insolvencyoracle

March 19, 2014
by insolvencyoracle 3 Comments

Who knew the Insolvency Service had a sense of humour?

Well, if I didn’t laugh, I’d cry!

I am conscious that my top ten jokes below make this a fairly destructive, not constructive, post about the Insolvency Service’s “Strengthening the regulatory regime and fee structure for insolvency practitioners” consultation. In addition, I do not cover many of the common concerns about the proposals, nor do I suggest here any real solutions. Nevertheless, I do think that it’s important, not to dismiss the proposals out of hand, but to think seriously about what might work. Our own ideas may not be what the Service has in mind, but we become the joke, if we plough on claiming that we see no ships (even if, yes I know, it may look as though that’s what I’m saying below… but rarely does public opinion concern itself with facts).

I have one week left to chew over my own suggestions before setting pen to paper in my formal response. Therefore, in the meantime, here are my top ten jokes told by the Service in its consultation document and two impact assessments (“IA”), which can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/insolvency-practitioner-regulation-and-fee-structure.

1. “Each year IPs realise approximately £5bn worth of assets from corporate insolvency processes, and in doing so charge about £1bn in fees, distributing some £4bn to creditors” (paragraph 88 of the consultation document)

The Insolvency Service has repeated this most absurd statement from the OFT’s market study. So, I ask myself, who is paying the solicitors’ fees, the agents’ fees, all the necessary costs of insolvencies such as insurance, advertising, bond premiums etc., and finally what about the Insolvency Service’s own fees that are payable from the assets in all (bankruptcies and) compulsory liquidations in priority to everything else? This statement just cannot be true!

It also grossly distorts the position and perception of IP fees: are we really talking about £1bn of IP fees here or costs on insolvent estates? The OFT’s explanation of how they came up with the £1bn (footnote 11 at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/Insolvency/oft1245) mixes up fees and costs, so it is difficult to be sure. However, as this debate has built up momentum, few seem bothered any longer about the facts behind the fees “problem”.

2. “Cases where secured creditors will not be paid in full and so remain in control of fees. The market works well in this instance so we do not want to interfere with the ability for secured creditors to successfully negotiate down fees” (paragraph 113 of the consultation document)

Both Professor Kempson’s report and the OFT market study drew conclusions about the effectiveness of secured creditors’ control. However, the OFT’s study looked only at Administrations and Para 83 CVLs (which are so not S98s) and Professor Kempson built on this study and therefore concentrated on the effect of IPs obtaining appointments via bank panels. And, from this relatively narrow focus, we end up with the conclusion above that the Service proposes to apply to all insolvencies (except, it is proposed, for VAs and MVLs, where it is suggested other fees controls work well… so maybe those cases have a different lesson for us about the level of engagement of those responsible for authorising the fees..?).

But, I ask myself, what about other cases involving secured creditors? What about less significant liquidations or even bankruptcies where the mortgaged home is in negative equity? Do the secured creditors really control the level of fees in these cases? It seems highly unlikely, when you remember that the bases of liquidators’ and trustees’ fees are fixed by resolutions of the unsecured creditors. And let’s not worry too much about the effectiveness (or not) of non-bank secured creditors…

Some might react: let it lie. If the Service wants to leave well alone all cases where secured creditors will not be paid in full – regardless of whether or not, in practice, they control fees – why make a fuss? The same could be said about my next point…

3. “The basis of remuneration must be fixed in accordance with paragraph (4) where… there is likely to be property to enable a distribution to be made to unsecured creditors…” (draft Rule 17.14(2)(b))

This is supposed to be the way the objective mentioned in 2 above is achieved, i.e. that fees may only be fixed on the bases described in “paragraph (4)” (i.e. percentage or set amount, but not time costs) where secured creditors are not in control of fees (plus in some other circumstances).

I am sure it has taken you less than a millisecond to work it out: “where a distribution to unsecured creditors is likely” is patently not the same as “where secured creditors do not remain in control of fees”. What about the vast majority of liquidations, which must represent by far the greatest proportion in number of insolvencies, where the asset realisations are not enough to cover all the costs (including IPs’ time costs)? In these cases, the Service’s proposal is that they would like the IP’s fees to be on a percentage or set amount, but in fact the draft Rules would entitle the liquidator to seek approval on a time cost basis. That must be a joke!

The problem for me in leaving these flaws alone is that IPs could be lumbered with Rules that do not implement the Government’s policy objectives, which may result in the Service/RPBs pressing for behaviours and approaches that are not supported by the statutory framework, which will do no one any good.

4. The use of the Schedule 6 scale rate for fees “ensures that there are funds available for distribution and not all realisations are swallowed up in fees and remuneration” (paragraph 117 of the consultation document)

Firstly, I object to “swallowed up”. It seems to me an emotive phrase, generating the image of an enormous whale greedily scooping up trillions of helpless krill in its distended maw. In fact, this image – and the reference to “excessive” fees/fee-charging, even though the consultation document acknowledges at one point that Professor Kempson did not interpret over-charging as deliberate but as largely related to inefficiencies – seems a constant throughout.

Secondly, and more fundamentally, as explained in (1) above, simply reverting to office holder fees being charged as a percentage, even the relatively low percentages of Schedule 6, will not ensure there are funds available for distribution. But this objective seems to be the raison d’etre of the fees proposals (and not just the Schedule 6 default), as Ms Willott MP explains in her foreword: “[The consultation document] also includes proposals to amend the way in which an insolvency practitioner can charge fees for his or her services, which should ensure that there will be funds available to make a payment to creditors” (page 2). This can only feed into some creditors’ misconceived expectations, not only about the post-new Rules world, but also about the insolvency process in general. If every insolvency were required to result in a distribution, there would be far more work for the OR and far fewer IPs in the country.

5. “The transfer of returns from IPs to unsecured creditors has the potential to deliver a more efficient dynamic economic allocation of resources as these creditors are more likely to reinvest these resources in growth driving activities” (paragraph 17 of the IP fees IA)

Actually, this isn’t funny; it’s just insulting. Even if you imagined a typical IP as a beer-bellied pin-striped man smoking a cigar of £50 notes, with more spilling out unnoticed from his pockets (which was the image in an Insolvency Service presentation to IPs last year), his ill-gotten gains are still going be passed on to the home sauna builders or the Michelin Star restaurants, aren’t they? But, of course, that’s beside the point; as someone who has worked decades in the insolvency profession, I take exception to the suggestion that the UK would be better off if my wages were paid to unsecured creditors.

6. “The OFT report states that some unsecured creditors say that if their recovery rate from insolvency increased, they would extend more credit. While this effect is likely to be slight, even a small increase in the £80bn of unsecured credit extended by SME’s will amount to many millions of pounds” (paragraph 56 of the IP fees IA)

How much better-off does the IA suggest unsecured creditors will be if the alleged “excessive fee charging” is passed to them? At the top end, 0.1p in the £ (paragraph 52) – will they even feel it..? Talk about a “slight” effect!

7. “We would estimate that familiarisation would take up to 1.5 hours of an IP’s time based on the assumption that this change is not complex to understand and would only need to be understood once before being applied… IPs are already required to seek the approval of creditors for the basis on which their remuneration is taken and it is anticipated that at the same time they will seek agreement to the percentage they are proposing to take. We do not therefore anticipate any additional costs associated with this” (paragraphs 35 and 43 of the IP fees IA)

1.5 hours once and nothing more? Ha ha!

For IPs to switch to a percentage basis (but only in certain circumstances/cases) will require days – weeks, perhaps months – of organising changes to systems, procedures and templates and a greater time burden per case. The challenges for systems, procedures and staff will include:

• Assessing a fair percentage of estimated future realisations to reflect the value of work done. This seems an almost impossible task on Day One. For example, book debts: will the money just fall in or will it be a tough job, involving scrutinising and collating records and re-buffing objections and procrastinations? How much do you allow for the SIP2 investigations, what if you need to follow a lead? So many questions…

• Ongoing monitoring to check if/when fees can no longer be fixed on a time cost basis. You’d think this would be relatively easy, until you read how the draft Rules deal with the tipping point for a dividend: a time cost basis falls away when “the office holder becomes aware or ought to have become aware that there is likely to be property to enable a distribution to be made to unsecured creditors” (draft R17.19(1)(b)). Hours of fun!

• Reverting to creditors when a revised fee basis needs to be sought, whether that be because the time costs basis is no longer available or because the case hasn’t progressed as originally anticipated or potential new assets are identified during a case, thus warranting a change in the percentage or set amount, with the potential for court applications if creditors don’t approve the revision.

• Calculating fees on a percentage basis. Again, it sounds easy, but… what about VAT refunds (will the use (or not) of VAT control accounts make it easier or more difficult?), trading-on sales (which are excluded under the draft Rules’ statutory scale), “the value of the property with which the administrator has to deal” (per the draft Rules)?

• Dealing with creditors’ committees, which the consultation document suggests will be encouraged under the proposed regime.

• More complex practice management to ensure that percentages are pitched correctly and potentially greater lock-up issues where IPs do not have the security of realisations in hand to fund ongoing efforts.

But these measures are intended to reduce IPs’ fees..?

8. Professor Kempson “highlights that the starting point for reforms in this area should be on providing greater oversight, therefore reducing the numbers of complaints and challenges relating to fees… Currently there are very few fee related complaints handled by the RPBs… Complaints about the insolvency profession are relatively low given the nature of insolvency, the number of creditors (and other stakeholders) involved in cases and the extent of financial losses that can be incurred” (paragraphs 29 and 46 of the IP fees IA and 1.60 of the regulation IA).

To be fair, I should put paragraph 46 in context: “Currently there are very few fee related complaints handled by the RPBs, but this is likely to be a result of RPBs stating publicly that they do not consider fee-related complaints and does not reflect the current level of concern around fees. In the past 6 months 23% of all IP related ministerial correspondence has been in relation to fees”, which admittedly does put a different colour on things.

The difficulty as I see it is: if an aim is to reduce the number of fees complaints and challenges, but the IA estimates 300 (new) fee complaints per annum and 50 appeals post-implementation of the proposals. Would such an outcome mean that the measures are hailed as a success or a failure?

9. Not taking the steps proposed by the Insolvency Service as regards regulatory objectives and oversight powers proposals “would not address concerns around an ineffective tick-box prescriptive type of regulation… The same prescriptive type of regulation would continue to exist whereas the intention is to move to a principles and objectives based regulatory system as suggested by the OFT report” (paragraphs 1.49 and 1.51 of the regulation IA)

Ooh, I could relate some stories from my time at the IPA about who was usually at the forefront in driving tick-box regulation! There were times when I had to be dragged kicking and screaming down that road. Still I should stay positive: maybe this signifies a new commitment to Better Regulation – after all, the draft regulatory objectives do not refer to ensuring that IPs meet prescriptive statutory requirements that do not contribute to delivering a quality service or maximising returns to creditors, and if value for money is an objective..?

