Insolvency Oracle

Developments in UK insolvency by Michelle Butler


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October starts with a bang!

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Wow! We all knew that there was a lot landing today, but in the past few hours we’ve received more news on Fees/SIP9, SIP16 and another Dear IP!

Although I’m reluctant to add to your in-boxes, I would like to highlight today’s post on The Compliance Alliance blog: http://thecompliancealliance.co.uk/blog/uncategorized/oct_changes/

I hope that that post provides a brief (for me, anyway!) summary of the bare essentials for your immediate needs on this unusual day.

Right, I’d better get back to reading..!


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October Fees Rules: Draft in Haste, Repent at Leisure

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In my last blog, I set out a few questions that had been raised in the spring/summer R3 SPG Technical Reviews. Now that I’ve returned from my intriguing holiday in Russia, I’ll answer them.

I haven’t commented on the draft SIP9, as I shall be working on my consultation response. I also need to focus primarily on the Rules, as I’m presenting a webinar for the ICAEW on 9 September and at the R3 Regional event on 22 September. Maybe by then, we’ll have a final SIP9 that we can all work to (and then I can record a webinar for the Compliance Alliance 🙂 ). Is that too much to ask..?

 

When can/should a CVL Liquidator seek approval for his fees: (i) prior to being appointed by the shareholders; (ii) after the general meeting but before the S98 meeting (via a Centrebind); or (iii) after the S98 meeting?

This question has been covered at length by myself (http://goo.gl/9mrWl4), Gareth Limb (http://goo.gl/9LvB2U) and I’m sure many others, but as it was the most frequently-asked question – and probably affects a significant majority of IPs – I thought it was worth covering again.

The answer seems to be any of the above, but each comes with its own difficulties:

(i)    The difficulty here is that the Rules require the “liquidator” to circulate his fees estimate. I’ve heard more than one person within the Insolvency Service express the view that this is intended to encompass a fees estimate from the IP prior to his appointment as liquidator, but there has been nothing written down. I understand that a Dear IP is on its way, although there will still be an element of risk in following a Dear IP over the letter of the Rules (remember Minmar..?)

There was a rumour that the revised SIP9 would try to clarify the matter, but if the words, “an insolvency practitioner is not precluded from providing information within pre-appointment communications (such as when assisting directors in commencing an insolvency process)” (para 7, draft revised SIP9), are meant to take care of it, then I think they fall far short – and, as Gareth pointed out, a SIP cannot address a deficiency in legislation either.

(ii)    At the R3 Reviews, several expressed the view that a Centrebind can only be used when there are company assets at risk that require a liquidator to deal with them immediately. I have to say that I am not aware of any such restriction and I have not heard – at least via the IPA within the past 10 years – of any pressure to discourage IPs from engaging in Centrebinds. The fact that directors can appoint their choice of Administrator in short order, I think reduces the perception that it is somehow shady to get a non-creditors’ IP in office. Rather, I suspect that many IPs naturally avoid Centrebinds because they do not want to be appointed with only limited powers to deal with the company’s assets.

At first glance, Centrebind appears to have some value in the context of the Fees Rules, as it gives the liquidator a week or so to circulate his fees estimate before the S98 meeting but after his appointment by the members. However, what would the sequence of events be? Either the S98 notice would not be issued until after the members’ meeting (which would contravene SIP8 para 13) so that it can accompany the liquidator’s fees estimate, or the fees estimate would be sent separately, a few days’ after the S98 notice is sent. This latter sequence does not appear to be prohibited, but I would be surprised if it were the most attractive option from the regulators’ perspective, as I understand that the preference is that the fees estimate is sent along with the S98 notice and proxy form, not days later.

(iii)   There is an additional cost in convening a R4.54 general meeting of creditors after the S98 meeting so that the liquidator may issue his fees estimate. However, given the issues around the two alternatives, I cannot see why the regulators would protest. From the IP’s perspective, however, the effect of the liquidator being the chairman at a R4.54 meeting, rather than the director at the S98 meeting, is bound to increase the risk that there is no positive vote from creditors on the fees resolution. And of course, who wants to provide a fees estimate before they’re appointed? I appreciate that this was one of the ideas behind the Rules (job-tendering even being suggested), but in that case the Insolvency Service should have drafted the Rules correctly, shouldn’t they?!

 

To make life easier, you could switch from time costs to a fixed or percentage fee basis. However, if the response at the R3 Reviews is anything to go by, it does seem that IPs may be reluctant to start seeking resolutions on a fixed/percentage fee basis. In any event, this doesn’t solve the problem. Whilst it means that you won’t need to provide a “fees estimate”, you do still need to provide information on the work you propose to undertake and an expenses estimate. The draft SIP9 also adds to the list of information required to propose fixed/percentage fees, making it not quite the easy fix it originally appeared.

 

Would it be sufficient to provide a fees estimate to attendees of the S98 meeting? How else can an IP who takes the appointment from the floor of the S98 meeting deal with a fees resolution?

These have been pretty-much answered above, but I think the fact that they were asked demonstrates how we’re exploring the Fees Rules and realising that S98s will never be the same again. Dare I mention that the 2016 Rules only make matters a thousand times worse for S98s? For example, in future the Director’s Estimated Statement of Affairs will need to be circulated to all creditors with notice of the S98 “meeting”, which will mean wholesale changes to our S98 process.

Returning to 1 October, it will not be sufficient to circulate a fees estimate only to S98 meeting attendees, as the Rules state that “the liquidator must, prior to determination of which of the bases [of fees] are to be fixed, give [the estimate(s)] to each creditor of the company of whose claim and address the liquidator is aware…” Although the Rules do not state how long before “determination” of the fees basis the fees estimate needs to be circulated, I think this means it will be very difficult for an incoming IP to obtain a fees resolution at the S98 meeting. I suspect that this can only really be tackled by a subsequent R4.54 meeting.

 

What level of breakdown is needed to comply with the new rules’ requirement to provide the (time cost) fees estimate broken down by “each part of the work”? For example, is “asset realisation” sufficient, or does it need to be broken down into book debt collection, sale of business/assets, etc.?

The answer to this is not in the Rules and I understand that the Insolvency Service did not envisage a greater breakdown than the old SIP9 six categories (administration & planning, asset realisation, investigations, trading, creditors and other case-specific matters).

Neither do the Rules provide for a proportionate approach, such that a larger case may be expected to have a greater degree of breakdown than a small one. The Rules treat all cases the same and simply require fees estimates to specify, inter alia, “details of the work the insolvency practitioner and his staff propose to undertake [and] the time the insolvency practitioner anticipates each part of that work will take”.

The draft revised SIP9 avoids being prescriptive, but is worded in such a way that I think it will be an easy step for the RPB monitors to assert SIP9 breaches if its “spirit” is not observed. The draft SIP states:

“Each part of an office holder’s activities will require different levels of expertise, and therefore related cost. It will generally assist the understanding of creditors and other interested parties to divide the office holder’s explanations into areas such as:

  • Statutory compliance
  • Asset realisation
  • Distribution
  • Investigations

“These are examples of common activities and not an exhaustive list. Alternative or further sub-divisions may be appropriate, depending on the nature and complexity of the case and the bases of remuneration sought and/or approved. It is unlikely that the same divisions will be appropriate in all cases and an office holder should consider what divisions are likely to be appropriate and proportionate in the circumstances of each case. An office holder should endeavour to use consistent divisions throughout the duration of the case. The use of additional categories or further division may become necessary where a task was not foreseen at the commencement of the appointment.”

Thus, it seems that, generally, “asset realisation” is one “part of the work” and will not usually need to be broken down into sub-divisions.

 

Given that the new rules require the (time cost) fees estimate to be broken down by “each part of the work”, does the IP need to revert to creditors if the time costs are exceeded for one part of the work, but the total estimate is not exceeded?

There seem to be some differences of opinion on this question. Personally, I believe that the Rules are very clear. They state that “the [office-holder’s] remuneration must not exceed the total amount set out in the fees estimate without approval”. The Rules require no comparison of the fees estimate breakdown in reports and it seems that, once the fees estimate has been approved, the breakdown has no further relevance (although, when seeking approval for exceeding the estimate, a comparison may come in handy in order to explain the reasons for the excess and what additional work has proven necessary).

The draft SIP9 states that creditors/other interested parties will commonly be concerned with “the actual costs of the work, including any expenses incurred in connection with it, as against any estimate provided” and that the IP should report “in a way which facilitates clarity of understanding of these key issues”. I guess you can still take these words either way: does it require only a comparison of the total costs incurred against the fees estimate as a single figure? Or should a comparison be made of “each part” of the fees estimate against the actual costs incurred in each of those categories? Keeping in mind what creditors want to know (if anything!), I would argue that, if it appears that the original fees estimate will not be exceeded, then creditors are unlikely to be interested in seeing a comparison of each category.

