kempson seems to be gazing at the Southern Cross a little more completely.

Kempson’s report to the Insolvency Service was tagged quite unceremoniously to the foot of the page, http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/news/news-stories/2013/Jul/transparency-and-trust, which headines Mr Cables’ Transparency & Trust Paper. Her report even had to follow the uninspiring terms of reference of the pre-pack review and so here I will follow the antipodean theme and blog about the bottom item of that press release first.

I’ll also start from the back of Kempson’s report and summarise her recommendations, uncontaminated by any personal opinion (for the moment):

• Consideration of the potential for limited competitive tendering (section 6.1.1)
• A radical revision or replacement of SIP9 (section 6.1.2)
• Consideration of the Australian approach of providing a costs estimate at the outset of the case with an agreed cap on fees (section 6.1.2)
• The creation and adoption of a Code on the lines of the Insolvency Practitioners Association of Australia Code of Professional Practice (section 6.1.2)
• Some contextual information from an independent body to help creditors assess the reasonableness of the remuneration and disbursements (section 6.1.2)
• Greater oversight exercised by the Crown creditors, HMRC, RPS and PPF, working together (section 6.1.3)
• Consideration of Austria’s model of creditor protection associations acting on creditors’ committees (section 6.1.3)
• Reconsideration of the circumstances in which creditors’ meetings need not be held in Administrations (section 6.1.3)
• Exploration of non-time cost bases or a mixture of bases for fees (section 6.1.4)
• Increasing the debt threshold for bankruptcy petitions (section 6.1.5)
• Extending S273 to creditors’ petitions (section 6.1.5)
• Provision of information (e.g. Insolvency Service booklet) to debtors regarding the likely costs of bankruptcy (section 6.1.5)
• Provision of generic information (e.g. Insolvency Service booklet) to directors subject to personal guarantees as well as case-specific information, e.g. by treating them on a par with creditors (section 6.1.5)
• A single regulator, perhaps the Financial Conduct Authority, for IPs (section 6.1.6)
• A simple low-cost mediation and adjudication service for disputes about low-level fees, perhaps by means of the Financial Ombudsman Service (section 6.1.7)
• Alternatively, some form of independent oversight of fees, such as that used in Scotland via court reporters and the AiB (section 6.1.8)

Charge-out rates – a surprisingly positive outcome!

Given the “how much?!” reaction often resulting from a disclosure of charge-out rates, I was ready to wince at this section, but actually I think the insolvency profession comes out of it fairly well.

The report details the charge-out rates gathered via the IP survey (which was responded to by 253 IPs):

Partner/Director: average £366; range £212-£800
Manager: average £253; range £100-460
Other senior staff: average £182; range £75-445
Assistants/support: average £103; range £25-260

Encouragingly, Kempson reports that these charge-out levels “are not, however, unusual in the accountancy and legal professions to which most IPs belong” (section 3.1). From my experience, I’d also suggest that the firms that charge the top end for partners/directors usually charge junior staff at the lower end and vice versa, i.e. I doubt that any firm charges £260 for juniors and £800 for partners/directors.

Professor Kempson also acknowledges that these “headline rates” are not always charged because IPs normally agree lower rates in order to sit on banks’ panels and, in other cases, the time costs are not recovered in full due to lack of realisations. Setting aside panel cases, Kempson suggests that fees were below headline rates “in about a half of cases, including: the great majority of compulsory liquidations, about two thirds of administrations; half of creditors’ voluntary liquidations and a third of personal bankruptcy cases” (section 3.2). Putting those two observations together, is it arguable, therefore, that IPs provide a far better value for money service than others in the accountancy and legal professions?

Panel Discounts – not so great

The report states that, at appointment stage, secured creditors negotiate discounts of between 10% and 40% on IPs’ headline rates and that some banks may achieve a further discount by entertaining tenders. “The implicit sanction underpinning all negotiations was to remove a firm from the panel. None of the banks interviewed could remember a firm choosing to leave their panel because the appointments they received were un-remunerative. From this they surmised that (individual cases aside) work was being done on a lower profit margin rather than a loss” (section 4.1.1).

Kempson does not suggest it, but I wonder if some might conclude that, notwithstanding the comments made above about charge-out rates, this indicates that IPs’ headline rates could drop by 10-40% for all cases. Personally, I do wonder if banks’ pressuring for discounts from panel firms could be un-remunerative in some cases, but that firms feel locked in to the process, unable to feed hungry mouths from the infrequent non-panel work, and perhaps there is an element of cross-subsidising going on. If Kempson had asked the question, not whether firms chose to leave a panel, but whether any chose not to re-tender when the panel was up for renewal, I wonder if she would have received a different answer.

Seedy Market?

To illustrate the apparent clout of bank panels, the report describes a service “that is marketed to IPs, offering to buy out the debts of secured creditors, thereby ensuring that an IP retains an appointment and giving them greater control over the fees that they can charge” (section 4.1.1).

Is it just me or is there something ethically questionable about an IP seeking to secure his/her appointment in this manner? Presumably someone is losing out and I’m not talking about the estate just by reason of the possibly higher charge-out rates that may have not been discounted to the degree that the bank would have managed with a panel IP. Presumably there’s an upside for the newly-introduced secured creditor? How do their interest/arrangement/termination charges compare to the original lender’s? Is the insolvent estate being hit with an increased liability from this direction? And why… because an IP wanted to secure the appointment..?

Is the problem simply creditor apathy?

Reading Kempson’s report did give me an insight – a more expansive one than I’ve read anywhere else – into an unsecured creditor’s predicament. They don’t come across insolvencies very often, so have little understanding of what is involved in the different insolvency processes (so maybe I shouldn’t get twitchy over the phrase “problems when administrations fail and a liquidation ensues”!). How can they judge whether hourly rates or the time charged are reasonable? They receive enormous progress reports that give them so much useless information (I’m pleased that one IP’s comment made it to print: “… For example saying that the prescribed part doesn’t apply. Well, if it doesn’t apply, what’s the point in confusing everybody in mentioning it?” (section 4.2.3)) and they struggle to extract from reports a clear picture of what’s gone on. Many believe that they’re a small fry in a big pond of creditors, so they’re sceptical that their vote will swing anything, and they have no contact with other creditors, so feel no solidarity. Personally, I used to think that creditors’ lack of engagement was an inevitable decision not to throw good money after bad, but this report has reminded me that their position is a consequence of far more obstacles than that.

Progress Reports – what progress?

The report majored on the apparent failure of many progress reports to inform creditors. Comments from contributors include: “Unfortunately the nature of the fee-approval regime can lead to compliance-driven reports, generated from templates by junior-level staff, which primarily focus on ensuring that all of the requirements of the statute and regulation are addressed in a somewhat tick-box-like manner. This very often means that the key argument is omitted or lost in the volume, which in turn make it difficult for us to make the objective assessment that is required of us” and from the author herself: “there were reports that clearly followed the requirements of the regulations and practice notes (including SIP9 relating to fees) slavishly and often had large amounts of text copied verbatim from previous reports. Consequently, they seemed formulaic and not a genuine attempt to communicate to creditors what they might want to know, including how the case was progressing and what work had been done, with what result and at what cost” (section 4.2.3).

To what was the unhelpful structure of progress reports attributed? Kempson highlighted the 2010 Rule changes (hear hear!) but she also mentions that IPs “criticised SIP9 as being too prescriptive”. I find this personally frustrating, because long ago I was persuaded of the value – and appropriateness – of principles-based SIPs. During my time attending meetings of the Joint Insolvency Committee and helping SIPs struggle through the creation, revision, consultation, and adoption process, I longed to see SIPs emerge as clearly-defined documents promoting laudable principles, respecting IPs to exercise their professional skills and judgment to do their job and not leaving IPs at the mercy of risk-averse box-tickers. I would be one of the first to acknowledge that even the most recent SIPs have not met this ideal of mine, but SIP9?! Personally, I feel that, particularly considering its sensitive and complex subject matter – fees – it is one of the least prescriptive SIPs we have. I believe that a fundamental problem with SIP9, however, is the Appendix: so many people – some IPs, compliance people, and RPB monitors – so frequently forget that it is a “Suggested Format”. Most of us create these pointless reports that churn out time cost matrices with little explanation or thought, produce pages of soporific script explaining the tasks of junior administrators… because we think that’s what SIP9 requires of us and because we think that this is what we’ll be strung up for the next time the inspector calls. And well it might be, but why not produce progress reports that meet the key principle of SIP9 – provide “an explanation of what has been achieved in the period under review and how it was achieved, sufficient to enable the progress of the case to be assessed [and so that creditors are] able to understand whether the remuneration charged is reasonable in the circumstances of the case” (SIP9 paragraph 14)? And if an RPB monitor or compliance person points out that you’ve not met an element of the Appendix, ask them in what way they feel that you’ve breached SIP9. Alternatively, let’s do it the Kempson way: leave the Insolvency Service to come up with a Code on how to do it!

I do wonder, however, how much it would cost to craft the perfect progress report. The comment above highlighted that reports might be produced by junior staff working to a template, but isn’t that to be expected? Whilst my personal opinion is that reports are much better produced as a free text story told by someone with all-round knowledge of the case (that’s how I used to produce them in “my day”), I recognise the desire to sausage-machine as much of the work as possible and this is the best chance of keeping costs down, which is what creditors want, right? Therefore, apart from removing some of the (statute or SIP-inspired) rubbish in reports, I am not sure that the tide can be moved successfully to more reader-friendly and useful reporting.

Inconsistent monitoring?

The report states: “During 2012, visits made by RPBs identified 12.0 compliance issues relating to fees per 100 IPs. But there was a very wide variation between RPBs indeed; ranging from 0 to 44 instances per 100 IPs. Allowing for the differences in the numbers of IPs regulated by different RPBs, this suggests that there is a big variation in the rigour with which RPBs assess compliance, since it is implausible that there is that level of variation in the actual compliance of the firms they regulate” (section 4.5). I also find this quite implausible, but, having dealt with most of the RPB monitors and having attended their regular meetings to discuss monitoring issues in an effort to achieve consistency, I do struggle with Kempson’s explanation for the variation.

Although I can offer no alternative explanation, I would point to the results on SIP9 monitoring disclosed in the Insolvency Service’s 2009 Regulatory Report, which presented quite a different picture. In that year, the RPBs/IS reported an average of 10.6 SIP9 breaches per 100 IPs – interestingly close to Kempson’s 2012 figure of 12.0, particularly considering SIP9 breaches are not exactly equivalent to compliance issues relating to fees. However, the variation was a lot less – from 1.3 to 18 breaches per 100 IPs (and the next lowest-“ranking” RPB recorded 8.1). Of course, I have ignored the one RPB that recorded no SIP9 breaches in 2009, but that was probably only because that RPB had conducted no monitoring visits that year (and neither did it in 2012). Kempson similarly excluded that RPB from her calculations, didn’t she..?

Somewhat predictably, Kempson draws the conclusion (in section 6.1.6) that there is a case for fewer regulators, perhaps even one. She suggests setting a minimum threshold of the number of IPs that a body must regulate (which might at least lose the RPB that reports one monitoring visit only every three years… how can that even work for the RPB, I ask myself). In drawing a comparison with Australia, she suggests the sole RPB could be the Financial Conduct Authority – hmm…

Voluntary Arrangements: the exception?

“We have seen that the existing controls work well for secured creditors involved in larger corporate insolvencies. But they do not work as intended for unsecured creditors involved in corporate insolvencies, and this is particularly the case for small unsecured creditors with limited or no prior experience of insolvency. The exception to this is successful company voluntary arrangements” (section 5). Why does Kempson believe that the controls work in CVAs? She seems to put some weight to the fact that the requisite majority is 75% for CVAs, but she also acknowledges that unsecured creditors are incentivised to participate where there is the expectation of a dividend. If she truly believes the situation is different for CVAs – although I saw no real evidence for this in the report – then wouldn’t there be value in examining why that is? If it is down to the fact that creditors are anticipating a dividend, then there’s nothing much IPs can do to improve the situation across cases in general. But perhaps there are other reasons for it: I suspect that IPs charge up far fewer hours administering CVAs given the relative absence of statutory provisions controlling the process. I also suspect that CVA progress reports are more punchy, as they are not so bogged down by the Rules.