The Service puts it this way: “As an example, rather than targeting regulatory activity to where there may be only potentially small losses to creditors from any regulatory breach, the regulators will focus attention on areas where creditors are likely to suffer larger losses” (paragraph 1.71). Oh well, that’ll put me out of a job! 🙂

10. “We do recognise that giving the RPBs a regulatory role in monitoring fees will increase the burden on them when dealing with complaints around the quantum of fees and have therefore included the estimated cost of this” (paragraph 100 of the consultation document)

Since when was “monitoring” all about dealing with complaints? The IAs provide nothing for the additional costs to RPBs of dealing with anything but complaints.

It would seem that a typical monitoring visit in the eyes of the Service would have the objective of aiming “to ensure that fees charged by IPs represent value for money and are ‘fair’ and valid for the work undertaken, by requiring the RPBs to provide a check and balance against the level of fees charged… The regulators will be expected to take a full role in assessing the fairness of an IP’s fees, including the way in which they are set, the manner in which they are drawn and that they represent value for money for the work done. This would be done via the usual monitoring visits and complaint handling processes” (paragraph 101). The Service believes that this is possible as the RPBs have “access to panels with the relevant experience, to adjudicate on fees” (paragraph 102).

Are they serious?! Do they have any idea how impossible it would be to achieve this practically, not least within the confines of the current visit timetable? And how are the “panels”, presumably the Service means committee members, going to engage in this process: is the Service really expecting them to adjudicate on fees? You might as well forget about the rest of the Act/Rules, SIPs and Ethics Code: the inspectors’/monitors’ time will be spent entirely looking at fees and RPBs’ committees/secretariat will be hard-pushed to make any adverse findings stick.

Oh, it’s alright for the Service, though; they’ve incorporated the cost of two new people in-house to handle their enhanced RPB supervisory functions. But they don’t think that this will add to RPBs’ costs in dealing with the Service’s queries, monitoring visits, demands for information on regulatory actions in general and in specific cases (apparently)?

The biggest joke of all is: where will all these costs land? In IPs’ laps, when their levies and licence fees increase. Remind me, what was the key objective of these proposals..?

Although the Service doesn’t mince words about its/the Government’s sincerity on these issues – e.g. “given the clear evidence of harm suffered by unsecured creditors, the Government feels strongly that reforms are required in order to address the market failure” (paragraph 93 of the consultation document) – I can’t help but hope that I’ll wake up a couple of days after the consultation has closed to a new announcement from the Insolvency Service: “April fool!”

March 9, 2014
by insolvencyoracle Leave a comment

Not the Game appeal

Plenty of comprehensive summaries of the Game appeal have been produced, so I cover here some lesser-known judgments:

• Salliss v Hunt – a Deputy Registrar’s approval of a Trustee’s fees basis being switched from percentage to time costs comes under scrutiny
• LSI 2013 Limited v The Solar Panel (UK) Company Limited – how presenting contingent creditors in a CVA proposal may have unintended consequences
• Credit Lucky Limited v NCA – a Company’s attempt to escape a winding-up in favour of an Administration Order fails
• Day v Shaw & Shaw – spouse entitled to an equity of exoneration even though the co-owner was not the principal debtor

A couple of useful summaries of the Game appeal can be found at: http://lexisweb.co.uk/blog/randi/landlords-can-rejoice-following-the-game-administration-decision/ and http://www.11sb.com/pdf/insider-note-cofa-game-decision-26-feb-2014.pdf.

(UPDATE: Game Retail’s application for permission to appeal to the Supreme Court is expected to be heard in November 2014.)

(UPDATE 02/11/2014: The Supreme Court refused Game Retail permission to appeal on the basis that “the application does not raise an arguable point of law of general public importance which ought to be considered by the Supreme Court at this time bearing in mind that the case has already been the subject of judicial decision and reviewed on appeal.” (http://goo.gl/cWWuDs))

Baister’s Practice Statement applied to Trustee’s request to switch fees basis from percentage to time costs

Salliss v Hunt (10 February 2014) ([2014] EWHC 229 (Ch))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/229.html

The Chancellor of the High Court opened his judgment by calling this a “regrettable case of litigation”, which should have been avoided.

Mr Salliss had been made bankrupt in 1993 on the petition of Barclays Bank plc, which appeared to have been owed over £2m originally. The creditors approved the Trustee’s fees as the first £2,000 realised and thereafter on the OR’s scale.

The only assets were pension plans. These had not been realised, but when Mr Salliss reached 65 in 2007 he began working on an annulment so that he could draw down on the pensions. He paid the claims of his creditors other than Barclays, which had not submitted a proof of debt and, when pressed, confirmed that it had withdrawn its right to claim in the bankruptcy due to the age of the case.

Then the court applications began…

Salliss applied for an annulment, but the Trustee’s report indicated that his time costs were almost £40,000 and other costs and expenses were £24,000. Salliss put forward an accountant’s report that stated that strictly the Trustee was not entitled to any remuneration, in view of the basis agreed by creditors.

The Trustee applied for an order that Salliss sign the necessary forms so that the Trustee could realise his interest in the pensions. The Trustee also applied to change the basis of his fees from the agreed percentage basis to time costs. Nine months on, the Trustee’s fees and costs had increased from £64,000 to over £150,000.

All three applications came before the Deputy Registrar, who rejected the annulment application, but granted the Trustee’s two applications. He considered that time costs was the only appropriate basis “because even though the bankruptcy commenced more than 19 years ago there is still uncertainty as to what might be realised and when if it continues and in any event the extent of the time necessarily and unavoidably spent by Mr Hunt and his staff already is such that a percentage basis of any kind could not, in my view, result in appropriate remuneration, especially as yet further time would have to be spent the amount of which cannot be anticipated” (paragraph 35). He had also been reluctant to ignore Barclays’ debt entirely, given the precedent of Gill v Quinn, which had involved the rejection of an annulment because of a number of creditors’ silence to invitations to prove their debts.

At the appeal, the Chancellor’s view was that this case was quite different to Gill v Quinn and that the evidence showed that Barclays had taken “an informed policy decision that it would not then or in the future lodge a proof in respect of any debt in Mr Salliss’ bankruptcy” (paragraph 41) and therefore Barclays’ debt was irrelevant to the annulment application.

He also felt that the Deputy Registrar’s approach to the remuneration application was flawed. He felt that insufficient regard had been given to Chief Registrar Baister’s Practice Statement on the fixing and approval of the remuneration of appointees, which, contrary to the Deputy Registrar’s view, he felt was relevant to applications to have a fees basis changed as well as fixed by the court. With the Practice Direction in mind, the Chancellor stated that the proper approach “is to begin by asking what has changed and was not foreseen and could not have been foreseen when the creditors made their decision” (paragraph 51). In this case, it had always been known that the assets were limited, but the Trustee had been content to continue to act under the creditors’ resolution. The Chancellor commented that “the usual and proper course should be for the trustee to apply to the court for a change in the basis of remuneration as soon as it becomes clear that an application will be necessary in order to make the remuneration (in the words of the Practice Direction) fair, reasonable and commensurate with the nature and extent of the work properly to be undertaken by the appointee. In other words, the application should, so far as practicable, be prospective and not retrospective. Unless there is some good and proper reason to do otherwise, it is not appropriate for the trustee to wait until all the work is done and then apply to the court as a ‘fait accompli’ for a retrospective change in the remuneration resolved by the creditors” (paragraph 53).

The Chancellor decided that the annulment and the remuneration applications should be set aside, although he felt unable to determine them on the appeal. He did, however, draw attention to “the considerable increase in the bankruptcy fees and expenses… in substance due to the time, cost and expense of litigating over the costs, expenses and remuneration at the date of the Trustee’s Report” (paragraph 52) and questioned whether the matter could have been brought to a swift conclusion far earlier, when the pension plans’ lump sum might have been sufficient to meet all the costs and expenses.

The consequences of presenting contingent creditors in CVA proposals

LSI 2013 Limited v The Solar Panel (UK) Company Limited (14 January 2014) ([2014] EWHC 248 (Ch))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/248.html

The Company appealed a winding-up order on the ground that the Deputy District Judge had been wrong to treat the petitioning creditor as a contingent creditor, when the petition debt was genuinely disputed on substantial grounds.

At the appeal, counsel for the petitioning creditor focussed on a draft proposal for the Company’s CVA, which had listed the petitioner as a contingent creditor, albeit only for £1, and did not refer to the claim as disputed; the IP who had drafted the CVA proposal clearly would have understood the distinction between contingent claims and disputed debts. Consequently, the Deputy District Judge had accepted that the Company was insolvent and that the petitioning creditor was a contingent creditor and thus the winding-up petition had been granted.

His Honour Judge Hodge QC felt that the Deputy District Judge had attached too much weight to the reference in the CVA proposal – which was described as draft and had not been signed by the director – that the creditor was contingent and, in any event, it also stated that £1 was the total claim the creditor would have in a terminal insolvency. Hodge HHJ also noted that the petition had not been founded on the petitioner being a contingent creditor and that the Deputy District Judge had not considered the counter-claim. The outcome was that the winding-up order was set aside and the case was remitted to the Bristol District Registry with a view to considering the merits of the dispute.

No escaping a winding-up order in favour of administration

Credit Lucky Limited & Anor v National Crime Agency (29 January 2014) ([2014] EWHC 83 (Ch))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/83.html

The Company applied for the winding-up order against it to be rescinded, varied or reviewed, or alternatively stayed. Amongst its arguments were that the director wanted to pursue a tax assessment appeal, which the liquidator regarded without merit and did not intend to pursue and that, if the tax assessment were challenged successfully, the director felt that there was every prospect of the creditors being paid in full. The director also intended to apply for an Administration Order so that the Company’s goodwill, name and database could be sold to a third party, which had made an offer conditional on the winding-up order being rescinded.

The judge had several concerns over the conditional offer, which led him to reject the application for rescission. He also did not see why someone should only be prepared to purchase the goodwill, name and database from an administrator and not from a liquidator. He felt that it was implausible that these assets would be more valuable if the Company “‘cleared its name’ by prosecuting and winning the tax appeal” (paragraph 40).

He also felt it was inappropriate to grant a stay: although the liquidator is obliged to take all reasonable steps the maximise asset realisations and therefore is entitled to decide whether to pursue an action in the name of the Company, if the Company or another interested party believes that the tax appeal should be pursued, “it is open to them to apply to the court for a direction which would enable them to prosecute the Tax Appeal in the name of the company or the liquidator. That being so it is difficult to see how – on the assumption that there is, contrary to the liquidator’s view, some merit in the Tax Appeal – the refusal of a stay would result in irremediable loss” to the Company or its shareholder (paragraph 64).

Equity of exoneration with a twist

Day v Shaw & Shaw (17 January 2014) ([2014] EWHC 36 (Ch))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2014/36.html

This case differed from the usual equity of exoneration scenario in that the principal debtor to the secured creditor was, not a co-owner of the property, but Mr Shaw’s limited company, “Avon”, that had gone into liquidation and that, although Mr and Mrs Shaw had granted a charge over their property, the debt to the bank was also secured by reason of personal guarantees by Mr Shaw and the couple’s daughter, Mrs Shergold. Mr Day’s interest in the case arose because he had obtained a charging order over Mr Shaw’s interest in the property, so he was keen to contend that Mrs Shaw was not entitled to an equity of exoneration, but that the debt due to the bank should be borne equally by the shares of Mr and Mrs Shaw in the proceeds of the sale of the property.