However, the speaker’s answer at an R3 Review worried me. Although he may have been answering the question on the hoof, he indicated that there was an expectation that creditors would be asked to approve an increased fees estimate even where only one of the work categories was going to be exceeded, but where the original fees estimate in total was not under threat of being exceeded. I really cannot see that this is required by the Rules – and it is not hinted at in the draft SIP9 – and I struggle to see how an IP might be justified in incurring additional costs in seeking creditors’ approval where it is clearly not required under statute.

 

Can a (time cost) fees estimate provide a range of likely costs or does it need to be a single figure? If the latter, how should IPs estimate, for example, the costs of realising the interest in a bankrupt’s property at an early stage of the case?

The Fees Rules do not allow a range approach. The fees estimate acts as a simple cap. The draft SIP9 reinforces this message: fees estimates “may not be presented on the basis of alternative scenarios and/or provide a range of estimated charges”.

I think that Dear IP 65 attempted to answer the second question by referring to “milestone” fees estimates. This idea was reinforced at the R3 Reviews. When dealing with something like realising interest in a home, where a straightforward deal might be achieved quickly or the matter could run and run, it seems that the expectation is that the Trustee would estimate the costs for establishing a strategy and then revert to creditors if it became clear that a court application would be necessary.

I do wonder how practical this is, especially when the Rules require the expenses estimate at the initial approval stage to be the total expenses anticipated for the case. Thus, the Trustee needs to estimate his third party costs right at the start; the Rules do not provide a similar “milestone” approach for expenses estimates.

True, the Rules also do not require an expenses estimate to be approved, either up front or if it looks like it will be exceeded, but it does not help answer the question of how to present a Day One expenses estimate: should the Trustee include the likely costs of applications for possession and sales orders, especially if his fees estimate only reflects “milestone” costs not including the time costs of dealing with a court application scenario? But if he omits the likely legal costs, how transparent is the estimate and is it even compliant with the Rules?

 

What consequences does the expenses estimate have for the future administration of the case?

Finally, a bit of good news: the office holder is not constrained by the expenses estimate. If he needs to incur additional expenses, he can do so without creditor approval. The draft SIP9 seems to treat Category 2 disbursements in this way too.

Progress reports will need to include reference to whether the original expenses (and fees) estimate remains sound. If the expenses incurred/anticipated are likely to exceed (or have exceeded) the original expenses estimate, the reasons for that excess need to be included in the next – and seemingly all subsequent – progress reports (which could get a bit repetitive!). There is no requirement, however, to provide a revised estimate.

 

Can an IP stop working on a case if creditors vote against an exceeding of the fees estimate?

The R3 Review speaker’s answer was: no. The IP would need to continue with his work and, if he wanted any more fees, then he would need to use the statutory remedies such as applying to court.

When the Insolvency Service’s fees consultation was ongoing a year or so ago, I remember having a conversation with some Insolvency Service staff on this question. Their view was that IPs should not be expected to continue to work if they were not comfortable they would be paid for it.

Personally, I think both views have merit… depending on the circumstances. Clearly, an office holder has work to do in concluding a case and the Rules do not provide failure to be paid as a reason for resignation. However, I do struggle to see how an IP can be forced to take “non-statutory” steps if the creditors have not supported a request by the office holder to be paid for the work.

The Insolvency Service’s “milestone” view of the Rules seems to support the idea that an office holder can down tools. The original fees estimate needs to detail “the work the insolvency practitioner and his staff propose to undertake”, so in a milestone case the IP might propose, say, to chase the easy book debts as stage one. When things get a bit tough and the IP needs to consider taking stronger measures to squeeze out a few more pounds, perhaps this is when he proposes stage two along with a request for approval of “excess” fees. If the creditors reject this proposal, might the IP be justified in moving to close the case? Or is he required by statute to collect in the company’s assets regardless?

Wouldn’t it be correct to give creditors a choice: either I bring this to an end now and distribute what balance I have or I spend some/all of that money in pursuing an uncertain/difficult asset? Doesn’t SIP2 lead us in that direction already?

Of course, it would be a harder sell if the IP were to say: erm, the RoT claims have proven to be bigger and tougher than I’d originally contemplated, so I’m going to have to spend more of the pot resolving them, is that ok?

With these kinds of questions looming, is it any wonder that the expectation is that fees estimates will tend to be drafted on a worst-case scenario basis? Personally, I don’t see that anything else is practical.


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October Fees Rules FAQs: more Qs than As

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Earlier this year, each of the three R3 SPG Technical Reviews was opened by John Cullen’s* fantastic presentation on the October fees rules and the draft revised SIP9.

The presentation generated many questions from delegates and a few controversial answers, which I’ve been bursting to recount here. Regrettably, work demands – and, tomorrow, my holiday – have frustrated my attempts to get blogging.

Thus, I’m being a bit cheeky, setting out here the questions… and leaving the answers for another day! I will try to get back here in a couple of weeks.

  • When can/should a CVL Liquidator seek approval for his fees: (i) prior to being appointed by the shareholders; (ii) after the general meeting but before the S98 meeting (via a Centrebind); or (iii) after the S98 meeting?
  • Would it be sufficient to provide a fees estimate to attendees of the S98 meeting? How else can an IP who takes the appointment from the floor of the S98 meeting deal with a fees resolution?
  • What level of breakdown is needed to comply with the new rules’ requirement to provide the (time cost) fees estimate broken down by “each part of the work”? For example, is “asset realisation” sufficient, or does it need to be broken down into book debt collection, sale of business/assets, etc.?
  • Given that the new rules require the (time cost) fees estimate to be broken down by “each part of the work”, does the IP need to revert to creditors if the time costs are exceeded for one part of the work, but the total estimate is not exceeded?
  • Can a (time cost) fee estimate provide a range of likely costs or does it need to be a single figure? If the latter, how should IPs estimate, for example the costs of realising the interest in a bankrupt’s property, at an early stage of the case?
  • What consequences does the expenses estimate have for the future administration of the case?
  • Can an IP stop working on a case if creditors vote against an exceeding of the fees estimate?

The Draft Revised SIP9

My swift read-through of the draft revised SIP9 has prompted a few more questions in my mind:

  • The draft revised SIP9 suggests time cost categories different from those of older SIP9s. How is this going to interact with firms’ time-recording systems and the administration of pre-October cases?
  • If an IP were to change his time-recording system in the future, would he risk falling foul of SIP9’s requirement that he “should use a consistent format throughout the life of the case”?
  • How will the SIP9’s blended rates work in practice?
  • The draft new SIP9 is not amended as regards pre-appointment costs. Given that there had been suggestions in the past that this section may apply only to pre-administration costs, where does this leave treatment of pre-CVL and pre-VA costs?
  • The draft new SIP9 is not amended as regards payments to associates, but continues to state that these should be approved “in the same manner as an office-holder’s remuneration or category 2 disbursements”. Does this mean that, where payments to associates are to be based on time costs, the estimate acts effectively as a cap so that the office-holder would need to seek creditors’ approval for any excess? As statute does not strictly require such approval to be sought, would an office-holder’s time costs incurred in reverting to creditors be justified? If an associate’s costs were treated instead as a category 2 disbursement, would this avoid the estimate acting as a cap?

 

* John Cullen is the ACCA’s representative on the JIC and an IP and partner of Menzies.

 

 

 

 


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Dual personality

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You may have noticed that my blogs have become less frequent in recent times.  Sorry about that!  It’s because I’ve been working hard with my new partners on The Compliance Alliance.

I have just posted a new blog on http://thecompliancealliance.co.uk/blog/ on the impacts of the new Alternative Dispute Resolution Regulations 2015 on IPs.

I will continue to use Insolvency Oracle to air the more controversial topics, especially where my personal opinion may not be shared by my partners! However, please do subscribe to http://thecompliancealliance.co.uk/blog/ if you want to catch our blog posts on technical developments for IPs.


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Ethics hits the headlines again: should we be worried?

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The big story of last week was the disciplinary sanction ordered to an EY IP for breaches of the Ethics Code.  But I think this is just one more straw on the camel’s back.  Every new criticism of apparent poor ethical standards that is added to the pile increases the risk of a regulatory reaction that would be counter-productive to the effective and ethical work of the majority.

 

Journalistic fog

Plenty has been said about the “noise” around pre-packs.  Therefore, I was not entirely surprised – but I was disappointed and frustrated – to read that the latest sanction had been twisted to fit one journalist’s evident attempt to keep shouting: “It was the classic cosy insolvency I wrote about last month: a company calls in insolvency advisers who conduct an ‘independent business review’, take the job of administrator and act on the sale as well.  On Wind Hellas, the creditors could not see how Ernst & Young could take both appointments without compromising their integrity. Six-and-a-half years later, the professional body has at last agreed with them.” (http://goo.gl/aIY9rU)

Actually, a look at the ICAEW notice (https://goo.gl/H7jUov) suggests that they did nothing of the sort.  The relationship that got the IP into hot water related to the fact that an associated company, Ernst & Young Societe Anonyme, had carried on audit related work during the three years before the IP took the appointment as Joint Administrator of the company.