But I don’t think anyone would argue with Kempson’s observation that IVAs are a completely different kettle of fish and that certain creditors have acted aggressively to restrict fees in IVAs to the extent that, as IPs told Kempson, they “frequently found this work unremunerative” (section 4.2.3).

Disadvantages of Time Costs

I found this paragraph interesting: “several authoritative contributors said that, when challenged either by creditors or in the courts, IPs seldom provide an explanation of their hourly rates by reference to objective criteria, such [as] details of the overheads included and the amount they account for, and the proportion of time worked by an IP that is chargeable to cases. Instead they generally justify their fees by claiming that they are the ‘market rate’ for IPs and other professionals. Reference is invariably made to the fact that the case concerned was complex, involved a high level of risk and that the level of claims against the estate was high. More than one of the people commenting on this said that the complexity of cases was over-stated and they were rarely told that a case was a fairly standard one, but that there were things that could have been done better or more efficiently or the realisations ought to have been higher so perhaps a reduction in fees was appropriate. They believed that, by adopting this approach, IPs undermined the confidence others have in them” (section 5.2.1). It’s a shame, however, that no mention has been made of the instances – and I know that they do occur – of IPs who unilaterally accept to write-off some of their time costs so that they can pay a dividend on a case.

But this quote hints at the key disadvantage, I think, of time costs: there is a risk that it rewards inefficiency.

Kempson first suggests moving to a percentage basis as a presumed method of setting remuneration, although she acknowledges that this wouldn’t help creditors as they would still face the difficulty on knowing what a reasonable percentage looked like. She then suggests a “more promising approach” is the rarely-used mixed bases for fees that were introduced by the 2010 Rules (section 6.1.4). She states that this should be “explored further, for example fixed fees for statutory duties; a percentage of realisations for asset realisations (with a statutory sliding scale as described above); perhaps retaining time cost for investigations”. Whilst I agree that different fee bases certainly do have the potential to deliver better outcomes – I believe that it can incentivise IPs to work efficiently and effectively whilst ensuring that they still get paid for doing the necessary work that doesn’t generate realisations – it does make me wonder: if creditors already feel confused..!

Lessons from Down Under?

Kempson is clearly a fan of the Australian regime. She recommends the scrapping or radical revision of SIP9 in favour of something akin to the IPAA’s Code of Professional Practice (http://www.ipaa.com.au/docs/about-us-documents/copp-2nd-ed-18-1-11.pdf?sfvrsn=2). At first glance (I confess I have done no more than that), it doesn’t look to have much more content than SIP9, but it does seem more explanatory, more non-IP-friendly, and the fact that Kempson clearly rates it over SIP9 suggests to me that, at the very least, perhaps we could produce something like it that is targeted at the unsecured creditor audience.

She also refers to a Remuneration Request Approval Report template sheet (accessible from: http://www.ipaa.com.au/about-us/ipa-publications/code-of-professional-practice), which she acknowledges “is more detailed than SIP9” (section 6.1.2) – she’s not kidding! To me, it looks just like the SIP9 Appendix with more detailed breakdowns of every key time category, probably something akin to the information IPs provide on a >£50,000 case.

Finally, she refers to a “helpful information sheet” provided by the Australian regulator (ASIC) (http://www.asic.gov.au/asic/pdflib.nsf/LookupByFileName/Approving_fees_guide_for_creditors.pdf/$file/Approving_fees_guide_for_creditors.pdf), which looks much like R3’s Creditors’ Guides to Fees, although again the content does perhaps come over more readable.

Thus, whilst I can see some value in revisiting the UK documents (or producing different ones) so that they are more useful to non-IPs (although will anyone read them?), I am not sure that I see much in the argument that moving to an Aussie Code will change radically how IPs report fees matters. I am also dismayed at Kempson’s suggestion that “a detailed Code of this kind would be very difficult to compile by committee and would require a single body, almost certainly the Insolvency Service in consultation with the insolvency profession, to do it” (section 6.1.2). Wasn’t the Service behind the 2010 Rules on the content of progress reports..?

After singing Australia’s praises, she admits: “even with the additional information disclosure described above, creditor engagement remains a problem in Australia” (section 6.1.3) – hmm… so what exactly is the value of the Australian way..?

Other ideas for creditor engagement

Kempson recommends consideration of the Austrian model of creditor protection associations (section 6.1.3), which is a wild one and not a quick fix – there must be an easier way? I was interested to note that, even though creditors are paid to sit on committees in Germany, committees are only formed on 15-20% of cases – so paying creditors doesn’t work either…

The report also seems to swing in the opposite direction to the Red Tape Challenge in suggesting that the criteria for avoiding creditors’ meetings in Administrations should be reconsidered. Kempson highlights the situation where the secured creditor is paid in full yet no creditors’ meeting is held either because there are insufficient funds to pay a dividend or because the Administrator did not anticipate there would be sufficient funds at the Proposals stage. As I mentioned in an earlier post (http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-3p), in my view these Rules just do not work – something for the Insolvency Rules Committee…

However, raising these circumstances makes me think: whilst endeavours to improve creditor engagement are admirable, could we not all agree that there are some cases that are just not worth anyone getting excited about? There must be so many cases with negligible assets that barely cover the Category 1 costs plus a bit for the IP for discharging his/her statutory duties – is it really sensible to try to drag creditors kicking and screaming to show an interest in fixing, monitoring and reviewing the IP’s fees in such a case? Whatever measures are introduced, could they not restrict application to such low-value cases?

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The fact that the release of this report seems to have made fewer ripples than the Government’s announcement of its plan to conduct the fees review makes me wonder if anyone is really listening..? However, I’m sure we all know what will happen when the next high profile case hits the headlines, when the tabloids report the apparent eye-watering sums paid to the IPs and the corresponding meagre p in the £ return to creditors. Then there will be a revived call for fees to be curbed somehow.

In the meantime, we await the Government’s response to Professor Kempson’s report, expected “later this year”.


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The Deregulation Bill

1228 Port Douglas

Tuesday’s announcement from the Insolvency Service reminded me that I’d buried its 2012 Annual Review of IP Regulation deep within a pile of court judgments that I’ve also not blogged about. I’ll tackle the easy job here: let’s look at the recent IS/BIS announcements…

“New Measures to Streamline Insolvency Regulation Announced” (1 July 2013)
http://insolvency.presscentre.com/Press-Releases/New-measures-to-streamline-insolvency-regulation-announced-68efa.aspx

SoS authorisations to come to an end

The Business Minister, Jo Swinson, announced proposals to transfer the regulation of SoS-authorised IPs to “independent regulators” in the interests of removing “a perceived conflict of interest” and in view of the limited powers of sanction when compared with the RPBs’.

This is not new. At the end of 2011, Ed Davey – two Ministers’ ago – described the Government’s intention to remove the Secretary of State from direct authorising, which was a conclusion of the consultation into IP Regulation. This also was a recommendation emanating from the OFT’s study into corporate insolvency, which was published in June 2010. And the idea has been bubbling along for years earlier than that.

However, perhaps I should not focus on how long it is taking the Department to progress this change; finally it has a name: the “Deregulation Bill”.

Limited Licences

The announcement also referred to proposals to allow “IPs to qualify as specialists in either corporate insolvency or personal insolvency, or both, [which] will reduce the time and money it takes to qualify for those who choose to specialise. This will open up the industry to more people and improve competition”.

This also is not new. Almost as soon as S389A was introduced via the IA2000, people have been asking for it to change. That Section sought to allow IPs to specialise by only authorising them to act as Nominee and Supervisor of (Company or Individual) Voluntary Arrangements. The regulatory structure was never put in place to allow such licences to be issued – the Secretary of State never recognised any bodies for the purpose of issuing such limited licences – but it was also soon appreciated that there would be little use in such licences: for example, if someone wanted to administer an IVA, it would also be useful for them to be able to become a Trustee in Bankruptcy, but this is not possible under S389A.

However, there was also much clamour from many IPs who felt that it was dangerous to allow IPs to specialise only in one field of insolvency. Many felt that the knowledge of someone who has passed only the personal insolvency JIEB paper was insufficient to enable them to deal successfully with the range of debtor circumstances that likely they would encounter even if they only took formal appointments on IVAs and Bankruptcies.

It certainly seems that the current Government proposals, which highlight the benefit of a fast track to a licence – 1-2 years for “the new qualifications” – will lead to limited-licence IPs narrowing their field of vision at the JIEB-stage.

Although there are many IPs who only take appointments in either the personal or corporate insolvency arena, I doubt that many would have chosen a limited licence route, even if that had been available. The corporate specialists tend to have got where they are either through a relatively many-runged large firm ladder or by having begun as a jack-of-all-trades, albeit with a corporate emphasis, in a smaller firm. Of course, the IPs who have lived and breathed IVAs for much of their professional life may have taken advantage of a limited licence route and they are unlikely to be taking on the complex bespoke IVA cases for which knowledge of corporate insolvency might be valuable, so personally I don’t feel too strongly about this being a bad idea… although I’m reluctant to call it a good idea, and I am not convinced that the profession needs to be opened up to more people and competition improved, does it?

Other aspects of the Deregulation Bill

The press release mentions a couple of other planned changes regarding the SoS’s and OR’s access to information on directors’ misconduct and the choice of interim receivers. Also hidden in the small print is reference to the Government’s proposals “to strengthen the powers of the Secretary of State as oversight regulator” – I’m not quite sure what they are, though…

“Consumers benefit and business to save over £30m per year from insolvency reforms” (5 June 2013)
http://insolvency.presscentre.com/Press-Releases/Consumers-benefit-and-business-to-save-over-30m-per-year-from-insolvency-reforms-68db0.aspx

Complaints Gateway

Business Minister, Jo Swinson, said: “An easy route to complain is important for consumers… This new Complaints Gateway will help consumers dealing with the insolvency industry to get speedier resolution of problems and easier access to the right information”.

“An easy route”? Firstly, the Complaints Gateway does not include complaints about Northern Ireland insolvencies. Nor does it include complaints against IPs licensed by the SRA/Law Societies. Nor does it, presumably, cover complaints about an IP’s conduct in relation to Consumer Credit Licensable activities..? Or at least it won’t if the IP/firm has their own Consumer Credit Licence… I’m not certain about IPs covered by a group licence… clear as mud!

“Speedier resolution”? Well the Service’s Complaints FAQs admit that complainants will normally be informed whether or not their complaint is being passed to the relevant authorising body within 15 working days of the Gateway receiving the complaint”. That’s a 3-week delay that would not have occurred under the old system.

Having said that, if the Complaints Gateway at least makes the public perceive IP regulation as more joined up and less self-serving than has been the perception to date, then that’s great!

Red Tape Challenge Outcomes

The press release details other proposed changes, although I do wonder at the “savings of over £30m per year” tagline:

• “Removing the requirement for IPs to hold meetings with creditors where they are not necessary”. Final meetings, presumably? With the exception of S98s, meetings are never actually held, are they, so I can’t see this measure resulting in less work/costs for IPs?
• “Enabling IPs to make greater use of electronic communications, for example making it easier to place notices on websites instead of sending individual letters to creditors”. So perhaps moving away from an opt out of the snail mail process to a default of website-only communication..? Anything less than that is pretty-much what we have already, isn’t it?
• “Allowing creditors to opt out of receiving further communications where they no longer have an interest in the insolvency.” Hmm… personally I can’t see creditors bothering to put “pen” to “paper” and opt out…
• “Streamlining the process by which IPs report misconduct by directors of insolvent companies to the Secretary of State, enabling investigations to be commenced earlier.” Well, yes, a much-reduced wishlist from the Service would be welcome, although that doesn’t require legislation, just re-revised Guidance Notes. Not sure how else you can “streamline” the process unless you make in online… but is that really going to make much difference..?
• “Removing the requirements on IPs to record time spent on cases, where their fees have not been fixed on a time cost basis, and to maintain a separate record of certain case events.” – good, about time too! No more Reg 13s..? What will the RPB monitors find to have a gripe about now?!
• “Removing the requirement for trustees in bankruptcy and liquidators in court winding-ups to apply to creditor committees before undertaking certain functions, to achieve consistency with powers in administrations”
• Radically reducing the prescriptive content required for progress and final progress reports – sorry, this one is a fiction; it’s my own suggestion of how a huge chunk of unnecessary regulation might be removed in an instant!