At first instance, the judge had decided that Mrs Shaw was entitled to an equity of exoneration. On the appeal, Mr Day contended that, if the judge had treated Avon as the principal debtor, the conclusion would have been that the equity of exoneration did not apply to the property jointly owned by Mr and Mrs Shaw.

The question for Mr Justice Morgan was whether Mr Shaw and Mrs Shergold, as guarantors, and Mr and Mrs Shaw, as mortgagors, were all sureties of the same rank or was one group effectively sub-sureties for the other? The conclusion he reached was that “it is clear that in substance, Mr Shaw and Mrs Shergold were sureties for the debt of Avon and Mr and Mrs Shaw, as mortgagors, were sub-sureties. I do not consider that the guarantors and the mortgagors can be considered to be co-sureties equally liable for the principal debt. The result is that the sub-sureties (Mr and Mrs Shaw) are entitled to be indemnified by the sureties (Mr Shaw and Mrs Shergold) in just the same way as a surety is entitled to be indemnified by a principal debtor” (paragraph 26). It follows that for the purposes of the equity of exoneration, Mrs Shaw can establish that she is entitled to be indemnified by Mr Shaw in relation to the debt owed to Barclays” (paragraph 30).

February 20, 2014
by insolvencyoracle Leave a comment

The Insolvency Rules “2015”: A Moveable Feast

I realise that talk of the Insolvency Service’s IP fees consultation has pretty-much smothered the draft Rules consultation. However, I’ve yet to get to grips with that one, so here are my thoughts – and a copy of my response – on the (already superceded!) draft “2015” Rules.

The consultation closed on 24 January and it seemed to me that, despite the enormity of the task, many IPs and associates went to a lot of effort to make thorough responses. Regrettably, personally I only managed to review a few of the sections in detail – and only then did I look at the consultation questions (yes, I know, that was a pretty stupid way of doing things!). I attach my response here: MB response 24-01-14. The Government’s consultation homepage is: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/modernisation-of-the-rules-relating-to-insolvency-law.

This is not meant to be an overview of the proposed changes – I’ve not covered the non-controversial aspects (that would be too boring!) – but I consider (but I don’t really answer – sorry!) the following:

• Just how draft are the Draft Rules and are we going to get to see how current/future initiatives impact on them?
• How huge a task will it be to absorb the changes and is there anything that can be done to make the job easier?
• Does the Consultation Document cover all the changes or do we have to look closer at the detail?

The condition of the Draft Rules

The Insolvency Service is between a rock and a hard place, but personally I think they have made the right decision in releasing these draft Rules even whilst they are draft to a greater degree than we’re accustomed for statutory instruments opened to consultation.

The Service acknowledges that the draft is a work in progress document and that there are inconsistencies across the different insolvency processes. The Service did pre-empt the outcome of the Red Tape Challenge somewhat and included within the draft Rules some of the proposed measures, such as removing more statutory meetings (which seems very odd now in the context of the fees consultation) and enabling creditors to opt out of receiving communications, but other measures arising from the Red Tape Challenge exercise – such as avoiding the payment of small dividends and effectively communicating by website alone – are not reflected in the draft Rules. Given that the RTC outcome had not been revealed when this consultation commenced, this is not surprising, but it demonstrates the moveable feast of insolvency legislation and the difficulties in seeking to set in stone – at pretty-much any point in the next half-decade or so – a revised set of Rules.

In the face of this continually moving conveyor belt of legislative proposals, it is understandable that the Service does not wish to hold up the process of revising the Rules and, personally, I am pleased that we have been given this work-in-progress look at the draft. In reading the draft, I have suppressed any nagging concern that much of my effort has already been wasted in view of more recent proposals and yet more of the draft will be overtaken by future events, because the alternative – that we don’t get to see a draft until the last minute – doesn’t bear thinking about.

But what are the Insolvency Service’s plans now? Will they continue to work on the draft, absorbing the responses to this consultation, the further RTC outcomes, the IP fees conclusions, the fall-out from Teresa Graham’s review of pre-packs, perhaps the rules around the S233 changes (which are yet to be the subject of a consultation, right?), and give us little opportunity to review a further draft on the basis that we’ve had our chance? I hope not. I hope we get to have another opportunity to comment on a draft. Whilst matters of agreed policy may not be up for debate in the Rules arena, my review of only a few sections of these draft Rules has demonstrated to me the value of having others input on the practicalities of the processes set out.

The Big Picture

I pity the first JIEB students after the Rules are enforced, although it will be a fantastic opportunity to get ahead of the pack and become the go-to person in one’s practice. How us old’uns with our rubbery neurons are going to get the hang of it all, I don’t know!

I shudder to think about the amount of time – and (non-chargeable) money – that will be expended to get internal systems, diaries, and templates new Rules-compliant… and the inevitable mistakes that will be made; after all, templates always require a bit of fine-tuning after the first (second… third…) version, don’t they? One way that firms can cushion the blow right now is to future-proof standard documents, strip out all those Rules references: after all, do readers really need to know that something has been produced pursuant to Rule xxx?

The Consultation Document is silent on a key issue, I think: are the Rules going to apply to all cases existing as at R-Day or only to new appointments after the new Rules begin to take effect? I appreciate that it would be a rare thing for the new Rules to apply to all cases, rather than just new cases, but it is not entirely unheard-of, and think of the safeguards that would need to be put in place if a firm’s case-load were a mixture of pre- and post-new Rules cases. It’s been tough enough for practices to handle the complexities of running a portfolio of mixed pre/post-2009 and pre/post-2010 Rules cases, but these changes go so much further, it will make our heads spin!

Little has been said of making any changes to the Act. I am sure there is a reluctance to go there, given the more significant difficulties in seeking changes to primary legislation. However, I think it undermines some of the effort made to modernise the Rules, if we cannot fix the Act provisions at the same time. In particular, I think the practical difficulties arising from the Enterprise Act 2002 have now become evident and it seems a wasted opportunity not to tweak those whilst we’re at it. And aren’t there Act changes, such as extending the phoenix provisions to companies that don’t survive Administration, that have been given an airing but seem to have now gone quiet? It would also seem useful to wrap in some of the other statutory instruments that involve significant overlap with the Rules, such as the Insolvency Practitioners Regulations (which will need to be revisited in view of the RTC anyway) and what about Insolvent Partnerships? Then again, I guess the Service has enough on its plate already!

The Detail

Although pretty-much all of the Rules have been re-jigged, the Consultation questions focussed around some of the more fundamental changes, such as the overall structure, which is a massive change, but well worth doing, in my view.

They invited us to comment on the format of setting out in the Rules the prescribed content of notices, forms etc., rather than prescribing a statutory form, the suggestion being that this makes “it easier to enable documents to be delivered by electronic means, preparing the system for moving to electronic delivery of information when the forms would become redundant”. I appreciate that the aim is to future-proof the process, but I don’t think we have to accommodate any transmission process other than textual, do we? We’re not exactly future-proofing for Elysium-style neural downloads, are we? Therefore, I really don’t think that it helps to do away with prescribing forms, as it just means that someone else is going to have to create them (and get paid for it). Even if every IP in the country only goes to a handful of suppliers, that’s still an unnecessary amount of duplication in my books, and micro-businesses will be burdened with a disproportionate expense. Perhaps a middle-ground would be to provide forms, but prescribe only that the information set out in the forms need be delivered? Anyway, do we know whether Companies House will stomach just any old form..?

The Consultation Document lists ten “minor and technical changes” (paragraph 42) – and I think they’re right: they are pretty minor. However, what I think is a little disingenuous is the fact that, if you have the time and the determination to scrutinise the detail of the draft Rules, I’m sure you’ll find far more technical changes that aren’t quite so minor!

I knew there was no way I’d get through the complete draft Rules, so I decided to focus on the sections that will impact mostly on Administrations – Parts 3 and 17. I managed to shoe-horn my thoughts into the consultation’s question 20 (“Do you have any other suggestions or comments on the structure or the content of the rules?”). My full response (MB response 24-01-14) lists my observations, but here are a select few:

• The current R2.48 Conduct of Business by Correspondence for approval of the Administrator’s Proposals is to be replaced by a new correspondence-based process whereby creditors can lodge a “notice of objection” (the only other option appearing to be that they keep silent) and, if 10% or more of the creditors by number or value object, the Administrator “may convene a meeting of creditors to seek their approval or seek approval of a revised statement of proposals” (R3.37). My thoughts are: what is wrong with the current process? What if a creditor just wants to modify the Proposals? How is an IP supposed to calculate whether the 10% threshold has been over-reached? This 10% threshold – of creditors by value (and sometimes by number) of the total – is repeated throughout the Rules. Research has shown that lack of creditor engagement is a recurring problem, so why erode the process whereby creditors who actually make the effort to vote are most influential?

• The Service has made yet another attempt to tidy up the filing and reporting processes when a Paragraph 83 move from Administration to CVL form is filed. This time, they are suggesting a return to the issuing of a final report simultaneously with the ADM-CVL form. However, they have drafted a requirement that, “if anything happens between the sending of the notice to the registrar of companies and its registration which the administrator would have included in the report had it happened before then”, the (former) Administrator must file and circulate “a statement of appropriate amendments to the report”. My issue is that, technically, “anything” could include the crediting of additional bank interest or even the incurring of time costs, so this could result in IPs needing to issue – at some cost – pretty meaningless statements. Ideally, I would prefer the Act (if only!) to be amended so that the date when the ADM-CVL move takes effect is the date that the form is signed, not registered, so that we can escape all this nonsense. After all, I can think of no other event such as this where the timing is in the hands of Companies House. Alternatively, if we are stuck with Companies House controlling the conversion date, couldn’t the Liquidator report on “anything” that had happened in that small window when he issues his annual report?

• The Service has made a big deal about the savings that will be made from reducing the requirements to have creditors’ meetings – and indeed the draft Rules include a general process for conduct by correspondence (in addition to R3.37 for Administrators’ Proposals). However, this excludes fees decisions, which need to be dealt with either by a committee or resolution of creditors (apart from Para 52(1)(b) cases, the provisions for which, disappointingly, are left unchanged). Given that this is pretty-much the only matter to be addressed at creditors’ meetings, I cannot see that many meetings will be avoided, other than final ones (which, let’s face it, already are a complete non-event and cost nothing other than a Gazette fee, as all the expense arises from the need to issue a final report etc.). Of course, if the IP fees consultation proposals are taken forward, we may find IPs trying harder to generate creditor interest in meetings, which erodes to some extent the Service’s message that great savings will be made by these Rules/RTC measures.

These are just a few of the intriguing changes I’ve spotted. I do sympathise with those who have the job of revising these Rules. I’ve only had to deal with few-pager SIPs and the Ethics Code before and they were tough enough. In those cases, we certainly didn’t please all the people all of the time and I am sure the same will be true of the Rules. All that I ask is that we’re kept informed, so that we can manage the transition as best we can… and, if questions continue to be raised about whether IPs are giving “value for money”, that the critics remember that it’s the enormous costs associated with these kinds of changes that IPs have no choice but to pay.