It is unfortunate that a failure to join the ethical dots between a potential insolvency appointment and the firm’s audit-related connection with the company has been used to pick at the pre-pack wound that we might have hoped was on the way to being healed.

 

Speed of complaints-handling

Is the journalist’s reference to 6½ years another distortion of the facts?  I was surprised to read an article in the Telegraph from February 2011 (http://goo.gl/8902YO).  Apparently, the ICAEW’s investigation manager wrote to the IP way back then, saying that “the threat to Ms Mills’ objectivity ‘should have caused you to decline, or resign, from that appointment’”.  Given that that conclusion had been drawn back in 2011, it does seem odd that it took a further four years for the ICAEW to issue the reprimand (plus a fine of £250,000 to the firm and £15,000 to the IP).  Perhaps the recouping of £95,000 of costs is some indication of why it took four years to conclude.

I found it a little surprising to read in the Insolvency Service’s monitoring report in June 2015 (https://goo.gl/Lm5vdU) that the Service considers the that ICAEW operates a “strong control environment” for handling complaints, although it did refer to some “relatively isolated and historical incidents” as regards delays in complaint-processing (well, they would be historic, wouldn’t they?). In addition, in its 2014 annual review (https://goo.gl/MZHeHK), the Service reported that two of the other RPBs evidenced “significant delays” in the progression of three complaints referred to the Service.

Although I do understand the complexities and the need for due process, I do worry that the regulators risk looking impotent if they are not seen to deal swiftly with complaints.  I also know that not a few IPs are frustrated and saddened by the length of time it takes for complaints to be closed, whilst in the meantime they live under a Damocles Sword.

 

Ethics Code under review

In each of the Insolvency Service’s annual reviews for the last three years (maybe longer, I didn’t care to check), the Service has highlighted ethical issues – and conflicts of interest in particular – as one of its focal points for the future.  In its latest review, it mentions participating in “a JIC working group that has been formed to consider amendments to the Code”.

Ethical issues still feature heavily in the complaints statistics… although they have fallen from 35% of all complaints in 2013 to 21% in 2014 (SIP3 and communication breakdown/failure accounted for the largest proportions at 27% apiece).  Almost one third of the 2014 ethics-based complaints related to conflicts of interest.

The Service still continues to receive high profile complaints of this nature: its review refers to the Comet complaint, which appears to be as much about the “potential conflict of interest” in relation to the pre-administration advice to the company and connected parties and the subsequent appointment as it has to do with apparent insufficient redundancy consultation.

I suspect that the question of how much pre-appointment work is too much will be one of the debates for the JIC working group.  Personally, I think that the current Ethics Code raises sufficient questions probing the significance of prior relationships to help IPs work this out for themselves… but this does require IPs to step away and reflect dispassionately on the facts as well as try to put themselves in the shoes of “a reasonable and informed third party, having knowledge of all relevant information” to discern whether they would conclude the threat to objectivity to be acceptable.

It is evident that there exists a swell of opinion outside the profession that any pre-appointment work is too much.  Thus, at the very least, perhaps more can be done to help people understand the necessary work that an IP does prior to a formal appointment and how this work takes full account of the future office-holder’s responsibilities and concerns.  Are Administrators’ Proposals doing this part of the job justice?

 

Criticisms of Disciplinary Sanctions

Taking centre stage in the Insolvency Service’s 2014 review are the Service’s plans “to ensure that the sanctions applied where misconduct is identified are consistent and sufficient, not only to deal with that misconduct, but also to provide reassurance to the wider public”.

Regrettably, the body of the review does not elaborate on this subject except to explain the plan to “attempt to create a common panel [of reviewers for complaints] across all of the authorising bodies”.  I am sure the Service is pleased to be able to line up for next year’s review that, with the departure of the Law Society/SRA from IP-licensing, the Complaints Gateway will cover all but one appointment-taking IP across the whole of the UK.

But these are just cosmetic changes, aren’t they?  Has there been any real progress in improving consistency across the RPBs?  It is perhaps too early to judge: the Common Sanctions Guidance and all that went with it were rolled out only in June 2013.  Over 2014, there were only 19 sanctions (excluding warnings and cautions) and seven have been published on the .gov.uk website (https://goo.gl/F3PaHj) this year.

A closer look at 2014’s sanctions hints at what might be behind the Service’s comment: 15 of the 19 sanctions were delivered by the IPA; and 20 of the 24 warnings/cautions were from the IPA too.  To license 34% of all appointment-taking IPs but to be responsible for over 80% of all sanctions: something has got to be wrong somewhere, hasn’t it?

The ICAEW has aired its own opinion on the Common Sanctions Guidance: its response to the Insolvency Service’s recommendation from its monitoring visit that the ICAEW “should ensure that sanctions relating to insolvency matters are applied in line with the Common Sanctions Guidelines” was to state amongst other things that the Guidance should be subject to a further review (cheeky?!).

 

Other Rumbles of Discontent

All this “noise” reminded me of the House of Commons’ (then) BIS Select Committee inquiry into insolvency that received oral evidence in March 2015 (http://goo.gl/CCmfQp).  There were some telling questions regarding the risks of conflicts of interest arising from pre-appointment work, although most of them were directed at Julian Healy, NARA’s chief executive officer.  Interestingly, the Select Committee also appeared alarmed to learn that not all fixed charge receivers are Registered Property Receivers under the RICS/IPA scheme.  Although it seems contrary to the de-regulation agenda, I would not be surprised to see some future pressure for mandatory regulation of all fixed charge receivers.

The source of potential conflicts that concerned the Select Committee was the seconding of IPs and staff to banks.  I thought that the witnesses side-stepped the issue quite adeptly by saying in effect, of course the IP/receiver who takes the appointment would never be the same IP/receiver who was sitting in the bank’s offices; that would be clearly unacceptable!  It was a shame that the Committee seemed to accept this simple explanation.  But then perhaps, when it comes to secondments, the primary issue is more about the ethical risk of exchanging consideration for insolvency appointments, rather than the risk that a seconded IP/staff member would influence events on a particular case to their firm’s advantage.

Bob Pinder, ICAEW, told the Committee: “It used to be quite prevalent that there were secondments, but he [a Big Four partner] was saying that that is becoming less so these days because of the perception of conflict… There is a stepping away from secondments generally”, so I wonder whether there might not be so much resistance now if the JIC were to look more closely at the subject of secondments when reconsidering the Ethics Code.

The FCA’s review of RBS’ Global Restructuring Group, which was prompted by the Tomlinson report (and which clearly was behind much of the Committee’s excitement), is expected to be released this summer (http://goo.gl/l96vtl).  When it does, I can see us reeling from a new/revived set of criticisms – one more straw for the camel’s back.


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A Call to shout about the obstacles to employee consultations

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As the deadline for the Call for Evidence comes to a close, do we have any hint of what might come of it?  Can we grab this opportunity to rescue the rescue process?

Rob Haynes, in ICAEW’s economia, summarises the key issue perfectly: how does government expect IPs (and insolvent businesses pre-appointment) to meet the statutory employee consultation burdens when they must act in the best interests of creditors?  Haynes’ article ends depressingly with thoughts that the EU might influence the protection pendulum to swing even further towards employees.

As I haven’t worked on the front-line for several years, I confess that my point of view is fairly theoretic.  But if we are to persuade government to make the legislation work better for this country’s insolvencies, we need to respond to the Call and I would urge those of you with current experience to put pen to paper, please?

The Insolvency Service’s Call for Evidence, “Collective Redundancy Consultation for Employers Facing Insolvency”, which closes on 12 June, can be found at: https://goo.gl/PW2AOa.

The economia article can be found at: http://goo.gl/Jfp8CX.

 

Answering the Call

As you know, this is all about the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (“TULRCA”), which requires employers to consult with employee representatives where they are proposing to make redundant 20 or more employees at an establishment.

Personally, I’ve always wondered what government hopes the employee consultation requirements will achieve, especially in insolvency situations.  The foreword to the Call states:

“The intention of this legislation is to ensure that unnecessary redundancies are avoided and to mitigate the effects of redundancies where they do unfortunately need to occur.”

Setting aside for now the realities of whether this can be achieved, if this is the intention, why does TULRCA tie in only establishments where 20 or more redundancies are proposed?  Aren’t these intentions just as valid for smaller businesses?  Does this threshold seek to recognise micro-businesses?  Maybe, although it also lets off large businesses where a relatively small number of redundancies are proposed, which bearing in mind the intention seems illogical to me.

Assuming that the threshold is intended to avoid micro-businesses carrying the cost burden of complying with consultation requirements, then this does seem to acknowledge that, in some cases, the cost to the employer is a step too far.

But who carries the cost burden in insolvency situations?  At present, the NI Fund.  If the government were to act on calls to elevate the priority of these claims, it would impact on the recoveries of creditors, or perhaps even the Administrators’ pockets if it were made an Administration expense.  Would that persuade insolvent companies/IPs to continue trading in order to consult, even if there were no realistic alternative to redundancy?  Even if trading-on were possible, it still doesn’t make it right to continue trading at a loss simply to meet the consultation requirements.