2012 Annual Review of Insolvency Practitioner Regulation (June 2013)
http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/insolvency-profession/Regulation/review-of-IP-regulation-annual-regulation-reports

This was released without a murmur, slipped into the notes of the press release above. It’s not really surprising that it created little noise – has everyone had enough of pre-pack bashing for now? – but I thought I’d try to extract some items of interest.

Monitoring of SIP16 Compliance

Given that only 51% of SIP16 statements were reviewed by the Service during the first six months of 2012, it would seem to me that the decision to move away from box-ticking SIP16 compliance was made some time before it was abandoned half way through 2012, but at least the Service could report that their work was “in line with [their] previous commitments”. Consequently, I really can’t get excited about the Service’s findings on their SIP16 compliance monitoring, although it still irritates me to read that the Service considers IPs have not complied with SIP16 because they have not provided information “as to the nature of the business undertaken by the company”, which is not a SIP16 requirement (and I cannot see that this is essential to explaining every pre-pack) but only appears in Dear IP 42.

Monitoring of pre-packs using SIP16 disclosures

In the second half of the year, the Service reports that they “moved to sample monitoring of the pre-pack itself in order to identify whether there is any evidence of abuse of pre-packs”.

The statistics are interesting. Out of 42 cases referred to the authorising bodies, over 80% of them, 34, related to IPs authorised by the Secretary of State. Given that the SoS authorised less than 5% of all appointment-taking IPs in 2012, that’s a fair old hit-rate. It has to be mentioned, however, that the 34 referrals involved only six IPs, so perhaps they are zoning in on particular IPs who seem to attract a disproportionate amount of criticism. It is a shame that, although the report describes the outcome of referrals to the RPBs, nothing is mentioned about the outcome of these 34 referrals to the SoS. Perhaps we will read it in next year’s regulatory report… or perhaps the Service hopes that the plans to drop their authorisation role will intervene…

It is also a shame that the Service does not report on the outcome of the 23 complaints on pre-packs/SIP16 received in the year from external parties; it mentions only that six were referred to the RPBs. The report’s Executive Summary states that “pre-pack administrations continue to cause concern amongst the unsecured creditor community”, but it would be very interesting to learn exactly what kinds of concerns are being reported. In view of the fact that 17 complaints did not make it past the starting post after the Service had only “considered the nature of the complaint”, it would seem to me that there is still a lot of dissatisfaction out there about the process itself, which unfortunately is sometimes translated into suspicions of IP misconduct. I will give the Service some credit, though, as their website now includes some FAQs on pre-packs that do attempt to counter the “it just cannot be right!” reaction.

A good news point to take away from the report is: “we have not found evidence of any widespread abuse of the pre-pack procedure”.

Themed Review on Introducers

It is good to see the Service taking action to tackle websites that misrepresent professional insolvency services, although the limit of the Service’s powers appears evident. The report indicates that five websites, which were not identified as being connected with an IP, were changed as a consequence of the Service’s requests, but it seems that several more likely made no changes. The report mentions recourse available to the Advertising Standards Authority and recent coverage of an ASA ruling (www.insolvencynews.com/article/15416/corporate/insolvency-ad-banned-after-r3-complaint), albeit on the back of an R3 complaint, does show that this can generate results.

The report indicates that IPs can expect the RPB monitors/inspectors to be more inquisitive in this area: the Service believes that RPB monitors should be “robustly questioning insolvency practitioners as to their sources of work and testing the veracity of answers to ensure confidence that insolvency practitioners are complying with the Insolvency Code of Ethics”.

Regulatory and disciplinary outcomes

Let’s look at the visit stats for 2012: IS stats 2012

Hmm… does this hint at perhaps another reason why the SoS might think the time is right to drop authorising..? I’m referring to the average number of years between visits – 5.82 years for SoS-authorised IPs compared to an average of 2.92 for the RPBs as a whole – not the percentage of IPs subject to targeted visits, as I think that’s a two-edged sword for authorising bodies: it could mean that you have more than the average number of problem cases or it could mean that you are tougher than the rest.

The only other points I gleaned from this section were:

• The ICAEW clearly takes its requirement for IPs to carry out compliance reviews very seriously: three out of its four regulatory penalties were for failures to undertake compliance reviews.
• The heftiest fines/costs resulting from the complaints process were generated as follows:
o £10,000 fine for failure to register 884 IVAs with the Insolvency Service
o £10,000 fine for failure to comply with the Ethics Code by reason of an affiliation with a third party website that contained misleading and disparaging statements about IPs and the profession
o £4,000 penalty and £30,000 costs for taking fees from a bankrupt as well as being paid by the AiB as agent
• According to the Executive Summary, apparently there have been concerns about “the relatively low number of complaints that are upheld and result in a sanction”… so can we expect the RPBs to “please” the Service by issuing more sanctions in future or will the RPBs satisfy the Service that their complaints-handling is just and that it is simply that there is nothing in the majority of complaints?

The future

The Service intends to look further at the “considerable concern in relation to ensuring that insolvency practitioners consult employees as fully as is required by law in an insolvency situation”. I think the case of AEI Cables v GMB (http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-3i) demonstrates the issues facing a company in an insolvency situation – something has to give: which statutory duty takes precedence? – and I cannot believe that the position for IPs is any easier. It will be interesting to learn what the Service discovers.

And of course, we’re all waiting expectantly for the outcome of the Kempson review on fees; the Service’s regulatory report states: “A report is expected by July”…


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No summer holidays for the Insolvency Service?

0828 Noosa

Yesterday, the Government published its response to the House of Commons BIS Committee’s February 2013 report on the Insolvency Service. My immediate reaction is: it looks like the Service is going to be very busy over the summer!

The report describes plans in the areas of:

• Funding models
• CDDA work
• SIP16 – and now potential pre-pack abuse – monitoring
• Interaction with the RPBs and complaints about IPs
• S233 continuation of supply changes
• Review of IPs’ fees

In addition, the response includes reference to the Service’s ongoing plans in relation to “estate rationalisation”, which was picked up by Insolvency Today: (http://www.insolvencynews.com/article/15147/corporate/government-responds-to-insolvency-service-concerns).

The Government’s full response can be found at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmbis/1115/1115.pdf

Funding models

There is a BIS/Insolvency Service joint project to review potential funding models, which is also considering fee structures. The response states that they are also exploring “the possibility of fees being paid by instalments and/or linked to the discharge of the bankrupt” (paragraph 33). I thought that was an interesting addition to the mix of ideas: so instead of an automatic 1-year discharge, it could be extended until the bankrupt has paid his/her instalments? It would mean fewer recoveries via IPOs/IPAs, wouldn’t it, so the OR would have to write off more administration fees..?

CDDA work

Reference is made to the efforts of R3, the RPBs, IPs and the Insolvency Service “to simplify reporting processes, enhance guidance and ensure improved feedback on the outcomes of ‘possible misconduct’ reports provided by IPs” (paragraph 36). Personally, I feel that the efforts to put D-forms online are one step forward compared to the two steps back of the Service’s revised guidance on CDDA reporting, which adds yet more to the document/information wish-list when submitting D-reports. However, I think the Service’s presentations at courses and conferences on what they are looking for in D-reports and what IPs can dismiss as immaterial are useful – I would recommend them – albeit in some respects the points are difficult for IPs to apply in practice for fear of being criticised for using their professional judgment too liberally.

As an aside, I was interested to note the proportion of D1 reports to non-compulsory corporate cases: 35% in 2010-11 and 28% in 2011-12 (paragraph 42) – perhaps useful benchmarks for IPs, although of course every IP has his/her own make-up of appointments that will lead to more or less D1s in his/her particular case.

I found the Service’s confession of staff turnovers quite alarming. Within its Investigation and Enforcement teams in recent years, they reported a 38% internal turnover of employees, with over 60% in front-line investigation roles (paragraph 40). It is not surprising that, along with the impact of austerity measures on resources, “investigation and enforcement outputs have dipped since 2010”. The report sounds positive, however, that perhaps a corner has been turned with the agency “delivering closer to expectations” in the second half of this year (paragraph 41).

Despite these positive sounds, the response includes: “given the concerns raised by the Committee and feedback from insolvency practitioners on the numbers of ‘possible misconduct’ reports being taken forward, the Insolvency Service intends to look again at how it assesses and prioritises cases. This will be done during 2013/14, with the goal of ensuring greater transparency on its processes and shared expectations on its investigation and enforcement outputs” (paragraph 48).

Pre-packs

It seems to me that there is a shift away from focussing, excessively in my view, on SIP16 compliance towards investigating potential abuse of the pre-pack process – personally, I welcome this shift.

However, I feel that the response unsatisfactorily addresses the Committee’s recommendation that the Service’s SIP16 monitoring should include “feedback to each insolvency practitioner… where SIP16 reports have been judged to be non-compliant”. The response simply refers to: (i) the Service’s education programme “including a webinar” to ensure that the requirements of the SIP are understood; (ii) reporting significant issues to the relevant RPB; (iii) revising SIP16; and (iv) Dear IP 42 issued in October 2009. It seems nonsensical to me that the Service would spend time reviewing the SIP16s, deciding whether they are compliant or not including, as acknowledged in the report “minor and technical” non-compliances, and then do not inform the IPs direct of their conclusion. Fine, report the serious cases to the relevant RPB, but how does the Service expect IPs to learn by their mistakes if they are not told about them?!

The Government response highlights proposed changes to SIP16, which “will require IPs to move faster in informing creditors about pre-packs. It will also require a specific and explicit statement by the IP to confirm that a pre-pack was the most appropriate method of producing the best return for creditors” (paragraph 58). Personally, those proposed changes to the SIP, as appearing in recent RPB consultation, do not concern me, but does that mean that the rejection of the lengthening of the SIP16 bullet point information list (as per the consultation draft SIP16) will not be a deal-breaker with the Service? The Government doesn’t seem too concerned about adding to the list. I think I know what my consultation response will be…

As I mentioned, I am pleased to see the Service’s apparent new focus on cases “where there is evidence of material detriment to creditors as a result of IP behaviours” (paragraph 60) and “targeted investigation… going beyond simply reviewing SIP compliance to assess potential abuse of the pre-pack procedure” (paragraph 63). The Service “has been investigating, on a risk assessed basis, the use of pre-packs by small to medium sized IP firms where there have been a number of previous instances of breaches of SIP16 [and] monitoring the relationship between IPs and online introducers to see whether the pre-pack process is being abused through misleading advertising” (paragraph 52). I hope that this monitoring moves on to getting under the skin of the cases, so that it doesn’t just turn into a statistical review black-marking IPs simply working in a particular market irrespective whether there is any real abuse – and for that, perhaps we should look to the RPBs dealing with the Service’s referrals – but overall I say “Hurrah!”

The Government response also confirms that a review into pre-packs “will be launched in the summer after the Service has reported on its current monitoring of pre-packs… and the new SIP 16 controls on pre-packs have been put in place” (paragraph 51).

Interaction with the RPBs and complaints about IPs

Nestled within the pre-pack comments is this: “The Insolvency Service is strengthening its role as the oversight regulator of the IP profession. A new senior post to lead related activities will be filled shortly. This will include working with the insolvency regulators to drive action on commitments that will enhance enforcement and improve confidence in the proper use of insolvency frameworks” (paragraph 57).