February 11, 2014
by insolvencyoracle Leave a comment

Two bankruptcy annulments, two council debts, and a decision “of potential interest to all insolvency practitioners”

Some questions answered by a few of the recent cases in the courts:

• Kaye v South Oxfordshire District Council – if an insolvency commences mid-year, how much of the year’s business rates rank as an unsecured claim?
• Yang v The Official Receiver – can a bankruptcy order be annulled if the petition debt is later set aside?
• Oraki & Oraki v Dean & Dean – on the annulment of a bankruptcy order, if the petitioning creditor cannot pay the Trustee’s costs, who pays?
• Bristol Alliance Nominee No 1 Limited v Bennett – can a company escape completion of a surrender agreement if the process is interrupted by an Administration?
• Rusant Limited v Traxys Far East Limited – is a “shadowy” defence sufficient to avoid a winding up petition in favour of arbitration?

A decision “of potential interest to all insolvency practitioners and billing authorities for business rates”

Kaye v South Oxfordshire District Council & Anor (6 December 2013) ([2013] EWHC 4165 (Ch))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/4165.html

HHJ Hodge QC started his judgment by stating that this decision is “of potential interest to all insolvency practitioners and billing authorities for business rates” (paragraph 1), as he disagreed with advice that appears to have been relied upon by billing authorities and Official Receivers for quite some time. This may affect CVAs, which were the subject of this decision, and all other insolvency procedures both corporate and personal.

The central issue was: how should business rates relating to a full year, e.g. from 1 April 2013 to 31 March 2014, be handled if an insolvency commences mid-year?

In this case, the council had lodged a proof of debt in a CVA for a claim calculated pro rata from 1 April to the date of the commencement of the CVA, but the Supervisor had observed to the council that he believed that the full year’s business rates ranked as an unsecured claim.

The council responded that the company had adopted the statutory instalment option (whereby the full year’s rates are paid in ten monthly instalments commencing on 1 April) and that, as this was still effective at the commencement of the CVA, the unsecured claim was limited to the unpaid daily accrued liability – with the consequence, of course, that the council expected to be paid ongoing rates by the company in CVA. The council stated that, had the right to pay by instalments been lost at the time of the CVA (by reason of the debtor’s failure to bring instalments up to date within seven days of a reminder notice), the whole year’s balance would have become due and this would have comprised the council’s claim. [This seems perverse to me: it would mean that companies would be better off postponing proposing a CVA until the business rates become well overdue, as the full year would then be an unsecured claim, rather than accruing as a post-CVA expense.] The Supervisor applied to the court for directions.

In support of the council’s view was advice (not directly related to this case) from the Insolvency Service of early 2010, which stated that, unless a bankrupt had failed to comply with a reminder notice, the Official Receiver would reject a claim for council tax for the portion of the year following a bankruptcy order. The council also provided what was said to be the current view of the Institute of Revenues and Valuation, which followed a similar approach in relation to a company’s non-domestic rates.

Hodge HHJ felt that the decision in Re Nolton Business Centres Limited [1996] was of no real assistance, because, although this had resulted in a liquidator being liable for rates falling due after appointment, he stated that it merely demonstrated the “liquidation expenses principle”: “the question was not whether the debt had been incurred before, or after, the commencement of the winding up, but whether the sums had become due after the commencement of the winding up in respect of property of which the liquidator had retained possession for the purposes of the company” (paragraph 38).

Although, in this case, the full year’s rates had not fallen due for payment by the time of the commencement of the insolvency, Hodge HHJ viewed it as “a ‘contingent liability’, to which the company was subject at the date of the [CVA]” (paragraph 54). Therefore, he felt that the full year’s non-domestic rates were “an existing liability incurred by reason of its occupation of the premises on 1st April 2013. It, therefore, seems to me that the liability does fall within Insolvency Rule 13.12” (paragraph 55) and, by reason of the CVA’s standard conditions, were provable. He also commented that it seemed that this would apply equally to liquidations and bankruptcies.

The judge decided that the council should be allowed to prove in the CVA for the full amount of unpaid rates and he felt that the company would have a good defence to the existing summons for non-payment of post-CVA rates.

My thanks to Jo Harris – I’d originally missed this case, but she’d mentioned it in her February technical update.

(UPDATE 22/07/2014: For an exploration of the application of this case to IVAs, take a look at my more recent post at http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-7y)

Absence of petition debt – council tax liability that was later set aside – was not a ground to annul bankruptcy order

Yang v The Official Receiver & Ors (1 October 2013) ([2013] EWHC 3577 (Ch))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/3577.html

Yang was made bankrupt on a petition by Manchester City Council for unpaid council tax of £1,103. After the bankruptcy order, Yang discharged the liability orders but also challenged the liability on the basis that the council had incorrectly classed the property as a house in multiple occupation. Subsequently, the valuation tribunal ordered the council to remove Yang from the liability.

Yang then sought to have the bankruptcy annulled, but the court ordered that the bankruptcy order be rescinded; the annulment was refused, as the court decided that there was no ground for the contention that, at the time the bankruptcy order was made, it ought not to have been: at that time, the multiple occupation assessment stood and Yang had not challenged it.

In considering Yang’s appeal, HHJ Hodge QC felt that the Council Tax (Administration and Enforcement) Regulations 1992 were relevant, which state that “the court shall make the [liability] order if it is satisfied that the sum has become payable by the defendant and has not been paid” (paragraph 20) and the court cannot look into the circumstances of how the debt arose, although the debtor is entitled to follow the statutory appeal mechanism. The judge stated: “It seems to me that the fact that a liability order is later set aside does afford grounds for saying that, at the time the bankruptcy order was made, there was no liability properly founding the relevant bankruptcy petition within the meaning of Section 282(1)(a) of the 1986 Act. But that does not mean that a bankruptcy order made on a petition founded upon such a liability order ‘ought not to have been made’” (paragraph 22) and therefore he was content that the bankruptcy order was rescinded, rather than annulled, although there remain three further grounds of the appeal to consider another day.

Innocence is relative

Oraki & Oraki v Dean & Dean & Anor (18 December 2013) ([2013] EWCA Civ 1629)

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1629.html

After a long battle, the Orakis’ bankruptcies were annulled on the basis that the orders should not have been made: the petition debt related to fees charged by a man who was not a properly qualified solicitor and was not entitled to charge fees. At the same time, the judge ordered that the Trustee’s costs should be paid by the Orakis, although they were open to seek payment from the solicitor firm (Dean & Dean) and to challenge the level of the Trustee’s remuneration.

The Orakis appealed the order to pay the Trustee’s costs on the basis that they were completely innocent. Floyd LJ agreed that the Orakis were wholly innocent “as between Dean & Dean and the Orakis”, however “the confusion occurs if one seeks to carry those considerations across to the costs position as between the trustee and the Orakis. There is no clear disparity, at least at this stage, between the ‘innocence’ of the two parties” (paragraphs 36 and 37). He also stated that, whilst it was still open for the Orakis to challenge the level of costs, which appear to have increased by some £250,000 since 2008, it seemed to him to be unlikely that the Trustee would not be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to at least some costs.

Lady Justice Arden added her own comments: “the guiding principle, in my judgment, is that the proper expenses of the trustee should normally be paid or provided for before the assets are removed from him by an annulment order” (paragraph 63) and it was not clear that the Orakis’ estates would be sufficient to discharge the expenses in full, which, absent the order, would have left the Trustee with the burden of unpaid expenses. She noted that, usually, the petitioning creditor would be ordered to pay the Trustee’s costs where a bankruptcy order is annulled on the ground that it ought never to have been made. However, unusually, in this case the petitioning creditor could not pay and therefore the judge was entitled to order that the Orakis pay.

Landlord entitled to escrow monies held for part-completed surrender interrupted by Administration

Bristol Alliance Nominee No. 1 Limited & Ors v Bennett & Ors (18 December 2013) ([2013] EWCA Civ 1626)

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2013/1626.html

In 2010, A\Wear Limited (“the company”) entered into an ‘Agreement for surrender and deed of variation’ with the landlord (“Bristol”) of leased properties and £340,000 was held in escrow pending completion of the surrender and payment by the company of the VAT on the escrow amount. A similar arrangement was made in relation to another property with an escrow amount of £210,000. Shortly after the landlords served notice on the company requiring completion of the surrender, the company entered into administration and the company, acting by its administrators, refused to complete the surrender.

At first instance, the judge refused to make the order requested by the landlords for specific performance to enable the escrow amounts to be released to them, on the basis that it would have offended the principle of pari passu treatment of unsecured creditors. At the appeal, Rimer LJ disagreed: although the refusal of an order for specific performance would open up the possibility that the company’s contingent interest in the escrow monies might be realised, the monies were not part of the company’s assets and therefore ordering specific performance would not deprive the company of any assets then distributable to creditors. Rimer LJ stated that the effect of the refusal “was to promote the interests of the company’s creditors over those of Bristol in circumstances in which there was no sound basis for doing so”. “Prior to the administration, Bristol had a right, upon giving appropriate notice, as it did, to compel the company to complete the surrender. If such a claim had come before the court before the company’s entry into administration, there could have been no good reason for the court to refuse to make such an order; and the consequence of doing so would have been to entitle Bristol to the payment of the escrow money. It was manifestly the intention of the parties to the surrender agreement to achieve precisely such a commercial result. The company’s entry into administration cannot have resulted, and did not result, in any material change of circumstances. The principle underlying Bastable’s case shows that Bristol remained as much entitled to an order for specific performance as it had before” (paragraph 34). With the support of the other appeal court judges, the appeal was allowed.

Winding up petition “trumped” by arbitration agreement

Rusant Limited v Traxys Far East Limited (28 June 2013) ([2013] EWHC 4083 (Comm))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Comm/2013/4083.html

Rusant Limited sought to restrain the presentation of a winding up petition against it by Traxys Far East Limited, which had issued a statutory demand for the repayment of a loan. However, the loan agreement included a term that “any dispute, controversy or claim… should be referred to and finally resolved by arbitration of a single arbitrator” and Rusant claimed that an extension to the loan repayments had been agreed.

Although Mr Justice Warren described Rusant’s defence as “shadowy” and stated that, apart from the arbitration agreement, he would not grant an injunction, “the arbitration agreement, it seems to me, trumps the decision which I would otherwise have made” (paragraph 33) and therefore, in consideration of the Arbitration Act 1996, he did not allow the petition to proceed.

February 5, 2014
by insolvencyoracle Leave a comment

Re Parmeko Holdings Limited: when are administrators’ proposals “futile”?

Re Parmeko Holdings Limited & Ors (In Administration) (6 September 2013) ([2013] EWHC B30 (Ch))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/B30.html

Recipients of R3 Recovery News will have seen a report on this case by Amy Flavell of Squire Sanders. In her article, Amy referred to the fact that the judge passed comment on the proposals “casting doubt on the utility or effectiveness of a number of standard form proposals” used by many administrators. I’ll cover those comments here.