And would a change in protective award priority achieve the intention described above?  Would it avoid unnecessary redundancies or result in more redundancies, as IPs run shy of taking appointments where their options boil down to: achieve a going concern sale with most of the employees intact (but we’d rather you didn’t do a pre-pack to a connected party without an independent review) or you don’t get paid at all?  And where does this leave the skills of IPs to effect rescue and restructuring strategies?

 

City Link Stokes the Fire

The House of Commons’ Committees’ report, “Impact of the closure of City Link on Employment”, just pre-dated the Service’s Call for Evidence.  Although the subject had been bubbling away for many years, this case may have been the light on the blue touch paper leading to the Call.

The report – at http://goo.gl/BNx5MH – covers much more ground than just TULRCA, but here are some quotes on this subject:

“It is clearly in the financial interest of a company to break the law and dispense with the statutory redundancy consultation period if the fine for doing so is less than the cost of continuing to trade for the consultation period and this fine is paid by the taxpayer…

“We are greatly concerned that the existing system incentivises companies to break the law on consultation with employees.”

These reflect comments by the RMT (City Link went into Administration on 24 December):

“They… were preparing contingency plans from November. Surely at that point they should either have made the thing public, in which case it would have given more prospective buyers time to come forward, or at least given the Government bodies and the union time to consult properly with their members and represent their interests. None of this was done.”

“they deliberately flouted that [the consultation period]. They can do that, because you and I as taxpayers pick up the tab for the Insolvency Service. It is absolutely disgraceful.”

But Jon Moulton’s comment was:

“The purpose of the consultation period was consultation. These are circumstances where no consultation is reasonably possible.”

Fortunately, the Committees acknowledged the position of Administrators:

“Once a company has gone into administration, it is likely to be the case that they will be, or will be about to become, insolvent and the administrator will not have the option to allow the company to continue to trade for the consultation period.”

The Committees’ conclusion was:

“When considering the consultation period in relation to a redundancy, company directors may feel they have competing duties. We recommend that the Government review and clarify the requirements for consultation on redundancies during an administration so that employees understand what they can expect and company directors and insolvency professionals have a clear understanding of their responsibility to employees.”

Does this conclusion suggest that the Committees were swayed by the RMT’s argument, that, although directors may feel they have competing duties, in fact their duties are aligned as there may be advantages in coming out with the news earlier?  The Committees also seem to be questioning IPs’ levels of understanding of their responsibility to employees.  Although they seem to recognise an Administrator’s limited options, they also believe that the system incentivises curtailed consultation, rather than seeing it as entirely impractical.

I hope that sufficient responses to the Call for Evidence address these misconceptions.  If they don’t, responses in the vein of the RMT’s comments may monopolise ministers’ ears.

 

The Call’s Questions

Here are some of the more spicy questions in the Call for Evidence:

  1. How does meaningful consultation with a ‘view to reaching agreement’ work in practice?
  2. What do you understand to be the benefits of consultation and notification where an employer is facing, or has become insolvent?
  3. In practice, what role do employees and employee representatives play in considering options to rescue the business and to help reduce and mitigate the impact of redundancies?
  1. What factors, where present, act as inhibitors to starting consultation or notifying the Secretary when an employer is imminently facing, or has moved into an insolvency process?
  1. What factors, where present, negatively impact upon the quality and effectiveness of consultation when an employer is facing insolvency, or has become insolvent?
  2. Are advisors (accountants, HR professionals, or where an insolvency practitioner is acting as an advisor pre-insolvency) informing directors of their need to start consultation when there is the prospect of collective redundancies? How do directors respond to such advice?
  3. Are directors facing insolvency starting consultation, and notifying the Secretary of State, as soon as collective redundancies are proposed and at the latest when they first make contact with an insolvency practitioner? If not, how can this be encouraged?
  4. Normally are employee representatives already in place? What are the practicalities of appointing employee representatives when no trade union representation is in place?
  1. The current sanctions against employers who fail to consult take the form of Protective Awards. Do you think these are proportionate, effective and dissuasive in the context of employers who are imminently facing, or have become insolvent? Is the situation different as it applies to directors and insolvency practitioners respectively?

 

As this is a Call for Evidence, the Insolvency Service is looking for examples and experiences, even when they are asking for an opinion.  I am sure that many IPs and others in the profession can report a host of examples illustrating powerfully the realities and justifiable strategies in trying to make the most of an insolvent business, demonstrating that efforts to avoid redundancies certainly do feature highly in IPs’ minds.

 


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Digging deeper into the new Acts & Rules

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I am delighted to say that I’ve had some productive exchanges with people at the Insolvency Service on the practical applications of parts of the SBEE Act, the Deregulation Act and the new fees Rules.  I have found them generally very reasonable and pragmatic.  That’s not to say, however, that it’s all good news!

Small Business Enterprise and Employment Act 2015

I’ve not covered the Small Business Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 since it was just a draft in autumn 2014.  Even now, considering that several provisions take effect from 26 May 2015, I don’t see the need to repeat the detail here.  Most of you will have received R3’s Technical Alert by email on 17 April 2015, which I think did a pretty good job of telling us all what we need to know right now.  However, there is one item that I think deserves more explanation.

CVLs – Progress Reports

As you know, the words “continuing/continues for more than one year” will be removed from S92A and S104A.  This means that, where a liquidator ceases to act at any time during a liquidation, he/she will need to issue a progress report in compliance of R2.47(3A) (for E&W only; I can see no equivalent in the Scottish Rules).

Although this may seem fairly innocuous, it now encompasses one circumstance that occurs quite frequently: the replacement of the members’ liquidator with the creditors’ choice at the S98 meeting.  The Insolvency Service has confirmed to me that this change does indeed mean that any members’ liquidator who leaves office at the S98 meeting will need to issue a progress report on his/her term in office.  There is no reason why this will not apply where the company general meeting immediately precedes the S98 meeting, although it is very difficult to see what the members’ liquidator will have to report other than an hour or so of time costs!

If the company general meeting is held on a different day to the S98 meeting, the creditors’ liquidator will also need to remember that R2.47(3A) resets the progress reporting clock and so, rather than issue a progress report for the first 12 months of the liquidation (i.e. from the date of the members’ meeting), the creditors’ liquidator will need to report every 12 months from the date of his/her appointment.

Although this seems a bit of a nonsense, I am optimistic that the progress reporting rules will become much simpler when the new Insolvency Rules come into force, which is the plan for April 2016.  Although there is still much work to be done on the draft Rules, the ones that are currently on the .gov.uk website (https://goo.gl/kr1CSR) hint that progress reports on office-holder switches will be far more flexible.  See, for example, draft Rule 18.8(4).

Deregulation Act 2015

This is an odd Act: it began life far earlier than the SBEE Act, but its progress seemed to stall when all eyes turned to the SBEE Act.  Thus, it is not surprising that it contains some items that, I think, are far more pressing for IPs than the 26 May provisions of the SBEE Act.

Correcting Minmar

Oh dear!  How long will we have to put up with the Minmar state of affairs where Notices of Intention to Appoint an Administrator (NoIA) have to be issued even on some cases where there is no floating charge holder?!

The answer is: not much longer.

The answer is in the Deregulation Act: its paragraph 6 of schedule 6 will amend Para 26 of Schedule B1 so that the need to issue an NoIA is restricted to cases only where there is a floating charge holder.  This will then flow through nicely to the existing Insolvency Rules.  The problem is that unfortunately it doesn’t yet have a commencement date.

I have been told that it is the Insolvency Service’s current intention to commence this provision in October 2015 (although, of course, that was under the previous Business Secretary).

New Fees Rules (The Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2015)

A month ago, I blogged on this subject – see http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-a3 – and now I’m able to update some of my queries.

When is a liquidator not a liquidator?

As mentioned previously, R4.127 will be amended to state that “where the liquidator proposes to take [remuneration on a time costs basis], the liquidator must prior to the determination… give to each creditor… the fees estimate”, but does this mean that the IP needs to be in office as liquidator when he/she issues the fees estimate?

The Insolvency Service does not believe this is limited to the liquidator once he/she is in office.  In other words, the prospective liquidator may provide the fees estimate before the members’ meeting.  This means that, provided the IP can produce an early estimate, these new rules should not impact on the current practice of holding members’ meetings and S98 meetings on the same day.

It is worth noting that the new rules do not stipulate how long before the creditors’ meeting (or postal decision) the fees estimate should be sent: thus, it could be sent along with the S98 notice or at any time before the meeting is held.  As the fees estimate needs to be provided to all creditors, however, it will not be sufficient to hand out the fees estimate only at the S98 meeting.

Exceptional treatment needed for SoS-appointed liquidators

As noted in my previous blog, the transitional provisions operate so that, generally, if an IP takes office (as administrator, liquidator, or trustee) after 1 October 2015, he/she will need to follow the new rules in fixing the basis of his/her fees.  However, whilst the rules cover compulsory liquidations where the liquidator is appointed by: creditors’ meeting (S139(4)); contributories’ meeting (139(3)); and the court following an administration or CVA (S140), they do not refer to appointments by the Secretary of State (S137).