The response also states that “common sanction guidance is close to implementation. This is expected to be in place over coming months” (paragraph 58). It also refers to a summer implementation of the new complaints gateway, which will mean that “in future virtually all complaints about IPs will come first to the Insolvency Service, where they will be subject to an initial assessment before being forwarded, as appropriate, to the relevant RPB for action” (paragraph 73). We also await the Insolvency Service’s Annual Review of IP Regulation.

S233 continuation of supply changes

A short one this: the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill – now “Act”, as the Bill received Royal Assent on 24 April 2013 (see https://www.gov.uk/government/news/enterprise-and-regulatory-reform-bill-receives-royal-assent – although that’s another story entirely) – includes the power to create of secondary legislation to extend the scope of S233. However, we still await the consultation before the Government decides “how and in what terms to exercise the new powers” (paragraph 70).

Review of IPs’ fees

Another short one: Professor Kempson’s review “is expected to produce final recommendations for consideration by the Secretary of State and the Minister with responsibility for insolvency issues by the end of June 2013” (paragraph 77).

Goodness, what a busy summer it will be!


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Peering into the Insolvency Statistics

Peru2114

Whilst clearing out my e-file, I took a few minutes to review the Insolvency Service’s insolvency statistics up to the end of 2012, released on 1 February 2013: http://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/201302/index.htm. I thought I’d dig a bit deeper into the stats*.

Corporate Insolvencies (England & Wales)

It has always bugged me that the Service produces a Liquidations graph but none for the other corporate procedures, so I thought I’d produce one myself. Unfortunately, whilst I’ve had no trouble embedding photos into my posts, I have failed to do the same with graphs, so I’m afraid you’ll have to click here to see the graphs: Graphs 03-04-13 (I’m probably teaching grandmother to suck eggs, but if you Ctrl-click onto “Graphs 03-04-13”, it will open up a new tab, which will mean that you can easily switch from text to graphs.)

A few notes on the figures of graph (i) (drawn from the Insolvency Service’s published data, linked via the Insolvency Service release referred to above):

• They have not been seasonally adjusted, which I presume explains some of the spikiness of the graph and particularly, I suspect, the more pronounced Q4 troughs and Q1 peaks.
• I have counted three sets of group company insolvencies (844 Adms in Q4 06; 729 Adms in Q4 08; and 129 CVAs in Q2 12) as only one insolvency in each case.
• Recs includes LPA Receiverships and the Insolvency Service noted a difference in their handling of the data during 2007 and thus the figures for 2007 (the most pronounced effect being on the Receivership figures) are not directly comparable.

I wonder if these complications are some of the reasons why the Service has never produced graphs for these insolvency procedures!

A few personal observations and conjectures:

• With the Enterprise Act 2002 introducing a fundamentally-revised Administration process in September 2003, it seems that it took some time for the momentum to build – Administration numbers did not seem to start levelling out until late 2005.
• Alternatively, perhaps it has something to do with the timing of post-Sept 03 debentures and that probably some of these began leading to Administration as the years rolled on (probably not coincidental that Receivership appointments were also falling in this 2003-2005 period).
• I thought the sequence of peaks in the various types of insolvency was interesting: Administrations peaked in Q4 08/Q1 09; Liquidations in Q1/Q2 09 (not included on the above graph); Receiverships in Q3 09; and CVAs in Q2 10. No doubt, commentators of recession and insolvency processes will have their own explanations for this sequence. I have my own ideas also, but as I am coming at it from such a position of ignorance, I wouldn’t dream to putting them in print!

I also looked at the figures for Administrations that moved to CVLs and compared them with the number of Administration appointments for the previous year on the assumption that, generally, if a CVL were the appropriate exit route, the Administration would move to CVL a year after appointment – the spikiness of the resultant graph probably indicates that this is a rubbish assumption! See graph (ii) of Graphs 03-04-13

I am not a statistician – it shows, doesn’t it?! – so all I think this suggests, if anything, is that the percentage of Administrations moving to CVL has held pretty steady throughout the past six years. Is that some positive news, that, despite the apparent diminished value of assets in the recession, it seems that just as many Administrations (by percentage) move to CVL, i.e. have the prospect of returning something to the unsecured creditors?

Personal Insolvencies (England & Wales)

The Insolvency Service releases tend to be very thorough when it comes to personal insolvencies, so there’s not much to add, but their data does include figures for Income Payment Orders (“IPOs”) and Income Payment Agreements (“IPAs”), at which I thought I’d take a look. As bankruptcies are recorded at the date of the order, but IPOs/IPAs occur later, I thought it only fair to look at this on a yearly basis – see graph (iii) of Graphs 03-04-13.

IPOs/IPAs look fairly proportionate to bankruptcies, don’t they? Let’s look at this in a different way – see graph (iv) of Graphs 03-04-13.

I’m not sure what – if anything – this illustrates: does it suggest that a larger proportion of bankrupts can pay something from their income? Or does it demonstrate the success of IPAs, which were introduced in April 2004? Or does it suggest that Official Receivers have become more proactive in pursuing IPO/IPAs?

Another Insolvency Service note I found interesting was: “Prior to December 2010 a proportion of surplus disposable income was allowed to be retained by the bankrupt, post December 2010 all surplus disposable income was claimed by the Official Receiver as trustee. Another change in policy was implemented at the same time in that the minimum payment sought under an IPO/IPA reduced from £50 per month to £20 per month”. Perhaps that explains the 2011 peak, but then what about the 2012 dip? I’ll be interested to see how this graph develops over the next couple of years.

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* All Q4 2012 figures are provisional.

By the way, if you’re wondering about the introduction of images… A friend suggested that I should liven up the posts (I absolutely agree they could do with it!) with photos that have a link – even if extremely tenuous – with the words. I hope it helps the readability!


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Proposals to Reform EC Insolvency Regulation: Better to be inside the tent?

If you, like me, were dissuaded from exploring the EC’s proposal on revising the European Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings, issued on 12 December 2012, by reason of its sheer length, you might find the Insolvency Service’s recent Call for Evidence useful in summarising its potential reach into the UK.

The Insolvency Service opened its Call for Evidence on 7 February 2013, with a closing date of 25 February. Whilst this may seem a tiny window in which to contemplate such a tome of proposals, I am certain that those for whom this holds most interest already will have spent quite some time over the last two months absorbing the proposals.

The fundamental question being asked by the Service is: should the Government opt in or out of the Regulation? Even with my zero personal experience and limited understanding of the work of cross-border insolvencies, it seems to me a no-brainer (well, the way the Service has argued it anyway). The Call for Evidence also asks questions on elements of the proposals likely to impact most on UK insolvency with a view to developing a negotiating mandate for the UK.

The Insolvency Service’s Call for Evidence can be found at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/Consultations/EU-CallForEvidence and the EC’s full proposals at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/newsroom/civil/news/121212_en.htm. I’ve set out below the proposals as they appear in the Service’s consultation.

In or Out?

By opting in, the UK can engage in negotiations in order to finalise the proposals, but it will not be able to opt out subsequently and so the UK will be bound by the final Regulation, whatever its form.

If the UK does not opt in, it can only observe the process; it may decide to opt in later, but it will need the Member States’ consent. If the UK does not opt in to the final Regulation at all, it may mean that the UK will remain bound by the existing Regulation. This could cause much confusion when dealing with an insolvency that crosses the border of an opted-in Member State and, as the Impact Assessment puts it, “the UK is generally considered to be a good environment for cross-border insolvency resolution, and this scenario would undermine that position” (paragraph 30).

An alternative scenario if the UK does not opt in is that the European Council may decide that the existing Regulation in its current form could no longer apply to the UK. The Service describes the consequences as: disenfranchisement of UK stakeholders from EU cross-border insolvencies; UK insolvencies failing to have EU-wide recognition; and, whilst the Model Law might help, it might involve multiple court proceedings in the different relevant jurisdictions and thus increased costs and time to get results.

From scanning commentaries on the EC proposals, it appears to me that not opting in is very unlikely. The only seriously negative vibe I’ve picked up – although even this is by no means universal – is a desire to keep Schemes of Arrangement out of the Regulation. As the EC proposes to retain the power of each Member State to decide whether a national insolvency procedure should be included, it seems to me that this is a weak reason for not opting in. And in any event, I would have thought there would be value in having Schemes of Arrangement acquire recognition across the EU. (UPDATE 16/10/2013: okay, I can see now the value of keeping Schemes out of the Regulation – see, for example, the following article by Dentons extolling the virtues of Schemes for essentially foreign companies: http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=3fd5d9b8-3356-4dd4-86bf-aea8980a9311&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML+email+-+Body+-+General+section&utm_campaign=Lexology+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed+2013-10-15&utm_term=)

Scope of the Insolvency Regulation

As alluded to above, the EC proposes to extend the scope of the Regulation wider than just “liquidation”, as presently (albeit that the Annex to the 2000 Regulation already includes Administration, VAs, Bankruptcy and Sequestration). It proposes to include proceedings “in which the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to the control or supervision by a court. Such supervision would include proceedings where the court has no real involvement unless a creditor makes an application to review a decision” (paragraph 21) and “proceedings which include the adjustment of debt and the debtor remains in control of any assets” (paragraph 22). This is where the idea that Schemes of Arrangement will be wrapped up in the Regulation comes from.

Also as mentioned above, the Member State can decide whether to notify a particular national insolvency procedure to be included, but it is proposed there will be a new mechanism whereby the EC then will scrutinise the procedure to ensure that it fits the defined scope of the Regulation.

Jurisdiction for opening insolvency proceedings

The concept of COMI is proposed to be retained, consistent with the body of case law that has developed. The proposals seek to extend the concept to individuals.

The EC proposes to introduce a duty on the court or IP that opens the insolvency proceedings to examine the COMI of the debtor and specify the ground on which their jurisdiction is decided. Creditors from other Member States shall have the right to challenge the decision.

Secondary proceedings

It is proposed that the court receiving an application to open secondary proceedings must inform the office-holder of the main proceedings and allow him/her to be heard before the court makes its decision. The main proceedings’ office-holder will be entitled to ask for the application for secondary proceedings to be stayed, if they are not necessary to protect the interests of local creditors.

The proposal removes the restriction that secondary proceedings must be winding-up proceedings; it is proposed that they can be any proceedings available under the law of that Member State, including restructuring.

In addition, it is proposed that the courts in the main and secondary proceedings be obliged to communicate and cooperate with each other and that a similar obligation will be on the office-holder to communicate and cooperate with the court in the other Member State involved in the proceedings.

Publicity of proceedings and lodging of claims

“Each Member State will be required to maintain a public register(s) of insolvency decisions relating to companies and self-employed individuals, which must be internet based and free of charge. This requirement does not extend to insolvency proceedings concerning non-trading individuals or consumers” (paragraph 32). The register will contain basic information on the insolvency (albeit more than is currently on Companies House; for example, the information must include the court and reference number) plus a date for lodging claims. “Each register will be searchable via the European e-justice portal, with an interconnected search facility” (paragraph 33).

The EC proposes the provision of two standard forms for foreign creditors – a notice of insolvency and claim form – which will be made available (by whom? I think by the European e-justice portal) in all official EU languages. Foreign creditors must be given at least 45 days to lodge a claim, irrespective of any national laws specifying shorter timescales.

Groups of companies

The EC proposes to retain the Regulation’s entity-by-entity approach to the insolvencies of group companies, but seeks to improve coordination of efforts. Thus courts and office-holders involved in different proceedings on group companies will be obliged to communicate and cooperate.

It is proposed that the office-holder of an insolvent group company will be entitled to be heard in any opening proceedings on any other group company and will have the right to request a stay. An office-holder will also be able to participate in any insolvency proceedings on other group companies, for example in creditors’ meetings. As the EC puts it, “these procedural tools enable the liquidator [i.e. office-holder] which has the biggest interest in the successful restructuring of all companies concerned to officially submit his reorganisation plan in the proceedings concerning a group member, even if the liquidator in these proceedings is unwilling to cooperate or is opposed to the plan” (page 9 of the EC proposal).