Background

Firstly, a summary of the case: the administrators sought direction as regards their proposals, which had attracted no response from any creditors at all. Cooke HHJ confirmed that, just as an administrator is entitled to exercise his statutory powers in such a manner as he considers best for fulfilling the purposes of administration before he puts his proposals to creditors, so too can he continue to use those powers in the event that creditors do not vote on his proposals. “If and when proposals are approved then he is required by paragraph 68 to manage the affairs of the Company in accordance with those proposals, but if no such proposals are approved then he is not so constrained and he must act in accordance with his own discretion” (paragraph 11).

This does not contradict with the earlier decision in Lavin v Swindell (http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-k), which involved administrators seeking the court’s direction because creditors had voted against their proposals and Cooke HHJ acknowledged that an administrator also may want to refer to the court in instances where “some specific question arises as to what he should do” (paragraph 13). However, the judge felt that this was not such a case, although he did acknowledge that the administrators required approval of the basis of their fees, which he granted with no particular comment.

The judge’s comments on the proposals

The judge stated that:

• No purpose is served in seeking sanction or direction to make payments, when and if available, to the secured and preferential creditors, as this is a statutory power (paragraph 16);

• He had “grave doubts as to the utility” of placing before creditors the proposals in relation to exit procedures. “The proposals as set out in this case do no more than set out the mechanisms provided by Sch B1 for exit, and leave it to the discretion of the administrator to make any choice between them that may be available in the circumstances as they transpire. That is not, in any positive sense, a proposal at all, nor does it in truth set out anything the administrator ‘envisages’” (paragraph 17);

• Stating that the administrators would become liquidators in any subsequent CVL is the default position unless the creditors nominate someone else, “so putting such a proposal to the creditors achieves little more than conveying information” (paragraph 18);

• Including a permissive proposal that the administrators may apply to court for sanction to pay a dividend to unsecured creditors simply provides “and indication to the creditors of an available option” (paragraph 19);

• “There must be some doubt as to the appropriateness of inviting the creditors at the commencement of the administration to agree a date upon which the administrators should be discharged from liability… It seems to me that the creditors can only sensibly consider this question when they know what the effect will be, which in turn means that they should be in a position to know what has gone on in the administration and form a view as to what if any potential claims might be affected by the release. They plainly cannot in most cases do this at the first meeting of creditors” (paragraph 20). The judge stated that “where as here the creditors have not fixed a discharge date, an application must be made to the court” (paragraph 21) at the appropriate stage.

• He also declined to comment on whether remuneration should be appropriately dealt with by way of proposal or by separate resolution, but he confirmed that the court could deal with it as a separate matter from the proposals.

Cooke HHJ finished by highlighting the need for administrators “to consider carefully what is the utility of an application to the court for directions” and, in his view, “it would be appropriate, if the administrator has to report to the court that his proposals have not been approved by the creditors, simply by virtue of what has been described as ‘creditor apathy’ in that the creditors did not express a view one way or the other, to say in that report whether he considers that anything useful would be served by seeking an order of the court pursuant to paragraph 55.2, and that if he does not, that he does not intend to make such an application” (paragraph 24). Personally, I think it would be a good start if the Notice of Result of Meeting of Creditors, Form 2.23B, provided for disclosure of unapproved proposals, as the current template only provides for approved or rejected outcomes, but this won’t be the first time that some fudging of a standard form has been necessary.

Comment

I think that this decision reveals a difficulty with the Rules around administrators’ proposals. Stepping back for a moment, I wonder if the drafter originally envisaged administrators’ proposals operating in a similar manner to VA proposals. It seems to me that R2.33 is a checklist of items to include in proposals resembling R1.3 and the idea in Para 53 is that the creditors would decide whether to reject or accept, with or without modifications, the administrators’ proposals… which reads very much like S4 regarding CVAs. It seems to me that the Act/Rules suggest a single statement of proposals from an administrator, which creditors are asked to reject, approve or modify as a whole, rather than the evolved practice of providing creditors with two parts: a report on the administration to date and a summary of points sometimes described as the administrators’ “formal” proposals on which creditors are asked to vote (which practice may have been a spin-off from the pre-Enterprise Act administration regime, where much of the detail was annexed to the administrator’s proposals).

However, I think there’s a key reason why this format – of creditors voting on a single statement of proposals – doesn’t really work for administrations: compared with VAs, the process, powers, and purposes of administration are far more well-defined by statute. This doesn’t seem to leave much for creditors to vote on and therefore, as Cooke HHJ observed, there is little point proposing matters to creditors which simply reflect statutory provisions. An example of this conflict arose a few years’ ago when HMRC was in the habit of seeking modifications to proposals that the administration would exit to CVL, but in some cases it was not statutorily possible for this to happen (at least not via Para 83), because the administrator did not think there would be a dividend. I understand that HMRC now seeks modifications that the exit be some form of liquidation, which gets around this problem, but I think it raises an issue: what exactly is up for modification?

The way the Rules are designed, it seems that we risk creditors trying to force administrators to act contrary to statute by seeking modifications to proposals, as statute seems designed so that the entire statement of proposals, covering all R2.33 items, is up for consideration, even though many items are merely for information purposes, either because they are statements of fact or because they simply describe what the administrator is bound to do by statute; I’m thinking, in particular, of Para 3 which describes the hierarchy of objectives, which the administrator must pursue. In some respects, ‘creditor apathy’ may have avoided more applications to court for directions.

Another issue identified by this decision is: what are administrators to do if their way is not clear at the time of issuing the proposals? For example, as Cooke HHJ observed, proposing to creditors that they approve a plan to leave the administrators with full discretion to decide the appropriate exit route is pretty futile. However, if the administrators truly do not know how best to exit when the proposals are due, what do the Act/Rules expect them to do: seek the court’s sanction to postpone their proposals until they are certain or perhaps plump for a sensible exit route and, if that later turns out to be inappropriate, ask creditors to approve revised proposals? Both these options seem a waste of time and expense to me and in conflict with the idea of being up-front and honest with creditors. So, given that R2.33 requires an administrator’s proposals to include “how it is proposed that the administration shall end”, it really does seem to me that the most sensible approach would be to make a best guess at the most likely appropriate exit route and seek to retain the discretion to choose an alternative route (but not exits that clearly will not be appropriate to the case in hand), if things change. I can see that this isn’t much of a proposal, but I suggest that, just as Cooke HHJ felt that creditors should not be asked to agree a discharge date at such an early stage in the administration, so too should administrators not be expected to identify, at the most 8 weeks into a case, the final exit route in all cases.

I wonder if the Rules could be revised so that they more clearly distinguish between what creditors are being asked to approve and what administrators are simply going to do in order to meet their statutory obligations, including importantly, I think, the hierarchy of objectives of administration. If only we could get back to non-prescriptive, non-checklisty Rules that focus on the purpose of reports, proposals, etc…

February 4, 2014
by insolvencyoracle Leave a comment

Last Chance to Speak Up on Partial Licences

In December, I reported on the current position of the Deregulation Bill (http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-4Z) and the Parliamentary Committee’s irritation at the apparent lack of formal consultation on the Insolvency Service’s plan to introduce partial licences for insolvency practitioners to take on either only personal or only corporate insolvency appointments.

I am sure that most of you will have become aware of the Insolvency Service’s letter, dated 23 January, inviting comments on the draft Bill, with a deadline of 21 February (http://www.bis.gov.uk/insolvency/news/news-stories/2014/Jan/Clause10).

Having exchanged views with my fellow R3 Smaller Practices Group Committee members, I had assumed that almost all IPs consider it essential to have the full spread of insolvency knowledge and preferably experience, so that they can react competently to whatever walks in through the door. Possible exceptions to this model would be the very few that really do live the life of a personal or corporate insolvency specialist, and it could be thought that even they may come a cropper when faced with an atypical client. I had assumed that the opinion of R3 vice-president, Giles Frampton (http://www.r3.org.uk/index.cfm?page=1114&element=19677), was pretty-much the norm, with others being even more vociferous, e.g. Frances Coulson’s “Don’t dumb down the profession” http://www.moonbeever.com/category-blog-entry/696-don-t-dumb-down-the-profession). However, other IPs on a Scottish Insolvency LinkedIn discussion seem to be far more in favour of the measure, seeing it as more realistic for the world we live in, so maybe it isn’t so black-and-white.

Given that Clause 10 is already in the Bill, which claims to be designed around the noble motive of reducing regulation, it is likely that those not in favour of the measure will need to generate quite a swell in order to turn the tide. Therefore, if you do feel strongly about this, I recommend that you make your views heard. You have just over two weeks!

The Insolvency Service’s View

The Insolvency Service’s letter highlights what they believe are three advantages of the change. They say it will:

• “reduce the barriers to entry to the IP market and thereby increase competition.

• “give rise to savings on training fees, which are likely to be of proportionally greater benefit to smaller firms of insolvency practitioners, including new entrants to the market

• “remove a burden from existing IPs who already choose to specialise in a particular area but are required to study areas that have little or no relevance to their work or benefit to their clients.”

“Reduce the barriers to entry to the IP market and thereby increase competition”

Personally, I don’t feel qualified to comment on the Service’s assumptions. I’m not in business as an appointment-taker and I only really witness the business end of insolvency from the side-lines. However, what I have seen in recent years are many more IPs and other insolvency professionals changing their LinkedIn profiles to “consultant” or “available”. I have also heard far more stories recently of cases being taken off the S98 floor and undercutting for MVLs than I have since the 1990s and I certainly don’t think that the IVA market is crying out for any fast-tracked personal insolvency specialists to compete for IPs’ meagre returns.

Does the profession really suffer from a lack of competition or is this an outdated view persisting from the OFT’s market study into corporate insolvency, which was generated from 2006 data when the world was a far different place?

“Give rise to savings on training fees, which are likely to be of proportionally greater benefit to smaller firms of insolvency practitioners, including new entrants to the market”

I assume that the Service’s thought-process is that there is likely to be a lower head-count of staff per IP in a smaller practice than in a large multi-national and therefore the smaller practice will gain a greater relative benefit from reduced training costs (on the assumption that it will cost less to train and qualify as a partial licence-holder).

However, has it not occurred to the Service that the smaller practice will have next to no use for a partial licence-holder? A key to most smaller practices’ success is that their doors are open to anyone in the locality in need of help whether they be individuals, business partners, or corporate entities. They are not regimented into “centres of excellence”, but have the breadth of knowledge and experience to deal with almost anything. Their case portfolios are, almost without exception, a mixture of corporate and personal insolvencies and usually their staff, some of whom will be the appointment-takers of the future, are exposed to a variety of insolvency types. Therefore, I cannot see why any smaller practice IP would want to take on a partial licence-holder or encourage their staff to study for such a licence.

The only profile of practice that might be a home for a partial licence-holder is the volume IVA provider or the corporate department of a large multi-national. Therefore, contrary to the Service’s view, I believe that the only beneficiaries of any reduced training fees may be large firms and that the corollary could be increased fees for those training for full licences, if demand for these drops, which would be felt disproportionately by smaller practices. This doesn’t sound like a sensible measure for a pro micro-business government to introduce.