The consequence of this is that the new rules will apply to all SoS-appointment liquidations, irrespective of when the liquidator was appointed.  However, the Insolvency Service has stated that, if the basis of the liquidator’s fees has already been approved before 1 October 2015, then the new rules will have no effect on that case (unless the liquidator seeks to change the basis of his/her fees).

Thus, you may want to look to get your fees fixed on all existing SoS appointment compulsory liquidations before 1 October 2015; otherwise you will need to have some system in place to ensure that you follow the new rules, despite your appointment commencing before 1 October.

Block transfers

As the transitional provisions define that the new rules apply generally wherever there is an administrator/liquidator/trustee appointed after 1 October 2015, I wondered how this would impact, say, cases involving block transfer orders after 1 October 2015: does this mean that the new office-holder would need to go through the fees estimate etc. process?

The answer I received was: not where the new office-holder is continuing to draw remuneration under any prior approval.  Only where a new office-holder seeks to change the basis of his/her fees will the new rules kick in.

I look forward to meeting some of you, and hearing more on these and other developments, at R3’s SPG Technical Review series, the first one being held on Tuesday 12 May 2015 in Manchester.  There’s a lot going on!


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Are regulators reacting to the Insolvency Service’s gaze?

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In this post, I analyse the Insolvency Service’s annual review of IP regulation, asking the following questions:

  • Are the regulators visiting their IPs once every three years?
  • How likely is it that a monitoring visit will result in some kind of negative outcome?
  • How likely is a targeted visit?
  • Has the Complaints Gateway led to more complaints?
  • What are the chances of an IP receiving a complaint?
  • How likely is it that a complaint will result in a sanction?

The Insolvency Service’s reports can be found at: http://goo.gl/MZHeHK.  As I did last year (http://wp.me/p2FU2Z-6C), I have only focussed attention on the authorising bodies with the largest number of IPs (but included stats for the others in the figures for “all”) and only in relation to appointment-taking IPs.  Again, regrettably, I don’t see how I can embed the graphs into this page, so they can be found at: Graphs 23-04-15.  You might find it easier to read the full article along with the graphs here(2).

 

Monitoring Visits

  • Are the regulators visiting their IPs once every three years?

Graph (i) (here(2)) looks at how much of each regulator’s population has been visited each year:

Is it a coincidence that the two regulators that were visited by the Service last year – the ACCA and the Service’s own monitoring team – have both reported huge changes in monitoring visit numbers?  Of course, this graph also shows that those two regulators carried out significantly less monitoring visits in 2013, so perhaps they were already conscious that they had some catching-up to do.

I’m not convinced that it was the Service’s visit that prompted ACCA’s increase in inspections: the Service’s February 2015 report on its 2014 visits to the ACCA did not disclose any concerns regarding the visit cycle and I think it is noteworthy that ACCA had a lull in visits in 2010, so perhaps the 2013 trough simply reflects the natural cycle.  Good on the Insolvency Service, though, for exerting real efforts, it seems, to get through lots of monitoring visits in 2014!

The trend line is interesting and reflects, I think, the shifting expectations.  The Service’s Principles for Monitoring continue to set the standard of a monitoring visit once every three years with a long-stop date of six years if the regulator employs satisfactory risk assessment processes.  However, I think most regulators now profess to carry out 3-yearly visits as the norm and most seem to be achieving something near this.

The ICAEW seems a little out-of-step with the other regulators, though.  At their 2014 rate, it would take 4½ years to get around all their IPs.  The report does explain, however, that the ICAEW also carried out 32 other reviews, most of which were “phone reviews” to new appointment-taking IPs.  The Service hasn’t counted these in the stats as true visits, so neither have I.

 

  • How likely is it that a monitoring visit will result in some kind of negative outcome?

Graph (ii) (here(2)) lumps together all the negative outcomes arising from monitoring visits: further visits ordered; undertakings and confirmations; penalties, referrals for disciplinary consideration; plans for improvement; compliance/self-certification reviews requested; and licence withdrawals (3 in 2014).

It’s spiky, but you can see that, overall around 1 in 4 visits in 2014 ended up with some kind of action needed.

Above this line, ACCA and ICAEW reported the most negative outcomes.  Most of the ACCA’s negative outcomes related to the ordering of a further visit (20% of their visits).  The majority of ICAEW’s negative outcomes related to the request for a compliance review (16% of their visits).  Of course, ICAEW IPs are required to carry out compliance reviews every year in any event.  I understand that this category involves the ICAEW specifically asking to see and consider the following year’s compliance review and/or requiring that the review be carried out by an external provider, where weaknesses in the IP’s internal review system have been identified.

I find ICAS’ flat-line rather interesting: for two years now, they have not reported any negative outcome from monitoring visits.  The Service had scheduled a visit to ICAS in April this year, so I’ll be interested to see the results of that.

 

  • How likely is a targeted visit?

Let’s take a closer look at ACCA’s ordering of further visits (graph (iii) here(2)): is this a new behaviour?

The 2015 estimated figures are based on the outcomes reported for the 2014 visits, although of course some could already have occurred in 2014.

ACCA seems to be treading a path all its own: the other RPBs – and now even the Service – don’t seem to favour targeted visits.

 

Complaints

 

  •  Has the Complaints Gateway led to more complaints?

It’s hard to tell.  The Service’s first-year report on the Complaints Gateway said that, as it had received 941 complaints in its first 12 months – and by comparison, 748 and 578 complaints were made direct to the regulators in 2013 and 2012 respectively – “it may be that this increase in complaints reflects the improvement in accessibility and increased confidence in the simplification of the complaints process”.

However, did the pre-Gateway figures reflect all complaints received by each regulator or only those that made it through the front-line filter?  If it is the latter, then the Gateway comparison figure is 699, not 941, which means that fewer complaints were received via the Gateway than previously (or at least for 2013), as this graph (iv) (here(2)) demonstrates.

The stats for 2013 are a mixture: for half of the year, the regulators were receiving the complaints direct and for the second half of the year the Gateway was in operation.  It seems to me that the Service has changed it reporting methodology: for the 2013 report, the stats were the total complaints made per regulator, but in 2014 the report refers to the complaints referred to each regulator.

Therefore, I don’t think we can draw any conclusions, as we don’t know on what basis the regulators were reporting complaints before the Gateway.  We cannot even say with confidence that the number of complaints received in 2013/14 is significantly higher than in 2012 and earlier, as this graph suggests, because it may be that the regulators were filtering out more complaints than the Gateway is currently.

About all we can say is that marginally fewer complaints were referred from the Gateway for the second half of 2014 than for the first half.

 

  • What are the chances of an IP receiving a complaint?

Of course, complaints aren’t something that can be spread evenly across the IP population: some IPs work in a more contentious field, others in high profile work, which may attract more attention than others.  The Service’s report mentioned that the IPA is still dealing with 34 complaints from 2012/2013 that relate to the same IVA practice.

However, graph (v) (here(2)) may give you an idea of where you sit.

This illustrates that, if complaints were spread evenly, half of all IPs would receive one complaint each year – and this figure hasn’t changed a great deal over the past few years.

As I mentioned last year, I do wonder if this graph illustrates the deterrent value of RPB sanctions: given that the Service has no power to order disciplinary sanctions on the back of complaints, perhaps it is not surprising that, year after year, SoS-authorised IPs have clocked up the most complaints.  I believe that the IPA’s 2013 peak may have had something to do with the delayed IVA completion issue (as I understand that the IPA licenses the majority of IPs specialising in IVAs).  It’s good to see that this is on the way down.

I am also interested in the low number of complaints recorded by ICAS-licensed IPs: maybe this justifies their flat-lined actions on monitoring visits explained above: maybe their IPs are just more well-behaved!  Or does it reflect that individuals involved in Scottish insolvency procedures may have somewhere else to go with their complaints: the Accountant in Bankruptcy?  Although the AiB website refers complainants to the RPB (shouldn’t this be to the Gateway?), it also states that they can write to the AiB and it seems to me that the AiB’s statutory supervisory role could create a fuzzy line.

 

  • How likely is it that a complaint will result in a sanction?

Although at first glance, this graph (vi) (here(2)) appears to show that the RPBs “perform” similarly when it comes to deciding on sanctions, it does show that, on average, the IPA issues sanctions on almost twice as many complaints when compared with the average over the RPBs as a whole.  Also, it seems that IPA-licensed IPs are seven times more likely to be sanctioned on the back of a complaint than ICAEW-licensed IPs.  The ACCA figure seems odd: no sanctions at all were reported for 2014.

Of the 43 complaints sanctions reported in 2014, 35 were issued by the IPA: that’s 82% of all sanctions.  That’s a hefty proportion, considering that the IPA licenses only 34% of all appointment-taking IPs.  It is no wonder that, at last week’s IPA conference, David Kerr commented on the complaints sanction stats and stressed the need for the RPBs to be working, and disclosing, consistently on complaints-handling.