The proposals are not intended to interfere with a strategy of pursuing a single set of insolvency proceedings over a highly integrated group of companies when it is determined that their COMI is in one jurisdiction.

Of course, this is all subject to negotiation and time… probably lots of time…

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UPDATE: On 15 April 2013, it was announced that the Government has decided to opt in to the proposal. This followed a unanimous response in favour of opting in by those who responded to the consultation. The written ministerial statement and the consultation responses can be accessed from: http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/news/news-stories/2013/Apr/EUCallForEvidence


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HoC BIS Committee recommendations on the Insolvency Service: will they help?

Goodness, what a busy week it has been! Consultations, draft Regulations, a DMP Protocol, and a bit of a backlog of High Court decisions… but they will have to wait.

Although the release of the House of Commons’ BIS Select Committee’s report on the Insolvency Service has already been reported widely, I wonder if you, like me, sigh at the tone of the press coverage, which all seems to lie somewhere on the spectrum between cold neutrality and wholehearted support. Don’t you wish people would come out and say what they really think? Therefore, I thought I would give it a go…

If you want to read all the Committee’s recommendations, this is not the place for you – I have only described the ones that have raised my hackles or got me thinking. You can access the report in full at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201213/cmselect/cmbis/675/675.pdf

Changes to debtors’ bankruptcy fees

“At present, individual debtor bankrupts have to pay an upfront fee of £525. Given the level of debt relief they can receive we agree with the Insolvency Service that it would not be unreasonable to increase that fee, possibly on a sliding scale. We also agree that the fee should not be automatically required to be paid up front but could be staggered along similar lines as payments to debt management companies. We will expect the Insolvency Service to set out progress in both of these areas in its response to this Report.” (paragraph 43)

It is clear that the Insolvency Service’s sums currently do not add up; something must change (and the BIS Committee made other recommendations to this effect). However, I had always thought that the charges relating to the bankruptcy process reflected the work carried out (setting aside the need for cross-subsidisation, which gives rise to another debate entirely). How does the service provided differ depending on a debtor’s level of debt? Whatever the individual’s liabilities, he/she has to go through pretty much the same process to enter bankruptcy as anyone else. True, the higher the debt level, often the more time-consuming the bankruptcy administration, but this is usually also reflected in the asset values, and as asset realisations attract a percentage fee, this already means that a high-liability bankruptcy is paying more.

I am not saying that individuals with large debts should not pay more, but I feel it is quite a step-change to structure fees, not as proportionate to the work undertaken, but to reflect somehow the level of debt relief that the individual is receiving. I am certain that it would not work in other fields of insolvency: could an IP justify basing the cost of putting a company into liquidation on the level of creditors’ claims, rather than on how much work was involved in preparing the Statement of Affairs and convening/holding the meetings? There is a Dear IP (no. 18, July 1991) warning against such a practice!

It is widely accepted that the cost of the petition and court fee restricts access to bankruptcy for many individuals. Graham Horne told the Committee that the Service would look at the DMCs’ model of paying fees in instalments. However, from the consultation and response on bankruptcy petition reform, it appears to me that the Service is looking only at the possibility of individuals paying instalments prior to entering bankruptcy, not after bankruptcy. Quite simply, this is not the DMCs’ model, which involves providing the service of administering a debt management plan whilst being paid the fee by instalments. It will be of little use to individuals to have to make payments to the Service… over how long, 6 months, 12 months..? but not get the relief of a bankruptcy order until the £700 (or more) is paid in full. I can imagine the Service’s suspense account soon bulging with countless numbers of one or two months’ staged payments from individuals who intended to go bankrupt, but because of the continuing stress of fighting off creditors they handed their affairs over to a DMC simply for a break from it all.

If a bankruptcy order cannot be made until the petition and court fees have been paid in full, it is still an up-front fee notwithstanding whether this is paid in instalments, and it will remain a barrier to bankruptcy for many.

Would the Service contemplate providing for the fees to be paid after bankruptcy? The Service already charges £1,625 to each bankruptcy estate and the report acknowledges that this is not recouped “in the majority of cases” (paragraph 35), so a post-bankruptcy application fee would simply be another unrecovered cost to write-off. There would be a few cases that could bear this cost, but then who really would be paying? The creditors.

Pre-packs

“We therefore recommend that together, the Department and the Insolvency Service commission research to renew the evidential basis for pre-pack administrations.” (paragraph 72)

Some have greeted this with an “oh please, not this old chestnut again!” Personally, I would welcome this step. Arguments against the use of pre-packs as a principle (or at least those that involve connected parties, “phoenixes”) usually relate to the perception that the connected party has achieved an unfair advantage – the directors have been able to under-cut their competitors because they have left creditors standing with Oldco and they have bought the business and assets at a steal. There is the additional allegation that there is no overall benefit to the economy because, whilst jobs may be saved in the business transfer from Oldco to Newco, jobs are lost in rival companies and/or with creditors. I think that the difficulty the insolvency profession has in responding to these arguments is that all IPs can do is their best, their statutory duty to maximise realisations of the insolvent company’s assets; even if these anti-pre-pack arguments were valid and that pre-packs were not good for the world at large, if IPs were to adjust their actions somehow to accommodate these wider concerns, i.e. resist completing a pre-pack in favour of a break-up or an expensive trading-on in the hope that an independent buyer comes along, they could be failing in their statutory duties.

If these arguments against pre-packs hold water, then let’s see the evidence and then watch the policy-makers decide whether some or all pre-packs should be banned in the public interest. In the meantime, all IPs can do is their best to fulfil their statutory duties in relation to each insolvency over which they are appointed.

One small point: I sincerely hope that the researchers avoid falling into the trap occupied by the pre-pack protesters. The arguments of unfair advantage and of creditors being left high and dry whilst the phoenix rises apply to business sales to connected parties, not to pre-packs. If an IP trades on a business in administration and then sells it to a connected party, the same allegations apply, don’t they? It seems strange to me that there is so much antagonism towards pre-packs when, really, I see little difference between a pre-pack administration and the Receivership business sales of the 1990s. In fact, I would suggest that pre-pack administrations are an improvement over Receivership business sales because at least the administrator is an officer of the court with wider responsibilities to creditors as a whole.

I’m not sure how the researchers will test the allegations. However, if they limit the research to a comparison of the direct outcomes of pre-pack sales compared with longer-running administration business sales, then I do not believe it will do anything to answer those who cry unfairness.

SIP16

“Despite the introduction of Statement of Insolvency Practice Note 16 and additional guidance, pre-pack administrations remain a controversial practice. The Insolvency Service is committed to continue to monitor SIP 16 compliance, but to make this effective, non-compliance needs to be followed through with stronger penalties by way of larger fines and stronger measures of enforcement. We have some sympathy with the concerns of the regulator R3, which argues that noncompliant insolvency practitioners are not made aware of the criteria on which they are being judged by The Insolvency Service, or given any feedback on their reports. We recommend that the Insolvency Service amend its monitoring processes to include feedback to each insolvency practitioner and their regulatory body where SIP 16 reports have been judged to be non-compliant. We further recommend that the criteria by which SIP 16 reports are judged should be published alongside the guidance.” (paragraphs 80 and 81)

This time I will cry: “oh please, not this old chestnut again!” Given the perceptions of unfairness surrounding pre-packs – or to describe the issue more accurately, business sales to connected parties – as explained above, it is not surprising that “despite the introduction of SIP16 and additional guidance, pre-pack administrations remain a controversial practice”. Even with 100% compliance with SIP16, the controversy would never fall away. SIP16 is simply about helping creditors to understand why the pre-pack sale was conducted; it will never answer the allegations that the practice of pre-packing businesses in general is unfair.

However, this limitation of SIP16 disclosures can never be an excuse for IPs failing to meet the requirements of the SIP. It is not beyond the ability of professional IPs to get this right.

Unfortunately, the key principle of SIP16 of “providing a detailed explanation and justification of why a pre-packaged sale was undertaken so that [creditors] can be satisfied that the administrator has acted with due regard for their interests” (SIP16, paragraph 8) does not fit well with a checklist of pieces of information. If an IP were to sit a creditor down and say “let me tell you why I did this sale this way”, I believe that it is very likely that, on a case-by-case basis, not every last detail required by SIP16 paragraph 9 would always be relevant to telling this story and it may even be that other factors not strictly required by SIP16 paragraph 9 would be valuable in helping the creditor understand. It makes me wonder how we got into this position – where unique stories describing a vast range of demised businesses and complex rescues are reduced to a monitoring exercise on a par with recounting Old Macdonald Had a Farm!

However, I repeat: this limitation of SIP16 monitoring should never be allowed to fuel the pre-pack critics. If IPs are being judged on strict compliance with SIP16, why can we not get it right?

There is no doubt in my mind that the absence of Insolvency Service feedback on each individual SIP16 disclosure has not helped. It also seems insensible to me that the Service would make these assessments and not inform each IP where they thought he/she had gone wrong. What on earth was the point of carrying out the review in the first place?!

However, I foresee a problem: in 2011, there were 1,341 appointment-taking IPs and 723 pre-packs. I appreciate that an average of 0.5 pre-packs per IP does not reflect reality, but even so it would seem to me that pre-packs are not that common; IPs might only conduct one or two each year and some IPs might go years before doing another pre-pack. In 2011, the Insolvency Service only reviewed 58% of all SIP16 disclosures, so there’s a big chunk of all SIP16s where no feedback is possible. In addition, 32% of the 2011 SIP16 disclosures reviewed were considered non-compliant by the Service. If our profession is lucky, it might be that these non-compliant SIP16s are being produced by the same bunch of IPs. However, my hunch (having worked in the IPA’s regulation department) is that sometimes an IP gets it right, sometimes he/she misses something. If this is the case, then years might pass before (i) an IP receives feedback on where he/she slipped up with SIP16 compliance and then when (ii) he/she can apply that feedback to his/her next pre-pack. Waiting for IPs to apply the Service’s feedback will not crack this nut: I suspect that, if the 2013 SIP16 monitoring report shows similar levels of non-compliance, there will be hell to pay!

Thus, I feel it is down to each and every IP to work at producing perfect SIP16 disclosures. Some may rebel at this formulaic approach to recounting the skills used in getting the best out of an insolvent company – I do! – but the threat of more legislation, which I suggest could be even more prescriptive and restrictive than SIP16, remains loud. Can we not just try to get it right?

Continuation of supply

“We recommend that the Department undertake a consultation as a matter of urgency on the rules relating to the continuation of supply to businesses on insolvency in order to assess whether a greater number of liquidations or further damage to businesses could be avoided if that supply was better protected.” (paragraph 86)

I shall use this opportunity to update you on the progress of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill. On 21 January, I reported that the House of Lords was considering a proposed amendment to S233 regarding the continuation of utilities and other contracted services and goods (https://insolvencyoracle.com/2013/01/21/more-on-the-err-bill-and-two-cases-1-scottish-court-shows-more-than-the-usual-interest-in-provisional-liquidators-fees-and-2-court-avoids-unpardonable-waste-or-scarce-resources/). Unfortunately, the Grand Committee threw the amendments out in full on the ground that there needed to be proper consideration of the consequences of such amendments. In hindsight, I can see that it was very unlikely that such changes could be slipped in to the Bill at such a late stage, but I guess that at least it keeps the issue on the table.

My personal view is that, whilst changes to S233 will be welcome, I do feel that some are over-egging the advantages. The BIS Committee picked up on R3’s research suggesting that “over 2,000 additional businesses could be saved each year, rather than being put into liquidation”, if suppliers were obliged to continue to supply on insolvency (paragraph 82). I bow to R3’s and IPs’ greater experience, however I cannot help but wonder whether companies really are resorting to liquidation, rather than trading on in an administration, simply because contracts with suppliers are terminated on insolvency. I would have thought that there were far more substantial barriers to trading-on that will remain even after S233 is changed.

Regulating the RPBs

“We agree that the Insolvency Service, in regulating the recognised professional bodies (RPBs), should have a wider range of powers, very much akin to those that the RPBs themselves have in disciplining their members.” (paragraph 97)

I note this simply because I was stunned at this non sequitur – none of the preceding paragraphs hinted that there was a problem with the RPBs that needed to be fixed or that this was any solution.