“Remove a burden from existing IPs who already choose to specialise in a particular area but are required to study areas that have little or no relevance to their work or benefit to their clients”

This is an odd one?! Has the Insolvency Service not read its own Regulations regarding CPD for IPs authorised by the Secretary of State? Even they do not specify that CPD needs to cover the range of insolvencies; it is merely “any activities which relate to insolvency law or practice or the management of the practice of an insolvency practitioner” (IP Regs 2005) and I believe that most RPBs’ views of CPD/CPE are, in a nutshell, whatever would help the licence-holder practise better as an IP. Therefore, I cannot see that IPs at present are under any pressure to study areas that have little or no relevance to their work or benefit to their clients. Hence, I can see no advantage in providing partial licences and I very much doubt that any existing IPs will downgrade to a partial licence.

Consultation

There are many more arguments against partial licences, such as those described by Giles Frampton and Frances Coulson, and no doubt R3 will be responding loudly to the consultation.

I think it is very important that the smaller practices’ voices are heard, particularly as the Service has claimed support for its plan in the expected savings to be felt by this group. I would encourage you to respond to the consultation and to R3’s Smaller Practices Group’s imminent invitation to send in your views, so that you can contribute to R3’s own response.

(UPDATE 04/03/14: The ICAEW has submitted, in my view, a storming response to the consultation: http://www.icaew.com/~/media/Files/Technical/icaew-representations/2014/icaew-rep-36-14-partial-authorisation-of-insolvency-practitioners.pdf. It reads like a gentle sledgehammer, maintaining a sense of calm reason throughout. I particularly liked the reference to the Government’s recently-disclosed proposed objectives of insolvency regulation and how partial licences may act contrary to at least one of them. The ICAEW response is unequivocal in its conclusion: “We have received through our own consultation process no indications of support at all for the proposed partial qualification regime”.)

January 30, 2014
by insolvencyoracle 1 Comment

Thank you, Santa, for delivering Red Tape Cuts

I owe the Insolvency Service an apology. I must have sounded like an ungrateful child at Christmas when I tweeted that we’d heard all their Red Tape-cutting measures before. Such is the disadvantage of having lived with my list for Santa for several months already and such is the immediacy of Twitter. Sorry, Insolvency Service!

The Insolvency Service’s release on 23 January 2014 – http://insolvency.presscentre.com/Press-Releases/Reforms-to-cut-insolvency-red-tape-unveiled-69853.aspx – announced that several measures, aired in its consultation document in July 2013, are to be taken forward, either via primary legislation changes “when Parliamentary time allows” or via changes to the Rules, which are “due for completion in 2015/16”. I’d blogged about the consultation document’s proposals on 16 August 2013 at http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-3Q. Here, I try to decipher exactly which of the consultation’s proposals are being taken forward, which is not as simple a task as it may sound!

“Allowing IPs to communicate with creditors electronically, instead of letters”

The consultation had set out a proposal that IPs could use websites to post creditors’ reports etc., as they do now, but without the need to send a letter to each creditor every time something is posted to the website. The proposal was that there would be one letter to creditors informing them that all future circulars would be posted to the website.

In my view, this really would save costs. I see quite a few IPs are now posting reports to websites, so it would be lovely to avoid even the periodic one-pager to creditors informing them of the publication of something new, although I’d love to see the statistics on how many people (other than us insolvency people) actually look at the reports on websites…

Of course, the Rules already provide that an IP can post everything onto a website, but at present only with a court order. Thus, I’m wondering, is the next bullet point simply another way of describing this first of Santa’s gifts..?

“Removing the requirements for office holders to obtain court orders for certain actions (e.g. extending administrations, posting information on websites)”

It’s not exactly clear what the Service has in mind on administration extensions. The consultation document suggested that administration extensions might be allowed with creditors’ consent for a period longer than 6 months. It suggested that creditors could be asked to extend for 12 months (with a 6-month extension by consent still an option), although it asked whether we thought that creditors should be allowed to approve longer extensions. So is the plan that creditors be allowed to extend a maximum of 12 months or longer?

And I’d like to know if the Service is persuaded to make any changes to the consent-giving process: are they going to stick to the requirement that all secured creditors must approve an extension (whether it is a Para 52(1)(b) case or not and no matter what the security attaches to or where the creditor appears in the pecking order), as is currently the case, or could they – please?! – lighten up on this requirement? And are they going to clarify that once a creditor is paid in full, they do not count for this, and other, voting purposes? So many questions remain…

The consultation document contained several other proposals for avoiding the court, such as “clarifying” that administrators need not apply to court to distribute a prescribed part to unsecured creditors (although I’m not sure why administrators should not be allowed also to distribute non-prescribed part monies to unsecured creditors). Coupled with changes to the extension process, administrations are no longer appearing to be the short-term temporary process that the Enterprise Act seemed to present them as.

“Reducing record keeping requirements by IPs which are only used for internal purposes”

I’m not entirely sure what this means. Does this refer to the current need to retain time records on all cases, including those where the fees are fixed on a percentage basis? These are internal records (even though they probably serve no purpose), but does that also mean that Rules 1.55 and 5.66, requiring Nominees/Supervisors to provide time cost information on request by a creditor, will be abolished?

Or does this statement relate to the maintenance of Reg 13 IP Case Records in their entirety? These are, in effect, records for internal purposes (in fact, they’re not even that, are they? Does anyone actually use them?), although the Regs provide that the RPBs/IS are entitled to inspect the Reg 13 records. So does that still make them an internal-purpose record?

I would like to think that the Service has accepted that the Reg 13 record is a complete waste of time and is planning to abolish it entirely. However, as I flagged up in my earlier post, the consultation document proposed that “legislation should require IPs to maintain whatever records necessary to justify the actions and decisions they may have taken on a case. It is not expected that such a provision would impose a new requirement, but rather codify what is already expected of regulated professionals.” Does this recent announcement mean that the Service will not seek to implement this measure? Let’s hope so!

“Simplifying the process of reporting director misconduct to make the process quicker by introducing electronic forms to ensure timely action is brought against them in a timely way, providing a higher level of protection to the business community and public”

Electronic D-forms? Lovely, we’ll have those, thank you, although in my view it’s not a big deal: it just avoids a bit of printing.

What makes me a little nervous is the use of “timely” twice in this statement. The consultation proposed to change the deadline for a D-form to 3 months and the Service believed that this would not be an issue for IPs if its other proposal – to drop the requirement for IPs to express an opinion on whether the conduct makes it appear that the person is unfit to be a director and replace it with a requirement to provide “details of director behaviour which may indicate unfitness” – is also taken up.

As I explained in my earlier post, personally I don’t see this as a great quid pro quo for IPs and I don’t think it will help the Service catch the bad guys much quicker. When faced with slippery directors, 3 months is a very short time to gather all the threads.

“Allowing office-holders to rely on the insolvent’s records when paying small claims, reducing the need for creditors to complete claim forms”

The consultation document proposed that IPs could admit claims under £1,000 per the statement of affairs or accounting records without any claim form or supporting documentation from creditors (although creditors would still be free to submit claims contradicting statements of affairs).

It doesn’t seem right to me – there’s a sense of fudginess about it, particularly in view of the shabbiness of most insolvents’ records just before they topple – but I guess that, in the scheme of things, it’s not a big deal if a creditor receives a few pounds more than he’s entitled to on one case, but a bit less on another. It might be academic anyway, given the final measure…

“Reducing costs by removing the requirement to pay out small dividends and instead using the money for the wider benefit of creditors”

The Service had proposed that, where a dividend payment would be less than, say, £5 or £10, it would not be paid to the creditor, but would go to the disqualification unit or the Treasury. The consultation document had asked whether the threshold should be per interim/final dividend or across the total dividends. Given the likely difficulties of keeping track of small unpaid dividend cheques, I do hope that the Service has its eye clearly set on saving costs and will stick with a threshold for each dividend payment declared. As with the previous measure, although it brings in a sense of creditor equality that seems more suited to Animal Farm, we are only talking about small sums here, so I guess it makes practical sense.

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Thank you, Insolvency Santa, for giving us a peek into your big red sack of goodies. It’s great to see some really promising outcomes from the Red Tape Challenge, even if we have to see at least one more Christmas pass by before we get to open our prezzies.

January 21, 2014
by insolvencyoracle Leave a comment

Changes to TUPE: Clear as Mud

The Collective Redundancies and Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) (Amendment) Regulations 2013 are set to come into force on 31 January 2014. The draft Regulations can be accessed at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/254738/bis-13-1272-draft-tupe-regulations-2013.pdf. (UPDATE 04/04/2014: On reading R3’s Technical Bulletin 106, I realised that I had not updated this to provide a link to the final regs: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2014/16/contents/made. BTW R3, as imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, I will take your article 106.6 as a compliment (although I’d still be interested in learning who on GTC was behind it)!)

These Regulations affect the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 and the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 and came about as a result of the Government’s early 2013 consultation. The Government’s response on the close of the consultation can be found at https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/transfer-of-undertakings-protection-of-employment-regulations-tupe-2006-consultation-on-proposed-changes.

From what I can see, the changes that may impact insolvency contexts are:

• The wording around unfair dismissals connected with transfers is being changed. The TUPE Regulations 2006 state that an employee is treated as unfairly dismissed “if the sole or principal reason for his dismissal is the transfer itself or a reason connected with the transfer” (where that is not an ETO reason etc.) (Regulation 7(1)). This is to be replaced with: “if the reason for the dismissal is the transfer” (other than ETO reasons). It would seem to me that this cleaner and more specific description may take a lot of the uncertainty out of how Tribunals might view dismissals – we can only hope!

• The definition of ETO reasons “entailing changes in the workforce” will include a change to employees’ place of work.

• Pre-transfer consultation may be carried out either by the transferor or, under these Regulations, by the transferee (with the transferor’s agreement), and this may count as consultation towards subsequent redundancies. However, a transferee will not be able to claim “special circumstances rendering it not reasonably practicable” to consult on the basis that the transferor had failed to provide information or assist the transferee.

• The time period within which a transferee must provide employee liability information to a transferor has been increased from not less than 14 days to not less than 28 days before the transfer.

• Employers of fewer than 10 employees – micro-businesses – no longer need to invite employees to elect representatives to consult on transfers, although if there are already recognised employee representatives, the employer needs to consult with them. If there are no representatives, the employer simply consults directly with the employees.

What has not changed?

Not unsurprisingly given that it is still the subject of an appeal, the Regulations continue to refer to “at one establishment”, although the current position of the Woolworths Tribunals process suggests that this does not implement adequately the EC Directive (http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-3I).

The Government had also sought views on whether a transferor could rely on a transferee’s ETO reason to dismiss an employee prior to a transfer. Although 57% of all those who responded to the consultation supported the concept (and only 26% were opposed), the Government has decided not to take this idea further, pointing out that it hadn’t actually put forward a proposal to change the Regulations, it had merely asked an open question! It felt that such a change could result in an increase in “general unfairness in the labour market” and could be challenged in the courts, as the suggestion had been made that it would be contrary to CJEU judgments and perhaps to the spirit of the Acquired Rights Directive (see Government response, section 11).