 

Overview

Finally, let’s look at the negative outcomes from monitoring visits and complaints sanctions together (graph (vii) here(2)).

Of course, this doesn’t reflect the severity of the outcomes: included here is anything from an unpublicised warning (when the RPB discloses them to the Service) to a licence withdrawal. And, despite what I said earlier about the timing of the Service’s visit to the ACCA, I am still tempted to suggest that perhaps the Service’s visits have pushed the regulators – the Insolvency Service’s monitoring team and ACCA – into action, as those two regulators have recorded significant jumps in activity over the past year.

The Service has a busy year planned: full monitoring visits to ICAEW, ICAS, CARB, LSS and SRA (although that may be scaled back given the decision for the SRA to pull out of IP-licensing), and a follow up visit to ACCA.  No visit planned to the IPA?  Perhaps that suggests that the Service is looking as closely at these stats as I am.


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New IP Fees Rules: Simples?

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With little more than benign overviews of the new fees rules out there, I thought I would examine them a bit closer.  What are the practical implications of the rules and do they contain any risky trap-doors?

My overriding thoughts are similar to those I have on the pre-pack changes: in an apparent effort to improve transparency, is the whole process becoming so unwieldy that it will turn IPs off altogether?  Maybe that’s the plan: make it so difficult to seek time costs that IPs switch to fixed/% fees.

As you know, the new rules take effect from 1 October 2015.  They can be found at: http://goo.gl/mekR5j.

Stephen Leslie, for Lexis Nexis, has produced a good basic summary of what they contain at: http://goo.gl/eqs9Aq.  R3’s Technical Bulletin 109 and Dear IP 65 also cover the subject.

S98s: same problem, different solutions

For CVLs, when should the liquidator set out his fees estimate?

R4.127(2A) will state that “the liquidator must prior to the determination of” the fee basis give the fees estimate (and details of expenses) to each creditor.  It seems to me that reference to “liquidator” requires the IP to be in office – so the fees estimate cannot be provided, say, along with notice of the S98 meeting.

But am I reading too much into this?  After all, R2.33 currently refers to pre-administration costs incurred by the “administrator”, when clearly the IP isn’t in office as administrator when the costs are incurred.  Therefore, maybe reference in the new rules to “liquidator” similarly is sloppy-hand to include “the person who would become liquidator”.  If that is the case, then maybe the expectation is that IPs will provide fees estimates along with S98 notices with a view to running S98 meetings along the same lines as they are at present.

Of course, then there’s the argument about how an IP is supposed to come up with a sensible estimate before he knows anything about the case.  Ok, he will have a better idea – but still not a great one – when the Statement of Affairs is drafted, but that’s little more than a few scribbles on a page, if that, at the stage when the S98 notices are issued.  So how long “prior” to the resolution should the liquidator “give” the information?  Given that S98s are pretty swift events anyway, would it be acceptable to send estimates the day before the S98 meeting..?

A confabulation of compliance consultants, especially with nothing more to guide us than a handful of new rules, is bound to generate a variety of proposed solutions.  Here are just three of them:

(i)         The return of the Centrebind

A Centrebind would overcome the problem of the IP being in office at the time of issuing the estimate and 14 days or thereabouts would seem sufficient to provide creditors with a reasonable estimate before the S98 meeting.

Of course, Centrebinds went out of fashion because of the limited powers the members’ liquidator has before the S98 meeting is held.  It’s not a great place to be as an office holder.  Do we really want to return to that practice wholesale?  And given the Cork Committee’s dissatisfaction over Centrebinds, would the regulators take a dim view if the practice were taken up again just to ensure that the IP could get his fees approved at the S98 meeting?  Some might argue that it’s the most practical way of working with the rules, but are there alternative solutions..?

(ii)        A second creditors’ meeting

This was my first thought when I read the rules: why seek a fees resolution at the S98 meeting?  Would it really be such a chore to convene another creditors’ meeting soon after appointment?

True, it would add another chunk of costs to the estate, but would IPs be criticised for taking this approach?  After all, how much of a solid estimate can an IP give before he truly knows what is involved in the case?  In my view, the costs of convening a second meeting would be entirely justifiable, as it seems to be the way the rules are pushing IPs.  Indeed, the rules as a whole are hardly cost-saving, given the additional work IPs will need to undertake to provide estimates and seek increases, if necessary later on.

Of course, in having a second meeting, IPs run the risk that the creditors already will have lost interest and they’re left with inquorate meetings and no resolution.  Also, as the liquidator (or an associate) will be chairman of the second meeting, they won’t be able to rely on the director-chairman’s vote or his use of general proxies.  However, the practice of looking to the director to approve the liquidator’s fees is viewed with scepticism anyway – many observers don’t recognise that, with so little creditor engagement, it’s sometimes the only practical way – so maybe it is a practice that we should be distancing ourselves from in any event.

(iii)       Fixed fees

This wasn’t my idea, but I see the attraction of it, particularly for “burial jobs”.

Given all the hassle of providing a detailed estimate of time costs, why bother, especially on jobs where in all likelihood the time costs incurred will outstrip the asset realisations net of other costs?  If liquidators were to seek a fixed fee, they would still need to provide, prior to the fees resolution, “details of the work the liquidator proposes to undertake and the expenses the liquidator considers will, or are likely to be, incurred”, but they could avoid providing the full estimated time costs breakdown.

Thus (provided that the IP doesn’t need to be in office as liquidator at the time), along with the S98 notices or just before the meeting, the IP can provide a pretty standard summary of tasks to undertake in any liquidation and set out the proposal to seek fees of £X.  If the SoA shows assets of, say, £15,000, the SoA/S98 fee is £7,500 of this and there are a few £hundreds of standard expenses, a fixed fee of £10,000 would seem reasonable to cover everything that a liquidator needs to do and, 9 times out of 10, there would be no need to seek an increase.

I guess that the proxy forms should list the proposed fee resolution in full, which would suggest that the IP knows what he wants to charge at the point of issuing the S98 notices.  As mentioned above, this would involve a degree of uncertainty, but for IPs working in the burial market, I can see that the risk is outweighed by the simplicity of this approach.  With Reg 13 ditched, IPs might not need to maintain time records* – what could be simpler?! – and they wouldn’t suffer the closure Catch 22 of billing time costs at a point when they haven’t yet spent the time closing the case.

But does this solution have legs for anything other than the simplest of jobs, where the IP would always be looking at a time costs write-off from the word go?  On its own, I don’t think so.  However, I don’t think it would be beyond the realms of possibility to devise a fairly standard formula for seeking fees on a combination of a fixed sum and a percentage basis.  This might help address any unexpected asset realisations, for example antecedent transactions or hidden directors’ loans.  Seeking percentage fees of such asset realisations would also deal with the concerns that it may be both impractical and indiscrete to propose fees estimates detailing what investigatory work is anticipated and how much that is likely to cost.

With several possibilities available, evidently S98s will require some thought and planning in readiness for 1 October.

* Although the Insolvency Practitioners (Amendment) Regulations 2015 are removing the Regulation 13 IP Case Record and thus, with it, the specific requirement to maintain “records of the amount of time spent on the case”, I do wonder whether an IP will be expected to continue to be prepared to meet the requirements of R1.55, R5.66 and Reg 36A of the 1994 Regs as regards providing time cost information to pretty-much any interested party who asks.  I know that no one asks, but with the continued existence of these Rules and Reg, does the abolition of Reg 13 really mean the abolition of time cost records in fixed/percentage fee cases?

Administrations: confusing

Of course, when tinkering with fee approval, it was always going to prove confusing for Administrations!  Here are a few reasons why:

Para 52(1)(b) cases

The current Act & Rules do not prescribe the process for seeking fee approval from secured (and preferential) creditors in Para 52(1)(b) cases.  Therefore, particularly where the Administrator has been appointed by a secured creditor and so will be reporting to his appointor outside of the statutory process, often a request is made very early on for approval for fees.

In future, if the Administrator is looking for time costs, he will need to “give to each creditor” the fees and expenses estimates before “determination” of the fee basis.  This indicates to me that an Administrator will not be able to seek approval for fees from a secured creditor before he has issued his Proposals to all creditors… unless he sends the estimates to all creditors in something other than his Proposals (unlikely)… or unless approval rests with other creditors in addition to his appointor – i.e. another secured creditor or also the preferential creditors – because it would seem to me that the basis of his fees is not “determined” until all necessary creditors have approved it.

This also means that an Administrator’s Proposals will have to include the fees and expenses estimates even for Para 52(1)(b) cases.  I can see some sense in this, as unsecured creditors can always requisition a meeting to form a committee that will override the secureds’/prefs’ approval of fees.  However, it seems quite a leap in policy, given that the full SIP9 information is not currently required in Proposals in these cases.