Having said that, personally I have no issues with the Service having such powers. In my experience at the IPA, whilst there may have been some tendency to want to push back on some of the Service’s recommendations from time to time (to be perfectly honest, usually more on my part than on the part of my employer!), it would always end up with the RPB taking the required action. I cannot see that the Service needs to be able formally to warn, fine, or restrict RPBs, but if it helps perception, why not?

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As I mentioned at the start, there were other Committee recommendations, which I would encourage you to read if you have not already done so, as I believe they help us to see how the profession is viewed from the outside and, whether we agree with them or not, those views will continue to influence the shape of our profession in the years to come.


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Soapboxing on the Enterprise & Regulatory Reform Bill

I don’t know about you, but I could do with a break from all these case law blog posts, so I thought I’d catch up with insolvency’s appearance in the Enterprise & Regulatory Reform Bill (“ERR Bill”).

Helpfully, John Tribe has posted extracts from the Bill (as at 18 October 2012) at http://www.jordansinsolvencylaw.com/articles/bankruptcy-applications-determination-by-adjudicators-draft-legislation; he also has reproduced the 16 October 2012 House of Commons’ debate on the insolvency part of the Bill at http://www.jordansinsolvencylaw.com/articles/interesting-recent-hansard-on-bankruptcy-hc-report-stage-debate-re-bankruptcy-amendments-16-10-12 (my references below to comments from MPs are drawn from this article). To follow the Bill’s progress through Parliament, take a look at http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2012-13/enterpriseandregulatoryreform.html. As you will see, the Bill has emerged from the House of Commons and is now working its way through the House of Lords.

What is in the Bill?

In brief, the Bill provides for an individual to apply to an “adjudicator” for a bankruptcy order, rather than petitioning the court. Adjudicators will hold office within the Insolvency Service, but will not be a role for Official Receivers. Once a bankruptcy order has been made under this route, the bankruptcy will be administered in the same manner as currently; the Bill includes consequential amendments to the Act so that the making of a bankruptcy application has the same effect as the presentation of a petition (e.g. S341 will be amended so that the relevant times for preferences and transactions at undervalue will be counted from the date the bankruptcy application is made).

To obtain a bankruptcy order, the individual must:
• be unable to pay his/her debts at the date of the adjudicator’s determination;
• not have a bankruptcy petition pending; and
• have a COMI in England/Wales or his/her COMI is not in an EC Regulation-relevant state, but he/she is: domiciled in E/W or, within the past three years, has been ordinarily resident, or has had a place of residence, or has carried on business, in E/W (the Bill also proposes to make changes to S265 so that the conditions for creditors’ petitions will be exactly the same).

The debtor must pay a fee, which Ms Swinson MP stated is anticipated to comprise an administration fee of £525, as presently, and an application fee of £70 (as compared with the current court fee of £175).

If the adjudicator is satisfied that the above criteria are met, he “must” make the bankruptcy order; if he is not so satisfied, he must refuse to make an order. During the “determination period”, the adjudicator may ask for more information to come to a conclusion, but he must either make or refuse to make an order before the end of this period.

If the adjudicator has refused to make an order, the debtor may ask him to review the information, provided the debtor’s request is made before the end of the “prescribed period”. If the adjudicator then confirms the refusal, the debtor may appeal to court before the end of the prescribed period.

The Bill does not prescribe the periods – presumably this is a detail for supporting rules to follow if/when the Bill obtains Royal Assent.

The Bill also removes S279(2) from the Act, so that bankrupts will no longer be able to be discharged early upon the filing of the Official Receiver’s notice.

Is it controversial?

A significant part of the Insolvency Service’s proposals – that consideration of creditors’ bankruptcy petitions also be moved away from the courts – proved particularly controversial and therefore has not been taken forward, demonstrating to me that responding to consultations does work!

Some also have concerns about debtors’ petitions being moved away from the courts, however the 2011/12 consultation did not ask a direct question on this matter, I presume because it had already been addressed in previous consultations. For example, 90% of those who responded to a February 2010 consultation were of the opinion that consideration of debtors’ bankruptcy applications should be the responsibility of someone within the Insolvency Service (http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.insolvency.gov.uk/insolvencyprofessionandlegislation/con_doc_register/DPRefResponses/DPrefIndex.htm).

I do not believe that it is the core principle that concerns some – after all, a company can resolve to wind itself up outside of any court procedure so, arguably, why should an individual not be granted a similar power? – but it seems to me there remain some questions surrounding the proposed process.

Will the individual always understand his/her options?

Of course, it could be argued that the current debtor’s petition process does not safeguard against individuals taking the so-called last resort without adequately considering the other options. However, I do wonder whether the apparent steps to improve access to bankruptcy detract from the seriousness of the act with the result that it risks losing its “last resort” status.

In the House of Commons’ debate, Ms Swinson recognised that “for many, other debt remedies will continue to be more appropriate. We will therefore encourage debtors to take independent debt advice before making their bankruptcy applications. We will work with the Money Advice Service and providers in the debt advice sector to ensure that all debtors have the information that they need in order to make an informed decision.” Thus, there will be no requirement for individuals to have obtained advice before applying for their bankruptcy; they will simply be encouraged to do so.

In that respect, it seems to me that the Insolvency Service will be following Scotland’s lead where an individual may apply direct to the Accountant in Bankruptcy. My knowledge of Scotland’s process is scanty, but having looked on the AiB website it seems to me that an individual can download the application pack and post it off to the AiB and, provided the criteria are met (receiving independent advice seems to be a prerequisite only if the individual is taking the Certificate of Sequestration route), sequestration follows. The AiB publishes a Debt Advice and Information Package (which, personally, I feel is not a touch on the Insolvency Service’s “In Debt – Dealing with your creditors” publication) that the AiB’s Guidance for Trustees states must be provided to debtors before they sign up a Trust Deed, but this does not appear to be part of the debtor’s bankruptcy application process. Do I have this right? The application form has a warning that “the consequences of bankruptcy can be severe” – although according to the form they are limited to the effects on one’s credit rating, and possibly to employment prospects, bank accounts and utility supplies! – and a strong recommendation to seek advice with some contact details provided, but is that seen as sufficient safeguard against individuals taking the last resort when another option may be more appropriate? Coming from a world where so much diligence is expected of IPs before agreeing to help an individual propose an IVA, this seems to me somewhat lightweight. I appreciate, however, that this process has been operating in Scotland for many years, so I am sure that the Insolvency Service has access to evidence of its effectiveness in ensuring that people do not end up bankrupt when an alternative process would have been more appropriate.

Would the Post Office providing a service to bankruptcy applicants, similar to the passport application “check and send” service, further erode the image of bankruptcy as the last resort? 65% of consultation respondents said that they did not believe this was a “useful” service (perhaps the consultation should have asked if it was thought “appropriate”). However, Ms Swinson told the House of Commons: “The Post Office is looking at a wide range of ways in which it can increase its services and its revenue. Playing a wider role in identity checks, as was mentioned, is one of those… On the issues relating to advice, there are examples of more credit union facilities and a wider range of financial services being able to be accessed through post offices”.

Will access to alternatives be cut off?

Ss273 and 274 provide that, in the right circumstances, a debtor’s petition for his/her bankruptcy can result in an IVA. I understand that these provisions are very rarely used (although there are plenty of cases of IVAs being proposed after a debtor has been made bankrupt), but at least there is an opportunity for the court and debtor to consider this alternative to bankruptcy. There is no provision in the ERR Bill for the debtor to exit the bankruptcy application process with an IVA; for the debtor to withdraw from the process, if he/she decides at the last minute to propose an IVA; or for the adjudicator to suggest the possibility of an IVA – if the debtor meets the criteria, then the bankruptcy order is made.

Similarly, S274A provides for the court to stay proceedings on a debtor’s petition, if the court thinks that it would be in the debtor’s interests to apply for a Debt Relief Order. Again, there is no provision in the Bill for the new bankruptcy application process to result in a DRO.

Will “bankruptcy tourism” be tackled?

The recent case of O’Donnell & Anor v The Bank of Ireland ([2012] EWHC 3749 (Ch)), on which I commented a week ago (https://insolvencyoracle.com/2013/01/04/three-pre-christmas-judgments-1-bankrupt-refused-suspension-of-discharge-to-pursue-iva-2-another-failed-attempt-to-prove-england-comi-and-3-receiver-refused-payment-of-costs-after-restraining/), demonstrates some of the difficulties in assessing whether the court has jurisdiction to grant bankruptcy orders and there are many more cases involving diverse circumstances that give rise to COMI issues.

Although the Insolvency Service’s consultation document suggested that bankruptcy applications might be referred to court where there is a dispute, there is no such provision in the ERR Bill. I wonder if an adjudicator’s referral to court was considered unnecessary in view of the fact that the new process now is limited to debtors’ applications. The Bill only provides for a referral to court in the event that an individual wishes to appeal the adjudicator’s confirmation of refusal to make a bankruptcy order; the adjudicator has only two choices on receipt of an application: make, or refuse to make, an order.

Ms Swinson was asked about the risk of “bankruptcy tourism”. She replied: “There is no evidence of widespread abuse, but the official receiver or a creditor can apply to court to annul the bankruptcy order if abuse takes place”. Evidence of widespread abuse there may not be, but it is a shame that the valuable gatekeeper role of the court (and others, e.g. the Official Receiver, who opposed Mr Benk’s bankruptcy petition (see https://insolvencyoracle.com/2012/09/07/two-case-summaries-comi-and-a-rejected-administration-order-application/)) will be removed and then it will be up to the OR or creditors to seek to unravel the bankruptcy after the event.

Ms Swinson was also asked about the skills of the adjudicator and she responded: “On the question about the adjudicator, the Insolvency Service is already looking at this for the debt relief orders that it administers and it will be able to do exactly the same in relation to the way in which adjudicators conduct their business. On the qualifications of adjudicators, they will be making an objective decision by reference to prescribed criteria and there will be a right of appeal for an applicant if the adjudicator refuses to make an order. Obviously, they will need appropriate qualifications and experience to function effectively, and the Secretary of State will make sure that people appointed to that role are appropriately qualified. They will be based within the Insolvency Service which, as the House knows, is an executive agency of BIS, and will already have extensive experience of administering an electronic administrative process similar to the debt relief order regime”. I imagine that it is unlikely that much, if any, “DRO tourism” exists given the low level of debt criterion for a DRO, so it is worrying that the new bankruptcy application process is being put on the same footing as a DRO application. Will Insolvency Service staff really be equipped to decide on complex COMI issues, a topic which already has taken up so much court time and effort?

Will paying by instalment work?

Although the majority of consultation respondents (possibly up to 61%) were opposed to the proposal that individuals may pay the fee by instalment, Ms Swinson informed the House of Commons that this would be part of the process, although it is not clear whether this is to apply only to the application fee, anticipated at £70, or also to the administration fee of £525.

The consultation document highlighted the difficulties of refunding instalment payments, but the summary of responses did not report how the two questions on this topic were answered nor is it known what the current plan is. Presumably, an application will not be considered as having been made until the fee has been paid in full. What is the individual supposed to do in the meantime? Will it really help individuals to trickle through payments over months but without any change in their status and with the risk that the monies will not be refunded if they decide to withdraw from the process?

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Of course, we live in a world of cost-saving efforts, so it is not surprising that this process, which in most cases is simply an administrative function, is considered a candidate for change (although some of the figures in the Impact Assessment, e.g. the estimated court time in dealing with a petition, seem a little over-cooked). As always, there are risks that a “streamlined” process introduces loop-holes or is not so well-equipped to deal with extraordinary circumstances. This does not make it wrong to make changes, but those risks should be understood and managed as best they can.


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Will the legislative change really help bankrupts to get bank accounts?