January 19, 2014
by insolvencyoracle Leave a comment

Just Scottish Coal Company: Scottish Liquidators’ Powers to Disclaim – back to square one

Re The Scottish Coal Company Limited (In Liquidation) (12 December 2013) ([2013] CSIH 108)

http://www.bailii.org/scot/cases/ScotCS/2013/2013CSIH108.html

In an earlier blog post – http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-3I – I covered the judgment in the Outer House of the Court of Session, which decided that the joint liquidators were entitled to disclaim onerous land and abandon water use licences.

The Scottish Environment Protection Agency and others appealed to the Inner House with the outcome that the previous decision was recalled and the court directed that the liquidators do not have the power to abandon or disclaim the sites or the statutory licences. The consequences seem to go further than that, however, as this decision indicates that the post-appointment liabilities arising under these statutory regimes will fall as liquidation expenses.

To summarise the issue facing the liquidators: the Scottish Coal Company Limited (“SCC”) carried out open cast coal operations on some of its sites under licences granted under the Water Environment (Controlled Activities) Regulations 2005 and 2011 (“the CARs”) and permits issued under the Pollution Prevention and Control (Scotland) Regulations 2000 and 2012. The costs of continuing to meet the terms of these licences and permits were running at c.£500,000 per month. If the liquidators’ only option in escaping these were to comply with the terms of surrender, the cost would be several million pounds.

The judgment runs to 162 paragraphs and is challenging in many respects. To do it justice, I thought I’d give this its own post. I think the key bases for the court’s decision can be summarised as follows.

If a trustee can abandon property, why can’t a Scottish liquidator?

The original decision arose in part from consideration of S169(2) of the Insolvency Act 1986, which states that “in a winding up by the court in Scotland, the liquidator has (subject to the rules) the same powers as a trustee on a bankruptcy estate”: as a Scottish trustee has power to abandon heritable property (S32(9A) of the Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985), so too, it was thought, should a Scottish liquidator. On appeal, the Inner House examined whether this trustee power does not translate into a liquidator’s power to rid himself of onerous property. Strictly speaking, a trustee does not abandon the property, but only “any claim to the debtor’s share and interest … in the property. No transfer of ownership is envisaged. Rather, the trustee gives up what… is a personal right to acquire ownership of (that is, a real right in) the property” (paragraph 117). When the trustee abandons this right, the property remains in the ownership of the bankrupt.

Now try applying that power to a liquidator: “Unlike the situation of a trustee, who obtains a personal right to acquire ownership of the bankrupt’s heritage upon vesting of the sequestrated estate, a liquidator acquires no such right. The company’s property, whether moveable or heritable, does not vest in him at all” (paragraph 121), thus the liquidator cannot “abandon” property in the same way as a trustee can, as he does not hold the “personal right to acquire ownership” of the property. The company remains the owner throughout. “From a practical point of view, the liquidator may elect, in certain circumstances and with appropriate sanctions, not to realise certain property, whether moveable or heritable; or he may be unable to realise it. If that remains the position as at dissolution, then so be it… The property, however, does not become separated in any legal sense from the company’s general assets in advance of that dissolution” (paragraph 123).

So, if a liquidator cannot abandon the sites, what about the licences?

The judges looked at the provisions contained in the CARs as an example of a statutory regime governing some of the many licences that the liquidators were seeking to abandon. Under the CARs, “simply by assuming the role of, for example, liquidator, the insolvency practitioner concerned becomes ‘the person who is responsible for securing compliance with the terms of [any CARs] licence’ granted to the company” (paragraph 129). “By virtue of it having applied for and been granted a CARs licence, SCC incurred onerous obligations to avoid the risk of adverse impact on the water environment and to leave it in such a state that it complies with the relevant environmental legislation. These obligations subsist notwithstanding the cessation of any or all activity on the part of SCC and, in particular, any controlled activity. Moreover, by virtue of the very clear terms of regulation 2(1) of the CARs, which as already noted include a liquidator within the definition of ‘responsible person’, those obligations are incumbent upon the liquidators” (paragraph 133).

As a Scottish liquidator has no express power to disclaim onerous property, “whether a Scottish liquidator has power specifically to abandon a CARs licence, and thereby bring an end to its onerous conditions, must depend on the terms of the CARs and the relevant licences” (paragraph 136). The CARs contain no such provision for abandonment, but instead they provide specific mechanisms for releasing a licensee, including surrender. Therefore, either the liquidator pursues a surrender – accepting the expensive conditions attached to it by SEPA – or the licences continue until the liquidators vacate office and the company is dissolved.

Ok, if the liquidators cannot disclaim the licences, can they at least avoid the obligations arising from them falling as liquidation expenses?

The judges considered the intended purpose of the CARs: “Where, as here, the relevant legislation was enacted to implement an EU Directive, it is taken to be the legislative intention to achieve the purpose of the Directive… As already noted, the CARs were made under section 20 of the 2003 Act, which was enacted in order to transpose the Water Framework Directive into domestic law. The Water Framework Directive is extensive in its scope and ambitious in its objectives. Its purposes include, for example, the establishment of ‘a framework for the protection of inland surface waters, transitional waters, coastal waters and groundwater which: …ensures the progressive reduction of pollution of groundwater and prevents its further pollution’ (art 1(a)). Where an insolvent company will in due course be dissolved, enforcing a statutory licence against a liquidator affords at best only temporary and imperfect environmental protection. Nevertheless it would seem to be beyond argument that the broad interpretation of the CARs will better achieve the desired result. As a consequence, SCC’s environmental obligations will be treated as liquidation expenses, thereby giving them priority over other obligations” (paragraphs 142 and 143).

They also pointed to other “persuasive factors in favour of giving pre-eminence to the policy of maximising environmental protection over the policy of the expeditious and equal distribution of available assets among the unsecured creditors of an insolvent company”, such as the decision in Re Mineral Resources, which included that “the interest in the protection of the environment should prevail over the interest in fair and orderly winding up of companies” (paragraph 144).

But, bearing in mind that an English liquidator may seek to disclaim a Scottish site or licence, doesn’t this overstep the mark of matters reserved to Westminster?

The judges thought not. “The purpose of the CARs as a whole, and the provisions relating to a liquidator in particular, is an environmental one. Neither the CARs as a whole, nor the provisions relating to liquidators, have as their purpose an insolvency objective. The effect on liquidators of companies possessing a CARs licence is no more than a loose or consequential connection. In all the circumstances, those provisions of the CARs which are said to restrict the power of a liquidator cannot be said to relate to reserved matters. They are, accordingly, not outwith the competence of the Scottish Parliament by reason of section 29(2)(b) of the [Scotland] 1998 Act” (paragraph 156). True, “the CARs have an effect on the practicalities of insolvency. However, more than that is required in order to place them beyond the devolved competence of the Scottish Parliament. If, contrary to the views expressed above, the CARs have modified the law on reserved matters (and in particular any of those aspects of the law of corporate insolvency which are listed under head C2 of schedule 5 to the 1998 Act), it remains the case that any such modifications are incidental to, and consequential on, provisions in the CARs relating to environmental matters, which are not reserved, and only to an extent that is necessary to give effect to the environmental purpose of the CARs” (paragraph 160).

So can an English liquidator disclaim a Scottish site or licence?

“An English liquidation may involve disclaimer of property held anywhere in the world and the liquidation process, and any final dividend upon dissolution, may proceed accordingly. However, the manner in which heritable property is actually disposed of is a matter to be determined by the lex situs (the law where the property is situated). Whatever the powers of a liquidator may be in terms of the law under which the liquidation is processed, the property will not transmit from the company unless that is achieved in accordance with the law applying where the land is located” (paragraph 126).

The Outcome

Therefore, the Inner House reversed the earlier decision and directed that the liquidators do not have the power to abandon (otherwise disclaim) the sites or the statutory licences.

Some commentators have hinted at the prospect of a Supreme Court appeal.

Personally, this outcome leaves me with the following questions:

• If the costs of meeting the ongoing obligations under such statutory licences rank as a liquidation expense, could companies involved in potentially environmentally-damaging, licensed, activities in Scotland find that their access to credit dries up?

• Although English liquidators have specific power to disclaim onerous property – and I don’t know how the English equivalent of the CARs are worded – how does this stack up against legislation implementing an EU Directive, which presumably is felt by all of the UK, with the overriding objective of environmental protection?

December 31, 2013
by insolvencyoracle Leave a comment

Exercise of court’s discretion to allow creditor’s action to continue despite Interim Order and Other Judgments

Some recent court decisions:

• Dewji v Banwaitt – under what circumstances will the court allow a creditor’s action to continue despite an IVA Interim Order?
• Masters & Beighton v Furber – can a debtor be forced to hand over assets caught by IVA?
• Ward Brothers (Malton) Limited v Middleton & Ors – does an IP acting in an informal capacity avoid TUPE?
• O’Kane & O’Kane v Rooney – fixed charge receivers’ agents’ “worrying conduct” scuppers sale
• Re Hotel Company 42 The Calls Limited – will the court terminate an Administration and hand back the company to the directors despite the Administrators’ wishes for it to continue?
• Re ARM Asset Backed Securities SA – does the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings apply when the winding-up petition is based on the just and equitable ground?
• Westshield Limited v Mr & Mrs Whitehouse – which takes precedence: a CVA term requiring a Supervisor to decide on set-offs or the enforcement of an Adjudicator’s decision?

Creditor’s interim charging orders made final despite IVA Interim Order

Dewji v Banwaitt (29 November 2013) ([2013] EWHC 3746 (QB))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/QB/2013/3746.html

Mr Banwaitt had obtained judgment in proceedings against Dr Dewji for fraudulent misrepresentation in relation to an agreement under which Mr Banwaitt had paid to Dr Dewji sums for the purchase of land in Cambodia. Mr Banwaitt then obtained interim charging orders over three properties, but before the charging orders were made final, Dr Dewji was granted an Interim Order. However, at the hearing on the charging orders, the Master granted leave under S252(2)(b) of the Insolvency Act 1986 for Mr Banwaitt’s action to continue and exercised his discretion in making the charging orders final.

Dr Dewji’s request for permission to appeal the charging orders was refused. Mrs Justice Andrews accepted that usually the overriding principle would be that all creditors of a single class should rank equally once a statutory scheme had got underway. However, she noted that “there may be situations in which, despite the Interim Order, the ‘first past the post’ approach is justifiable” (paragraph 45). She suggested some scenarios: where a judgment creditor were seeking to recover monies paid under a contract that had been rescinded for fraud, “the Court might take the view when exercising its discretion that it would not be in the interests of justice to allow the debtor’s other creditors to participate in that share of his estate that was increased at the expense of the party he deceived” (paragraph 29) or where “the asset against which the judgment creditor is seeking to execute judgment falls entirely outside the IVA, so that there is no question of it being shared between the general body of creditors. Another, quite independent, example would be where the IVA was bound to fail, either because the judgment creditor had sufficient voting power to block it by himself, or because the creditors as a whole or a majority of them were bound to regard it as unattractive” (paragraph 39).