Changed outcomes

I am not surprised that the Service has introduced a new rule to deal with some Administrations where the prospective outcome has changed so that a different class of creditors is now in the frame for a recovery.  The Enterprise Act’s dual mechanism for obtaining fee approval depending on the anticipated outcome was always meant to have ensured that fees were approved by the party whose recovery was reduced because of the fees.  It’s true that the Act & Rules often do not deliver that consequence (not least because Para 52(1)(c) cases aren’t dealt with at all properly), but that has always been touted as the policy objective.

Sure enough, Dear IP 65 repeats this objective: “the new provision revises to whom the office holder must make a request or application in such circumstances [as described below] to make sure that such matters are determined by parties with the appropriate economic interest”.  Yes, but does it..?

In future, if fees have been approved on a Para 52(1)(b) case by secureds/prefs and the Administrator wants to draw fees in excess of the previous estimate, but he now thinks that a (non-p part) unsecured dividend will be made, he will need to seek approval from the unsecured creditors.  Fine.

However, there is no new provision to deal with outcomes changing in the other direction.  For example, if an Administrator originally thought that there would be a (non-p part) unsecured dividend – so he sought approval for fees by a resolution of the unsecured creditors – but now he thinks that there won’t be a dividend and maybe even that the secureds/prefs will suffer a shortfall, to whom does he look for approval of fees in excess of the previous estimate?  From what I can see, he will still go to the unsecured creditors.

[Theoretically, he might be able to issue revised Proposals in which he makes a Para 52(1)(b) statement, so that the secureds/prefs have authority to approve his fees.  In any event, the changed outcome might make revised Proposals appropriate.  But then what?  Would that result in the basis of his fees not being “determined” with the consequence that he has to issue fees and expenses estimates again to every creditor before he can seek the secureds’/prefs’ approval to the basis of his fees?]

Given that the OFT study concluded that secured creditors are so much better at controlling fees than unsecureds are, why not hand the power to secured creditors automatically by means of the new rules when the outcome deteriorates, in the same way that they shift the power automatically from the secureds to the unsecureds when the outcome improves?

Transitional provisions

This is more just a headache than confusing: one more permutation to accommodate in systems.

In general, the transitional provisions are designed so that, if an IP takes office after 1 October 2015, he will need to go through the new process to get his fees approved.  In effect, they treat Para 83 CVLs as new appointments, so the new rules disapply R4.127(5A) for Para 83 CVLs beginning after October in relation to Administrations that began before October.  Thus, Para 83 CVL Liquidators will not be able to rely on any fee approvals in the Administration.  Instead, they will have to go through the new process.

However, R4.127(5A) kicks back in for Para 83 CVLs following Administrations that begin after 1 October.  This is because, in these cases, the Administrator will have already gone through the new process in order to get fee approval, so it seems reasonable that the Liquidator can continue to rely on this approval.  Of course, the Liquidator will be subject to the Administrator’s fee estimate, so if he wants to draw fees in excess of the estimate, he will need to go through the new process for approval.

It might seem a bit much to expect an Administrator to be able to estimate a subsequent Liquidator’s fees.  For once, I think that the Insolvency Service has been sensible: the rules state that the Administrator’s estimates may include any subsequent Liquidator’s fees and expenses, not must – it’s good to see office holders left with a choice for a change!  Thus, where the Administrator’s estimates have not provided anything for the Liquidator, an increase in the estimate is probably going to be one of his first tasks.

I wonder if an Administrator’s estimate might be devised so that, if he has not used up his estimate in full, then it can be treated as the Liquidator’s estimate..?  I suspect the regulators might take a dim view of that…

Compulsory Liquidations: inconsistent treatment?

I didn’t spot this one, but it was passed to me by a Technical & Compliance Manager (thank you, D).

As explained above, the transitional provisions seem to be designed so that the critical date is the date of the IP’s appointment, rather than the more commonly-used insolvency event date.

It gets complicated, however, when one tries to define every way that an IP can be appointed.  For compulsory liquidations, the transitional provisions cover appointments (post-1 Oct) by: creditors’ meeting (S139(4)); contributories’ meeting (139(3)); and the court following an administration or CVA (S140).

What about appointments by the Secretary of State (S137)?

I cannot see why these appointments should be treated differently.  Does this mean that no Secretary of State appointments will be subject to the new rules?  Or does it mean that all SoS appointments will be subject to them..?

I have asked the Insolvency Service for comments.

Practical difficulties

Of course, there are practical difficulties in devising fee and expenses estimates for each case.  The Impact Assessment for the new rules (http://goo.gl/vCOsnS) state: “Based on informal discussions with IPs and internal analysis by the Insolvency Service it has been estimated that the costs of learning about the new requirements will be relatively moderate as in many cases IPs produce estimates of the work they will be undertaking for their own budgeting purposes. Therefore the industry has the pre existing infrastructure in place to produce estimates and so there will no additional set up costs for business. All the information that will be needed for the estimates is already available to IPs so there will be no additional costs of gathering information” (paragraph 34).  What nonsense!  Even if IPs do estimate fees at the start of a job, they are little more than finger-in-the-air estimates and are way less sophisticated than the new rules envisage.

The Insolvency Service followed up this nonsense with the suggestion that it would take IPs 1 hour to get their systems up to scratch for the changes!  Personally, I feel that such a fantasy-based statement is an insult to my intelligence.

In relation to generating fee and expenses estimates, the Impact Assessment states: “The work is likely to be an administrative task extended from the existing practice to produce estimates for business planning so we believe the work is likely to be completed by support staff within practices. It is estimated that the task will take around 15 minutes per case” (paragraph 36).  This is just so much nonsense!

Anyway, back to the practicalities…

The Insolvency Service has explained that it is working with the JIC to tackle “the key challenge… to present this information [the fees and expenses estimates] in a clear, concise format that the creditor, i.e. the end user, finds both useful and informative” (Dear IP 65, article 55).  I guess we are talking here about a revised SIP9.

Given that it has taken the IS/JIC ten months (and counting) to complete a revised SIP16 following Teresa Graham’s report, how close to the 1 October deadline do you think we’ll get before we see a revised SIP9?  I know that the SIP16 revision has been dependent on the pre-pack pool being set up, but I reckon it’s all going to get a bit tense towards early autumn.

The issue is: do we gamble now on what we think the regulators will want or do we sit and wait to see?  The new rules require that time costs fee estimates specify:

“details of the work the insolvency practitioner and his staff propose to undertake… [and] the time the insolvency practitioner anticipates each part of that work will take”. 

Is it a safe bet to assume that the regulators will expect a SIP9-style matrix, classifying work as Admin & Planning, Investigations, Realisation of Assets etc.?  Will they also want the estimate to list, not only the total time costs per work category, but also the time costs per staff grade, i.e. the hours plus time costs?  Will they also want a greater level of detail, say breaking down the Admin & Planning etc. categories into sub-categories, for cases where time costs are anticipated to exceed £50,000?  Conversely, what level of detail will they expect for cases with time costs estimated at less than £10,000, given that at present SIP9 requires only the number of hours and average hourly rate to be disclosed for fee-reporting purposes? Finally, will these expectations be, as they are now, set out as a Suggested Format, or will there be required disclosure points?

Given that the rules refer to “each part of that work”, personally I would get cracking now to devise systems and models to produce fees estimates styled on the table in the SIP9 appendix.  I might run some analyses of past cases to see if I could come up with some sensible tables for “typical” cases, maybe examine some outliers to see, for example, how much it costs to realise some difficult assets or pay dividends, depending on the class and number of creditors.  Setting up such templates and systems to capture the key elements of each case is going to take time.  We have less than six months.

Not quite so urgent, but just as systems-based, is the need to design mechanisms for monitoring fees estimates.  It would be useful to know if the major software-providers are designing tools to compare fees estimates to fees taken – much like the bond adequacy review – and whether these tools can be used to identify cases where fees are approaching estimates.

And of course, the rules provide loads more work on creating and revising standard documents and checklists *sigh*!

Finally, an obvious practical difficulty will be ensuring that creditors are still sufficiently engaged some way down the insolvency process to put pen to paper and approve additional fees.

Techies’ corner

I know that the following points are nit-picky, but, as we’re talking about fees approval, I felt that they were important to get right.

When does remuneration arise..?

We’ve had drummed into us that “remuneration is charged when the work to which it relates is done” (R13.13(19)).  This definition was introduced with the new progress reports so that IPs disclose time costs incurred, not just remuneration drawn.

But how does this definition fit with the new rules that state that “the remuneration must not exceed the total amount set out in the fees estimate without approval”?  Does this mean that we need to ask creditors to approve an excess before the time costs are incurred, i.e. before the work is done?  And what if the IP is prepared to write off the excess, does he still need to seek approval?

Yeah, I know, it’s pretty obvious what the intention of the rules is, but I asked the Insolvency Service anyway.  Their lawyer’s view was that the “court would resolve any tension” between the rules by coming to the conclusion that the new rules make it “sufficiently clear that the office holder is permitted to incur additional fees above the level of the estimate, before securing further approval”, because the same rules state that a request for approval must specify the reasons why the office holder “had exceeded” (or is likely to exceed) the fees estimate.  It’s the drawing down of additional fees that would be prohibited without approval, not the incurring of them.  Fair enough.