“Bank rules eased for bankrupts” goes the press coverage, but will the planned legislative change really open the way for bank accounts for bankrupts?  Why does there need to be a change in the legislation?  And how will it affect IPs?  The government response to the consultation and the impact assessment (“IA”) – at: http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/Consultations/BankAccount – provide some answers.

The Legislation – current and future

S307 of the Insolvency Act 1986 currently provides for a Trustee to claim after-acquired property, however he is not entitled to such property where a banker passes it on in good faith and without notice of the bankruptcy order.  The flipside of this is that banks feel there is a risk that, if they are aware that an account-holder is an undischarged bankrupt and after-acquired property moves through the account, the Trustee could seek remedy from the bank.  “Insolvency legislation as drafted leaves bankers unwilling to countenance the risk of claims from a trustee in bankruptcy.  Although such a claim is unlikely, the likelihood of a court upholding the claim (if challenged) is unlikely and there is no evidence that such a claim has previously been brought, the perception of the risk is sufficient to discourage banks from transacting with undischarged bankrupts” (paragraph 68, IA).

Despite the existence of a perceived, rather than a real, risk, the conclusion of the consultation process is: change the Act.  Although my first instinct was to feel that this was a disproportionate response, if it solves the problem, then it makes sense.  After all, if (to my knowledge) there has never been a claim made, the change will have little impact on IPs or on creditors’ prospects, will it not?

The planned change will redraft S307 so that “liability would only transfer to a bank after receipt of notice from a trustee regarding the potential claim” (paragraph 70, IA).  Although it is only a small issue – particularly given the few, if any, claims made on banks – it seems that this change would remove the ability to claim against a banker that acted in bad faith prior to receiving notice from the Trustee of a claim to after-acquired property.  “Banking respondents generally felt that risks were minimal as banks have to work to codes of practice anyway” (paragraph 75, IA).  Oh well, that’s alright then, isn’t it?!

Will the change really work?

Jo Swinson, Minister for Employment Relations and Consumer Affairs, seems pretty certain: “I am pleased with the positive response from the banking sector, in particular from those that offer basic bank accounts.  They have said that a small change in insolvency legislation will prompt them to change their policy on access for people who have become bankrupt” (Ministerial Foreword, government response, my italics).  The government response hints at some of the discussions leading to this conclusion: “It was not clear from initial responses whether more banks would change their policies as a result.  Further consultation with the main banks has provided assurance that a change in insolvency law to prevent trustees from claiming against them in respect of after-acquired property will result in banks looking again at their policy”.  Although agreement to look again at a policy is not agreement to change policy, it is evident that there is significant political pressure stacked against banks to make a change.

The argument for financial inclusion may well be the principal driver, but the IA identifies other pressures: recipients of the new Universal Credit scheme payments will need to have access to a bank account and new European Commission proposals include giving everyone the right to have a basic payment account with a bank.

Political pressure aside, will this change really prompt a change to bank policy?

Banking respondents explained that providing basic bank accounts is often done at a loss.  Withdrawing access to cash machines for basic account users appears to me to be a recent step taken by some banks towards reducing such losses.  In discussing the rationale for banks providing basic accounts, the IA states: “a significant benefit is that the customer is likely to remain with them for future years with only 12 months (the duration of bankruptcy) in a basic account and then free to operate whatever account suits them at which point the bank will be able to run a profitable account service” (paragraph 126, IA).  However, I suspect that this benefit has become less realistic as switching accounts between banks has become easier.

I think it is particularly telling that one of the two banks that offered accounts to bankrupts recently withdrew the service.  This bank responded to the consultation stating “that it already holds a disproportionate share of the basic bank account market and that, given that accounts were provided at a cost to them, it was an unsustainable situation” (paragraph 55, IA).  I would not be surprised if the consultation prompted the bank to review its policy and consequently it questioned why it was in the clear minority in providing this service.  It seems that those two banks’ responses came with a threat: “They considered that any increase in applications, or any change made which did not increase the number of providers, came with a risk that their policies would be changed, which would worsen the current position for undischarged bankrupts” (paragraph 108, IA).

Thus, clearly the banks have no real incentive for providing accounts to bankrupts – quite the opposite – and yet they put the focus on the S307 risk simply being too great.  If that were truly the case, then what is stopping banks providing accounts to debtors in DROs?  The CAB reported that some debtors find their accounts closed as a consequence of them entering into a DRO and many are refused new accounts because of the DRO… but the fact is that there is no S307 equivalent for DROs.  The IA acknowledges that “it remains a commercial decision whether or not to offer a bank account, but this proposed amendment should ensure that bankrupts are on an equal footing with other account holders and applicants” (paragraph 13), but if DRO debtors are also having difficulties in keeping or getting new accounts, then will anything change for bankrupts?  “Analysis of responses indicates that market behaviour is based on a range of factors and suggests that where bankrupt individuals are unable to open a bank account, it is mainly because of their credit record, and not specifically because of a risk of a claim by a trustee in relation to after-acquired property” (government response) – but their credit record will not change with the change of S307, so why should that result in improved access to accounts for bankrupts?

It seems to me that, if it were not for the political pressure, it would be highly unlikely that any change to S307 would improve bankrupts’ access to bank accounts and, whilst it seems a little disingenuous to suggest that S307 is the overriding reason for restricting access, it is difficult to criticise banks for their risk-averse stance and the best approach must be to remove this alleged barrier and then watch for the banks’ reaction.

When will the change be made?

Ah, the all-purpose “when Parliamentary time allows”!  Of course, this is primary legislation and opportunities to change that do not come around very often at all.  I recall many changes to the Insolvency Act proposed by the Insolvency Service over the past few years and as far as I am aware remain on the cards; they must form quite a stack by now.  It’s a shame that this has just missed the boat of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill – the repeal of Insolvency Act’s provision for early discharge from bankruptcy managed to slip into the Bill, but then of course that is counted as an ‘Out’ in regulatory reform terms, whereas this measure is an ‘In’… and with effect from January 2013, the government is planning to operate a ‘One-in Two-out’ process (http://news.bis.gov.uk/Press-Releases/-One-in-two-out-Government-to-go-further-and-faster-to-reduce-burdens-on-business-and-help-Britain-compete-in-the-global-race-6838c.aspx), which will make it even trickier to get the S307 change through.

However, let’s hope that this proposal does not sit of the shelf too long, because in the meantime bankrupts are left with only one bank (which seems twitchy about being the sole provider) and a few expensive alternatives.


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Some inflammatory remarks made as the BIS Committee interrogates the Insolvency Service

On 23 October 2012, the BIS Committee put questions to Dr Richard Judge, the Inspector General and Chief Executive of the Insolvency Service, and Graham Horne, the Deputy Inspector General and Deputy Chief Executive.  The recording of the session can be found in the archive section of www.parliamentlive.tv.

Here I have set out the main points I drew from it and I have used quotes to avoid putting my own spin on the proceedings (although I could not refrain completely from adding some of my own observations).  It is a long entry, I’m afraid, but here are the topics that I have covered:

  • Allegation of “age-old problem” of asset sales at an undervalue by IPs
  • What is being done about forcing suppliers to continue to supply?
  • Apparent disjoint between number of D1 reports and number of disqualifications being pursued
  • Proposals to affect pre-packs and what is to be done about continuously “disappointing” levels of SIP16 compliance?
  • Is the lower level of complaints as a whole a reflection of the current low-value cases or an indication of increased confidence in IPs?
  • The evolving plans to change complaints processes
  • Prospects for a single regulator
  • Progress in enhancing creditors’ powers to challenge excessive fees
  • Ideas arising from the Red Tape Challenge
  • “Perceived cosy relationship between IPs and asset-based lenders”

The session also covered questions on the Insolvency Service’s current and prospective resources, their projections of insolvency case numbers, the drop in their customer satisfaction rates, and more, but I realised that I had to stop somewhere!

Asset sales at an undervalue (timed at 9.47am in the recording)

Brian Binley (Conservative MP) started the discussion: “I’m particularly concerned about many small businesses who should be in receipt of some return for a sizeable build-up of debt and that build-up occurs because they daren’t be too heavy because the business has been fragile for 5 years or so and yet insolvency agents sell off at 10% irrespective and they feel very badly let down”.

I thought that Graham Horne did a reasonable job of explaining the considerable write-down of asset value on facing a fire-sale for a company in an insolvency process, but Mr Binley had not finished: “I do know how angry it makes people and particularly people running small businesses when they know the value is sizeably higher but where there is a culture of, because of the firewall (sic.) that you talk about, oh get rid of it, 10% will do…  Can I ask you seriously to look into this matter and can I ask you to come back to me because I’m not satisfied with your answers and I think they have been sizeably complacent and I think that a consideration of SME is where hopefully the growth is going to come from and it needs to be higher up your list of priorities than it appears to be.”

It seems to me that there is still much work to do, primarily by R3 I would suggest, in progressing education of the public and politicians about the realities of insolvency.  I would add that I think this is largely outside of insolvency regulation, is it not?  An IP instructs a professional agent to do a professional job; I cannot see that they can be criticised for using accredited agents (say, by RICS and/or NAVA; I’m not sure of any other such bodies) to do their job, can they?

Continuation of supplies (10.00am)

Graham Horne stated that, in relation to the “regulated industries… we should do something about it and are doing something about it, so it’s no right that regulated industries should seek to profit because a company is going insolvent, whereas with a contracting party, it’s trickier.  We’re aware of the issues; we are discussing them with IPs and others.  It will require legislation.  It’s really those unforeseen consequences – if you put a lever over here, you’re not totally sure what the consequences are over there at the moment – but certainly I think there’s a fair amount of forbearance around at the moment.”

The Insolvency Service’s record on director disqualifications (10.10am)

Mike Crockart (Lib Dem MP) observed that last year 5,401 D-reports were submitted, but only 1,151 resulted in disqualifications and he suggested that the perception is that directors who have been alleged as guilty of misconduct are not being tackled.  Dr Judge responded by explaining the Insolvency Service’s strategy in prioritising high risk cases.  He also explained that some cases are not taken forward because, inter alia, the evidence may not be there and he accepted that the Service has not been particularly good at explaining to IPs why cases have not been taken forward.

Mike Crockart responded: “You seem to be handing it back to IPs and saying, you’re sending too many… IPs are seeing something there that they believe you should be dealing with because the numbers are going up, but you seem to be quite satisfied with the number that you’re dealing with.”

I was surprised that Dr Judge responded: “To be clear on what I’ve said, there are 5,000 indications of misconduct – I say ‘indications’ because I think that’s an important point; not every one is going to be severe or even, you know, there are people who are innocent in that…”  At least Graham Horne tempered this a little with the observation that IPs are statutorily obliged to report metaphorically those driving 31mph in a 30mph zone and consequently not all cases are taken forward, but even so I thought it was interesting to hear what comes into the new Inspector General’s mind.

Pre-packs (10.22am)

The Committee Chairman started: “Widespread dissatisfaction with them [pre-packs]; proposals that had been mooted were shelved earlier this year…”  Was there scope for further reform?

Dr Judge repeated the Insolvency Service’s view that pre-packs are seen as a useful tool in the rescue culture, they have saved jobs, and in conducting their monitoring “we haven’t come across widespread evidence of abuse”.  He also explained the general view that the real concern is sales to connected parties and that SIP16 has “tried to” address concerns over transparency.

Graham Horne explained the reason the proposals for 3 days notice was shelved, due to a desire to avoid introducing legislation affecting small businesses, “although it has not been ruled out”.  He also hinted at the relevance of the director disqualifications, reporting that 161 disqualifications were where directors had entered into transactions to the detriment of creditors; 56 for misappropriating assets; and 102 for “conduct that was quasi-criminal”.

He continued: “Transparency is something that we continue to work on and we’re not satisfied that IPs are doing enough to persuade creditors that they’re doing a good job in the way that they’ve handled pre-packs.  We don’t see evidence that the pre-pack wasn’t the right thing to do or that it wasn’t the best option in the circumstances.  What I don’t think IPs are doing enough of is explaining to people why they chose that option and giving the circumstances for that”.  He confirmed that no other specific suggestions arising from the stakeholder meetings into improving confidence in pre-packs are being considered.