What Dr Dewji had proposed for his IVA led the judge to conclude that the Master had been justified in exercising his discretion in favour of the creditor. “The question that the Master had to determine is not whether it would be unfair to let Mr Banwaitt have an advantage over the general body of creditors. It is whether it would be unfair to let Mr Banwaitt, (who, on the evidence before the Master, was the only Investor induced to part with his money for this project by deceit, and who alone has chosen to expend costs in pursuing its recovery from Dr Dewji) obtain final charging orders over property that was not going to be distributed between Dr Dewji’s creditors, but (in the case of one property only, Dale Street) utilised to raise money to pay foreign lawyers to try and recover a substantial sum of money that would then be shared equally between Dr Dewji himself and some of those creditors, including the judgment creditor” (paragraph 47).

IVA debtor was not free to resist realisation of assets

Masters & Beighton v Furber (30 August 2013) ([2013] EWHC 3023 (Ch))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/3023.html

The Joint Supervisors of Mr Furber’s IVA sought an order requiring Mr Furber to allow the collection of some of his vehicles that, in accordance with the terms of the IVA, had been sold. The Joint Supervisors had also been granted a power of attorney to enable them to deal with Mr Furber’s assets. Mr Furber refused to allow the vehicles to be collected, claiming that he entered the IVA under pressure and that the vehicles had been sold at an undervalue.

Purle HHJ acknowledged that, in one sense, Mr Furber could choose to default on the IVA, with a potential consequence of being made bankrupt. However, as counsel for the applicant put it, “unless the process of disposal of the vehicles is concluded, there is a risk that the successful bidders will withdraw their bids and thereafter demand return of all monies paid, as well as possibly seeking damages. Ironically, if, as Mr Furber says, the value of the vehicles was higher than the sum that has been achieved by the online auction process then there will be a claim for loss of bargain by the successful bidders” (paragraph 9). With the risk of increasing creditors’ claims in mind, the judge agreed to order the release of the vehicles: “In my judgment, requiring Mr Furber to comply with his obligations under the IVA and the power of attorney will be in the best interests of his creditors generally and maintain the authority of the supervisors who are effectively, if not in law, officers of the court” (paragraph 11).

IPs acting in an advisory capacity not sufficient to avoid TUPE

Ward Brothers (Malton) Limited v Middleton & Ors (16 October 2013) ([2013] UKEAT 0249)

http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKEAT/2013/0249_13_1610.html

Bulmers Transport Limited ceased to trade on a Friday and on the following Monday Ward Brothers (Malton) Limited started to perform Bulmers’ major contracts using some of its former employees. Before Bulmers had ceased to trade, it had been presented with a winding up petition and had sought the advice of IPs. It seems that, although Administration had been contemplated, this was abandoned around the time that trading ceased. Some ten days later, different IPs were appointed Administrators by the QFCH.

The key question for the Appeal Tribunal was: did the involvement of IPs fit the TUPE exception, “where the transferor is the subject of bankruptcy proceedings or any analogous insolvency proceedings which have been instituted with a view to the liquidation of the assets of the transferor and are under the supervision of an insolvency practitioner” (Regulation 8(7) of TUPE)?

The Appeal Tribunal supported the original Tribunal’s conclusion that the first set of IPs had been acting only in an advisory capacity and that Bulmers had not been under the supervision of an IP at the time of the transfer.

The Appeal Tribunal also appreciated that “it is regrettable that so much uncertainty exists” (paragraph 20) as regards the application of TUPE and acknowledged “the importance of establishing, if possible, a red line”. They felt that the principles in Slater v Secretary of State for Industry, whilst not formally binding, “command considerable respect; and we respectfully agree that what is there set out is an appropriate and sensible red line and is the correct principle to apply. It is consistent with section 388, which, as we have said, provides that a person acts as an insolvency practitioner in relation to a company by acting as its liquidator, provisional liquidator, administrator or administrative receiver; if not appointed as such, then a person is not acting as an insolvency practitioner” (paragraph 23).

In the summary to the decision, it states that “an appointment (formal or informal) was necessary before there could be said to be supervision by an insolvency practitioner”. Personally, I struggle to see how an IP can be informally appointed and acting in a S388 capacity. The body of the decision states: “Clearly, that red line is not an entirely straight line. There may be disputes, for example, as to whether an insolvency practitioner was on the facts, appointed before a formal letter of appointment was provided or even drafted” (paragraph 24), so perhaps that is what is meant by an “informal” appointment.

The consequence of this decision in this case was that the appeal was dismissed: there had been a transfer that was not subject to the TUPE exclusion as regards the transfer of employee claims to the transferor.

Fixed charge receivers’ sale process tainted by agents’ “worrying conduct”

O’Kane & O’Kane v Rooney (12 November 2013) ([2013] NIQB 114)

http://www.bailii.org/nie/cases/NIHC/QB/2013/114.html

The O’Kanes sought an injunction restraining the joint fixed charge receivers from selling a property.

The judge was presented with evidence, albeit most of it hearsay but nonetheless “very strong”, which the judge described as showing “worrying conduct”, “very curious behaviour indeed”, and even “bad faith” (paragraphs 8, 9, and 10). The criticisms were levelled at the joint receivers’ agents who seemed to have discouraged some parties from bidding, provided inaccurate information, and allegedly advised the highest bidder not to increase its bid during the open bidding process, stating that the bidder would win out at the lower figure.

Although the O’Kanes’ proposal was complex and it was argued to be unrealistic, the judge viewed the previous sealed bid process to be tainted. He granted an injunction restraining the sale and directed that the property should be remarketed and sold by way of private treaty, with a bidding book being maintained and exhibited to the court for its approval of the sale. He directed that there should be no involvement of the individuals named, although he did not go so far as to require a new firm of agents to be instructed.

Administration terminated and company handed back to directors despite outstanding fees and expenses

Re Hotel Company 42 The Calls Limited (18 September 2013) ([2013] EWHC 3925 (Ch))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/3925.html

Joint Administrators were appointed on the application of a creditor. All creditors’ claims were paid or waived, although no monies passed through the Joint Administrators’ hands, as they were dealt with by third parties.

The shareholder and director wanted the company returned to them and the administration terminated, given that its purpose had been achieved, but the Joint Administrators were reluctant to rely simply on their statutory charge as regards their unpaid remuneration and expenses as provided by Paragraph 99 of Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act 1986, given that the appointing creditor had been “given the run around” by an associated company for many years. There was also a separate application ongoing by the shareholder and director under Paragraphs 74 and 75 under a claim that there had been unfair harm and misfeasance by, amongst other things, the charging of excessive remuneration.

Purle HHJ did not consider that the Joint Administrators’ fears were “sufficient to justify their continuing in office when, as they themselves recognise, there is no practical reason for them to do so, and, most importantly, the administration purpose has been achieved” (paragraph 21). It was also his view that the statutory charge, which could be supported by a restriction registered against the company’s property by means of filing an agreed notice with the Land Registry, was ample to protect them.

The judge refused the relief sought by the Joint Administrators to authorise them to grant a charge to themselves and he ordered the termination of the administration. He did not order that the Joint Administrators be discharged, as the misfeasance proceedings remained unresolved.

Does the EC Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings apply when the winding-up petition is based on the just and equitable ground?

Re ARM Asset Backed Securities SA (9 October 2013) ([2013] EWHC 3351 (Ch))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Ch/2013/3351.html

A Luxembourg-incorporated company applied for the appointment of provisional liquidators under a winding up petition presented on the grounds that it would be just and equitable to wind it up.

Mr Justice David Richards was satisfied that the evidence pointed to an England COMI: it was apparent that the decisions governing the Company’s administration and management were taken in London and that this was clear to third parties. However, as the petition was based on the just and equitable ground, rather than on the Company’s insolvency, the judge had to consider whether the EC Regulation on “Insolvency Proceedings” kicked in.

Rather than reach a conclusion on this question, the question of the Company’s solvency was addressed. The circumstances of this case were not cut and dried: although it was likely that there would be insufficient funds to service in full the Company’s issued bonds, the terms of the bonds provided that the holders were entitled to recover sums only to the extent that the Company had available to it certain sums. “As a matter of ordinary language, I would take the view that if a company has liabilities of a certain amount on bonds or other obligations which exceed the assets available to it to meet those obligations, the company is insolvent, even though the rights of the creditors to recover payment will be, as a matter of legal right as well as a practical reality, restricted to the available assets, and even though, as the bonds in this case provide, the obligations will be extinguished after the distribution of available funds. It seems to me it can properly be said in relation to this company that it is unable to pay its debts. A useful way of testing this is to consider the amounts for which bond holders would prove in a liquidation of the company. It seems to me clear that they would prove for the face value of their bonds and the interest payable on those bonds” (paragraphs 31 and 32).

Consequently, although David Richards J has left open the question of whether just-and-equitable petitions are caught by the EC Regulation, he was content that the Company could and should be wound up.

(UPDATE 16/03/14: I recommend a briefing by Tina Kyriakides of 11 Stone Buildings: http://www.11sb.com/pdf/insider-limited-recourse-agreement-march-2014.pdf?500%3bhttp%3a%2f%2fwww.11sb.com%3a80%2fhome%2fhome.asp. This briefing addresses the issue as regards the application of the EC Regulation, pointing out that the decision in Re Rodenstock GmbH held that the winding up of a solvent company is governed by the Judgments Regulation 44/2001 and not by the EC Regulation. More interestingly, this briefing deals with the issue about this case that had niggled me (but which I cowardly avoided): how can liabilities that are expressly restricted to the company’s funds topple the company into insolvency? Personally, I find the conclusions of this briefing far more satisfying.)

Supervisor required to consider effect of set-off despite Adjudicator’s decision

Westshield Limited v Mr & Mrs Whitehouse (18 November 2013) ([2013] EWHC 3576 (TCC))

http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/TCC/2013/3576.html

The Whitehouses had some work done on their house by Westshield prior to the company entering into a CVA in December 2010. After little exchange, Westshield served a Notice of Adjudication in relation to the work done. The Whitehouses raised the issue of a substantial counterclaim and referred to the terms of the CVA, which included that the Supervisor should address the extent of mutual dealings and consider set-off. The Adjudicator decided that the Whitehouses should pay Westshield c.£133,000, but did not consider the counterclaim. The Whitehouses submitted a claim to the Supervisor of c.£200,000, but the Supervisor was reluctant to deal with it given the Adjudicator’s involvement.

Westshield then issued proceedings seeking to enforce the Adjudicator’s decision, but the Whitehouses maintained that the Supervisor would need to deal with the counterclaim.

The judge believed that Westshield had been entitled to pursue the pre-CVA debt and that, had the cross-claim not intervened, the Adjudicator’s decision would have been enforceable. However, the Whitehouses had become bound by the CVA and therefore the CVA condition requiring an account to be taken of mutual dealings and set off to be applied could be carried out by the Supervisor. “Once that exercise is done, if it shows money due to Westshield, that can be paid subject to the right which the Whitehouses have to refer the matter to Court within a short time. The Court can then consider what effect (if any) the adjudication decision may have on its decision as to what should be done. If the accounting shows money due to the Whitehouses, they will get however many pennies in the pound as are available to creditors from the CVA” (paragraph 27).

Consequently, the judge dismissed the application for summary judgment, staying any further steps until the outcome of the Supervisor’s account was known.

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