What “creditors” should be asked in Para 52(1)(b) Administrations..?

I have drafted the article above on the basis of the Insolvency Service’s answer to my second question, although I have to say that I think they could have done a better job at drafting the rules on this one.

New R2.109AB(2) explains which party/parties the Administrator should approach for approval of fees in excess of the estimate.  There are three choices, dependent on who fixed the fee basis in the first place:

“(a)  where the creditors’ committee fixed the basis, to the committee;

“(b)  where the creditors fixed the basis, to the creditors;

“(c)  where the court fixed the basis, by application to the court”.

My question was: if a secured creditor alone fixed the basis, who should approve the excess?  It can hardly be said that “the creditors” approved the basis.  Also, given that the OFT study had concluded that secured creditors seem to control fees quite adequately, perhaps it was felt that there was no need to add another layer of control in these cases…

The Insolvency Service’s response was: “it would be for the secured/preferential creditors to approve if the para 52(1)(b) statement held good. We think the wording of the Rules is sufficiently clear in this regard”.  Well, I’m glad I asked!

 


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Regulatory Hot Topics: (2) Administration Technicalities

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I’m itching to blog about the new legislation, but that’s all a bit taxing so close to the Easter weekend.  Therefore, I’ll continue with my summary of points made in the R3 webinar.  This week: Administration Technicalities.

For my clients, this post may sound all very familiar, as I’ve pulled most of this from my last newsletter.  However, I’ve added some new points about the SBEE Act at the end of this post.

Matthew Peat and I agreed that failing to meet the statutory provisions for administrations is one of the most common issues identified on review visits.  I’m not at all surprised, as the legislation is extraordinarily (and in many respects, I think, unnecessarily) complicated… and it’s only going to get even more complicated with the Small Business, Enterprise & Employment Act and the Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2015 (the IP fees rules) – but that’s for another day.

Areas that seem to cause difficulties include:

Pre-administration costs

It should be remembered that the requirement to disclose in the Proposals (and seek approval of any unpaid) pre-administration costs relates, not only to the charges of the IP, but to other costs incurred pre-appointment such as the solicitors’ or agents’ fees.

It is also evident that the RPBs do not believe that estimates of pre-administration costs comply with the Rules and they expect you to contact third parties and establish the quantum of their pre-administration costs in order to disclose them properly in the Proposals.  Also, if any payments from the estate to third parties exceed the (estimated) pre-administration costs as they appeared in the Proposals, do not be surprised if an RPB monitor suggests that the excess is unauthorised.

Most IPs have cottoned on by now that the Rules specifically state that approval of pre-administration costs does not form part of the Administrator’s Proposals (even though R2.33 requires that the Proposals include details of pre-administration costs).  However, there seem to be still the odd flawed template or two in circulation that do not present a separate specific resolution for the approval of pre-administration costs.

Statement of affairs

There have occasions when a statement of affairs (“SoA”) has not been submitted by the director(s), but the Proposals haven’t included the alternative required by R2.33(2)(g) of details of the financial position of the company (which usually takes the form of the Administrator’s own estimated SoA).

It is perhaps worth adding that this rule also requires a list of creditors (names, addresses, debts and any security) – whether or not the directors have submitted an SoA – and “an explanation as to why there is no statement of affairs” (although personally I cannot see that any explanation is going to be likely, other than “it has been requested but the director has not yet provided one”, particularly where Proposals have been issued swiftly after appointment).

How the purpose of the administration is to be achieved

If the Proposals explain that the Administrator thinks that the second administration objective is achievable, then the Proposals should explain why you believe that the result for creditors as a whole is going to be better than if the company were wound up (without first having been in administration).

Statement of expenses

Progress reports – not only in administrations, but in all other cases (apart from VAs and Receiverships) – all need to include a statement of the expenses incurred by the office holder during the period of the report, whether or not payment has been made in respect of them during the period.

It is important to remember that this includes more than simply the office holder’s time costs and disbursements, so this again means that solicitors, agents etc. need to be contacted to establish what is on their clocks.  Also, do not forget items such as insurance premiums and statutory advertising.  In addition, the Rules do not set a de minimis: all and any expenses incurred must be disclosed.  There have been some suggestions that the regulators might take a proportionate view of the disclosure of expenses, but personally I wouldn’t risk it.

Extensions

If seeking an extension via creditors’ consent, make sure that you approach the right creditors.

In every case, you will need to obtain the consent of all the secured creditors.

Whether you approach also the preferential or unsecured creditors as a whole will depend on what you wrote in the Proposals: per Para 78(2), if you have made a Para 52(1)(b) statement, you need to approach preferential creditors, if you think that a distribution to them will be made.  This is different from seeking approval to fees: in that case, under R2.106(5A) you need to seek preferential creditors’ approval to fees, not only if you intend paying a distribution, but also if you have paid a distribution.

However, events could have moved on since you issued the Proposals: by the time you contemplate an extension, the anticipated outcome might have changed.  What if your Proposals did not include a Para 52(1)(b) statement, but now you don’t think that a dividend will be paid to non-prefs?  Who do you approach for approval of an extension?

Assuming that your Proposals have accommodated alternative outcomes (such that you don’t believe you need to issue revised Proposals), Para 78 still indicates that whether you go to prefs or unsecureds in general depends on what you stated the anticipated outcome was in your Proposals.  However, to show consideration for the apparent spirit behind the provisions, it would seem prudent to consider also which creditors are in the frame at the time that you seek an extension, to ensure that you achieve the requisite majority from them too.

Extension Progress Reports

Whichever way you seek consent to an extension, you will need to issue a progress report (which is one reason why I am nervous about including in Proposals the power for the Administrator to extend without further recourse – because Proposals are not a progress report).  The usual one month deadline applies to these extension progress reports, so if you have only asked secureds/prefs to consent to the extension, make sure that you circulate the progress report to all other creditors – as well as send a copy to the Registrar for filing – within the month.

The same goes for court extensions: you will have produced a progress report to accompany your court application and, in the event that the court does not grant your extension before the month-end, you will need to send a copy of the report to all creditors and for filing and then send another circular (for the Notice of Extension) once you have received the order for the extension.

Finally, remember that the 6 month cycle for progress reports is counted from the period-end of the last report.  Therefore, where a progress report to accompany an extension request has been issued – which can be at any time – diaries will need changing so that the next progress report is 6 months after that report (i.e. no longer 6-monthly from the date of appointment).  This can prove a nightmare for automated diary systems… and, as you need to provide sufficient lead-time before any extension period ends in order to consider whether to apply for a further extension, make sure that you don’t leave diary prompts for progress reports too tight on the 6-month deadlines.

Exits

RPBs appear to be expecting decisions over exit routes to be clearly and contemporaneously evidenced.  This is also valuable in the event that things do not turn out the way you had hoped, e.g. where you moved to CVL because you had thought that there would be sufficient realisations to pay a dividend to unsecured creditors, but something happened later to scupper that outcome.

I also understand that it is generally accepted that Para 83’s reference to an Administrator thinking that a distribution will be made to unsecured creditors is a reference to non-preferential unsecured creditors only.  Thus, if you are nearing the end of the administration and you think that only a preferential distribution will be paid, you will need to seek an extension and pay it through the administration.  Alternatively – and if HMRC (or, of course, any other creditor) has modified the Proposals so that the exit must be by liquidation – you will need to seek a compulsory winding-up order.

Small Business, Enterprise & Employment Act 2015

I couldn’t resist one point on this new Act.  Although some items come into force on 26 May 2015, there are no transitional provisions (yet).  In other words, unless a new Order changes things, the provisions will apply to all existing insolvency appointments, not only future ones.

The Act amends Para 65 to the effect that, from 26 May 2015, administrators may pay a prescribed part dividend without the court’s permission.  However, the Act also amends Para 83 so that it will read that an administration may move to CVL only where the administrator thinks (“that the total amount which each secured creditor of the company is likely to receive has been paid to him or set aside for him” – no change there – and) “that a distribution will be made to unsecured creditors of the company (if there are any) which is not a distribution by virtue of section 176A(2)(a)”, i.e. a prescribed part distribution.  In other words, from 26 May 2015, the Para 83 move to CVL cannot be used to pay a prescribed part dividend (unless you also think there is going to be a non-prescribed part dividend as well).

Thus I would strongly recommend that you revisit your standard Proposals template to make sure that they do not run contrary to the post-May position: you do not want to be stuck with approved Proposals requiring you to exit by CVL to pay a prescribed part dividend, when the Act won’t allow you to do it.  Having looked at some standard Proposals, I reckon many will have sufficient wriggle-room to avoid you having your hands tied, but it would be worth checking the Proposals of any cases where you anticipate a prescribed part dividend: you still have a month or so during which you can do a Para 83 move to CVL before the Act takes effect.

My thanks to Deborah Manzoori and Jo Harris for pointing out this issue to me.

My thoughts on more wrinkles in the new legislation will follow soon.  In the meantime, have a lovely long weekend.