Brian Binley queried the relevance of the disqualification statistics.  He added: “It is about SMEs in pre-packs, small businesses who often think that the whole deal is done above their heads; they don’t get any information whatsoever and they feel either that the Inland Revenue or the banks or the big companies have wrapped it up without any recognition of the relative size of the hit to a small business.  To a bank, £50,000 is not a great deal of money, but to a small business it’s very often the difference between survival or going under and in terms of pre-packs it is often the SME, the very small business, that is totally left out of any considerations.  Is that fair and if there is a hint of concern there, what are you doing about it to find out how great that concern is?”

Personally, I do wonder at the level of acumen of a business that provides life-or-death levels of credit to a company and thus how sensibly they could contribute to, or absorb the details of, any pre pre-pack completion process.

Graham Horne responded that he understood the concern.  He believed that the forbearance of HMRC and the banks is helping; companies are not being pushed into insolvency, but he recognised that it is the absence of information before the sale that is the concern.  “That is why we’ve not ruled out going back to the idea that people should give notice and we do encourage – and it is part of the practice of IPs – to market the company’s assets because I think one answer here would be to say to people: what is anyone prepared to pay for these assets? Because this is what it’s all about… a fair open market to say what’s anyone prepared to pay? And I think the issue on pre-packs is often that it’s behind closed doors.  The SIP is supposed to be telling IPs to give information about what marketing they’ve done and this is where we pull them up and their compliance I’m afraid is disappointing”.

I was interested to note that Graham Horne referred to sales of assets, not businesses, which supports my perception that perhaps he still does not quite appreciate the damage that can be done to some businesses in indiscreetly seeking to attract purchasers before the commencement of insolvency.  Having said that, I do wonder if some IPs may still feel that as long as sale consideration is comparable to, or a slight improvement over, a valuation, then it is as good as selling on the open market and I wonder if adequate contemplation of open market selling occurs.

In response to Ann McKechin’s (Labour MP) question of whether the Service was satisfied with the last SIP16 monitoring report’s results – 32% not fully compliant and 7% substantially deficient – Graham Horne stated: “No, I’m not at all satisfied with that.  It is disappointing that the industry has been unable to get that level up to where I’d expect it to be.  I mean, they are professional people, it’s a complicated SIP and it’s got quite a lot of elements to it, but one would expect them to be able to comply with that to a far higher level that 68%.  I would say that the non-compliances are slightly technical, so it’s not as though in those cases that the pre-pack is in any way wrong or was the wrong thing to do or there was abuse.  It is simply the point that they’re not giving enough information to creditors and that’s why again as part of the reforms we are looking at strengthening the rules and regulations relating to the supply of information to really put it on a statutory footing, rather than the footing that it is with the SIP”.

I was disappointed that, whilst Ann McKechin was seeking confirmation that “the SIP is at the moment voluntary guidance provided by your department”, Graham Horne nodded and muttered “yes”.  Ms McKechin continued by asking whether Mr Horne would prefer it to be statutory.  He responded: “I’m not sure that my personal opinion particularly carries much weight, but it is something that ministers would want to look at and it’s part of the consultation that went out”.  Then Ann McKechin asked: “Have any of the professional regulators that are involved adopted the SIP16 guidance into their own regulatory environments and the fact that there are penalties for non-compliance?”  Disappointingly again, Graham Horne did not put the Committee straight on the status of SIPs within the RPBs, but he responded: “Oh there are penalties for non-compliance, yes, and when we complain, penalties are imposed, fines are imposed and undertakings are given, so there are some regulatory consequences of the failure to comply.  My disappointment is that those penalties have not had the impact of improving compliance levels and I think what we’re trying to do with the RPBs is urge them to up the game to say, look, you need to do more, to ensure they do reach acceptable levels of compliance.  I think our view is that the penalties imposed so far have not really been of the size, of the level, that we would have liked to have seen in some cases.  In some cases we think that perhaps RPBs could have taken a little bit of a firmer line with some of the non-compliance cases.”

Personally, I was really disappointed at the style and wording of SIP16 when it was released (my disappointment perhaps is heightened, as I was the IPA secretariat attendee at the JIC when the SIP was being worked on – I believe that there was plenty of effort on the IPA’s part to get the SIP into a better shape).  I do believe that the checklist style has led to some SIP16 disclosures lacking real substance or a sensible explanation of why and how the pre-pack was undertaken.  I do think that more could be done to make the disclosures useful, although I fear that the Insolvency Service’s apparent checklist style of monitoring has not helped, as I wonder if some IPs are sticking to the checklist approach in order to prove to the Service that a disclosure does meet SIP16 requirements.  If that is the case, perhaps these IPs put too much emphasis on the bullet point list in the SIP when they perhaps should be reflecting on SIP16’s paragraph 8: “It is important, therefore, that they [unsecured creditors] are provided with a detailed explanation and justification of why a pre-packaged sale was undertaken, so that they can be satisfied that the administrator has acted with due regard for their interests”.

I would hope that the JIC could be left alone to revise SIP16 (and perhaps SIP13 too?) – and when I left the IPA in May this year, a JIC working group (including someone from the Insolvency Service) was working on this endeavour.  However, it is clear that the threat of the current SIP16-style legislation remains alive.

Complaints in general (10.39am)

Ann McKechin followed up an observation that complaints against IPs had fallen by 16% with an interesting question: does this reflect the value of cases at present or is it an indication of increased confidence in the profession?  Unfortunately, the Insolvency Service did not grasp hold of this idea, but instead Graham Horne responded: “If you read the OFT report, you might think it was possibly because of a lack of awareness of how to complain and maybe there’s a little bit of an issue there about the mechanisms by which you complain, the way in which you complain.  Levels of insolvency are fairly static at the moment, so we would not expect increasing levels of complaints and IPs in fairness do a difficult job and do it well in the main and the level of complaints is comparatively small compared to the sorts of cases they deal with.”

Evolving plans for changes to complaints processes

Graham Horne immediately continued: “What we are doing is trying to work with the RPBs on a measure to have a single gateway for complaints and we’re pretty close to hopefully announcing a basket of measures where we will host a gateway for complaints so people will be able to see the way in which they can complain.”

He confirmed to Ms McKechin that this was considered an alternative to the creation of a single complaints body and he added: “we’re close to hopefully getting ministerial approval to launch shortly.  We’re also working on common sanctions so it won’t matter which body you’re complaining to, there’ll be a consistent approach to the misconduct, common appeals process as well, so you get many of the advantages of a single regulator but by bringing it together with a single front-end and approach to complaints.”

Prospects for a single regulator (10.41am)

In response to Brian Binley’s question regarding the apparent demise of the proposal for a single regulator, Graham Horne acknowledged that the consultation had generated “quite a lot of strong support for that”, but that “ministers have ruled out at this stage legislation.  The previous minister said he would want to explore achieving the same aims through voluntary means, which is this package of measures I’ve been talking about…  We haven’t ruled out and ministers haven’t ruled out a single independent regulator, needs Parliamentary time, needs to think about that, but what we’re trying to achieve through this set of measures is some of the advantages it would give us.”

Mr Binley observed that R3’s survey reported that the vast majority would like fewer regulatory bodies and asked how quickly the Service was moving, to which Mr Horne observed that it is in the hands of ministers.  Dr Judge added that they “could probably reinforce” the Service’s oversight function; he noted that they are limited to the “nuclear action”, but he pointed out that it did not stop the Service from making their expectations clear to the RPBs.

Creditors’ powers to challenge excessive fees (10.48am)

Rebecca Harris (Conservative MP) asked what progress was being made in enabling creditors to challenge excessive fees.  Graham Horne responded: “This is an area where we’ve made some progress, but I have to say not as much progress as we would have liked with our dealings with the RPBs…  They will be able to raise complaints about fees and RPBs will look at those where the circumstances surrounding the fees amount to misconduct – so an IP has not got proper authority for fees, where an IP cannot support a calculation for the fees, or where the fee levels are very egregious – so they will look at those and that will give creditors some avenues to complain. The position is still that in most cases the recourse is to the court if you’re not happy with the way IPs have handled fees.  Most fees are approved by creditors…  We are looking at whether we can push this voluntary measure a little further because the recourse again would come back to legislation and we haven’t ruled out looking at secondary legislation to give RPBs the right to examine the quantum of fees and I think their natural concern is getting into a commercial discussion/debate about: was that the appropriate fee in that particular case?  We think it is right that there should be some mechanism where someone looks at that and decides whether, not down to the last pence (he was interrupted by a Committee member asking another question)…  We are doing all we can in our role as creditor, albeit we become a creditor after the event, to use our powers as a creditor to look at IPs’ conduct and to raise issue and HMRC do quite a lot as well, although they would have to take it on a resource basis; they can’t take on every case because they are a creditor in every case.”  Mr Horne’s additional comments suggest that the Insolvency Service has devoted new resources to this endeavour and recently formed an RPO team to look particularly, from a creditor’s perspective, at how IPs have administered cases.

The Red Tape Challenge (“RTC”) (10.53am)

Graham Horne set out the timescale: the revised rules are planned to come into force in October 2014 and a set of rules will be sent to a focus group in early 2013.  He said that the revised rules would be made available to the public at least 6 months before implementation, as he appreciated that people needed time to adjust their systems.  Personally, I thought that suggestion of any public consultation on revised rules was conspicuous by its absence.

Mr Horne explained that the “D-form issue” was a particular issue arising from the RTC; the rest of the suggestions were generally around the process of insolvency, meetings, whether modern means of communication could be incorporated more widely, for example with the current need to use first class post.  He said there were no big ideas, but “incremental pruning” should make reasonably significant improvements overall.

Mike Crockart referred to the apparent desire amongst IPs for an electronic D-form, but commented that it seemed a “moratorium” had stalled this development.  Graham Horne confirmed that the idea was certainly not shelved but he acknowledged there were some legislative barriers to look at.  He also said that the Service wants to take a wider look at the whole D-report/return process, for example is a D2 nil return really necessary?  Should there be a form or reporting requirement?  He noted that the risk of a form is that it becomes something completed by rote.

“Perceived cosy relationship between IPs and asset-based lenders” (11.01am)

The above words were what the Chairman used to introduce the next subject and he then handed over to Brian Binley: “I understand you are to meet with officials from the BIS department and with the Treasury and the Campaign for Regulation of Asset-based Finance – due to take place this week”, although Graham Horne later said that discussions were ongoing, rather than confirming a meeting this week.  Mr Binley referred to a case involving a bakery which was given 2.5 days over the Jubilee period by Bibby to find other funders and then Bibby wanted a £92,000 termination fee.  He asked whether this kind of power was unfair and continued: “Some factoring companies put companies into administration and appoint a friendly insolvency firm and some go even further – they pass leads to lenders who are owned by the insolvency practice firm themselves.  Now this is pretty-much of an unacceptable mess, isn’t it?”

Dr Judge acknowledged that this was a relatively recent concern brought to the Service’s attention and pointed out that the Service’s function is limited to insolvency and that this appeared to fall to other departments.  He encouraged people to provide specific evidence of any concerning events.  Graham Horne’s follow-up comments suggest to me that the Service may not have fully grasped Mr Binley’s particular concern: “I think that the regulatory framework is in place.  We don’t need any more tools.  If people have taken out charges late-on prior to the insolvency, those charges could be rendered invalid.  These sorts of things can be looked at in the way the company’s business was restructured just before the insolvency.  This is stuff that we can do with our current powers, so what we need to do is get complaints to us.  We’ve got powerful powers to investigate companies.”

Mr Binley was keen to highlight the banks’ role in this matter, although in so doing, I wonder if he is muddling two different issues: “It’s the banks that almost stipulate that some of their small businesses actually use an associated factoring company, so the whole loop sort-of has the smell about, which is not overly savoury.”

Shortly afterward, the Chairman wrapped up the session by reminding the Service representatives that further written evidence covering a number of matters was expected – the story continues…